{ "id": 8558933, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIE JUNIOR JONES", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Jones", "decision_date": "1977-01-31", "docket_number": "No. 3", "first_page": "681", "last_page": "687", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "291 N.C. 681" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "174 S.E. 2d 487", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 598", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563091 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0598-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 S.E. 2d 545", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "547" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "241 N.C. 156", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8604316 ], "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "159" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/241/0156-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 S.E. 2d 149", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 142", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570160 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0142-01" ] }, { "cite": "220 S.E. 2d 575", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "589" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 632", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570479 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "651" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0632-01" ] }, { "cite": "124 S.E. 2d 174", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "256 N.C. 492", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573589 ], "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/256/0492-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 S.E. 2d 393", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565707 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 S.E. 2d 338", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 N.C. 540", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571077 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/289/0540-01" ] }, { "cite": "219 S.E. 2d 178", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "187" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 397", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569503 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "411" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0397-01" ] }, { "cite": "10 S.E. 2d 708", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1940, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "710" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "218 N.C. 146", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8614611 ], "year": 1940, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "150" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/218/0146-01" ] }, { "cite": "49 S.E. 2d 469", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1948, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "229 N.C. 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12165227 ], "year": 1948, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/229/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "52 S.E. 2d 225", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1949, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "230 N.C. 91", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8628490 ], "year": 1949, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/230/0091-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 N.C. 737", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8698711 ], "year": 1881, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "741" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/84/0737-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 767, "char_count": 15342, "ocr_confidence": 0.669, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.5511508567305834e-07, "percentile": 0.8143391757588956 }, "sha256": "9aa6988873e8d9b31bef40782a78e8503584444cd2b587aea86d213d88bf4e4f", "simhash": "1:27336437f04cf077", "word_count": 2633 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:35:26.216351+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIE JUNIOR JONES" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "SHARP, Chief Justice.\nDefendant brings forward four assignments of error. Three relates to the testimony of Robert Johnson, a witness called by the State after the close of defendant\u2019s evidence. Defendant argues first that Johnson\u2019s evidence was inadmissible because it did not contradict the testimony of any defense witness. In making this contention defendant misperceives both the effect of Johnson\u2019s testimony and the law governing the order of proof. His entire defense was based on evidence tending to establish an alibi. In support of his contention that he was elsewhere when Mr. Daniels was killed, he called as a witness his brother, James Junior Jones, who testified that he and defendant were at James\u2019s residence throughout the night of 4 January 1975 and until 1:30 on the morning of January 5th when he escorted defendant to his door and saw him enter his own house. Johnson, on the other hand, testified that he saw defendant at Mrs. Beasley\u2019s apartment around 12:20 a.m. on January 5th.\nJohnson\u2019s evidence also tended to contradict defendant\u2019s evidence in another respect. Vanessa Jones testified that defendant wore a white turtleneck sweater and blue jeans that night and that the sweater was not bloodstained. Johnson testified that when he saw defendant he was wearing a white turtleneck sweater and dark blue pants, and that the \u201cshirt\u201d was bloodstained. (It is not clear from the record whether Johnson meant that the turtleneck or a separate garment was bloodstained.) Thus, Johnson\u2019s testimony did contradict defense witnesses and, as such, was properly admitted on rebuttal. However, the order in which Johnson testified is irrelevant to this appeal.\nThe order of proof and presentation of witnesses is a matter completely within the discretionary control of the trial judge. \u201cThe court, to attain the ends of justice, may in its discretion allow the examination of witnesses at any stage of the trial.\u201d State v. King, 84 N.C. 737, 741 (1881). Accord, In re Westover Canal, 230 N.C. 91, 52 S.E. 2d 225 (1949); State v. Strickland, 229 N.C. 201, 49 S.E. 2d 469 (1948); Miller v. Greenwood, 218 N.C. 146, 150, 10 S.E. 2d 708, 710 (1940); 4 Strong\u2019s N. C. Index 3d Criminal Law \u00a7 93 (1976). There was no abuse of judicial discretion in this case.\nDefendant\u2019s second contention is that in allowing Johnson to testify he saw blood on defendant\u2019s shirt the judge erroneously permitted him to state a conclusion based on facts not within his personal knowledge. This contention is also without merit.\nThe average layman is familiar with bloodstains; they are a part of common experience and knowledge. When a witness says he saw blood he states an opinion based on his observations, and most likely it would be exceedingly difficult for him to describe the details which led him to conclude that the stains were blood. When he testifies they looked like blood to him he has stated his conception. \u201cThis Court has long held that a witness may state the \u2018instantaneous conclusions of the mind as to the appearance, condition, or mental or physical state of persons, animals, and things, derived from observation of a variety of facts presented to the senses at one and the same time.\u2019 Such statements are usually referred to as shorthand statements of facts.\u201d State v. Spaulding, 288 N.C. 397, 411, 219 S.E. 2d 178, 187 (1975). See 1 Stansbury\u2019s North Carolina Evidence \u00a7 125 (Brandis rev. ed. 1973). The Court did not err in admitting this testimony.\nNor did the judge err when, in recapitulating Johnson\u2019s evidence, he stated that the witness testified, \u201cat the time he [Johnson] saw him [defendant] he was wearing a white turtleneck sweater and had blood on his shirt.\u201d The judge did no more than repeat what Johnson had said. Such a summary of testimony was not a comment on the evidence within the meaning of G.S. 1-180.\nDefendant\u2019s first three assignments of error are overruled.\nIn his charge the trial judge instructed the jury to return one of three verdicts: Guilty of murder in the first degree, guilty of murder in the second degree, or not guilty. Defendant\u2019s final assignment of error is that the judge erred in failing to submit the issue of his guilt of manslaughter. This assignment has no merit.\nMurder in the second degree, the crime for which defendant was convicted, is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice but without premeditation and deliberation. Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice and without premeditation and deliberation. State v. Cousins, 289 N.C. 540, 223 S.E. 2d 338 (1976); State v. Duboise, 279 N.C. 73, 181 S.E. 2d 393 (1971); State v. Kea, 256 N.C. 492, 124 S.E. 2d 174 (1962). Where all the evidence tends to show a killing resulting from the intentional use of a deadly weapon, and there is no evidence which will support a finding that the killing was done in the heat of passion on sudden and sufficient provocation or that the defendant used excessive force while fighting in self defense, the law of this State requires the trial judge to instruct the jury that if they are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant intentionally inflicted a wound upon the decedent with a deadly weapon which proximately caused his death it would be their duty to return a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree. State v. Hankerson, 288 N.C. 632, 651, 220 S.E. 2d 575, 589 (1975).\nIn this case all the evidence for the State tended to show that defendant went to the home of the deceased, an elderly black man, for the purpose of collecting money from him; that when defendant ascertained Daniels had no money he deliberately and intentionally killed him with knives and a heavy shovel, all deadly weapons, after having stated his intention to do so. There was not a scintilla of evidence that defendant acted either in the heat of passion on sudden provocation or in self defense. Defendant\u2019s defense was an alibi. Neither the State nor defendant adduced any evidence which would support a verdict of manslaughter, and it would have been improper for the court to have submitted the issue. See State v. Griffin, 280 N.C. 142, 185 S.E. 2d 149 (1971); State v. Duboise, 279 N.C. 73, 181 S.E. 2d 393 (1971). \u201cThe necessity for instructing the jury as to an included crime of lesser degree than that charged arises when and only when there is evidence from which the jury could find that such included crime of lesser degree was committed. The presence of such evidence is the determinative factor.\u201d State v. Hicks, 241 N.C. 156, 159, 84 S.E. 2d 545, 547 (1954). None of the evidence adduced would support or allow a submission of the charge of manslaughter to the jury.\nDefendant has had a fair trial, free of prejudicial error. The State\u2019s evidence made out against him a brutal case of murder in the first degree. G.S. 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1975); State v. Sanders, 276 N.C. 598, 174 S.E. 2d 487 (1970). A lenient jury, although rejecting his evidence of alibi, convicted him of the lesser offense of second degree murder. He has no cause to complain.\nNo error.", "type": "majority", "author": "SHARP, Chief Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Rufus L. Edmisten and Assistant Attorney General William Woodward Webb for the State.", "William A. Graham III for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIE JUNIOR JONES\nNo. 3\n(Filed 31 January 1977)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 93\u2014 rebuttal testimony\nIn this homicide prosecution, a State\u2019s witness was properly allowed to give testimony on rebuttal which contradicted defendant\u2019s evidence as to his whereabouts on the night of the crime and that there were no bloodstains on the sweater he wore that night; moreover, such testimony would have been admissible had it not contradicted defendant\u2019s evidence, since the order of proof is a matter completely within the discretion of the trial judge.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 71\u2014 blood on defendant\u2019s shirt \u2014 lay testimony \u2014 shorthand statement of fact\nA witness\u2019s testimony that he saw blood on defendant\u2019s shirt was admissible as a shorthand statement of fact.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 114\u2014 recapitulation of testimony \u2014 no expression of opinion\nTrial court\u2019s recapitulation of a witness\u2019s testimony that defendant \u201cwas wearing a white turtleneck sweater and had blood on his shirt\u201d did not constitute a comment on the evidence in violation of G.S. 1-180.\n4. Homicide \u00a7 26\u2014 instructions \u2014 duty to find guilt of second degree murder\nWhere all the evidence tends to show a killing resulting from the intentional use of a deadly weapon, and there is no evidence which will support a finding that the killing was done in the heat of passion on sudden and sufficient provocation or that defendant used excessive force while fighting in self-defense, the trial judge is required to instruct the jury that if they are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant intentionally inflicted a wound upon the decedent with a deadly weapon which proximately caused his death it would be their duty to return a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree.\n5. Homicide \u00a7 30\u2014 first degree murder \u2014 failure to submit manslaughter\nThe trial court in a prosecution for first degree murder did not err in failing to submit the issue of defendant\u2019s guilt of manslaughter where defendant\u2019s defense was alibi and all the evidence for the State tended to show that defendant went to the home of the deceased for the purpose of collecting money from him, and that when defendant ascertained deceased had no money he deliberately and intentionally killed him with knives and a heavy shovel, all deadly weapons, after having stated his intention to do so.\nAppeal by defendant under G.S. 7A-27 (a) from Preston, J., at the 25 August 1975 Session, Durham Superior Court.\nDefendant was tried upon a bill of indictment (drawn under G.S. 15-144) which charged him with the first degree murder of Willis Daniels. The trial was conducted in the manner prescribed for a capital case. The State\u2019s evidence tended to establish the following facts:\nHelen Beasley\u2019s apartment in Durham was the scene of frequent gatherings by young people. Around 10:00 p.m. on 4 January 1975 Billy Perry, age 14, was at this apartment. There he was joined by defendant Willie Jones. After a brief conversation they decided to go to a nightclub. Defendant told Perry that an elderly man, Mr. Willis Daniels, owed him money, and the two left to go to his home. En route Perry complained of being cold and defendant gave him his jacket.\nAt Daniels\u2019 dwelling, when he answered defendant\u2019s knock, defendant grabbed him by the neck, choked him, and said, \u201cGive me my money.\u201d Daniels said he had no money. Whereupon defendant pushed him into a bedroom, and Perry heard him tell Daniels to remove his pants. Defendant soon came out and announced that he would have to kill Daniels. He procured a kitchen knife from the back of the house and reentered the room where Daniels was. He returned shortly thereafter laughing, and he told Perry the knife had broken. Defendant went to the back of the house again, got another knife, and reentered the room where he had left Daniels. Perry heard the second knife hit the floor, and defendant again emerged laughing. He told Perry the other knife had broken also. This time he picked up a short-handled shovel (State\u2019s Exhibit 9) and said, \u201cThat won\u2019t break.\u201d He then reentered the bedroom where Perry saw him raise the shovel and hit Daniels on the head. Perry then \u201ctook off running up the street.\u201d\nDefendant came out of the house and called Perry to come back. The two then crossed a small branch and went into some bushes where defendant threw the shovel away. A few minutes later the two separated. Perry returned to Mrs. Beasley\u2019s apartment, left defendant\u2019s jacket there, and then went home. About ten days later police officers came to see him. He gave them a statement and then took them to the area where defendant had discarded the shovel. After some \u201clooking around,\u201d they retrieved the shovel.\nAbout noon on 5 January 1975 Daniels\u2019 body was discovered by Ben Hawkins, a neighbor who had become concerned about him. He found the front door ajar and immediately observed Daniels lying partly on the bed, \u201chis head full of blood.\u201d After a brief look he called the police.\nUpon arrival the police found Daniels lying on his back, nude from the waist down and hanging off the bed. The head had been badly battered. One eyeball was out of the socket; two teeth had been knocked out and were lying beside him on the bed; and there were several lacerations about the face. The room was \u201cpretty well torn up.\u201d The Durham County medical examiner was summoned, and he concluded that Daniels had then been dead from five to seven hours. The pathologist who performed the autopsy testified that the wounds on Daniels\u2019 body had been inflicted by both sharp and blunt instruments, and they were consistent with blows from a shovel and cuts with a knife. It was his opinion that the blow which caused Daniels\u2019 death was the one which knocked the eye out of the socket and lacerated the nose. Blood from this wound had flowed through the trachea and into the lungs. A blood test revealed that at the time of his death Daniels\u2019 blood alcohol level was 260 milligrams percent. He was, therefore, intoxicated when he died.\nThe defendant did not testify. However, he offered evidence tending to show that from 8:00 a.m. on 4 January 1975 until 1:30 a.m. on 5 January 1975 he was with his older brother, James Jones; that they started drinking about 8:15 and that during the day they consumed two 6-packs of beer and three fifths of wine. From 9:00 p.m. until 1:30 a.m. they were both at the home of their mother, Mrs. Margie Jones, where they played cards and drank wine. At 1:30 a.m. James \u201cwalked\u201d defendant home and saw him enter his residence. Mrs. Vanessa Jones, defendant\u2019s wife, testified that she had been in bed watching television when defendant came home just before 2:00 a.m. on 5 January 1975; that he was so \u201chigh\u201d he went to sleep as soon as he undressed and \u201chit the bed\u201d; that he slept beside her until 8:00 a.m. She further said that on the night of 4-5 January, 1975 defendant was wearing a white turtleneck sweater which she washed later in the week, and at no time did she see any blood on it.\nAt the close of defendant\u2019s evidence the State called Robert Johnson as a rebuttal witness. He testified that during the early morning hours of 5 January 1975, about 12:20 a.m., he went to Helen Beasley\u2019s apartment, where he saw defendant, who was then wearing a white turtleneck sweater. He saw defendant\u2019s shirt and noticed that there were blood stains on it. At that time some other poeple, including Vanessa Jones, defendant\u2019s wife, were also at Mrs. Beasley\u2019s apartment. Defendant left the apartment before his wife, who stayed for about a half hour longer.\nThe court instructed the jury it might return one of three verdicts: guilty of murder in the first degree, guilty of murder in the second degree, or not guilty. The jury\u2019s verdict was \u201cguilty of murder in the second degree.\u201d From the judgment that he be imprisoned for the term of his natural life, defendant appealed to the Supreme Court. Defendant\u2019s appeal was not perfected within the time required by law. His petition for certiorari was allowed on 29 January 1976. The case was docketed in this Court on the 13th of April 1976 and argued on 14 September 1976.\nAttorney General Rufus L. Edmisten and Assistant Attorney General William Woodward Webb for the State.\nWilliam A. Graham III for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0681-01", "first_page_order": 705, "last_page_order": 711 }