{ "id": 8571677, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TIMITHY RAY GAINEY", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Gainey", "decision_date": "1977-05-10", "docket_number": "No. 71", "first_page": "627", "last_page": "633", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "292 N.C. 627" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "225 S.E. 2d 843", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "29 N.C. App. 653", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8556940 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/29/0653-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 S.E. 456", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1933, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "204 N.C. 28", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8610419 ], "year": 1933, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/204/0028-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 S.E. 2d 491", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "494" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "248 N.C. 432", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624128 ], "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "435" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/248/0432-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 S.E. 2d 765", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "770" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 N.C. 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563764 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "214" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/277/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 S.E. 2d 883", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "273 N.C. 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575091 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/273/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "123 S.E. 2d 222", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "224" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "256 N.C. 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571012 ], "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "74" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/256/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 S.E. 2d 578", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 113", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565031 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0113-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 736, "char_count": 14836, "ocr_confidence": 0.696, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.935436763439376e-08, "percentile": 0.4620060860691106 }, "sha256": "ce0560c4b0b886d2774cc8b941d599facff007fe59c99f473fec8648a673c49c", "simhash": "1:cf2c894f4ad5c74e", "word_count": 2525 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:01:08.778506+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TIMITHY RAY GAINEY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "SHARP, Chief Justice.\nApplying the well-established rules for testing the sufficiency of the State\u2019s evidence to carry the case to the jury, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the evidence adduced at the trial survived defendant\u2019s motions for nonsuit. State v. McKinney, 288 N.C. 113, 215 S.E. 2d 578 (1975). Clearly, the State\u2019s evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant failed to bring his vehicle to a stop on Winona Street before entering its intersection with C Street; that his failure to yield the right-of-way to the Freeze pickup truck approaching on West C Street, a designated \u201cmain-travelled or through highway,\u201d was a violation of G.S. 20-158 (a) (1965) ; and that this statutory violation was culpable negligence which proximately caused the death of Mrs. Freeze. We hold, however, that the Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that the State had offered no evidence tending to show that at the time defendant approached and entered the intersection he was operating his vehicle at an unlawful rate of speed and that the trial judge had, therefore, committed prejudicial error in charging upon a state of facts not presented by the evidence.\nSince the evidence fails to disclose the presence of any signs giving notice that a lower speed limit had been established for the locus in quo, we must assume that the speed limit for that area was 55 mph. G.S. 20-141 (b) (4) (1965). No witness testified that defendant was traveling at a speed in excess of 55 mph. However, a speed less than the maximum limit designated in the statute is not per se a lawful speed, for G.S. 20-141 (a) (1965) provided, \u201cNo person shall drive a vehicle on a highway or in a public vehicular area at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions then existing.\u201d The meaning and intent of this section was fully stated in G.S. 20-141 (c) (1965) as follows:\n\u201cThe fact that the speed of a vehicle is lower than the [statutory] limits shall not relieve the driver from the duty to decrease speed when approaching and crossing an intersection, when approaching and going around a curve, when approaching a hill crest, when traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway, or when special hazard exists with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of weather or highway conditions, and speed shall be decreased as may be necessary to avoid colliding with any person, vehicle, or other conveyance on or entering the highway, and to avoid causing injury to any person or property either on or off the highway, in compliance with legal requirements and the duty of all persons to use due care.\u201d\n(Here we note that the section quoted above was not specifically reincorporated in G.S. 20-141 when it was rewritten by 1973 Sess. Laws, ch. 1330, \u00a7 7, effective 1 January 1975. Notwithstanding its omission, G.S. 20-141 (a) (1975) still encompasses all its provisions. See Cassetta v. Compton, 256 N.C. 71, 74, 123 S.E. 2d 222, 224 (1961).)\nThe State\u2019s evidence tended to show that defendant approached the \u201cT\u201d intersection in the nighttime at a speed \u201cexceeding 35 miles per hour\u201d and, without stopping or slowing down, entered it \u201cjust like a flash of light.\u201d Defendant\u2019s version was, \u201cMy speed was 35 miles per hour. I didn\u2019t try to make a turn after I entered the intersection because I didn\u2019t see the car until I was right on the intersection. There was no use to turn.\u201d When the Freeze pickup truck hit the side of defendant\u2019s Ford, both vehicles were overturned and destroyed. The camper was turned upside down and Mrs. Carrie Freeze, who was riding in it, received fatal injuries.\nDefendant testified that after he came on Winona Street he negotiated two sharp curves and then drove four-tenths of a mile on a straight, dry, paved road before he entered the intersection. He offered no explanation of his failure to see. the approaching Freeze truck and camper, and his statement that his brakes failed was not corroborated either by the investigating highway patrolman or defendant\u2019s \u201cman,\u201d both of whom examined his brakes after the accident.\nClearly, the foregoing evidence was sufficient not only to support a finding that defendant drove into the intersection without stopping, a violation of G.S. 20-158 (1965), but also that at the time he approached and entered it he was driving at a greater speed than was reasonable and prudent under the conditions then existing, a violation of G.S. 20-141 (a) (1965). It. is equally clear that the evidence was entirely adequate to support a finding that defendant\u2019s violation of these two statutes constituted culpable negligence as that term is defined in State v. Weston, 273 N.C. 275, 159 S.E. 2d 883 (1968) and the cases cited therein.\nApprehending that the trial judge \u201ccould have left the impression with the jury that a mere violation of G.S. 20-158, proximately resulting in death, would warrant a conviction of involuntary manslaughter,\u201d the Court of Appeals held the following instruction to be prejudicial error:\n\u201cSo I charge that if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about October 7, 1973, at about 7:55 p.m., Timithy Ray Gainey intentionally or recklessly drove his motor vehicle at a speed that was greater than reasonable and prudent under the conditions then and there existing, or drove his vehicle through a stop sign without braking his vehicle to a stop, thereby proximately causing the death of Carrie Freeze, and that the violation or violations did not result from brake failure on the defendant\u2019s car, it would be your duty to return a verdict of guilty of involuntary manslaughter. However, if you do not so find or if you have a reasonable doubt as to one or more of these things, you would not return a verdict of guilty, but would return a verdict of not guilty.\u201d\nStanding alone, the foregoing mandate would be inadequate. However, it is axiomatic that the trial judge\u2019s charge must be considered as a whole and construed contextually. The fact that some expressions, standing alone, might require amplification, will afford no ground for reversal when the charge as a whole presents the law fairly and clearly to the jury. E.g., State v. Lee, 277 N.C. 205, 214, 176 S.E. 2d 765, 770 (1970) ; 4 Strong\u2019s N. C. Index 3d, Criminal Law \u00a7 168 (1976).\nImmediately preceding the portion of the charge quoted above the judge had instructed the jury that in order to convict defendant of involuntary manslaughter the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that defendant had violated a safety statute (either G.S. 20-141 (a) or G.S. 20-158) in a criminally negligent manner and (2) that such violation was the proximate cause of Carrie Freeze\u2019s death, that is, \u201cA real cause, a cause without which [her] death would not have occurred.\u201d He also charged that \u201cfor a violation to be criminally negligent it must have been committed intentionally or recklessly,\u201d and he defined a reckless violation as one which, when judged by the rule of reasonable foresight, shows the violator to have been \u201cheedlessly indifferent to the safety and rights of others.\u201d\nThe evidence in this ease was brief and uncomplicated. Except for the issue of brake failure, it was relatively free from conflict. As a result, we cannot believe the jury could have misunderstood either the court\u2019s definition of criminal negligence or instruction that before they could convict defendant of involuntary manslaughter they must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that criminal negligence on the part of defendant was a proximate cause of the death of Carrie Freeze.\nWe hold, therefore, that the charge of the trial judge meets the requirements of this case. At the same time, however, we are constrained to say that the fuller and more explicit exposition of the law of culpable negligence contained in such cases as State v. Weston, supra; State v. Hancock, 248 N.C. 432, 435, 103 S.E. 2d 491, 494 (1958) ; and State v. Cope, 204 N.C. 28, 167 S.E. 456 (1933) is more likely to enlighten the jury and to pass muster on appeal. For many years the carefully phrased statements of Chief Justice Stacy in State v. Cope, supra, have served both trial and appellate court judges well when they were called upon to explain the difference between civil and criminal negligence, and we recommend their continued use.\nThe decision of the Court of Appeals vacating the judgment from which defendant appealed and ordering a new trial is reversed; and this cause is remanded with directions that it be returned to the Superior Court of Rowan for the reinstatement of the judgment.\nReversed and remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "SHARP, Chief Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Rufus L. Edmisten, Special Deputy Attorney General John R. B. Matthis, and Associate Attorney Jo Anne Sanford Routh for the State.", "Robert M. Davis for defendant appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TIMITHY RAY GAINEY\nNo. 71\n(Filed 10 May 1977)\n1. Automobiles \u00a7 113.1\u2014 involuntary manslaughter \u2014 failure to stop at intersection \u2014 exceeding safe speed \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nIn a prosecution for involuntary manslaughter evidence was sufficient to support a finding that defendant drove into an intersection without stopping, a violation of G.S. 20-158; that at the time he approached and entered it he was driving at a greater speed than was reasonable and prudent under the conditions then existing; and that defendant\u2019s violation of these two statutes constituted culpable negligence which proximately caused the death of a passenger in the vehicle with which defendant collided.\n2. Automobiles \u00a7 114.1\u2014 involuntary manslaughter \u2014 criminal negligence and proximate cause \u2014 instructions proper\nThe trial court\u2019s instructions in an involuntary manslaughter prosecution were sufficient where they informed the jury that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that defendant had violated a safety statute (either G.S. 20-141 (a) or G.S. 20-158) in a criminally negligent manner and (2) that such violation was the proximate cause of a passenger\u2019s death; and the court explained the term \u201cproximate cause,\u201d explained what was required for a violation to be criminally negligent, and defined a reckless violation.\nAppeal by the State pursuant to G.S. 7A-30(2) from the decision of the Court of Appeals vacating the judgment entered by Collier, J., at the 1 December 1975 Session of the Superior Court of Rowan, 29 N.C. App. 653, 225 S.E. 2d 843 (1976). This appeal was docketed and argued as Case No. 69 at the Fall Term 1976.\nUpon an indictment charging him with the unlawful and felonious slaying of Carrie Freeze, defendant was tried and convicted of involuntary manslaughter. From a sentence of three to five years he appealed to the Court of Appeals.\nThe State\u2019s evidence, summarized except when quoted, tended to show the following facts:\nAt approximately 8:00 p.m. on 7 October 1973 Mrs. Julia Ann Freeze was operating a pickup truck in a westerly direction on West C Street in Rowan County. Her nephew and her mother, Mrs. Carrie Freeze, were riding in a detachable camper unit, fastened to the truck bed with four steel cables. As Mrs. Freeze approached the \u201cT\u201d intersection of West C and Winona Streets near Kannapolis, she was driving at a speed of 80 mph. The lights on her vehicle were burning. At the same time defendant was approaching the intersection on Winona Street. He was driving his 1963 Ford at a speed in excess of 35 mph. Both streets were paved roads, but the intersection was not controlled by any traffic light. There was a stop sign on Winona Street; none on West C Street. As Mrs. Freeze entered the intersection she saw that defendant\u2019s vehicle was also entering and \u201cin a flash it came out.\u201d Her truck hit the side of his car and the vehicles overturned. The camper was torn from the truck, and both it and the Ford were turned upside down. The vehicles were totally destroyed and the back of the camper was demolished. Mrs. Carrie Freeze died three weeks later from the head and chest injuries she suffered in the collision.\nThe investigating patrolman, J. E. Everett, did not know the posted speed limit on Winona Street as it approached the intersection. He found no skid marks within the area of the intersection. He detected a \u201cmoderate odor of some alcoholic beverage\u201d from defendant\u2019s breath, and he \u201cobserved four or five beer cans in the [defendant\u2019s] vehicle. There was the odor of some alcoholic beverage.\u201d Defendant \u201cindicated\u201d to the patrolman that \u201csomething had happened to his car.\u201d The next day Everett examined the car in a garage in Kannapolis. He depressed the brake pedal and \u201cit was a full brake pedal,\u201d which did not go to the floor. In his opinion it was adequate to stop a vehicle.\nDefendant\u2019s evidence, consisting of his testimony only, tended to show:\nAt the time of the collision he had traveled about one half a mile on Winona Street. Where he came on to the street, \u201cthere is a sharp curve to the right, and then it goes right back to the left\u201d and \u201cstraight up to C Street. . . . The sharp curve is about three, four-tenths miles to West C Street.\u201d Defendant was returning to his home in Concord from the Charlotte Motor Speedway, where he had spent the day and the latter half of the preceding night in a camper with friends. He had just left the home of one who lived \u201coff Winona Street.\u201d When defendant was \u201calready right at the intersection\u201d of Winona and West C Streets he saw the camper coming and applied his brakes. When they went all the way to the floor he pumped them but was unable to stop. He entered the intersection at a speed of about 35 mph. He didn\u2019t intentionally enter West C Street without stopping, but when he saw the camper coming he knew there was no way for him to get out of its path. A few days after the collision defendant personally checked the brakes on his car, and \u201cthey were showing a little over half a pedal.\u201d After he was charged with manslaughter he \u201chad a man\u201d examine the brakes, but \u201che said he didn\u2019t see anything wrong.\u201d\nDefendant testified that he had drunk three beers during the day of the collision; that he had consumed the last one prior to 4:00 p.m.; that on the back seat of his car he had a cooler containing seven bottles of beer and the collision \u201cbusted the beers\u201d and he \u201cwas wet from it.\u201d\nOn 7 October 1973, in consequence of his collision with Mrs. Freeze\u2019s camper, defendant received a citation charging him with a \u201cstop sign violation.\u201d He \u201cpaid it off\u201d; he had \u201calways paid them off.\u201d In addition to this violation on 7 October 1973, between May 1968 and August 1975, defendant was seven times convicted of speeding, once for failing to yield the right-of-way, and once for \u201crunning a red light.\u201d\nUpon defendant\u2019s appeal from his conviction of manslaughter, the Court of Appeals ordered a new trial upon the ground that Judge Collier had committed error in his charge to the jury.\nAttorney General Rufus L. Edmisten, Special Deputy Attorney General John R. B. Matthis, and Associate Attorney Jo Anne Sanford Routh for the State.\nRobert M. Davis for defendant appellee." }, "file_name": "0627-01", "first_page_order": 647, "last_page_order": 653 }