{ "id": 8557466, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RANDOLPH THOMAS FAIR", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Fair", "decision_date": "1976-11-04", "docket_number": "No. 50", "first_page": "171", "last_page": "174", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "291 N.C. 171" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "223 S.E. 2d 704", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "29 N.C. App. 147", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554629 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/29/0147-01" ] }, { "cite": "169 S.E. 2d 472", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "6 N.C. App. 66", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8546913 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/6/0066-01" ] }, { "cite": "151 S.E. 2d 62", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "268 N.C. 480", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563197 ], "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/268/0480-01" ] }, { "cite": "150 S.E. 2d 428", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "431" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "268 N.C. 258", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561200 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "262" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/268/0258-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 S.E. 2d 365", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 N.C. 578", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571244 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/289/0578-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 S.E. 829", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1938, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "830" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "213 N.C. 524", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8628995 ], "year": 1938, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "526" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/213/0524-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 S.E. 2d 369", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "274 N.C. 594", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561135 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/274/0594-01" ] }, { "cite": "72 N.C. 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8698345 ], "year": 1875, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/72/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 S.E. 513", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1903, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 N.C. 656", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8659162 ], "year": 1903, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/133/0656-01" ] }, { "cite": "153 S.E. 2d 741", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "270 N.C. 25", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565060 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/270/0025-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 383, "char_count": 6880, "ocr_confidence": 0.676, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.932631232079484e-07, "percentile": 0.9030949294727222 }, "sha256": "63e6d9c6ab8f6bbe2a67251c43e8104b5574115c50475f60b5f400b73da6022f", "simhash": "1:bf633066938c9d69", "word_count": 1187 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:35:26.216351+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RANDOLPH THOMAS FAIR" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "COPELAND, Justice.\nDefendant assigns as error the trial judge\u2019s failure to charge the jury that the doctrine of recent possession was applicable only if the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that the cuff links discovered in the defendant\u2019s possession were stolen at the same time and place as the items listed in the bill of indictment.\nThe State relied heavily on the doctrine of recent possession. Upon an indictment for larceny, recent possession of stolen property has always been considered by this Court as a circumstance tending to show the guilt of the possessor. State v. Bell, 270 N.C. 25, 153 S.E. 2d 741 (1967); State v. Hullen, 133 N.C. 656, 45 S.E. 513 (1903); State v. Graves, 72 N.C. 482 (1875). Similarly, recent possession is evidence of the fact that the defendant broke and entered the house when the breaking and entering was necessary to enable the thief to gain access to the property. State v. Jackson, 274 N.C. 594, 164 S.E. 2d 369 (1968); State v. Bell, supra; State v. Hullen, supra.\nThe presumption, or inference as it is more properly, called, is one of fact and not of law. The inference derived from recent possession \u201cis to be considered by the jury merely as an evidentiary fact, along with the other evidence in the case, in determining whether the State has carried the burden of satisfying the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant\u2019s guilt.\u201d State v. Baker, 213 N.C. 524, 526, 196 S.E. 829, 830 (1938); accord State v. Greene, 289 N.C. 578, 223 S.E. 2d 365 (1976); State v. Bell, supra. Proof of recent possession by the State does not shift the burden of proof to the defendant but the burden remains with the State to demonstrate defendant\u2019s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Greene, supra, State v. Baker, supra.\nThe State in order to invoke the permissible inference must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each fact necessary to give rise to the inference. See State v. Jackson, supra; N.C.P.I. \u2014 Crim. \u00a7 104.40 (June 1972). \u201cInference may not be based on inference. Every inference must stand upon some clear and direct evidence, and not upon some other inference on presumption.\u201d State v. Parker, 268 N.C. 258, 262, 150 S.E. 2d 428, 431 (1966); accord State v. Greene, supra.\nThe inference that the person in possession of the goods is the thief arises upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the property described in the indictment was stolen, (2) the property shown to have been possessed by the accused was the stolen property, and (3) the possession was recently after the larceny. State v. Foster, 268 N.C. 480, 151 S.E. 2d 62 (1966). It follows that where the defendant is indicted for stealing items different from those actually found in his possession, the inference cannot arise unless it is also shown that the property in his possession was stolen at the same time and place as the property listed in the bill of indictment. State v. Blackmon, 6 N.C. App. 66, 169 S.E. 2d 472 (1969). See State v. Hullen, supra.\nThe jury should have been instructed that in order for the doctrine of recent possession to apply they must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the cuff links were stolen at the same time and place as the other property for which defendant stands indicted. The failure to so instruct was error and, under the facts of this case, we cannot say that it was harmless. The cuff links were not listed in the original police report as stolen, and a warrant was taken out alleging that the cuff links were stolen by another person on a different day.\nThus, the defendant is entitled to a\nNew trial.", "type": "majority", "author": "COPELAND, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Rufus L. Edmisten by Assistant Attorney General Ralf F. Haskell and Associate Attorney Sandra M. King for the State.", "Don H. Bumgardner for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RANDOLPH THOMAS FAIR\nNo. 50\n(Filed 4 November 1976)\n1. Burglary and Unlawful Breakings \u00a7 5; Larceny \u00a7 5\u2014 larceny by breaking and entering \u2014 possession of recently stolen property \u2014 inferences\nWhen it is established that a larceny was accomplished by a breaking and entering, discovery of the stolen articles in defendant\u2019s possession soon after the theft raises the inference that defendant was guilty of both the breaking and entering and the larceny.\n2. Larceny \u00a7 5\u2014 inference from possession of stolen property \u2014 prerequisites\nThe inference that the person in possession of stolen goods is the thief arises upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the property described in the indictment was stolen; (2) the property shown to have been possessed by the accused was the stolen property; and (3) the possession was recently after the larceny.\n3. Larceny \u00a7 8\u2014 possession of item not listed in indictment \u2014 doctrine of possession of recently stolen property \u2014 instructions\nWhere the only stolen articles found in defendant\u2019s possession were cuff links which were not lised in the indictment, the trial court should have instructed that in order for the doctrine of possession of recently-stolen property to apply the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the cuff links were stolen at the same time and place as the property listed in the indictment.\nON petition by defendant under G.S. 7A-31 for discretionary review of the decision of the Court of Appeals reported in 29 N.C. App. 147, 223 S.E. 2d 704 (1976), affirming judgment of Kirby, J. entered 24 June 1975, Gaston County Superior Court.\nOn a two-count bill of indictment, proper in form, defendant was tried and convicted of (1) felonious breaking and entering and (2) felonious larceny of two stereo tape players, two bicycles, two radios, twenty-five silver dollars, and $25.00 in coins, having a total value of more than $200.00.\nThe evidence for the State tended to show that on 25 February 1975 the home of Alex W. Stuart was broken into between 8:15 a.m. and 6 p.m. while the family was away. Mr. Stuart reported to the police on the day of the breaking and entering that the items shown in the bill of indictment were taken. No cuff links were mentioned in the list of stolen objects given to the police that day.\nMr. Stuart\u2019s son owned a pair of gold cuff links that were last seen on the top of one of the stolen stereos the morning of 25 February 1975. The defendant was arrested at 5 p.m. on 26 February 1975 approximately one hundred yards from the Stuart home with a pair of gold cuff links in his pocket. At 5:30 p.m. on the same day the cuff links were identified as the son\u2019s cuff links. A warrant dated 27 February 1975 charged defendant with breaking and entering and felonious larceny of the items, reported stolen by Mr. Stuart, but did not include the gold cuff links.\nThe defendant\u2019s evidence, produced on cross-examination, tended to show that the police took out a warrant charging Bruce Nelson Johnson with breaking and entering the Stuart home and stealing the cuff links on 26 February 1975.\nAttorney General Rufus L. Edmisten by Assistant Attorney General Ralf F. Haskell and Associate Attorney Sandra M. King for the State.\nDon H. Bumgardner for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0171-01", "first_page_order": 195, "last_page_order": 198 }