{ "id": 8567692, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ISAAC JOE TAYLOR, JR., alias Michael Anthony Young", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Taylor", "decision_date": "1976-01-29", "docket_number": "No. 8", "first_page": "223", "last_page": "231", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "289 N.C. 223" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "421 U.S. 684", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 541415 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/us/421/0684-01" ] }, { "cite": "220 S.E. 2d 575", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 632", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570479 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0632-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 S.E. 2d 291", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "237 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8604747 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/237/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "153 S.E. 2d 44", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "269 N.C. 453", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564264 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/269/0453-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 S.E. 2d 765", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 N.C. 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563764 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/277/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 S.Ct. 1884", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "12 L.Ed. 2d 747", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "377 U.S. 978", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6280578, 6280805, 6281832, 6281074, 6281620 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/377/0978-01", "/us/377/0978-02", "/us/377/0978-05", "/us/377/0978-03", "/us/377/0978-04" ] }, { "cite": "134 S.E. 2d 334", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "261 N.C. 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572663 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/261/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 S.E. 2d 607", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "287 N.C. 578", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564309 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/287/0578-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 S.E. 2d 858", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 322", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571913 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0322-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 S.E. 2d 874", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 N.C. 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565616 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/277/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 S.E. 2d 384", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572439 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 S.E. 2d 335", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 N.C. 646", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566320 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/271/0646-01" ] }, { "cite": "32 S.E. 2d 648", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "224 N.C. 825", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8615827 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/224/0825-01" ] }, { "cite": "153 S.E. 255", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "198 N.C. 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8617197 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/198/0655-01" ] }, { "cite": "6 S.E. 2d 521", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "216 N.C. 709", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8612186 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/216/0709-01" ] }, { "cite": "212 S.E. 2d 132", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 N.C. 472", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568917 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/286/0472-01" ] }, { "cite": "86 S.E. 2d 424", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "241 N.C. 650", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8616136 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/241/0650-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 649", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6175415 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0649-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 S.E. 2d 802", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 N.C. 23", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562331 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/271/0023-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 S.Ct. 2290", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. 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Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "408 U.S. 939", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1782720, 1782785, 1782912, 1782723, 1782762, 1782831, 1782832, 1782961, 1782833, 1782865, 1782868, 1782933, 1782941, 1782835, 1782936, 1782777, 1782813 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/408/0939-13", "/us/408/0939-10", "/us/408/0939-06", "/us/408/0939-16", "/us/408/0939-01", "/us/408/0939-05", "/us/408/0939-02", "/us/408/0939-08", "/us/408/0939-07", "/us/408/0939-17", "/us/408/0939-14", "/us/408/0939-15", "/us/408/0939-03", "/us/408/0939-12", "/us/408/0939-04", "/us/408/0939-11", "/us/408/0939-09" ] }, { "cite": "181 S.E. 2d 572", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565554 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "421 U.S. 684", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 541415 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/421/0684-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 935, "char_count": 19751, "ocr_confidence": 0.646, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.2888598795343646e-07, "percentile": 0.91632697504758 }, "sha256": "8e8d14feb417d53d4d9b3b0a19fd5243d7d9f1a7e76815f1da3e10123090f5a5", "simhash": "1:41691e463825fe4b", "word_count": 3340 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:21:01.191113+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ISAAC JOE TAYLOR, JR., alias Michael Anthony Young" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BRANCH, Justice.\nDefendant assigns as error the trial judge\u2019s actions in overruling his objections to certain statements made by the District Attorney during his argument to the jury.\nA prosecuting attorney may not place before the jury incompetent and prejudicial matters not admissible in evidence or include in his argument facts not included in the evidence. State v. Westbrook, 279 N.C. 18, 181 S.E. 2d 572, vacated on other grounds, 408 U.S. 939, 33 L.Ed. 2d 761, 92 S.Ct. 2873; State v. Dockery, 238 N.C. 222, 77 S.E. 2d 664. However, arguments of counsel are largely in the control and discretion of the trial judge who must allow wide latitude in the argument of the law, the facts of the case, as well as to all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts. State v. Noell, 284 N.C. 670, 202 S.E. 2d 750; State v. Westbrook, supra. See also State v. Williams, 276 N.C. 703, 174 S.E. 2d 503, rev\u2019d on other grounds, 403 U.S. 948, 29 L.Ed. 2d 860, 91 S.Ct. 2290; State v. Spence, 271 N.C. 23, 155 S.E. 2d 802, rev\u2019d on other grounds, 392 U.S. 649, 20 L.Ed. 2d 1350, 88 S.Ct. 2290. Ordinarily we do not review the exercise of the trial judge\u2019s discretion in controlling jury arguments unless the impropriety of counsel\u2019s remarks is extreme and is clearly calculated to prejudice the jury in its deliberations. State v. Barefoot, 241 N.C. 650, 86 S.E. 2d 424; State v. Bowen, supra.\nIt is necessary that we consider separately the portions of the argument questioned by this assignment of error. Defendant first points to this portion of the District Attorney\u2019s argument:\nMr. Brannon : You notice Mr. Edwards examining Mr. Jones asking him some interesting questions, didn\u2019t he? I asked him if he didn\u2019t go in the basement of the building and feel the man\u2019s pulse as well as get your knife. Of course, my question of Mr. Edwards, where did he get that information\u2014\nMr. Edwards: Objection.\nThe Court: Specifically what are you objecting to?\nMr. Edwards: Where I got the information.\nThe Court: Sustained. You will not consider that last statement by the Solicitor.\nDefendant contends that the evil in this argument lies in that the \u201cinformation\u201d therein referred to could have come only from someone who was present when the crime was allegedly committed and that the remarks, therefore, tended to place defendant at the scene of the crime.\nInitially we note that this record does not contain any part of the jury argument of counsel for defendants. Thus we cannot know whether these isolated remarks of the District Attorney are in reply to arguments of defense counsel or to what extent the District Attorney was provoked by defense counsel\u2019s arguments. We do not know what knowledge the \u201cinformation\u201d imparted or which defendant it might have affected. Further, the record discloses that the \u201cinformation\u201d could have come from at least two people other than defendant who were present in the courtroom and who by their own admission were present when the crime was committed. Finally, any semblance of prejudice which might have arisen from this portion of the solicitor\u2019s argument was removed when the trial judge promptly sustained defendant\u2019s objection and instructed the jury not to consider the portion specifically objected to by defense counsel.\nThe next part of the argument challenged by this assignment of error is as follows:\nMr. Brannon: The truth of Mr. Jones\u2019 guilt slipped out from him on the stand. The Truth About Isaac Taylor Slipped Out During Mr. Edwards\u2019 Argument to You Yesterday. (Emphasis added.)\nMr. Edwards: Objection and move for a mistrial.\nObjection Overruled. (R pp 49-50)\nDefendant takes the position that the above-quoted statement amounts to a comment on defendant\u2019s failure to testify.\nThe provisions of G.S. 8-54 unquestionably prohibit any mention before the jury of a defendant\u2019s failure to testify in his own behalf. State v. McCall, 286 N.C. 472, 212 S.E. 2d 132; State v. Buchanan, 216 N.C. 709, 6 S.E. 2d 521; State v. Spivey, 198 N.C. 655, 153 S.E. 255. Here the District Attorney\u2019s remarks do not specifically point to defendant\u2019s failure to take the stand. In fact, we do not believe that an average juror would so interpret this language. The first sentence in the challenged argument refers to the testimony of defendant Jones who elected to testify. Certainly the District Attorney was within his rights to argue this evidence and any reasonable inference arising therefrom. State v. Barefoot, supra; State v. Oxendine, 224 N.C. 825, 32 S.E. 2d 648. The District Attorney\u2019s comment that the truth slipped out during Mr. Edwards\u2019 argument does not appear to be improper. Again we do not have the benefit of knowing what Mr. Edwards said. Even so, the general rule allows counsel to address remarks to the argument of opposing counsel. 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial, \u00a7 218, page 300. This assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant next assigns as error the failure of the trial judge to grant a mistrial because of derogatory statements made by the District Attorney concerning counsel for defendant. During the cross-examination of the witness Wright by defendant\u2019s counsel, the following exchange took place:\n\u201cMr. Edwards:\nQ. You have been charged, tried and convicted of Public Drunk?\nA. No, I paid a fine of $24.00.\nQ. That was on the 24th day of December, 1972, was it not?\nA. Of 71.\nQ. 71?\nA. Actually.\nQ. Actually Christmas Eve 71?\nA. Yes, that is right, I can prove it because I stayed in jail about two days.\nMr. Brannon : Mr. Edwards has the record in front of him, and it does in fact indicate 12-24-71 so he is deliberately making a misstatement.\nMr. Edwards: Objection to that.\nA. I can tell why, because I was only 16.\nMr. Edwards: Objection. I am going to move for a mistrial.\nThe Court: You will not consider the remark made by the Solicitor. Dismiss it from your minds.\u201d (R pp 38-39)\nA similar occurrence during a jury argument appears in the case of State v. Miller, 271 N.C. 646, 157 S.E. 2d 335. We quote a self-explanatory excerpt from that case:\nDefendants assign as error the following part of the solicitor\u2019s argument. \u201cThere is something in this case that is not very pretty. Mr. Walker, himself a former solicitor of this court until other things tempted him to the place where he now is ... \u201d The statement about Mr. Walker, who represented defendant Miller at the trial, is not clear, but it is manifest that it was uncomplimentary, and there is nothing in the record before us to justify it. While not so prejudicial as to warrant a new trial, we disapprove of it. Clients, not lawyers, are the litigants. Whatever may be the ill-feeling existing between clients, it should not be allowed to influence counsel in their conduct and demeanor toward each other or toward suitors in the case. All personalities between counsel should be scrupulously avoided. Canons of Professional Ethics, 62 Reports of American Bar Association 1105 \u00a7 17.\nIn 88 C.J.S. Trial \u00a7 185 at page 367, it is stated:\n. . . Where his remarks are not sustained by the facts it is improper for counsel in argument to make statements reflecting on the character or conduct of the opposite party or his attorney, ....\nIt would seem that this matter of little moment could have been corrected without resorting to charges that counsel was deliberately misleading the court and the jury. We do not approve of statements unnecessarily reflecting upon the character or conduct of a counsel by his adversary at any stage of a trial. Nevertheless we do not find this language sufficiently prejudicial to defendant to warrant a new trial.\nDefendant argues that he was denied a fair trial when, over his objection, the trial judge consolidated his case for trial with the case of defendant, Jones.\nThe State\u2019s motion for consolidation was addressed to the trial judge\u2019s sound discretion. Consolidation of cases for trial is generally proper when the offenses charged are of the same class and are so connected in time and place that evidence at trial upon one indictment would be competent and admissible on the other. State v. Bass, 280 N.C. 435, 186 S.E. 2d 384; State v. McVay and State v. Simmons, 277 N.C. 410, 177 S.E. 2d 874. This exercise of discretion by the trial judge will not be disturbed absent a showing that defendant has been deprived of a fair trial by the order of consolidation. State v. Jones, 280 N.C. 322, 185 S.E. 2d 858.\nDefendant seems to take the position that he was seriously prejudiced by the order of consolidation because his codefend-ant elected to testify.\nIt is well established in this jurisdiction that an accomplice is always a competent witness. The fact that his testimony is usually induced by a promise of or a hope for leniency goes only to his credibility as a witness. State v. Woodson, 287 N.C. 578, 215 S.E. 2d 607; State v. Goldberg, 261 N.C. 181, 134 S.E. 2d 334, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978, 12 L.Ed. 2d 747, 84 S.Ct. 1884.\nIn instant case, another alleged accomplice in the murder, Ezekial Wright, had already entered a plea of guilty and testified for the State. The record does not disclose that the trial judge knew when he entered the order of consolidation that either the codefendant Jones or Ezekial Wright would testify. In our opinion, the testimony of the codefendant Jones would have carried equal force if it had been received without the order of consolidation. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial judge\u2019s order consolidating the cases for trial. Neither do we find merit in defendant\u2019s contention that the consolidation of the cases resulted in prejudicial error to him because he was deprived of his right to open and close the j ury arguments when his codefendant elected to testify.\nIt is well settled in this jurisdiction that when there are several defendants and one of them elects to offer evidence, the right to open and conclude the arguments belongs to the State. State v. Lee, 277 N.C. 205, 176 S.E. 2d 765; State v. Overman, 269 N.C. 453, 153 S.E. 2d 44; State v. Smith, 237 N.C. 1, 74 S.E. 2d 291.\nFinally defendant, relying on Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 44 L.Ed. 2d 508, 95 S.Ct. 1881, contends that the trial judge erred by charging the jury that if the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant killed deceased with a deadly weapon, the law raised presumptions that the killing was unlawful and that it was done with malice. Defendant further argues that under the Mullaney rule, it was error to place any burden on defendant to rebut the presumption of malice so as to reduce the charge from second-degree murder to manslaughter.\nThis argument is feckless. Here all the evidence revealed a cold-blooded killing done with malice and with premeditation and deliberation. The jury returned a verdict of murder in the first degree and therefore never reached the questions raised by Mullaney as to instructions relating to second-degree murder and manslaughter. Further, in State v. Hankerson, 288 N.C. 632, 220 S.E. 2d 575 (filed 17 December 1975), we declined to apply the Mullaney rule retroactively without further instruction from the United States Supreme Court. Mullaney was decided 9 June 1975. This case was tried at the 18 June 1973 Session of Durham Superior Court. Thus, even if otherwise applicable, the rules enunciated in Mullaney do not apply to instant case.\nWe have carefully examined this entire record and find no error which would justify a new trial or warrant that the judgment be disturbed.\nNo error.", "type": "majority", "author": "BRANCH, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Rufus L. Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General William B. Ray and Special Deputy Attorney General William W. Melvin, for the State.", "James B. Maxwell for the defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ISAAC JOE TAYLOR, JR., alias Michael Anthony Young\nNo. 8\n(Filed 29 January 1976)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 102 \u2014 actions and argument of prosecutor\nA prosecuting attorney may not place before the jury incompetent and prejudicial matters not admissible in evidence or include in his argument facts not included in the evidence.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 102 \u2014 arguments of counsel \u2014 discretion of court \u2014 review\nArguments of counsel are largely in the control and discretion of the trial judge who must allow wide latitude in the argument of the law, the facts of the case and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts, and the appellate courts ordinarily will not review the exercise of the trial judge\u2019s discretion in controlling jury arguments unless the impropriety of counsel\u2019s remarks is extreme and is clearly calculated to prejudice the jury in its deliberations.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 102\u2014 prosecutor\u2019s argument \u2014 source of defense counsel\u2019s information\nDefendant in a homicide case was not prejudiced by the district attorney\u2019s question during jury argument as to where defense counsel got information used in questioning a codefendant where the record does not show what knowledge the \u201cinformation\u201d imparted or which defendant it might have affected, and the record shows the information could have come from persons other than defendant who were present when the crime was committed, particularly when the judge instructed the jury not to consider such argument.\n4. Criminal Law \u00a7 102 \u2014 prosecutor\u2019s argument \u2014 guilt shown during counsel\u2019s argument\nThe district attorney\u2019s jury argument that the truth about defendant\u2019s guilt slipped out during defense counsel\u2019s argument to the jury did not constitute a comment on defendant\u2019s failure to testify and was not prejudicial to defendant.\n5. Criminal Law \u00a7 102 \u2014 prosecutor\u2019s remark about conduct of defense counsel\nDefendant in a homicide case was not prejudiced by the district attorney\u2019s remark that defense counsel was deliberately making a misstatement in cross-examining a witness about the time of a prior conviction.\n6. Criminal Law \u00a7 92 \u2014 consolidation of charges against defendants \u2014 testimony by one defendant\nDefendant was not prejudiced by the consolidation of his murder trial with that of a codefendant charged with the same crime even though the codefendant elected to testify at the trial and defendant was thus deprived of his right to open and close the jury arguments.\n7. Homicide \u00a7 24\u2014 instructions \u2014 burden to rebut malice \u2014 Mullaney decision \u2014 nonretroactivity\nWhere the jury returned a verdict of first degree murder, defendant is not entitled to a new trial under the decision of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, because of the court\u2019s instructions placing the burden on defendant to rebut the presumption of malice so as to reduce the charge of second degree murder to manslaughter since the jury did not reach the questions raised by Mullaney as to instructions relating to second degree murder and manslaughter; furthermore, the Mullaney decision is not retroactive and does not apply to defendant\u2019s trial which was held some two years prior to that decision.\nAppeal by defendant, Isaac Joe Taylor, Jr., alias Michael Anthony Young, from Hall, J18 June 1973 Session of Durham Superior Court.\nDefendant\u2019s counsel gave notice of appeal in open court but the appeal was not perfected within the time allowed. Upon motion of the District Attorney, the appeal was dismissed on 30 January 1975. On 6 May 1975, we issued a writ of certiorari to Durham County Superior Court directing that defendant be allowed to perfect his appeal.\nDefendants Isaac Joe Taylor, Jr., alias Michael Anthony Young (hereinafter referred to as Taylor), Schuyler Jones and Ezekial Wright were charged with the crimes of murder in the first degree and armed robbery. Prior to 18 January 1973, Ezekial Wright entered a plea of guilty to the second-degree murder of Charles Edward Thompson. On 18 June 1973, the cases of defendant Taylor and defendant Jones were called for trial upon the charges of murder in the first degree. The cases were consolidated for trial over objection of counsel for each defendant. Each defendant entered a plea of not guilty.\nThe State\u2019s evidence tended to show the following:\nEzekial Wright testified that on 29 December 1972 he was walking along Pettigrew Street in Durham, North Carolina, with defendants Jones and Taylor when they discovered a man lying on the side of the street. Taylor took a wallet that was hanging out of the man\u2019s pocket. Finding no money in the wallet, they divided its contents and went to the bus station. Shortly thereafter the man they had robbed (later identified as Charles Edward Thompson) came into the station. Taylor asked Thompson if he wanted to accompany them to a \u201cbootleg house.\u201d Thompson indicated that he did and he accompanied them to a house on Queen Street where Taylor \u201cwrestled him into the basement.\u201d Taylor demanded that Thompson give him money and Thompson replied that he only had four cents. Taylor, while holding a knife to Thompson\u2019s throat, ordered him to take off his clothes. A search of the clothes yielded four pennies. In response to Thompson\u2019s pleas that his life be spared, Taylor said \u201cNaw, you get away and get to the police, I got to kill you.\u201d Thompson tried to run and Taylor cut him across the chest several times. Upon Taylor\u2019s order Jones and Wright tied the victim\u2019s hands behind his back with cord taken from a Venetian blind lying on the basement floor. Taylor cut a piece of Thompson\u2019s trousers and gagged him to quell his screams and pleas. He then tied Thompson into a chair, kicked the chair over and struck him about the head and face five or six times with a piece of cast-iron pipe. The three of them fled. Wright identified several State\u2019s exhibits including the knife used to cut the victim, the iron pipe with which Taylor attacked Thompson, and the cord used to tie the victim. On cross-examination, the witness admitted that he had hit and kicked Thompson, and that he had been allowed to plead guilty to second-degree murder.\nLieutenant Richard Morris of the Durham Police Department testified that on 29 December 1972 he went to the basement of a house on Queen Street where he observed the body of Charles Edward Thompson. His hands were tied behind his back and he was gagged. His face was \u201cbeaten to a pulp.\u201d\nSergeant Patterson of the Durham Police Department testified that he fingerprinted Taylor and that Taylor\u2019s fingerprints matched those taken from a Venetian blind in the basement of the house on Queen Street.\nDr. Richard Page Hudson, Jr., an expert in medical pathology, testified that he performed an autopsy on the body of Charles Edward Thompson. He described various knife wounds on the body and the wounds about the face and head which were caused by some blunt object. He in part, stated:\nAs a result of the autopsy which I performed on the deceased, I am of the opinion that Charles Edward Thompson died of brain injuries secondary to blunt trauma to the head in a beating. Even in the absence of the head injuries that have been described, the victim would have died as a result of the abdominal wounds, unless, of course, he had had fairly rapid surgery for his abdominal wounds. Either the blows to the head or the blows to his body would have killed him.\nThe State also offered evidence that certain objects of personal property belonging to Charles Edward Thompson were found in the possession of Jones and Taylor when they were arrested on the morning of 30 December 1972.\nDefendant Jones elected to offer evidence and his testimony tended to corroborate the testimony of Ezekial Wright. He also offered some evidence of good character.\nDefendant Taylor offered no evidence.\nThe jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree as to James Isaac Taylor, Jr., and a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree as to defendant Schuyler Jones.\nDefendant Taylor appealed from judgment imposing a sentence of imprisonment for the term of his natural life.\nAttorney General Rufus L. Edmisten, by Assistant Attorney General William B. Ray and Special Deputy Attorney General William W. Melvin, for the State.\nJames B. Maxwell for the defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0223-01", "first_page_order": 243, "last_page_order": 251 }