{ "id": 8571452, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. BOBBY LEE WILLARD", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Willard", "decision_date": "1977-05-10", "docket_number": "No. 34", "first_page": "567", "last_page": "580", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "292 N.C. 567" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "183 S.E. 2d 661", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569459 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 S.E. 2d 546", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 455", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569610 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0455-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 S.E. 2d 335", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "287 N.C. 37", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560972 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/287/0037-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 S.E. 2d 51", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "287 N.C. 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562706 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/287/0344-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 L.Ed. 1302", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "year": 1952, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 U.S. 790", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11341724 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1952, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/343/0790-01" ] }, { "cite": "47 S.E. 2d 852", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1948, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "229 N.C. 123", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12164915 ], "year": 1948, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/229/0123-01" ] }, { "cite": "228 S.E. 2d 424", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "290 N.C. 718", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564509 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/290/0718-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 S.E. 2d 348", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "287 N.C. 266", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562576 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/287/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 S.E. 2d 513", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 145", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565158 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0145-01" ] }, { "cite": "87 S.Ct. 136", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "17 L.Ed. 2d 96", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "385 U.S. 869", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11377664, 11378083, 11377994, 11377838, 11377776, 11377718, 11377591, 11377624, 11377947, 11378173 ], "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/385/0869-03", "/us/385/0869-09", "/us/385/0869-08", "/us/385/0869-06", "/us/385/0869-05", "/us/385/0869-04", "/us/385/0869-01", "/us/385/0869-02", "/us/385/0869-07", "/us/385/0869-10" ] }, { "cite": "218 A. 2d 758", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "763" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "421 Pa. 396", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa.", "case_ids": [ 1900432 ], "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa/421/0396-01" ] }, { "cite": "285 A. 2d 563", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 N.J. 22", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J.", "case_ids": [ 1911335, 1911498, 1911312, 1911409, 1911390 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj/60/0022-03", "/nj/60/0022-02", "/nj/60/0022-04", "/nj/60/0022-01", "/nj/60/0022-05" ] }, { "cite": "283 A. 2d 537", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 N.J. Super. 26", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J. Super.", "case_ids": [ 335947 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj-super/117/0026-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 Ariz. 105", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ariz.", "case_ids": [ 631200 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "107" }, { "page": "423" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ariz/103/0105-01" ] }, { "cite": "46 A.L.R. 3d 544", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 S.E. 2d 458", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1948, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "229 N.C. 251", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12165471 ], "year": 1948, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/229/0251-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 S.E. 2d 560", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "274 N.C. 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559380 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/274/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 S.E. 2d 433", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 N.C. 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560097 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/278/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 S.E. 2d 305", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 N.C. 549", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569898 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/286/0549-01" ] }, { "cite": "227 S.E. 2d 97", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "115" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "290 N.C. 511", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561887 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "540" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/290/0511-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 S.E. 2d 668", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1958, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "247 N.C. 590", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8628037 ], "year": 1958, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/247/0590-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 N.C. 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569623 ], "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/263/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "203 S.E. 2d 781", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 N.C. 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562772 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/285/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 S.E. 2d 595", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "290 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560063 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/290/0001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1193, "char_count": 30367, "ocr_confidence": 0.675, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.927098028903385e-07, "percentile": 0.9531866529670263 }, "sha256": "81641819ddbd8c989d5a0fc0555c8973df83fb8063433e9f5609a952708da280", "simhash": "1:5307f29c20070ccc", "word_count": 5095 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:01:08.778506+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. BOBBY LEE WILLARD" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "COPELAND, Justice.\nDefendant first contends the court erred when it allowed Sheriff Blalock at the pretrial hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to express a personal opinion as to why defendant\u2019s mental condition had changed.\nThe record of the hearing discloses the following testimony by Sheriff Blalock on direct examination:\n\u201cWhen Bobby came back from the hospital the first time back in November, the jailer let him out on different occasions to do small jobs around the jail and he appeared to be a normal prisoner. The unusual something came up right before the last term or right after the last term of Superior Court. That is when I noticed a change in Bobby. There was a change in Bobby\u2019s attitude. He started sort of rambling in his talk rather than talking about specific things. I might add that at the time that we had Superior Court we had several prisoners here from Central Prison as we have at this time and my own personal feeling is-\u201d\n\u201cMr. Dellinger: Objection.\n\u201cCourt: Overruled.\n\u201cA. It is my feeling and my observation that these people talked a lot to Bobby and I feel that is one reason why he changed.\n\u201cMr. Dellinger: Objection.\n\u201cCourt: Overruled.\u201d\nA layman who has had a reasonable opportunity to form an opinion based on observation may testify as to the mental capacity of a defendant in a criminal case. State v. Hammonds, 290 N.C. 1, 224 S.E. 2d 595 (1976); 1 Stansbury\u2019s N. C. Evidence, \u00a7 127 (Brandis Rev. 1973); see State v. Thompson, 285 N.C. 181, 203 S.E. 2d 781 (1974). Assuming, arguendo, that a lay opinion as to the cause of a change in a defendant\u2019s mental state would nevertheless be incompetent, then the latter portion of Sheriff Blalock\u2019s testimony would be objectionable. However, we assume that when the court is the trier of fact, as is generally true on a pretrial motion, it will not consider incompetent evidence. Brown v. Boger, 263 N.C. 248, 139 S.E; 2d 577 (1965); Bizzell v. Bizzell, 247 N.C. 590, 101 S.E. 2d 668 (1958).\nIn a \u201c \u2018hearing before the judge on a preliminary motion, the ordinary rules as to the competency of evidence applied in a trial before a jury are to some extent relaxed, for the reason that the judge with knowledge of the law is able to eliminate from the testimony he hears that which is immaterial and incompetent, and consider only that which tends properly to prove the facts to be found.\u2019 (Citations omitted.)\u201d State v. Davis, 290 N.C. 511, 540, 227 S.E. 2d 97, 115 (1976). Absent affirmative evidence to the contrary, this Court presumes that the trial judge disregarded incompetent evidence in arriving at his decision. State v. Davis, supra; Bizzell v. Bizzell, supra.\nWith respect to the challenged testimony in the instant case Judge Walker made the following finding of fact:\n\u201cThat he [Sheriff Blalock] did however notice recently a change in the defendant after he had been placed with several persons from either Central Prison or the Department of Correction System, inmates from the Department of Correction, and that the defendant had started rambling in his talk.\u201d\nThis finding was based solely on Sheriff Blalock\u2019s competent testimony. The trial court properly ignored the Sheriff\u2019s arguably incompetent statement of opinion which had earlier been admitted over defendant\u2019s objection. We note, however, that the safer practice is for the trial judge to adhere to the rules of evidence at a hearing on a pretrial motion. State v. Davis, supra. But where, as here, it does not affirmatively appear that the trial judge based his findings on the incompetent evidence the assignment of error will be overruled.\nIn his next two assignments of error, defendant contends the trial court erred in finding that he was mentally capable of standing trial.\nThe test of a defendant\u2019s mental capacity to proceed to trial is whether he has the capacity to comprehend his position, to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to conduct his defense in a rational manner, and to cooperate with his counsel to the end that any available defense may be interposed. State v. Cooper, 286 N.C. 549, 213 S.E. 2d 305 (1975) ; State v. Jones, 278 N.C. 259, 179 S.E. 2d 433 (1971) ; State v. Propst, 274 N.C. 62, 161 S.E. 2d 560 (1968) ; State v. Sullivan, 229 N.C. 251, 49 S.E. 2d 458 (1948) ; 4 Strong\u2019s N. C. Index 3d, Criminal Law \u00a7 29 (1976). The issue may be determined by the trial court with or without the aid of a jury. State v. Cooper, supra; State v. Propst, supra; State v. Sullivan, supra. When the trial judge conducts the inquiry without a jury, the court\u2019s findings of fact, if supported by competent evidence, are conclusive on appeal. State v. Cooper, supra; see State v. Thompson, supra.\nDefendant assails the court\u2019s conclusion that he was capable of standing trial because at the hearing on the motion (1) the most recent expert medical evidence indicated the defendant was mentally incapable of standing trial and (2) uncontradicted medical evidence showed the defendant suffered from amnesia regarding the events of the crime.\nThe trial court\u2019s findings and conclusions as to the defendant\u2019s capacity to stand trial were supported by (1) defendant\u2019s score of 26 on the Competency Screening Test in November 1975, which was well within the range of competency to stand trial according to standards established by the National Institute of Mental Health; (2) Dr. James Groce\u2019s expert opinion that when he examined the defendant in November 1975, defendant was competent to stand trial; (3) the testimony of Sheriff Blalock, who observed the defendant in jail from the time of his arrest until trial (except for the periods he was at Dorothea Dix Hospital), which indicated that defendant was a normal prisoner and carried on normal conversations until recently when he started \u201crambling in his talk\u201d after he had been placed with some prisoners from Central Prison.\nDr. Groce\u2019s examination of defendant preceded Dr. Royal\u2019s examination by some nine months. Dr. Groce admitted he could not agree or disagree with Dr. Royal\u2019s opinions because they were based on data and a time period unavailable to him, and further admitted that defendant\u2019s competency could have changed since his examination. We would be inclined to agree with the defendant that the test data and Dr. Groce\u2019s examination were too remote in time to support the trial court\u2019s conclusion on defendant\u2019s competency to stand trial in light of Dr. Royal\u2019s examination but for Sheriff Blalock\u2019s observation that defendant\u2019s personality changed only after he was placed with other prisoners.\nThe trial court could reasonably have believed from all the evidence that the defendant decided, after coming in contact with other prisoners, that it was to his advantage to feign the auditory hallucinations and delusions which led to Dr. Royal\u2019s diagnosis of simple schizophrenia. It appears from the record that simple schizophrenia, combined with defendant\u2019s mild mental retardation and amnesia, were the basis for Dr. Royal\u2019s opinion that the defendant was incompetent to stand trial. Dr. Royal testified that schizophrenia, simple type, is a disease that comes on \u201cinsidiously or slowly so there is not an acute sudden onset.\u201d (Emphasis supplied.) By contrast, Sheriff Blalock\u2019s testimony disclosed a sudden change in the defendant\u2019s personality. Dr. Royal also admitted that it was possible for defendant to fake the hallucinations. Under these circumstances, we think Judge Walker\u2019s findings and conclusions are sufficiently supported by the evidence and therefore, are conclusive on appeal. State v. Cooper, supra.\nDefendant's alleged amnesia concerning the events of the crime would not prevent him from comprehending his position and understanding the nature and object of the proceedings against him. Nor would his partial amnesia prevent him from conducting his defense in a rational manner or cooperating with his counsel in presenting any available defenses. Obviously if defendant is unable to recall the events of the crime, his available defenses may be limited. We do not believe this fact alone renders him incompetent to stand trial or denies him a fair trial in view of the fact that the State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime charged was committed and that the defendant was the perpetrator. The general rule in other jurisdictions, which we adopt, is that amnesia does not per se render a defendant incapable of standing trial or of receiving a fair trial. Annot., 46 A.L.R. 3d 544, 553 (1972). See, e.g.\u201e State v. McClendon, 103 Ariz. 105, 437 P. 2d 421 (1968) ; State v. Pugh, 117 N.J. Super. 26, 283 A. 2d 537 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971), cert. denied, 60 N.J. 22, 285 A. 2d 563 (1972) ; Cummins v. Price, 421 Pa. 396, 218 A. 2d 758, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 869, 17 L.Ed. 2d 96, 87 S.Ct. 136 (1966). Partial amnesia places a defendant in no worse a position than the defendant who cannot remember where he was on a particular day because of the passage of time, or because he was insane, very intoxicated, completely drugged, or unconscious at the time. Cummins v. Price, supra. In each of these cases, the defendant\u2019s available defenses may be limited or impaired because of his present inability to reconstruct a past period of his life.\nIn deciding this same issue, the Arizona Supreme Court noted that, \u201camnesia \u2018is nothing more than a failure of memory concerning facts or events to which an individual has been exposed\u2019 and that \u2018every individual\u2019s memory process is marked by some distortion which may occur at any point\u2019 and \u2018as a result, no one\u2019s memory is in fact complete, even wider ideal conditions . . . every one is amnesic to some degree.\u2019 (Emphasis supplied.) 71 Yale Law J. 109-111 (1961-62).\u201d State v. McClendon, supra at 107, 437 P. 2d at 423. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in considering the issue which now confronts us, pointed out that, \u201c[i]f in fact the condition of amnesia is permanent, defendant\u2019s contention (1) would require Courts to hold that such amnesia will permanently, completely and absolutely negate all criminal responsibility and (2) will turn over the determination of crime and criminal liability to psychiatrists, whose opinions are usually based in large part upon defendant\u2019s self-serving statements, instead of to Courts and juries, and (3) will greatly jeopardize the safety and security of law-abiding citizens and render the protection of Society from crime and criminals far, more difficult than ever before in modern history. (Emphasis in original.) Cummins v. Price, supra at 406, 218 A. 2d at 763.\nWe find the reasoning of our sister courts persuasive on this issue. We note that nothing in the record suggests that this defendant\u2019s alleged amnesia was merely a temporary condition, a fact which might have influenced the court to delay the trial. State v. McClendon, supra. We have previously held on a related issue that amnesia is no defense to a criminal charge. State v. Bock, 288 N.C. 145, 217 S.E. 2d 513 (1975) ; see State v. Caddell, 287 N.C. 266, 215 S.E. 2d 348 (1975). The assignments of error relating to defendant\u2019s mental capacity to stand trial are overruled.\nIn his next assignment of error, defendant maintains the trial court erred by excluding certain medical testimony as to the mental condition of the defendant. Defendant argues that because the burden of proving insanity to the satisfaction of the jury rests upon him, he should be allowed to introduce any evidence bearing on his mental condition. We disagree.\nTrue, defendant has the burden of proving to the satisfaction of the jury that he was insane at the time the crime was committed. State v. Harris, 290 N.C. 718, 228 S.E. 2d 424 (1976) ; State v. Hammonds, supra; State v. Caddell, supra. This burden, however, is to show that defendant was insane in a legal sense at the time of the crime. State v. Swink, 229 N.C. 123, 47 S.E. 2d 852 (1948). The test of legal insanity asks whether, at the time the accused committed the act, he was laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind as to be incapable of knowing the nature and quality of his act or, if he did know this, incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong in relation to such act. State v. Harris, supra; State v. Cooper, supra; State v. Swink, supra. It follows that a defendant who pleads insanity in bar to a criminal charge is only entitled to introduce evidence relevant to the issue of legal insanity.\nDefendant complains that Dr. Royal was not allowed to testify at trial concerning his findings of schizophrenia, simple type, and alcohol pathological intoxication. Dr. Royal was permitted to give the following testimony:\n\u201cI am not able to state whether or not he [defendant] knew right from wrong at the time that the crime was committed . . .\n\u201cI am not able to state because the charged person indicated and has indicated consistently amnesia for the time of the alleged crime and so that is an area that we were unable to discuss. My thought is that he was operating under a psychotic condition and at times those people are able to determine right from wrong even when psychotic, but unless you interview the person at the time that they are in that condition that is impossible to say with certainty.\n\u201cA psychotic condition generally means a deranged mind within which a person has certain thought processes going on that are unrealistic.\u201d\nThus, it appears the doctor was allowed to state his opinion that the defendant was suffering from some type of psychosis at the time of the crime. The fact that the doctor was not permitted to place a label on the specific type of psychosis would not be reversible error. We also note that no proper foundation for the doctor\u2019s opinions as to simple schizophrenia and alcohol pathological intoxication was laid and thus the objections to this testimony were properly sustained. State v. Bock, supra. The doctor did state that he was unable to form an opinion as to whether the defendant knew right from wrong at the time of the crime, which was the relevant consideration. This assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant next challenges the constitutionality of the test for legal insanity in this State, the so-called \u201cM\u2019Naghten Rule.\u201d M\u2019Naghten\u2019s Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200 (H.L. 1843). Defendant concedes that our Court has on many occasions rejected this argument, see e.g., State v. Harris, supra, and that the only United States Supreme Court decision on point is contra to his position. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 96 L.Ed. 1302, 72 S.Ct. 1002 (1952). Defendant nevertheless asks this Court to reconsider the issue. Suffice it to say, that we have adhered to the \u201cright and wrong\u201d [M\u2019Naghten] test for many years and are not disposed to depart from it now. State v. Harris, supra; State v. Hammonds, supra; State v. Wetmore, 287 N.C. 344, 215 S.E. 2d 51 (1975) ; State v. Cooper, supra. This assignment of error is overruled.\nLastly, defendant claims the court erred when it refused to grant defendant\u2019s motion to set aside the verdict as being against the greater weight of the evidence. At motion to set aside the verdict as being contrary to the greater weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court and is not reviewable on appeal. State v. Vick, 287 N.C. 37, 213 S.E. 2d 335 (1975); State v. Moore, 279 N.C. 455, 183 S.E. 2d 546 (1971) ; State v. Mason, 279 N.C. 435, 183 S.E. 2d 661 (1971). The assignment of error is without merit and overruled.\nDue to the serious nature of the offenses charged, we have searched the record for errors other than those assigned and have found none.\nIn the trial we find\nNo error.", "type": "majority", "author": "COPELAND, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Rufus L. Edmisten by Assistant Attorney General James Wallace, Jr. for the State.", "James L. Dellinger, Jr. for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. BOBBY LEE WILLARD\nNo. 34\n(Filed 10 May 1977)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 29\u2014 competency to stand trial \u2014 sheriff\u2019s \u201cpersonal feeling\u201d \u2014 absence of prejudice\nIn a pretrial hearing to determine defendant\u2019s competency to stand trial, defendant was not prejudiced by a sheriff\u2019s testimony that it was his \u201cpersonal feeling\u201d defendant\u2019s attitude and manner of speech changed because prisoners from Central Prison who were placed in jail with defendant had talked to him, even if such testimony was incompetent, where it does not appear that the trial judge based his findings on the incompetent evidence.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 29\u2014 test of mental competency to stand trial\nThe test of defendant\u2019s mental competency to stand trial is whether he has the capacity to comprehend his position, to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to conduct his defense in a rational manner, and to cooperate with his counsel to the end that any available defense may be interposed.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 29.1\u2014 determination of mental competency to stand trial\nThe issue of defendant\u2019s mental competency to stand trial may be determined by the trial court with or without the aid of a jury.\n4. Criminal Law \u00a7 29.1\u2014 competency to stand trial \u2014 non-jury hearing \u2014 conclusiveness of findings\nWhen the trial court conducts an inquiry without a jury to determine defendant\u2019s competency to stand trial, the court\u2019s findings of fact, if supported by competent evidence, are conclusive on appeal.\n5. Criminal Law \u00a7 29\u2014 competency to stand trial \u2014 conflicting evidence\nAlthough a psychiatrist who examined defendant in July and August 1976 was of the opinion that defendant was mentally incompetent to stand trial in August 1976, the trial court\u2019s determination that defendant was mentally competent to stand trial was supported by (1) defendant\u2019s score of 26 on the Competency Screening test in November 1975, which was well within the range of competency to stand trial according to standards established by the National Institute of- Mental Health; (2) another psychiatrist\u2019s expert opinion that when he examined defendant in November 1975 defendant was competent to stand trial; and (3) testimony of the sheriff, who observed defendant in jail from the time of his arrest until trial (except for the periods he was in a State hospital), that defendant was a normal prisoner and carried on normal conversations until recently when he started \u201crambling in his talk\u201d after he had been placed with some prisoners from Central Prison.\n6. Criminal Law \u00a7 29; Constitutional Law \u00a7 32\u2014 amnesia \u2014 competency to stand trial \u2014 fair trial\nAmnesia concerning the events of the crime does not per se render a defendant incapable of standing trial or of receiving a fair trial.\n7. Criminal La.w \u00a7 63.1\u2014 evidence of legal insanity\nA defendant who pleads insanity in bar to a criminal charge is entitled to introduce evidence relevant to legal insanity.\n8. Criminal Law \u00a7 63.1\u2014 insanity \u2014 exclusion of expert\u2019s testimony\nThe trial court did not err in refusing to permit a psychiatrist to testify as to his findings that defendant suffered from simple schizophrenia and alcohol pathological intoxication at the time of the crime where the witness was permitted to state his opinion that defendant suffered from some type of psychosis at the time of the crime, no proper foundation was laid for the witness\u2019s opinion as to simple schizophrenia and alcohol pathological intoxication, and the witness stated that he was unable to form an opinion as to whether defendant knew right from wrong at the time of the crime, which was the relevant consideration.\n9. Criminal Law \u00a7 5\u2014 insanity \u2014 M\u2019Naghten Rule \u2014 constitutionality\nThe ability to distinguish between right and wrong test [M\u2019Nagh-ten Rule] for legal insanity is constitutional.\nDependant appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-27(a) from judgments of Walker, H. H., Jentered 26 August 1976, Stokes Superior Court. Defendant\u2019s conviction of felonious assault with a deadly weapon with the intent to kill inflicting serious injury was certified for initial appellate review by the Supreme Court pursuant to G.S. 7A-81 (a) on 21 December 1976.\nOn indictments, proper in form, defendant was charged with first degree burglary, aggravated kidnapping, assault with intent to commit rape, and assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury.\nDefendant entered a general plea of not guilty and a special plea of not guilty by reason of insanity to each indictment. The assault with intent to commit rape charge was dismissed upon motion of the district attorney at the close of the State\u2019s evidence. Defendant was found guilty of the remaining offenses. The court imposed the mandatory life sentence for the first degree burglary conviction, life imprisonment for the aggravated kidnapping conviction to commence at the expiration of the burglary sentence, and a sentence of ten years imprisonment for the assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury conviction to commence at the expiration of the kidnapping sentence.\nThe evidence for the State tended to show the following:\nOn the evening of 4 November 1975, Alma M. Joyce, aged 74, was living by herself at her home in Prestonville, North Carolina. She went to bed about 10:30 p.m. and before retiring, closed and locked all the outside doors and windows. She was awakened about 11:00 p.m. when she heard a \u201cscrambling\u201d under her bed. The defendant jumped out from under the the bed. Mrs. Joyce ran through the house and out the front door, which she found half open, towards her daughter\u2019s house. The defendant gave chase and caught her at the mail box. Putting his hands over her mouth, he forced her back into the house. In the kitchen he said, \u201cI am bloodthirsty and I came to kill you\u201d and proceeded to cut Mrs. Joyce with a pocket knife across her face and throat.\nThe defendant then pushed her into the bedroom where he kept her confined for five or six hours. During the night, he cut the telephone cord, the refrigerator and some calendars in the kitchen. Periodically, he resumed his assaults, cutting* the victim numerous times on the hands, arms, breast, back and other parts of the body. He slit Mrs. Joyce\u2019s dresses that were hanging in the bedroom and cut off her night clothes. At 6:30 a.m. he finally left. Shortly thereafter, Mrs. Joyce heard a gunshot. Defendant had previously told the victim that he had left a gun outside beside a tree.\nAfter defendant had gone, Mrs. Joyce staggered out of the house onto the steps and slumped down. Neighbors responded to her screaming and she was taken to the hospital where she remained for two weeks. She was on the operating table for five hours and .received 400 stitches to close her wounds.\nMrs. Joyce had known the defendant before the attack. The defendant, on occasion, had stayed with his brother who farmed Mrs. Joyce\u2019s land and had assisted his brother in packing tobacco and carrying it to market. Mrs. Joyce and the defendant had never exchanged any cross words prior to the assault.\nMrs. Joyce described the defendant as calm during the entire evening. He smoked cigarettes all through the morning from a Winston package. When she inquired if he was drunk, he told her that he was not but that he had smoked some \u201cLSD cigarettes.\u201d\nAccording to the SBI Laboratory report, a button found at Mrs. Joyce\u2019s house was similar to one missing off a shirt belonging to the defendant. A knife recovered from the defendant revealed bloodstains of the same type as Mrs. Joyce\u2019s blood (defendant\u2019s own blood type was different). A flashlight and some shotgun shells were discovered near Mrs. Joyce\u2019s house. The screen door on the front of her house had been damaged.\nPrior to trial, defendant was twice committed to the State mental hospital, Dorothea Dix, for a period of observation and treatment pursuant to G.S. 15A-1002. He was hospitalized November 10-21, 1975, and July 23-August 20, 1976. After each period of hospitalization, he was returned to the Stokes County Jail.\nPrior to jury selection, counsel for the defendant moved presumably for a continuance because \u201cthe defendant was unable to plead his case and understand the nature of the charges and is unable to stand trial because of mental incompetency.\u201d\nAt the hearing on the motion, defendant's evidence tended to show that Dr. Billy Williamson Royal, a staff psychiatrist, had examined the defendant during the months of July and August 1976 while he was at Dorothea Dix Hospital. The examination revealed that the defendant was illiterate and had an IQ of 53, which is regarded as mild to moderate retardation. According to Dr. Royal\u2019s diagnosis, the defendant was also suffering from schizophrenia, simple type, which is a \u201ctype of illness that comes on insidiously or slowly so there is not an acute sudden onset.\u201d At the hospital defendant experienced auditory hallucinations and paranoia according to Dr. Royal. In addition, the defendant was diagnosed as having suffered from alcohol pathological intoxication on the evening of the crime. The defendant had no memory of the offense and thought he had already been tried for it. This mental amnesia, in the opinion of Dr. Royal, was attributable to his alcohol pathological condition and possible drug use on the night of the crime.\nDr. Royal testified that alcohol pathological intoxication is very unusual. \u201cIt is a condition in which a person is not aware of what they were doing. They are operating with what may be called a deranged mental mechanism in terms of what they are doing. Having in essence no control over their operation. In lay terms, crazy or psychotic. In other words, it is a condition that person is in when he commits a perfectly senseless crime which is unexplained. It is an unusual condition brought on by alcohol in some people on some occasions, in a very low percentage of cases. It is a form of drunkenness or the effects of alcohol upon the mind. . . . From a psychiatric standpoint a person in this condition is simply not responsible for what he is doing or does not know any better.\u201d (Emphasis supplied.) Defendant told Dr. Royal that he consumed a fifth of alcohol, plus some beer, on the day in question. Defendant admitted customarily drinking substantial amounts of alcohol on weekends. The alleged crime was comitted on a weekday.\nDr. Royal was of the opinion that as of 20 August 1976 the defendant was not capable of assisting with his defense. Specifically, Dr. Royal did not think the defendant had the mental capacity to comprehend his position and the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to conduct his defense in a rational manner and to cooperate with his counsel to the end that any available defense may be interposed. Dr. Royal stated the defendant did understand the difference between right and wrong at the time of his examination.\nDr. Royal felt that the defendant\u2019s mental condition had deteriorated since the time of his first commitment to Dorothea Dix Hospital and Dr. Royal based his opinion that the defendant was incapable of standing trial on this deterioration in mental state.\nThe defendant\u2019s sister and mother both testified that the defendant\u2019s personality had changed for the worse while he was in jail and confirmed his amnesia concerning the events of the crime.\nThe State\u2019s evidence in opposition to the motion tended to show that Dr. James Groce, a staff psychiatrist at Dorothea Dix Hospital, had examined the defendant when he was first sent to the hospital in November 1975. It was the opinion of Dr. Groce that the defendant could understand his position in the court and the nature of the charges against him and could intelligently cooperate with his attorney in preparing his defense.\nDr. Groce indicated that alcohol pathological intoxication was rare. He testified that the fact that the assault took place over a five to six hour period, and that no alcohol was consumed during this time, made it less likely that the defendant was in a state of pathological intoxication. Dr. Groce felt that over this period of time, with no further consumption of alcohol, a person would sober up or at least his alcohol pathological intoxication would diminish.\nDr. Groce found no simple schizophrenia or other psychosis. Defendant had no problems with delusions or hallucinations during his first stay at the hospital. The doctor was of the opinion that the defendant knew the difference between right and wrong at the time he examined him. His only diagnosis was mild mental retardation. The defendant reported drinking alcohol on the day of the crime but did not report the use of any drugs to the doctor.\nDuring the November 1975 commitment, defendant was administered the Competency Screening Test, designed by the National Institute of Mental Health to assist in determining a person\u2019s capacity to proceed to trial. The maximum score on the test is 40, and a score above 20 is evidence of capacity to proceed to trial. The defendant scored 26.\nSheriff Tony Blalock of Stokes County testified that he had observed the defendant in jail during his incarceration and had normal conversations with him from time to time. When defendant first returned from Dorothea Dix in November 1975, he was permitted to do small jobs around the jail and appeared to be a normal prisoner. After the last term of superior court the defendant\u2019s attitude changed and his speech became \u201crambling.\u201d (We take judicial notice that the \u201clast term\u201d was the 7 June Session of Stokes Superior Court.) Several prisoners from Central Prison were placed in the county jail for that session of court and these people had talked \u201ca lot\u201d to the defendant. It was the Sheriff\u2019s feeling that these conversations had something to do with the change in the defendant.\nAt the close of the evidence, the court made findings of fact and based on those findings concluded that \u201cthe defendant is capable of standing trial at this time and [is able] to plead to the bills of indictment against him.\u201d More specifically, the court concluded that \u201cthe defendant at this time does in fact have the mental capacity to comprehend his position and to understand the nature and the object of the proceedings against him and to conduct his defense in a rational manner and to cooperate with his attorney to the end that any available defense may be interposed.\u201d Whereupon, defendant\u2019s motion was denied and the matter proceeded to trial.\nOther facts necessary to the decision will be discussed in the opinion.\nAttorney General Rufus L. Edmisten by Assistant Attorney General James Wallace, Jr. for the State.\nJames L. Dellinger, Jr. for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0567-01", "first_page_order": 587, "last_page_order": 600 }