{ "id": 8568094, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILBUR JAMES SANDERS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Sanders", "decision_date": "1975-10-07", "docket_number": "No. 20", "first_page": "285", "last_page": "303", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "288 N.C. 285" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "125 S.E. 2d 603", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "257 N.C. 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566928 ], "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/257/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 S.E. 2d 536", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "267 N.C. 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559691 ], "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/267/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 S.E. 2d 696", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 N.C. 735", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569859 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/285/0735-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 S.E. 816", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1938, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "213 N.C. 221", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627395 ], "year": 1938, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/213/0221-01" ] }, { "cite": "49 S.E. 2d 733", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1948, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "229 N.C. 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12166109 ], "year": 1948, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/229/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 S.E. 2d 522", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "272 N.C. 417", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573176 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/272/0417-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 S.E. 2d 587", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "272 N.C. 505", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573768 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/272/0505-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 S.E. 2d 28", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "36" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 217", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560837 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "230" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0217-01" ] }, { "cite": "14 S.E. 2d 668", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1941, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "219 N.C. 620", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625663 ], "year": 1941, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/219/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "203 S.E. 2d 803", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 N.C. 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562465 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/285/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 S.E. 2d 444", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1957, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "246 N.C. 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624062 ], "year": 1957, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/246/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 S.E. 2d 14", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "265 N.C. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575235 ], "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/265/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "2 S.E. 2d 7", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1939, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "215 N.C. 393", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8629856 ], "year": 1939, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/215/0393-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 S.E. 2d 112", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 N.C. 500", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565129 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/271/0500-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 S.E. 743", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1926, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "191 N.C. 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8629365 ], "year": 1926, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/191/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "46 S.E. 2d 824", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1948, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "228 N.C. 567", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627518 ], "year": 1948, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/228/0567-01" ] }, { "cite": "457 P. 2d 622", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10568425 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/457/0622-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 S.E. 2d 279", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 N.C. 297", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564416 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/282/0297-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 S.E. 2d 24", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "34" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "287 N.C. 84", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561084 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/287/0084-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 S.E. 2d 102", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 621", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571881 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0621-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 S.E. 2d 481", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 N.C. 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558300 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/283/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 S.Ct. 1434", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "39 L.Ed. 2d 484", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "415 U.S. 927", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6238753, 6240042, 6239723, 6239088, 6240338, 6240626, 6241173, 6241493, 6239452, 6241821, 6242142, 6240895 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/415/0927-01", "/us/415/0927-05", "/us/415/0927-04", "/us/415/0927-02", "/us/415/0927-06", "/us/415/0927-07", "/us/415/0927-09", "/us/415/0927-10", "/us/415/0927-03", "/us/415/0927-11", "/us/415/0927-12", "/us/415/0927-08" ] }, { "cite": "199 S.E. 2d 450", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "284 N.C. 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559979 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/284/0087-01" ] }, { "cite": "206 S.E. 2d 222", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 N.C. 509", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565287 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/285/0509-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 S.E. 2d 649", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 N.C. 238", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563902 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/285/0238-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 S.E. 2d 530", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 N.C. 627", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559705 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/283/0627-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 S.E. 2d 897", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 499", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562301 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0499-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 S.E. 2d 384", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572439 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 S.E. 2d 39", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 N.C. 342", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558758 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/275/0342-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 S.E. 2d 4", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 N.C. 576", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565553 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/271/0576-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 S.E. 2d 664", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 N.C. 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562829 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/282/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 S.E. 2d 539", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 N.C. 589", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559660 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/283/0589-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 S.E. 2d 262", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 N.C. 638", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570035 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/286/0638-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 S.E. 2d 779", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 N.C. 121", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573959 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/281/0121-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 S.E. 2d 239", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 N.C. 368", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558855 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/283/0368-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 S.E. 2d 272", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1951, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "234 N.C. 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8622098 ], "year": 1951, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/234/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 S.E. 2d 589", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "255 N.C. 412", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569896 ], "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/255/0412-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 S.E. 2d 485", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "260 N.C. 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574035 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/260/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "200 S.E. 2d 182", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "284 N.C. 219", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560808 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/284/0219-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1420, "char_count": 43523, "ocr_confidence": 0.585, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.594043795904823e-07, "percentile": 0.9707332357986894 }, "sha256": "a26237aa3ad56a314fde5e44bff8e1c5a4bf8969956cb5b4b0228c2962a1a14e", "simhash": "1:a1afa96ae6be0742", "word_count": 7307 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:59:08.487022+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILBUR JAMES SANDERS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MOOEE, Justice.\nDefendant first assigns as error the failure of the trial court to allow his motion for nonsuit at the close of the State\u2019s evidence and at the close of all the evidence. This assignment is without merit.\nDefendant was present when the bomb was placed in Agent Stout\u2019s automobile. At that time, he was seated in Jack Sellers\u2019 automobile guarding the witness Hutton with a pistol. Defendant and Hutton remained in the car after Hutton had pointed out Stout\u2019s car. Blackmon and Sellers got out of Sellers\u2019 car carrying a brown bag which earlier in the night had contained four or five sticks of dynamite. After Blackmon and Sellers reached Stout's car, they raised its hood and worked for some eight or ten minutes, then closed the hood and returned to Sellers\u2019 car without the brown bag. The four men then left and returned to where Blackmon\u2019s car had been parked. Blackmon then got in his own car and the others returned to Charlotte.\nEarlier that night defendant had been with Sellers at Jeannette Grier\u2019s house when Blackmon arrived carrying a brown bag. Sellers took four or five sticks of dynamite out of the bag, together with some wire folded up with clips on the end, and some silver-looking capsules. Sellers later, armed with a pistol, took Hutton to Hutton\u2019s house apparently to verify that Hutton had been seeing Stout and that Hutton had been acting as an informer to Stout. When Stout arrived at Hutton\u2019s home and knocked on the door, Hutton, acting under orders from Sellers, failed to respond. Stout then left and Sellers and Hutton returned to Jeannette Grier\u2019s home. From then until Sellers and Blackmon went to Stout\u2019s car, defendant continued to point the pistol at Hutton. After the men returned to Charlotte, defendant told Sellers that they had no reason to kill Hutton, that Hutton was a part of it, and that if anything happened Hutton was dead anyway. Defendant then knocked Hutton down and Hutton crawled out of the house to his car and left.\nThe mere presence of the defendant at the scene of the crime, even though he is in sympathy with the criminal act and does nothing to prevent its commission, does not make him guilty of the offense. State v. Rankin, 284 N.C. 219, 200 S.E. 2d 182 (1973) ; State v. Gaines, 260 N.C. 228, 132 S.E. 2d 485 (1963). To support a conviction, the State\u2019s evidence must be sufficient to support a finding that the defendant was present, actually or constructively, with the intent to aid the perpetrators in the commission of the offense should his assistance become necessary and that such intent was communicated to the actual perpetrators. The communication or intent to aid, if needed, does not have to be shown by express words of the defendant but may be inferred from his actions and from his relation to the actual perpetrators. State v. Hargett, 255 N.C. 412, 121 S.E. 2d 589 (1961) ; State v. Holland, 234 N.C. 354, 67 S.E. 2d 272 (1951).\nIt is elementary that for the purpose of ruling upon a motion for judgment of nonsuit, evidence for the State is to be taken to be true and every reasonable inference favorable to the State is to be drawn therefrom and discrepancies therein are to be disregarded. State v. Rankin, supra; State v. Felton, 283 N.C. 368, 196 S.E. 2d 239 (1973) ; State v. Spencer, 281 N.C. 121, 187 S.E. 2d 779 (1972).\nThe evidence for the State was sufficient to permit the jury to find that defendant was present at the scene of the offense for the purpose of aiding Blackmon and Sellers and that Black-mon and Sellers were aware of such purpose. Thus, there was no error in the denial of the motion for judgment of nonsuit.\nDefendant next contends the court erred in allowing hearsay testimony. The witness Stout was asked the question, \u201cWas he [Hutton] there?\u201d Stout answered, \u201cNo, he was not.\u201d Defendant contends that this was indirect hearsay since the answer was based on a statement made by a Negro female when Stout asked her if Hutton was home, and she replied that he was not. This contention is without merit. Almost identical testimony had just been given by Stout without objection when he testified: \u201cA Negro female came to the door. She informed me that Mr. Hutton was not there and who was calling and I told her it was a friend and I then left.\u201d Since defendant made no objection to this testimony, his subsequent objection to evidence of the same or similar import was of no avail. State v. Stegmann, 286 N.C. 638, 213 S.E. 2d 262 (1975) ; State v. Van Landingham, 283 N.C. 589, 197 S.E. 2d 539 (1973) ; State v. Davis, 282 N.C. 107, 191 S.E. 2d 664 (1972) ; State v. Jarrett, 271 N.C. 576, 157 S.E. 2d 4 (1967). This same rule applies to the other questions objected to by defendant as they had also been substantially answered by other witnesses. This assignment is overruled.\nDefendant next assigns as error the failure of the trial court to quash the bill of indictment charging defendant with willful and malicious damage to personal property by means of an explosive device, for the reason that the property was only described as a \u201c1974 Ford Torino,\u201d which defendant alleges was not an adequate description. Defendant cites State v. Conrad, 275 N.C. 342, 168 S.E. 2d 39 (1969), in support of this position.\nIt is noted that in Conrad, the Court did not hold that the description of the automobile in the indictment was insufficient. The description in that bill of indictment was strikingly similar to the description in the bill of indictment in the present case. There, the automobile was described as \u201cthe 1966 Mercury Comet automobile, the property of Fred C. Sink, and located at 318 Spruce Street in Lexington.\u201d In the present case, in addition to the description, a \u201c1974 Ford Torino,\u201d the following was added: \u201cowned by the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation, being at the time occupied by another, Albert Stout, Jr.\u201d This was a sufficient description of the automobile in question to inform defendant with certainty as to the crime that he had allegedly committed. State v. Bass, 280 N.C. 435, 186 S.E. 2d 384 (1972) ; State v. Sparrow, 276 N.C. 499, 173 S.E. 2d 897 (1970). Had defendant required additional information for the preparation of his defense, he could have requested a bill of particulars prior to the trial. State v. Springer, 283 N.C. 627, 197 S.E. 2d 530 (1973).\nDefendant further contends that the second indictment should be quashed for the reason that it arises from the same alleged criminal act as the first and that he is being subjected to multiple prosecutions for the same offense. He relies on State v. Potter, 285 N.C. 238, 204 S.E. 2d 649 (1974), to support this contention.\nIn Potter, the defendant was charged with two separate offenses of robbery, in violation of G.S. 14-87. The facts as disclosed by the opinion in that case are as follows:\n\u201cEach indictment refers to the felonious taking of $265.00 on 29 December 1972. Neither alleges the ownership of the $265.00 to which it refers. Although the reading of the two indictments, side by side, leaves the impression each refers to the same $265.00, and that Hall and Harrell were robbed on the same occasion, neither refers to the other. Each indictment is complete.\n\u201cThe evidence discloses all of the $265.00 defendant obtained from Hall and Harrell belonged to the Food Market, their employer; and that, on the same occasion, and in the immediate presence of both, defendant, by the threatened use of a revolver, first obtained from Hall the cash in register No. 1 and immediately thereafter obtained from Harrell the cash in register No. 2. Although we find no evidence that defendant actually pointed the revolver at Hall or at Harrell, each was put in fear by defendant\u2019s threatened use of the revolver. Neither Hall nor Harrell was physically injured in any manner.\n\u201cThe evidence indicates that, when the robbery occurred, Hall had immediate charge of register No. 1 and Harrell had immediate charge of register No. 2. However, the cash in both registers belonged to their employer. Both Hall and Harrell had custody thereof for their employer and the right to retain possession of all of it against robbery or theft.\n\u201cIn the light of the evidence, we hold that the verdicts have the same effect as if defendant had been found guilty after trial on a single indictment which charged the armed robbery of Hall and Harrell on 29 December 1972 in which $265.00 of the money of Food Market, their employer, had been taken from their persons and presence.\u201d\nPotter is clearly distinguishable from the present case. Here, the record is clear that defendant was charged in two separate indictments with two separate offenses. In the first, he is charged with damage to personal property occupied by an individual, in violation of G.S. 14-49.1; and in the second, he is charged with willfully and maliciously injuring an individual by the use of explosives, in violation of G.S. 14-49. Admittedly, all injuries arose out of the same explosion, but two separate offenses occurred which were punishable under two separate statutes.\nIn Potter, only one robbery occurred. There the Court specifically implied that if other offenses arose out of the same original wrongful act it would not necessarily treat such attendant offenses as part of the original offense, stating:\n\u201cWe express no opinion as to factual situations in which, in addition to robbery, an employee is physically injured or killed, or to factual situations in which, in addition to the theft of the employer\u2019s money or property, the robber takes money or property of an employee or customer.\u201d\nSee State v. Carey, 285 N.C. 509, 206 S.E. 2d 222 (1974) ; State v. Alexander, 284 N.C. 87, 199 S.E. 2d 450 (1973), cert. den. 415 U.S. 927, 39 L.Ed. 2d 484, 94 S.Ct. 1434 (1974) ; State v. Cameron, 283 N.C. 191, 195 S.E. 2d 481 (1973) ; State v. Richardson, 279 N.C. 621, 185 S.E. 2d 102 (1971).\nThe motions to quash the bills of indictment were properly-overruled.\nDefendant next assigns as error the trial court\u2019s conclusion that an experiment carried out by Special Agent Pearce was carried out under substantially similar circumstances as those which surrounded the original transaction (the explosion), and the further conclusion that the experimental testimony was admissible in evidence.\nIn a recent case, State v. Jones, 287 N.C. 84, 98, 214 S.E. 2d 24, 34 (1975), Justice Branch, after reviewing the authorities from this and other states, stated the rule as to the admissibility of experimental evidence as follows:\n\u201c . . . Although experimental evidence should be received with great care, it is admissible when the trial judge finds it to be relevant and of probative value. Even upon such finding the admission of experimental evidence is always subject to the further restriction that the circumstances of the experiment must be substantially similar to those of the occurrence before the court. Whether substantial similarity does exist is a question which is reviewable by the appellate courts in the same manner as is any other question of law. State v. Carter, 282 N.C. 297, 192 S.E. 2d 279; Love v. State [457 P. 2d 622 (Alaska) ].\u201d\nSee 2 Strong, N. C. Index 2d, Criminal Law \u00a7 45, and cases therein cited.\nIn the present case, the trial judge found:\n\u201cCourt: Let the record show that during the direct examination of Special Agent Pearce, that the Solicitor asked the witness about a certain experiment at which time the defendant objected and the jury was sent from the jury room \u2014 courtroom, for the purpose of Voir Dire. That after hearing the evidence and argument of counsel, the Court makes the following findings of fact: That the witness took a similar Ford Torino automobile, and placed a clip on the starter post; that he placed another clip on a ground position on the motor vehicle; that he took an electrical blasting cap and placed to the end of the wire; that the clips were alligator type clips; that he used an Atlas blasting cap; that the wire is consistent with Atlas blasting cap wire; that after attaching the blasting cap and the clip to the post and the clip to the ground, he then turned the ignition on and the blasting cap detonated immediately.\n\u201cBased on the foregoing findings of fact, the Court concludes that the experiment was carried out under substantially similar circumstances as to those which surrounded the original transaction and the Court concludes that the experimental testimony can be introduced into evidence.\u201d\nThe record reveals that the testimony of Special Agent Pearce was sufficient to show that he had created substantially similar conditions as those that produced the actual explosion. He conducted the experiment by using clips and wires similar to those he found in the wreckage of the victim\u2019s car and by using an identical 1974 brown Ford Torino. He placed a clip on the starter post of the experimental car in the position he had found a clip on the damaged car. The wire that had been found was of the composition and color of Atlas blasting cap wire, thus indicating that an Atlas blasting cap was used in the actual explosion. Therefore, in the experiment an Atlas blasting cap was used to simulate actual conditions.\nAgent Pearce further concluded from traces of nitroglycerin and ethylene glycol deposits found on a piece of wire running from the starter post clip and on the floorboard that the damage had been caused by dynamite. His investigation of the location of the physical evidence, including the wires and clips on the damaged automobile, indicated to him that a complete circuit was constructed through the use of these material which was culminated by the spark caused by the ignition being turned on. Therefore, on the experimental car, Agent Pearce actually placed a clip on the starter post and a clip on a ground position on the car and attached an Atlas blasting cap to the end of these wires. He then turned on the ignition of the experimental automobile and the blasting cap detonated immediately.\nThis experimental evidence was relevant and of probative value since it tended to enlighten the jurors in their search for the truth. Precise reproduction of circumstances is not required, and we hold that the trial judge correctly concluded that the circumstances of the experiment were substantially similar to those surrounding the actual explosion. Therefore, the trial judge correctly admitted the experimental evidence.\nDefendant further contends that in questioning various witnesses the district attorney at times assumed that an explosion had occurred, thereby invading the province of the jury. For example, on one occasion Agent Pearce, a forensic chemist thoroughly qualified in the field of explosives, was asked:\n\u201cQ. Based on your findings of the presence of sodium nitrate and ethyleneglycol dinitrate, did you form an opinion satisfactory to yourself as to what caused the explosion heretofore described by Special Agent Stout?\n\u201cA. Yes, sir, I did. Objection. Overruled. Exception.\n\u201cQ. And what is your opinion, Mr. Pearce?\n\u201cA. It is my opinion. . . .\n\u201cObjection. Overruled. Exception.\n\u201cA. . . . that this explosion was caused by dynamite.\n\u201cMr. Horton: The defendant moves to strike his answer.\n\u201cMotion Denied. Exception.\u201d\nDefendant contends that Agent Pearce answered one of the very questions before the jury for consideration: \u201cWas there an explosion injuring Mr. Stout and damaging the automobile?\u201d The evidence clearly shows that an explosion had occurred. Agent Stout had previously testified without objection that his right eye was destroyed as a result of the explosion. He further testified without objection that he had a compound fracture of the tibia, and of smaller bones in the front foot area as a result of the blast. The victim, Agent Stout, described the occurrence as follows: His automobile was parked where he left it the night before. He opened the door with the key and then put the key in the ignition of the automobile. He turned the ignition and there was a searing pain as if he were caught up in a vacuum. Then there was a loud, bursting noise and he was thrown to the seat of the automobile face down. Furthermore, early in the trial, counsel for defendant stated: \u201c . . . [W]e can stipulate there was in fact one explosion damaging the automobile and injuring Mr. Stout by its force.\u201d The real question involved in the present case is not did an explosion occur, but did defendant aid and abet those who made it occur. In view of the stipulation and Agent Stout\u2019s testimony without objection that he was injured by the explosion or blast, the objection to the use of the word \u201cexplosion\u201d by the district attorney came too late. State v. Stegmann, supra; State v. Van Landingham, supra; State v. Davis, supra; State v. Jarrett, supra.\nThe court allowed certain exhibits into evidence and instructed the jury that these were introduced for illustrative purposes only. Defendant contends that there was not sufficient foundation for the introduction of these exhibits. Whether there is sufficient evidence of the correctness of such an exhibit to render it competent to be introduced into evidence for the purpose of illustrating or explaining the witness\u2019s testimony, is \u201ca preliminary question of fact for the judge.\u201d State v. Gardner, 228 N.C. 567, 46 S.E. 2d 824 (1948) ; State v. Matthews, 191 N.C. 378, 131 S.E. 743 (1926) ; 1 Stansbury\u2019s N. C. Evidence, \u00a7 34 (Brandis Rev. 1973) ; 2 Strong, N. C. Index 2d, Criminal Law \u00a7 43. The record discloses that there was ample evidence to justify the court\u2019s permitting their introduction.\nDefendant further contends that the court erred in instructing the jury with reference to these photographs as follows: \u201c . . . These photographs are introduced for the purpose of illustrating the witness\u2019 testimony and for no other purpose.\u201d Defendant excepts to the failure of the court to instruct the jury that the photographs were admissible for illustrative purposes only if the jury found that they did illustrate the witnesses\u2019 testimony. No request was made by defendant that the admission of the photographs be limited or restricted. In the absence of such request, an unrestricted admission would not be error. State v. McKissick, 271 N.C. 500, 157 S.E. 2d 112 (1967) ; State v. Cade, 215 N.C. 393, 2 S.E. 2d 7 (1939) ; 2 Strong, N. C. Index 2d, Criminal Law \u00a7 43. Nevertheless, the judge, having undertaken to instruct the jury, should have completed the instruction as he did on the introduction of other photographs, when he stated: \u201cState\u2019s Exhibits 3 and 4 are introduced for the purpose of illustrating the witness\u2019 testimony, if you find that it does illustrate the witness\u2019 testimony and for no other purpose.\u201d We fail to see, however, how this omission could prejudice defendant.\nThe photographs to which defendant objected were of the wire found at the scene, a metal clip also found at the scene, and the clip found on the starter. There was no evidence to contradict the fact that these photographs properly depicted each of the items shown or that these items had not been found at the scene. Later, the objects themselves were introduced without objection. Defendant also objected to the introduction of State\u2019s Exhibit 5, a diagram showing the streets and buildings, which was explained by the witness who drew it to scale. At the request of defendant\u2019s counsel, this witness was asked if this diagram fairly and accurately represented the complex at the time he visited it. The witness replied that it did. The court thereupon stated: \u201cLet it be introduced. . . . This also is introduced for the purpose of illustrating the witness\u2019 testimony, if you find that it does illustrate their testimony.\u201d Again, we fail to perceive how defendant could be prejudiced by the admission of this diagram or by the judge\u2019s instruction concerning it. This assignment is overruled.\nOther assignments concerning the introduction of testimony have been considered and found to be without merit.\nDefendant has brought forward a number of assignments of error relating to the court\u2019s charge. First, defendant assigns as error the failure of the trial court to give a statement of defendant\u2019s evidence equal to that given the evidence for the State, and to equally stress the contentions of the State and defendant, as required by G.S. 1-180. Defendant complains that the evidence elicited on direct examination by the State was extensively recapitulated while that elicited on defendant\u2019s cross-examination was scarcely mentioned. This assignment is without merit. The requirement of G.S. 1-180 that the judge state the evidence is met by presentation of the principal features of the evidence relied on by the prosecution and the defense. State v. Guffey, 265 N.C. 331, 144 S.E. 2d 14 (1965) ; State v. Davis, 246 N.C. 73, 97 S.E. 2d 444 (1957). A \u201cverbatim recital of the evidence\u201d is not required. State v. Fowler, 285 N.C. 90, 203 S.E. 2d 803 (1974). A party desiring further elaboration must aptly tender requests for further instructions. State v. Guffey, supra. Here, the trial judge set forth fairly and accurately the most important testimony offered by each side. It is true that the court spent more time summarizing the State\u2019s evidence than the evidence of the defendant but this was simply because the State presented considerably more evidence than the defendant. See State v. Jessup, 219 N.C. 620, 14 S.E. 2d 668 (1941). Secondly, defendant maintains that the trial court substantially misstated his contentions in the following portion of the charge:\n\u201cOn the other hand, the defendant says and contends that you ought not to find him guilty from all the evidence in this case. That you ought not to believe what the State\u2019s witnesses say about it and at the very least you ought to have some reasonable doubt in your mind and return a verdict of not guilty in both cases.\u201d\nDefendant states that the court should have said that it is the contention of the defendant that he was not even present at the Stout apartment in Salisbury and that he offered alibi witnesses to support this contention. Further, the court, according to the defendant, substantially misstated a portion of the \u2022evidence when it reviewed the testimony of Agent Cone on recall and stated that this testimony \u201c . . . tends to show that he made an examination of an automobile registered to Jeannette Grier and that that automobile was clean; that they could find no debris or anything in the car.\u201d Defendant maintains Cone\u2019s testimony, that fingerprints taken from the car were those of Hutton and Sellers but that no fingerprints of the defendant were identifiable, should have been included in the court\u2019s recapitulation. However, defendant\u2019s objections come too late.\n\u201c . . . [I]t is the general rule that objections to the charge in reviewing the evidence and stating the contentions of the parties must be made before the jury retires so as to afford the trial judge an opportunity for correction; otherwise they are deemed to have been waived and will not be considered on appeal.\u201d State v. Virgil, 276 N.C. 217, 230, 172 S.E. 2d 28, 36 (1970) ; State v. Fowler, supra; Emanuel v. Clewis, 272 N.C. 505, 158 S.E. 2d 587 (1968).\nDefendant made no such objections. This assignment is overruled.\nDefendant next assigns as error the failure of the court to apply the applicable law to the evidence in not setting forth the acts of the defendant that would constitute aiding and abetting. The court in charging on this feature of the case first instructed the jury that they must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the crimes were committed by Sellers and Blackmon, or either of them, and that in order to find this defendant guilty of aiding and abetting, the State must prove that the defendant was present at the time the crimes were committed, and that he \u201c . . . knowingly advised, instigated, encouraged or aided Jack Sellers or Otis Blackmon or either of them to commit the crime . . . , \u201d and that \u201c a person is not guilty of a crime merely because he is present at the scene. Even though he may silently approve of a crime or secretly assist in its commission. To be guilty, he must aid or actively encourage the person committing the crime or in some way communicate to this person his intention to assist in its commission. ...\u201d The court then specifically charged the jury that if they found \u201c . . . beyond a reasonable doubt,... Sellers and Blackmon or either of them . . .\u201d committed the crimes as charged and that \u201c . . . defendant was present at the time the crime was committed and that he aided or encouraged them by holding a pistol on Hutton and keeping him from running to the officers and that in so doing the defendant knowingly advised, instigated, encouraged or aided Sellers or Blackman or either of them ... it would be your duty to return a verdict of guilty as charged. However, if you do not so find or have a reasonable doubt as to one or more of those things, it would be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty.\u201d This assignment is without merit. See State v. Rankin, supra; State v. Gaines, supra; State v. Hargett, supra; State v. Holland, supra.\nIn a related point, the defendant asserts that the court erred in failing to require a finding that defendant knowingly aided and abetted others in the commission of the crime charged. Defendant does concede that the court used the word \u201cknowingly\u201d in one portion of the charge. In fact, a perusal of the charge discloses that all four times the court directly charged as to what the jury must find to return a verdict of guilty, the term \u201cknowingly\u201d was used. This assignment is overruled.\nNext, defendant asserts that the court erred in reiterating the testimony of SBI Agent Pearce that in his opinion the explosion was caused by dynamite. He contended that this repetition left the clear impression with the jury that an explosion had occurred, thereby invading the province of the jury on this issue. As to this contention, we refer to our earlier discussion of Stout\u2019s testimony that he was injured by an \u201cexplosion,\u201d and to the stipulation entered by defendant\u2019s counsel that Stout was injured by an explosion. Defendant is in no position to object to a repetition of this testimony in the charge.\nDefendant\u2019s next assignment of error challenges the court\u2019s instruction concerning defendant\u2019s failure to testify. Defendant submitted the following special instruction to the'court:\n\u201cThe defendant in this case has not testified. Any defendant may or may not testify in his own behalf and his failure to testify shall not create any presumption against him.\u201d\nRather than give the tendered instruction, the court charged the jury as follows:\n\u201cNow, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the defendant did not take the stand and testify in his own behalf. The Court instructs you the defendant has a right to testify if he so elects or he has a right to remain off the stand and the fact that the defendant has not taken the stand and testified in his own behalf should not be considered by you against him or to his prejudice at any stage for the defendant was exercising a right which the law gives to him.\u201d\nDefendant contends that he is entitled to an instruction in the mandatory language of G.S. 8-54 that his failure to testify \u201cshall not create any presumption against him.\u201d However, defendant did not cite and we cannot find any case so holding. Our cases do not prescribe any mandatory formula but instead look to see if the spirit of G.S. 8-54 has been complied with. State v. Paige, 272 N.C. 417, 158 S.E. 2d 522 (1968) ; State v. McNeill, 229 N.C. 377, 49 S.E. 2d 733 (1948) ; State v. Proctor, 213 N.C. 221, 195 S.E. 816 (1938). Justice Lake, speaking for the Court in State v. Baxter, 285 N.C. 735, 208 S.E. 2d 696 (1974), stated the general rule that \u201c . . . any instruction thereon is incomplete and prejudicially erroneous unless it makes clear to the jury that the defendant has the right to offer or to refrain from offering evidence as he sees fit and that his failure to testify should not be considered by the jury as basis for any inference adverse to him. ...\u201d The instruction in the present case easily meets this test. This assignment is overruled.\nSince defendant was being tried separately from the principals in this case, the trial judge charged the jury on the elements of the crimes for which Sellers and Blackmon, or either of them, must be found guilty before defendant could be convicted of aiding and abetting. Defendant excepts to this alternative wording, complaining that it is confusing and misleading. The evidence clearly shows that both Sellers and Blackmon were principals; but, the court made it clear that as long as the jury found that one or both of them were guilty of all elements of the crimes, then defendant could be guilty of aiding and abetting if so found. No prejudicial error is made to appear by the use of the alternative wording.\nFinally, defendant maintains that the court erred in not accurately charging as to the elements of the crimes with which defendant is charged. Defendant stood charged with two crimes: willful and malicious injury to a person, Albert Stout, by use of explosives and willful and malicious damage to occupied, personal property, a 1974 Ford Torino, by means of explosives. Defendant now contends that the charge on the elements of these crimes was confusing and misled the jury into thinking that they only need find injury to Agent Stout in order to convict in both cases, rather than also finding damage to occupied personal property. Portions of the instruction are admittedly not models of clarity; however, construing the charge contextually we do not find any prejudicial error. The court correctly read the bills of indictment and the applicable statutes at the beginning of the charge. The court repeatedly referred to the two crimes accurately as: \u201cdamaging personal property, it being occupied at the time, by use of explosives,\u201d and \u201cinjuring Albert Stout, Jr., by use of explosives.\u201d Immediately before the jury retired to the jury room, the court repeated the two crimes for which defendant could be convicted and then gave the jury a sheet of paper on which the two separate charges were written to use in its deliberations.\nA charge will be construed contextually as a whole, and when so construed it presents the law of the case in such a manner as to leave no reasonable cause to believe the jury was misled or misinformed, an exception thereto will not be sustained even though the instruction might have been more aptly given in different form. 7 Strong, N. C. Index 2d, Trial \u00a7 33; Lewis v. Barnhill, 267 N.C. 457, 148 S.E. 2d 536 (1966) ; Phillips v. R. R., 257 N.C. 239, 125 S.E. 2d 603 (1962). All of the evidence showed extensive damage to the automobile as well as serious injury to Stout. We have carefully reviewed these instructions and we do not believe the jury was misled or confused as to the nature of the charges.\nOther assignments concerning the jury instructions have been considered and found to be without merit.\nAn examination of the entire record discloses that defendant received a fair trial, free from prejudicial error. The verdicts and judgments must therefore be upheld.\nNo error.", "type": "majority", "author": "MOOEE, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Rufus L. Edmisten by Assistant Attorney General Thomas B. Wood, for the State.", "Clarence E. Horton, Jr., for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILBUR JAMES SANDERS\nNo. 20\n(Filed 7 October 1975)\n1. Assault and Battery \u00a7 14; Property \u00a7 4\u2014 damage to person and property by use of explosives \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nEvidence for the State was sufficient to permit the jury to find that defendant was present at the scene of the offense for the purpose of aiding the perpetrators and that the perpetrators were aware of such purpose where the evidence tended to show that defendant was present when a bomb was placed in an SBI agent\u2019s car, defendant was seated at that time in the automobile of one of the perpetrators guarding a State\u2019s witness with a pistol, and defendant and the witness remained in the car after, the witness pointed out the SBI agent\u2019s car to the perpetrators.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 9\u2014 aider and abettor \u2014 finding required\nThe mere presence of the defendant at the scene of the crime, even though he is in sympathy with the criminal act and does nothing to prevent its commission, does not make him guilty of the offense; rather, to support a conviction, the State\u2019s evidence must be sufficient to support a finding that the defendant was present, actually or constructively, with the intent to aid the perpetrators in the commission of the offense should his assistance become necessary and that such intent was communicated to the actual perpetrators.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 169\u2014 failure to object to evidence \u2014 subsequent similar evidence properly admitted\nThe trial court did not err in allowing testimony which defendant alleged was hearsay since almost identical testimony was previously given and defendant made no objection.\n4. Property \u00a7 4\u2014 damage to property by use of explosives \u2014 description of property in indictment \u2014 sufficiency\nThe trial court did not err in failing to quash the bill of indictment charging defendant with wilful and malicious damage to personal property by means of an explosive device since the description of the property as a \u201c1974 Ford Torino owned by the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation, being at the time occupied by another, Albert Stout, Jr.\u201d was a sufficient description of the automobile in question to inform defendant with certainty as to the crime that he had allegedly committed.\n5. Criminal Law \u00a7 26\u2014 one explosion \u2014 damage to person and property \u2014 two offenses \u2014 no double jeopardy\nWhere defendant was tried under separate bills of indictment for wilful and malicious damage to occupied personal property, an automobile, by means of an explosive device and for wilful and malicious injury to a person by means of an explosive device, the trial court did not err in refusing to quash the second indictment though both offenses arose from the same explosion, \u2022 since two separate offenses occurred which were punishable under two separate statutes.\n6. Criminal Law \u00a7 45\u2014 experimental evidence \u2014 substantially similar conditions\nIn a prosecution for damage to occupied personal property and for injury to a person by means of an explosive device, the trial court did not err in admitting experimental evidence where the testimony of the agent conducting the experiment was sufficient to show that he had created substantially similar conditions as those that produced the actual explosion.\n7. Criminal Law \u00a7 102; Property \u00a7 4\u2014 district attorney\u2019s use of word \u201cexplosion\u201d \u2014 no invasion of jury province\nWhere defendant stipulated early in the trial that \u201c . . . there was in fact one explosion damaging . .\u201d an automobile and its occupant, and where the occupant testified without objection that he received certain injuries as a result of the explosion and described the explosion, defendant could not complain that the use of the word \u201cexplosion\u201d by the district attorney in questioning witnesses invaded the province of the jury by assuming that an explosion had occurred.\n8. Criminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 43, 95\u2014 admission of photographs \u2014 restrictive instruction \u2014 sufficiency\nDefendant was not prejudiced where the trial court instructed the jury that photographs were admissible only to illustrate witnesses\u2019 testimony but the court failed to instruct that the photographs were admissible for illustrative purposes only if, the jury found that -they did illustrate the witnesses\u2019 testimony.\n9. Criminal Law \u00a7 114\u2014 instructions \u2014 more time devoted to State\u2019s evidence \u2014 no expression of opinion\nThough the trial court spent more time summarizing the State\u2019s evidence than the evidence of defendant, the court did not thereby express an opinion on the evidence in violation of GiS. 1-180, since the greater amount of time was spent on State\u2019s evidence because the State had presented considerably more evidence than had defendant.\n10. Criminal Law \u00a7 163 \u2014 jury instructions \u2014 failure to object at trial \u2014 no consideration on appeal\nDefendant\u2019s objections to the trial court\u2019s charge stating one of defendant\u2019s contentions and recapitulating the evidence came too late when they were made for the first time on appeal.\n11. Criminal Law \u00a7 113\u2014 defendant as aider and abettor \u2014 jury instructions applying law to facts\nThe trial court properly applied the law to the evidence and set forth the acts of the defendant that would constitute aiding and abetting where the court instructed the jury that they must find beyond a reasonable doubt that \u2022\u201c . . . defendant was present at the time the crime was committed arid that he aided or encouraged [the perpetrators] by holding a pistol on Hutton and keeping him from running to the officers and that in so doing the defendant knowingly advised, instigated, encouraged or aided Sellers or Blackmon or either of them. ...\u201d\n12. Criminal Law \u00a7 116\u2014 charge on defendant\u2019s failure to testify \u2014 statutory language not mandatory\nIn charging the jury on defendant\u2019s failure to testify the trial court is not required to use the exact language of G.S. 8-54 that such failure \u201cshall not create any presumption against him.\u201d\n13. Criminal Law \u00a7 113\u2014 defendant as aider and abettor \u2014 finding of one or both principals\u2019 guilt required\nWhere defendant was tried separately from the principals in this case, the trial court did not err in making it clear that as long as the jury found that one or both of the principals were guilty of all elements of the crimes charged, then defendant could be guilty of aiding and abetting if so found.\n14. Assault and Battery \u00a7 15; Property \u00a7 4\u2014 damage to person and property by use of explosive \u2014 instructions\nThe trial court\u2019s charge, when construed contextually, made it clear to the jury that defendant was charged with wilful injury to a person by use of explosives and with wilful damage to occupied personal property, and the jury was not misled into thinking that they need only find injury to a named person in order to convict in both cases.\nAppeal by defendant pursuant to G.S. 7A-27 (a) from Rousseau, J., at the 20 January 1975 Special Criminal Session of Cabarrus Superior Court.\nDefendant was tried on separate bills of indictment charging him with willful and malicious damage to occupied personal property, an automobile, by means of an explosive device, in violation of G.S. 14-49.1, and with willful and malicious injury to Albert Stout, Jr., by means of an explosive device, in violation of G.S. 14-49. The case was transferred from Rowan County on defendant\u2019s motion for a change of venue. The bills of indictment were consolidated for trial without objection, and defendant entered pleas of not guilty to both charges.\nThe testimony of Albert Stout, Jr., tended to show that he was an undercover agent for the State Bureau of Investigation, residing in Salisbury, North Carolina. He was assigned to the Charlotte area, where he was engaged in buying narcotic drugs from known sellers and aiding in their prosecution. On 9 September 1974, in Charlotte, Stout went to the home of Jule Hutton on several occasions from 3:00 p.m. to 10:30 p.m., but failed to contact Hutton.\nAgent Stout returned to his home in Salisbury about midnight on 9 September 1974, parked his car, a brown 1974 Torino, in the parking area adjacent to his apartment, locked it, and went into his apartment. He returned to his car the next morning, 10 September 1974, about 8:00 a.m., unlocked the door and got in. Upon turning the key in the ignition, he felt \u201ca searing pain\u201d as if he were \u201ccaught up in a vacuum\u201d and heard a \u201cloud, bursting noise.\u201d Stout was severely injured in the explosion. His right foot and leg were blown off, his right eye and ear destroyed or severely damaged, his right hand mangled, and various bones were broken.\nStout had testified against Jeannette Grier in connection with some heroin buys and against Otis James Blackmon, a co-defendant not on trial. He had never met or testified against defendant.\nFurther evidence presented by the State may be summarized as follows: Following the explosion, the local law enforcement officers cordoned off the area. Two SBI forensic chemists searched the area thoroughly, photographing and cataloging numerous items of evidence. Pieces of orange and yellow wire and a metal clip were found in the vicinity of the Stout automobile. SBI chemist Cone found an alligator clip connected to one of the posts of the starter. SBI chemist Pearce testified that traces of certain chemicals had been found on the wires arid floorboard, and from his analysis it was his opinion that the explosion was caused by dynamite.\nJule Hutton, a codefendant not on trial, testified that he was an informer for the Charlotte Police Department and the SBI and that he knew Agent Stout, whom he was supposed to meet on 9 September 1974. About noon on 9 September, Hutton had gone to the home of Jeannette Grier in order to meet a girl named Sissy Gal. When he arrived, he found the defendant (whom Hutton only knew as \u201cChuck\u201d), Otis Blackmon and Jack Sellers. Blackmon grabbed Hutton and hit him. Sellers then gave defendant a .38-caliber pistol which defendant held on Hutton. During this time Hutton saw a brown paper bag which contained four or five sticks of dynamite, some wire, clips and silver-looking capsules. Later that night Sellers, armed with the same .38-caliber pistol, took Hutton to Hutton\u2019s house. Shortly thereafter, Stout arrived and knocked on the door. When Hutton and Sellers failed to answer, Stout left. Soon thereafter, Hutton and Sellers returned to Grier\u2019s house.\nAbout midnight, defendant, Sellers and Hutton left in Sellers\u2019 car and drove down 1-85 to the Salisbury exit. There they met Blackmon and drove to Agent Stout\u2019s apartment where Hutton pointed out Stout\u2019s brown 1974 Torino. Blackmon and Sellers, carrying the same brown bag in which Hutton had previously seen the dynamite, wires, etc., went to Stout\u2019s car, opened the hood, and were out of sight for some eight or ten minutes. They returned without the brown bag.\nDefendant, Sellers and Hutton returned to Charlotte after leaving Blackmon where he had parked his ear.\nThe State rested and defendant moved for judgment as of nonsuit in each case, which motions were denied.\nDefendant did not testify but offered testimony tending to show an alibi through Eva Spraggins, with whom he lived, Bernice Scott, Eva\u2019s mother, Darrell Evans, Eva\u2019s cousin, and A1 Porter. Their testimony placed defendant at the Spraggins\u2019 home during the afternoon of 9 September and that evening from approximately 6:00 p.m. until 11:30 p.m., at which time he left with Wiley Lawrence Anderson. He returned to the Spraggins\u2019 home about 12:45 a.m. and spent the remainder of the night there with Eva Spraggins.\nOther evidence pertinent to decision will be set out in the opinion.\nThe jury returned verdicts of guilty as to both charges and defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for the willful and malicious damage to occupied personal property by means of an explosion, and to fifteen years in prison for the willful and malicious injury to Albert Stout, Jr., by means of an explosion. Defendant appealed from the judgment imposing life imprisonment and we allowed certiorari prior to determination by the Court of Appeals on the charge of willful and malicious injury to Albert Stout, Jr.\nAttorney General Rufus L. Edmisten by Assistant Attorney General Thomas B. Wood, for the State.\nClarence E. Horton, Jr., for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0285-01", "first_page_order": 305, "last_page_order": 323 }