{ "id": 8574309, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ERNEST MARTIN", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Martin", "decision_date": "1978-04-17", "docket_number": "No. 14", "first_page": "702", "last_page": "713", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "294 N.C. 702" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "414 U.S. 874", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11762922, 11762669, 11763119, 11762495, 11762997, 11762845, 11763196, 11762557, 11762751 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/414/0874-06", "/us/414/0874-03", "/us/414/0874-08", "/us/414/0874-01", "/us/414/0874-07", "/us/414/0874-05", "/us/414/0874-09", "/us/414/0874-02", "/us/414/0874-04" ] }, { "cite": "180 S.E. 2d 755", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 N.C. 561", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561152 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/278/0561-01" ] }, { "cite": "160 S.E. 2d 469", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "472" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "273 N.C. 509", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575701 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "514" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/273/0509-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 U.S. 83", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11716714 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/373/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 S.E. 2d 481", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 N.C. 592", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575699 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/281/0592-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 S.E. 2d 75", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "270 N.C. 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566940 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/270/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 S.E. 2d 202", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1956, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "243 N.C. 771", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627281 ], "year": 1956, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/243/0771-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 S.E. 2d 881", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 341", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571955 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0341-01" ] }, { "cite": "143 S.E. 187", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1928, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "195 N.C. 552", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8630764 ], "year": 1928, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/195/0552-01" ] }, { "cite": "203 S.E. 2d 849", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 N.C. 202", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562902 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/285/0202-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 S.E. 2d 512", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 N.C. 328", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569699 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/292/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "429 U.S. 492", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 7010 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "494-495" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/429/0492-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 976, "char_count": 24781, "ocr_confidence": 0.822, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1902579346784862e-07, "percentile": 0.591236400268896 }, "sha256": "00b30def2d7f91836ad9066640c678866cec62387607d65dddbf5c8846ddaaae", "simhash": "1:f63901e3f636befb", "word_count": 4122 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:31:40.522690+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ERNEST MARTIN" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BRANCH, Justice.\nDefendant contends that the trial judge erred by admitting into evidence statements made by defendant before he was given the Miranda warnings.\nPursuant to the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence of statements made by him to police officers, a voir dire hearing was held before the jury was empaneled. The State offered the testimony of S.B.I. Agent William Thompson and Officers Ronnie Thigpen and James L. Sasser which tended to show that upon receiving information that Don Zell Jones might be involved in the killing of Mrs. Blackwell they ascertained that he was residing at the home of Helen Martin. After obtaining Mrs. Martin\u2019s consent to search her home, they proceeded to the premises. Upon arrival, they encountered Ernest Martin, who told them that Don Zell Jones lived there and was his sister\u2019s boyfriend. Officer Flowers asked Ernest if he would go to the police car and talk with them. He agreed to do so and while sitting in the police car, he was asked if a lady in a red car came to his home on 6 April 1977. He replied in the negative. He was then asked if he was afraid of Don Zell Jones, and he replied that he was. The officers told him he would be protected from Jones, and defendant then stated that a woman in a red car drove up to the house on 6 April and he was asked to tell her that his mother was in the back room of the house and wanted to cash a check. He delivered the message, and the woman entered the house. Shortly thereafter, the woman ran out of the house with Don Zell Jones following her armed with a shotgun. Don Zell Jones and the woman entered her car and left. Ernest Martin was then advised that he was a witness and was requested to go to the city hall to make \u00e1 statement. He consented and they proceeded to the Mt. Olive City Hall, where Ernest made a statement similar to the one immediately above recited. The officers testified that at this point, they had not considered defendant a suspect and that he was not under arrest or restrained in any manner. However, when he had completed his statement, one of the officers inquired of him \u201cif he had anything to do with the crime\u201d and Ernest replied, \u201cI went with him to ditch the car.\u201d After Ernest Martin made this reply, S.B.I. Agent Thompson immediately and fully advised Ernest Martin of his rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L.Ed. 2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966). Defendant affirmatively waived his constitutional rights including his right to presence of counsel. He then, in substance, repeated the statement above summarized and further stated that he went with Jones to hide the car and later, at Jones\u2019 request, bought some kerosene. Jones took the kerosene and rode off on a bicycle.\nAfter the interview ended, the officers took defendant home.\nDefendant offered no evidence on the voir dire hearing.\nAt the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Cowper found facts consistent with those above stated and concluded that the first statement was non-custodial and, therefore, required no Miranda warnings. He further concluded that the second statement was voluntarily made after defendant understandingly and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights. Judge Cowper thereupon ruled that the statements were admissible into evidence.\nWe are of the opinion that the court correctly ruled. In Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 50 L.Ed. 2d 714, 97 S.Ct. 711 (1977), a parolee voluntarily came to the police station and was advised that he was not under arrest. He was questioned about a burglary and was falsely told that his fingerprints were found at the scene of the burglary. He confessed to the burglary but then left the police station without any hindrance. At trial, his statement was admitted into evidence, and he was convicted of first degree burglary. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed, but upon his petition for review, the Supreme Court of Oregon reversed holding that the failure to give the Miranda warnings was reversible error. The State of Oregon petitioned the United States Supreme Court for review and the petition was allowed. In reversing the decision of the Supreme Court of Oregon, the United States Supreme Court, in part, stated:\nOur decision in Miranda set forth rules of police procedure applicable to \u201ccustodial interrogation.\u201d \u201cBy custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.\u201d\n* He *.\n. . . police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question. Nor is the requirement of warnings to be imposed simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect. Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person\u2019s freedom as to render him \u201cin custody.\u201d It was that sort of coercive environment to which Miranda by its terms was made applicable, and to which it is limited. [Emphasis ours.] 429 U.S. at 494-495.\nAccord: State v. Biggs, 292 N.C. 328, 233 S.E. 2d 512 (1977); State v. Sykes, 285 N.C. 202, 203 S.E. 2d 849 (1974).\nIn instant case, all the evidence shows that defendant voluntarily went to the police station and at the time he made the statements he was not under arrest and his freedom to depart was not restricted. In fact, the police officers returned him to his home at the conclusion of the interview. We hold that defendant\u2019s first statement was not the product of \u201ccustodial interrogation\u201d and, therefore, no Miranda warnings were required. Neither was the assurance by the officers that they would protect him from Don Zell Jones of such nature as to render the otherwise valid statement inadmissible. See, State v. Newsome, 195 N.C. 552, 143 S.E. 187 (1928).\nDefendant\u2019s contention that the statements made after the Miranda warnings were given were involuntary and inadmissible is without merit. Our holding that the original statement was properly admitted destroys his argument that the statement made after the warnings were given was tainted by the original statement. Further, Judge Cowper\u2019s findings which support his conclusions and ruling were supported by the evidence and are, therefore, binding upon us. State v. Biggs, supra.\nDefendant\u2019s assignment of error number 5 is as follows:\nThe court erred in admitting testimony of evidence seized during the search of defendant\u2019s premises with a search warrant and in refusing to permit defense counsel to introduce the search warrant into evidence on cross examination of the State\u2019s witness.\nOn direct examination, S.B.I. Agent Thompson testified that he went to the Martin residence with Deputy Sheriffs Sasser, Uzzle, and others where Officer Jernigan served a search warrant on defendant. Over defendant\u2019s objection, Thompson testified that there they found a number of caps from .410 gauge shells and a plastic Clorox jug which smelled of kerosene. On cross-examination, he was shown defense exhibit 2 which he identified as a copy of the search warrant which authorized a search of the Martin home. The return of the search warrant shows:\nX on the 9 day of April, 1977, at 1:20 o\u2019clock a.m., I made a search of within described premises as therein commanded. X I did not seize any items.\nAt this point, in the absence of the jury, defense counsel moved that the court allow the search warrant into evidence as an exhibit of the court or in the alternative instruct the district attorney to present the warrant as a part of the State\u2019s case. In his argument on these motions, defense counsel, in part, stated:\nYour Honor, I am not moving to suppress. I am using the search warrant to impeach witnesses who have testified contrary to what they\u2019ve sworn to in an affidavit.\n* * *\nI have not moved to quash the search warrant.\nJudge Cowper overruled these motions and advised defense counsel that he could, at the proper time, offer the search warrant into evidence if he so desired.\nThe validity of a search warrant, and the admissibility of evidence obtained by a search warrant are matters of law to be determined by the trial judge. Further, it is ordinarily error for the trial judge to permit a search warrant together with the affidavit attached thereto to be introduced into evidence, because the statements in the affidavit are hearsay evidence which deprives an accused of his right to confrontation and cross-examination. State v. Spillars, 280 N.C. 341, 185 S.E. 2d 881 (1972).\nDefendant\u2019s reliance on State v. McMilliam, 243 N.C. 771, 92 S.E. 2d 202 (1956), is misplaced. McMilliam stands for the proposition that when the State proposes to justify a search by the possession of a valid search warrant, the search warrant must be produced. Obviously, the production of the search warrant is necessary so that the trial judge may determine its regularity before ruling on the admissibility of the evidence seized under the warrant. In instant case, the search warrant was produced and was before the court. In fact, it was ultimately used by defense counsel in the cross-examination of certain witnesses. Further, defendant had no right to control the State\u2019s presentation of its evidence. His motions relating to the admission of the search warrant ran counter to the ordinary rules of trial procedure and deviation from the normal conduct or course of the trial is a matter which rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge. Shute v. Fisher, 270 N.C. 247, 154 S.E. 2d 75 (1967).\nDefendant\u2019s contention that the admission into evidence of the caps from .410 gauge shells and the admission of the Clorox jug bearing the odor of kerosene, over his general objection, was prejudicial error merits little discussion. We do not deem it necessary to discuss the questions of whether Mrs. Martin\u2019s consent to search was still'viable at the time these items were seized or whether defendant\u2019s failure to timely move to suppress waived his objections to the admission of this evidence. Suffice it to say that the evidence simply was not prejudicial to defendant. The witness Don Zell Jones without objection testified that he killed Mrs. Blackwell with a .410 gauge shotgun and that defendant at his request brought kerosene to the Martin home in a Clorox jug. Defendant\u2019s statement which was admitted into evidence corroborated this portion of Jones\u2019 testimony.\nFor reasons stated, this assignment of error is overruled.\nBy his assignment of error number 9, defendant contends that the court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial and by refusing to order the State to present for cross-examination the officers who obtained statements from the witness Jones.\nDefense counsel lodged these motions at the close of the direct examination of Don Zell Jones, and Judge Cowper conducted a lengthy inquiry in the absence of the jury. At that inquiry, defense counsel pointed to the marked discrepancy between the statements made by Jones prior to the trial and his in-court testimony. The record shows that the statements taken prior to trial corroborated the statement given by defendant while the in-court testimony by Jones was much more damaging in that it placed defendant at the scene of the killing as an active participant. Defense counsel argued that the State deliberately conspired with law enforcement officers to change Jones\u2019 testimony. On the other hand, the record contains evidence tending to show that on 23 June, during the trial of the case, S.B.I. Agent Thompson, without the knowledge of the district attorney, obtained a statement from Jones which was consistent with his in-court testimony. When the district attorney was informed of this additional evidence, a copy of the statement obtained by Agent Thompson was promptly furnished to defense counsel. The prosecution had not previously known that Jones would so testify and, in fact, had not planned to use him as a witness. At the time Jones gave the last statement to Agent Thompson, he had already pled guilty to murder in the first degree and had received a sentence of life imprisonment.\nAt the conclusion of the inquiry, Judge Cowper denied defendant\u2019s motion for a mistrial and also denied his motion to order the State to submit the police officers as State\u2019s witnesses for cross-examination by defense counsel. However, Judge Cowper stated that he would permit defense counsel to examine these witnesses as hostile witnesses if he desired to offer them.\nWhether a motion for mistrial shall be granted in criminal cases less than capital ordinarily rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge, and his ruling (without findings of fact) will not be disturbed absent a showing of gross abuse. State v. Daye, 281 N.C. 592, 189 S.E. 2d 481 (1972).\nIn Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 10 L.Ed. 2d 215, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963), it is stated:\nWe now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.\nFurther, G.S. 15A-907 provides that when a party subject to compliance with an order of discovery \u201cdiscovers prior to or during trial additional evidence or decides to use additional evidence . . . he must promptly notify the attorney or the other party of the existence of the additional evidence or the name of each additional witness.\u201d\nIn instant case, the record discloses that as soon as the district attorney became aware of the new matter to which the witness Jones would testify, he furnished defense counsel a copy of the additional evidence. These facts do not disclose prosecu-torial misconduct. To the contrary, it appears that the conduct of the district attorney was within constitutional bounds and complied with the statutory mandate. Further, when defense counsel commenced his cross-examination of the witness Jones, he had been fully informed of all prior statements made by Jones. At that time, defense counsel conducted a knowledgeable and searching cross-examination which clearly placed before the jury the differences in Jones\u2019 pretrial statements and his in-court testimony. Defense counsel also had the opportunity to offer the witnesses who took Jones\u2019 statements. This he did. Under these circumstances, we are unable to say that Judge Cowper abused his discretion in denying defendant\u2019s motion for a mistrial or committed prejudicial error in denying his motion that the court order the State to present witnesses for cross-examination by defendant.\nDefendant contends that the trial judge expressed an opinion in violation of G.S. 1-180 during his recapitulation of the State\u2019s evidence.\nAfter summarizing the testimony of the witness Jones, Judge Cowper stated, \u201cThere was also other corroborating evidence which I will not attempt to relate at this time.\u201d Defendant points to this statement as an erroneous expression of opinion. Immediately following the challenged statement, the court instructed the jury:\nIt is your duty to remember and consider all the evidence whether I call it to your attention or not and if I have neglected to state the evidence properly or if counsel neglected to state the evidence properly it\u2019s your duty to remember and consider all the evidence and use your own recollection and disregard anyone else\u2019s recollection.\n\u201cSlight inadvertencies in recapitulating the evidence or stating contentions must be called to the attention of the court in time for correction. Objection after verdict comes too late.\u201d State v. Goines, 273 N.C. 509, 514, 160 S.E. 2d 469, 472 (1968).\nDefendant failed to call this alleged misstatement to the court\u2019s attention before verdict. Even had he done so, the record discloses that there was in fact other testimony tending to corroborate the testimony of the witness Jones, e.g., the testimony of John William Wilkins, II, corroborated Jones\u2019 testimony that he and defendant encountered two white men in a pickup truck as they were leaving the scene of the crime; the testimony of the persons who discovered Mrs. Blackwell\u2019s body tended to corroborate defendant\u2019s testimony as to how and where the killing took place. Under these circumstances, we find no expression of opinion on the part of the trial judge which violated the provisions of G.S. 1-180.\nDefendant assigns as error the court\u2019s denial of his motion for judgment as of nonsuit.\nUpon a defendant\u2019s motion for judgment as of nonsuit in a criminal case, the evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the State and the State must be given the benefit of every reasonable inference deducible therefrom. When so considered, the motion for judgment as of nonsuit should be denied if there is substantial evidence of each element of the charged offense and when there is like evidence that defendant committed the offense. State v. Vestal, 278 N.C. 561, 180 S.E. 2d 755 (1971), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973).\nThe State offered substantial evidence of every element of the crimes of murder in the first degree and armed robbery. There was also ample evidence of like quality presented which tended to show that defendant was one of the perpetrators of each of these crimes. Therefore, the trial judge correctly denied defendant\u2019s motion for judgment as of nonsuit.\nThe remaining assignments of error are formal and do not require discussion.\nDefendant has failed to show prejudicial error in the trial of this case, and the verdict and judgment entered below will not be disturbed. Nevertheless, in view of this youthful defendant\u2019s cooperation with the police and the facts which suggest that the witness Don Zell Jones was the moving force in the planning and execution of these crimes, this may well be a case warranting early review by the executive branch of our government.\nNo error.", "type": "majority", "author": "BRANCH, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Rufus L. Edmisten, Attorney General, by Charles M. Hensey, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "Herbert B. Hulse, for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ERNEST MARTIN\nNo. 14\n(Filed 17 April 1978)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 75.7\u2014 no custodial interrogation \u2014 statements admissible\nThe trial court did not err in allowing into evidence statements made by defendant where his first statements were made at a time when defendant was not in custody and his freedom to depart was not restricted, and the later statement was made after defendant was given the Miranda warnings.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 73.1\u2014 search warrant and affidavit \u2014 exclusion as hearsay evidence\nIt is ordinarily error for the trial judge to permit a search warrant together with the affidavit attached thereto to be introduced into evidence because the statements in the affidavit are hearsay evidence which deprives an accused of his right to confrontation and cross-examination; therefore, the trial court properly denied defense counsel\u2019s motion to allow the search warrant authorizing search of defendant\u2019s premises into evidence as an exhibit of the court or in the alternative to instruct the district attorney to present the warrant as a part of the State\u2019s case.\n3. Homicide \u00a7 20\u2014 shotgun shells \u2014 Clorox jug \u2014 admission not prejudicial\nIn a prosecution for first degree murder and armed robbery, defendant was not prejudiced by the admission into evidence of .410 gauge shells and a Clorox jug bearing the odor of kerosene which were seized from defendant\u2019s premises.\n4. Bills of Discovery \u00a7 6\u2014 accomplice\u2019s statement made during trial \u2014 statement furnished defense counsel \u2014 no mistrial\nDefendant was not entitled to a mistrial where the district attorney learned, during trial, of a statement made by defendant\u2019s accomplice in the crime which implicated defendant and which' differed from the accomplice\u2019s pretrial statement; as soon as the district attorney became aware of the new matter to which the witness would testify, he furnished defense counsel a copy of the additional evidence; defense counsel cross-examined the accomplice and clearly placed before the jury the differences in his pretrial statements and his in-court testimony; and defense counsel offered as witnesses the people who took the accomplice\u2019s statements.\n5. Criminal Law \u00a7 114.2\u2014 jury instructions \u2014 no expression of opinion\nIn a prosecution for first degree murder and armed robbery, the trial judge did not express an opinion in violation of G.S. 1-180 during his recapitulation of the State\u2019s evidence when he stated, after summarizing the testimony of a certain witness, \u201cThere was also other corroborating evidence which I will not attempt to relate at this time,\u201d since there was in fact other testimony tending to corroborate the testimony of that witness.\n6. Homicide \u00a7 21.5; Robbery \u00a7 4.3\u2014 first degree murder \u2014 armed robbery \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nEvidence was sufficient to be submitted to the jury in a prosecution for first degree murder and armed robbery where it tended to show that defendant- and an accomplice robbed an insurance collection agent at gunpoint; they forced the victim to drive to a wooded area where they shot her when she tried to run; they left her car behind an abandoned farmhouse; the victim\u2019s body had an odor of kerosene about it and it appeared that the back of her body had been burned; and a Clorox jug bearing the odor of kerosene and shotgun shells were found on defendant\u2019s premises.\nAPPEAL by defendant from Cowper, J., 20 June 1977 Session of WAYNE Superior Court.\nDefendant was charged with first degree murder and armed robbery.\nThe State\u2019s evidence tended to show that on 6 April 1977, Rose C. Blackwell, an insurance debit agent, left her home in Mt. Olive for the purpose of making collections. She was last seen at the residence of Mrs. Norma Carroll Vann, who lived a short distance from the home of defendant\u2019s mother. Mrs. Blackwell did not return to her office at the customary time, and the police were notified. A search was immediately instituted, and Mrs. Blackwell\u2019s body was located in the woods near an abandoned farmhouse. A rope had been tied around her neck, she had suffered gunshot wounds, there was an odor of kerosene about her body, and it appeared that the back of her body had been burned. A jar having the odor of kerosene about it was found nearby, and a fingerprint later identified as being the right thumbprint of Don Zell Jones was lifted from this jar. An autopsy was performed upon Mrs. Blackwell\u2019s body, and the medical examiner testified that in his opinion her death was caused by multiple gunshot wounds.\nDon Zell Jones, who was also charged with the murder of Mrs. Blackwell, testified for the State. He had previously entered a plea of guilty and had been sentenced to a term of life imprisonment. He stated that he was living with defendant\u2019s sister in the Martin home on 6 April 1977, and on that day, he and defendant were the only adult persons in the Martin residence when Mrs. Blackwell arrived. He and defendant knew that she was coming to collect for insurance, and they agreed that defendant would tell Mrs. Blackwell that his mother was in the back room and that she wanted to cash a check. When Mrs. Blackwell came into the back room, the witness pointed his gun toward her, and she ran to the front part of the house where defendant took about $200.00 from Mrs. Blackwell while Jones held a shotgun on her. The witness then forced Mrs. Blackwell to enter the driver\u2019s seat \u2022 of her automobile. Defendant entered the back seat, and the witness sat in the front passenger seat. He ordered Mrs. Blackwell to drive to a wooded area where defendant got out of the automobile and took Mrs. Blackwell by the arm. She pulled away and started to run, and Jones shot her three times. They then left her car behind an abandoned farmhouse. As they were returning to the Martin home, they encountered four men in a pickup truck, one of whom asked where they were going. Jones later gave defendant $50.00 of the money taken from Mrs. Blackwell and kept about $150.00.\nThe State introduced a statement made by defendant to police officers which will be more fully discussed in the opinion. There was also other evidence concerning the search for and discovery of Mrs. Blackwell\u2019s body.\nDefendant did not testify but offered police officers Goodman, Bryant, and Flowers, who testified that on 8 April 1977, Don Zell Jones made a statement to them which differed from Jones\u2019 in-court testimony in that Jones told the officers that defendant was not present when the killing occurred.\nThe jury returned verdicts of guilty of first degree murder in the perpetration of a felony and guilty of armed robbery. Judge Cowper imposed a sentence of life imprisonment in the murder case and continued prayer for judgment in the armed robbery case.\nRufus L. Edmisten, Attorney General, by Charles M. Hensey, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nHerbert B. Hulse, for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0702-01", "first_page_order": 726, "last_page_order": 737 }