{ "id": 8564853, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES H. BERRY", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Berry", "decision_date": "1978-08-29", "docket_number": "No. 62", "first_page": "534", "last_page": "543", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "295 N.C. 534" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "421 U.S. 684", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 541415 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/us/421/0684-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 S.E. 2d 139", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "287 N.C. 505", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564055 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/287/0505-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 S.E. 260", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1934, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "first degree murder conviction; error in instructions on second degree murder not cured by verdict" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "207 N.C. 156", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8623769 ], "year": 1934, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "first degree murder conviction; error in instructions on second degree murder not cured by verdict" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/207/0156-01" ] }, { "cite": "244 S.E. 2d 397", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 N.C. 126", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561834 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/295/0126-01" ] }, { "cite": "47 S.E. 15", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1904, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "134 N.C. 680", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11273922 ], "year": 1904, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/134/0680-01" ] }, { "cite": "47 S.E. 44", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1904, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "46" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "134 N.C. 689", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11273982 ], "year": 1904, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "697" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/134/0689-01" ] }, { "cite": "170 S.E. 2d 461", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 N.C. 662", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559824 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/275/0662-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 S.E. 2d 595", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "290 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560063 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/290/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "43 U.S.L.W. 3392", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "U.S.L.W.", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "No. 669" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "207 S.E. 2d 712", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 N.C. 631", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567357 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/285/0631-01" ] }, { "cite": "220 S.E. 2d 558", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 680", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570581 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0680-01" ] }, { "cite": "432 U.S. 233", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6178254 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/432/0233-01" ] }, { "cite": "220 S.E. 2d 575", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "588" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 632", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570479 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "649-51" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0632-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 S.E. 2d 116", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 150", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570201 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0150-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 S.E. 2d 759", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560918 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/295/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "206 S.E. 2d 229", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "235" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 N.C. 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565214 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "492" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/285/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "421 U.S. 684", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 541415 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/421/0684-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 887, "char_count": 19875, "ocr_confidence": 0.805, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5628386366915196e-07, "percentile": 0.6772122621820809 }, "sha256": "29f86924e6037547ce8d1bea523181b3f8ec1d1baa35b61a3a1308e2de6288e3", "simhash": "1:1425f122e02774fc", "word_count": 3320 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:50:00.775554+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES H. BERRY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "EXIJM, Justice.\nDefendant brings forward six assignments of error relating to the admission of evidence, incidents in the courtroom that defendant claims improperly influenced the jury, and the instructions to the jury. We find no error entitling defendant to a new trial.\nThe state offered evidence tending to show that on 12 December 1976 Willie Lee Moore, Alton Norman and defendant were playing poker at the Shady Rest Inn, a business Moore operated near Plymouth. An argument over the poker game arose between Norman and defendant, and they went outside for about five minutes. Norman came back inside and walked over to a counter where some men were talking together. Defendant went to his truck, took out a rifle, loaded it, and came back inside with the rifle. He said, \u201cI want my money,\u201d whereupon Norman grabbed Andy Barnes, age fifteen, and held him as a shield while he backed behind the counter. Norman then shoved Andy Barnes under the counter. Defendant immediately fired two or three shots at Norman, who fell face down on the floor.\nAfter the shots were fired, Moore came over to Norman, shook him and said, \u201cBerry, I believe you killed that man.\u201d Defendant denied it and then said, \u201cNow I\u2019m going to shoot you because you\u2019ll call the cops.\u201d Moore and defendant struggled over the rifle until James Johnson came to Moore\u2019s assistance and wrested the rifle away from defendant.\nPolice were summoned to the scene of the shooting. On arrival they found Norman inside, lying face down in a pool of blood, a .22 caliber rifle with a scope propped against the wall, two .22 caliber cartridges on the floor, and a .38 caliber pistol on top of a refrigerator. James Johnson identified the rifle at trial as the one he had taken from defendant.\nNorman was taken to the hospital and subsequently pronounced dead. An autopsy showed the cause of death to have been a gunshot wound to the left forehead. One .22 caliber bullet was removed from his brain.\nSpecial Agent Frank Satterfield of the State Bureau of Investigation testified as an expert in firearms identification. In his opinion the two cartridges found on the floor at the scene of the shooting were fired from the rifle taken from defendant.\nDefendant testified that he had won about $60 in the poker game with Moore and Norman. On the last hand, which defendant won, Norman grabbed the pot and said, \u201cYou won\u2019t get this damn money .... You want to fight about it?\u201d Defendant replied that he did not. Defendant picked up $5.00 Norman had left on the table and started to walk out. Looking behind him, he saw Norman pointing a gun at his back. Defendant became frightened, walked to his truck and took out his rifle to \u201cscare off\u201d Norman. Norman ran back inside and defendant followed to demand his money. He walked toward the spot where Moore was standing. Norman suddenly \u201ccome up from behind the bar\u201d and shot at defendant. As defendant pointed his rifle in the direction of the shot, Moore grabbed the barrel and the weapon discharged.\nDefendant denied he had loaded his rifle when he took it from the truck and insisted he had no intention of harming Alton Norman. He also testified that the rifle fired only once.\nBy his first assignment of error defendant challenges the admission into evidence of the testimony of state\u2019s witness Kelvin Ray Perkins. Perkins was an eleven year old boy who testified, in essence, that on the day of the shooting he, while playing near the Shady Rest Inn, observed defendant take a \u201clong\u201d gun out of a truck, load it, and walk with the gun away from the truck \u201caround the house\u201d and out of view. After observing this incident, Perkins testified, he heard \u201cshots.\u201d\nWhen Perkins was first called to the stand, he testified that he had not seen defendant on the day in question and did not know him. The record reflects only that Perkins was immediately \u201crecalled\u201d as a witness and then gave the testimony of which defendant now complains. All the record reveals about what transpired in the hiatus between Perkins being first called as a witness and then being \u201crecalled\u201d is given in his testimony during cross-examination by defendant:\n\u201cYes sir, I do remember when I first went on the stand that Mr. Griffin [the district attorney] asked me if I saw Mr. Berry at any time on December 12, 1976. Yes sir, I do remember I told him no. Yes sir, that is right.\n\u201cYes sir, then I went back in the back room and talked to Mr. Griffin and Mr. Young. Mr. Young, the one without the glasses talked to me. Yes sir, I talked to him. We talked about Mr. Berry. Mr. Young asked me did I see Mr. Berry on December . . . No sir, I cannot finish. I don\u2019t even know.\u201d\nDefendant says in his brief that after Perkins initially denied seeing or knowing defendant, \u201c[t]he District Attorney requested and was granted a short recess. During this recess, the District Attorney, along with SBI Agent Lewis Young, conferred with Kelvin Ray Perkins in private. After the recess, Kelvin Ray Perkins was recalled to the witness stand and testified to seeing the defendant on December 12, 1976, and proceeded to describe the events of that day.\u201d We do not know why Perkins initially made statements that seem to conflict with this testimony upon being recalled. On this record it is probable that, as a result of his youth and his unfamiliarity with courtroom surroundings, he simply became confused upon taking the stand and failed to apprehend that \u201cthe defendant, James Berry,\u201d as the question was first put, was the same person he thereafter identified as \u201cthe man sitting down there at the end of the table, the man with the glasses,\u201d as the question was subsequently put. In all likelihood the purpose of the recess and conference with the witness was to clear up, if possible, this confusion. In any event defendant did not object at trial, nor does he complain of the recess or what transpired during it.\nDefendant complains here rather of the state\u2019s being permitted to \u201cimpeach\u201d this witness by asking him leading questions. This, however, is not a case where the state attempted to impeach its own witness. Whatever initial confusion existed in the witness\u2019 mind was apparently dissipated during the out-of-court conference with the district attorney. There was no attempt by the state to discredit any testimony which this witness gave after being recalled. The jury, furthermore, was fully apprised of the fact of the conference and the manner in which the witness gave his testimony.\nIt is true that the trial judge did permit several leading questions during Perkins\u2019 direct examination. Most of the questions, however, were not leading, and the trial judge was alert to sustain an objection to a question which he deemed to be unnecessarily leading. \u201c[I]t is firmly entrenched in the law of this State that it is within the sound discretion of the trial judge to determine whether counsel shall be permitted to ask leading questions, and in the absence of abuse the exercise of such discretion will not be disturbed on appeal.\u201d State v. Greene, 285 N.C. 482, 492, 206 S.E. 2d 229, 235 (1974); accord, State v. Cobb, 295 N.C. 1, 243 S.E. 2d 759 (1978). It is usually permissible to lead a witness on direct examination when the witness has difficulty in understanding questions because of age or immaturity. State v. Greene, supra; State v. Payne, 280 N.C. 150, 185 S.E. 2d 116 (1971); 1 Stansbury\u2019s North Carolina Evidence \u00a7 31 (Brandis rev. 1973) (hereinafter Stansbury). The trial judge\u2019s rulings on this aspect of the case were well within his discretion. This assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant next assigns as error a remark made by the trial court during defendant\u2019s cross-examination of the state\u2019s witness Andy Barnes. The witness was interrupted by Mr. Scott, defendant\u2019s counsel, who was cross-examining him; and the state lodged an objection to the interruption. The following then occurred:\n\u201cCOURT: Sustained. Now Mr. Scott, you\u2019ve asked the witness a question and you\u2019ve interrupted him. I\u2019ll have to let the witness when there\u2019s an objection answer the question. Let him finish answering the question.\nMr. SCOTT: Your Honor, he\u2019s throwing in something extra besides what I\u2019m asking him.\nCourt: No sir.\u201d\nDefendant contends these statements by the trial judge constituted an expression of opinion in violation of General Statute 1-180. He argues that the trial judge \u201cunnecessarily belittled the defendant\u2019s counsel in his remarks\u201d and that \u201cwhen he responded in an emphatic negative manner to defendant\u2019s counsel\u2019s complaint . . . [t]his remark clearly implied to the jury that the State\u2019s witness\u2019 testimony was credible . ... \u201d\nWe find this contention without merit. Although it does not appear what question he had asked the witness, defendant\u2019s counsel clearly interrupted his answer. There is nothing to suggest the trial judge improperly sustained the district attorney\u2019s objection or that he was unnecessarily harsh in instructing defense counsel to let the witness finish his answer. Nor does the record show that the trial court\u2019s negative response to counsel\u2019s complaint was \u201cemphatic.\u201d Even had it been, we fail to perceive how the jury could possibly have understood such a remark as an expression of opinion on the credibility of the witness. None of the cases cited by defendant contain any suggestion that such straightforward statements, relating solely to the manner of cross-examination by counsel, fall within the proscription of General Statute 1-180. This assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant next contends the trial judge committed error prejudicial to him in the following portion of his charge to the jury:\n\u201cIf the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally killed Alton Norman with a deadly weapon or intentionally inflicted a wound upon Alton Norman with a deadly weapon that proximately caused his death, you may infer that the killing was unlawful and second that it was done with malice, but you are not compelled to do so. You may consider this, along with all other facts and circumstances in determining whether the killing was unlawful and whether it was done with malice. A 22 caliber rifle is a deadly weapon.\u201d\nDefendant argues that this instruction employs an unconstitutional presumption of malice and unlawfulness proscribed by Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). There is no merit in this contention.\nIn State v. Hankerson, 288 N.C. 632, 649-51, 220 S.E. 2d 575, 588 (1975), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 432 U.S. 233 (1977), we said:\n\u201cThe Mullaney ruling does not, however, preclude all use of our traditional presumptions of malice and unlawfulness. It precludes only utilizing them in such a way as to relieve the state of the burden of proof on these elements when the issue of their existence is raised by the evidence. The presumptions themselves, standing alone, are valid and, we believe, constitutional. State v. Williams, 288 N.C. 680, 220 S.E. 2d 558 (1975); State v. Sparks, 285 N.C. 631, 207 S.E. 2d 712 (1974), pet. for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3392 (U.S. Nov. 29, 1974) (No. 669). Neither, by reason of Mullaney, is it unconstitutional to make the presumptions mandatory in the absence of contrary evidence nor to permit the logical inferences arising from facts proved (killing by intentional use of deadly weapon), State v. Williams, supra, to remain and be weighed against contrary evidence if it is produced. The effect of making the presumptions mandatory in the absence of any contrary evidence is simply to impose upon the defendant a burden to go forward with or produce some evidence of all elements of self-defense or heat of passion on sudden provocation, or rely on such evidence as may be present in the State\u2019s case. The mandatory presumption is simply a way of stating our legal rule that in the absence of evidence of mitigating or justifying factors all killings accomplished through the intentional use of a deadly weapon are deemed to be malicious and unlawful.\n\u201cIf there is evidence tending to show all elements of heat of passion on sudden provocation or self-defense the mandatory presumption of malice and unlawfulness, respectively, disappear but the logical inferences remaining from the facts proved may be weighed against this evidence.\u201d\nAccord, State v. Hammonds, 290 N.C. 1, 224 S.E. 2d 595 (1976). The instructions complained of comport with Mullaney as we understand it.\nDefendant next assigns as error the trial court\u2019s instruction defining involuntary manslaughter: \u201cInvoluntary manslaughter is the intentional killing of a human being by an unlawful act not amounting to a felony or by an act done in a criminal, negligent way.\u201d (Emphasis supplied.) The instruction is, of course, erroneous. The word \u201cintentional,\u201d if not an error in transcription, must have been used inadvertently. Earlier in his instructions the trial judge correctly defined involuntary manslaughter as \u201cthe unintentional killing of a human being by an unlawful act not amounting to a felony . . . . \u201d Since defendant, however, was convicted of first degree murder, this lapsus linguae could not have been prejudicial. State v. Freeman, 275 N.C. 662, 170 S.E. 2d 461 (1969); State v. Lipscomb, 134 N.C. 689, 697, 47 S.E. 44, 46 (1904); State v. Munn, 134 N.C. 680, 47 S.E. 15 (1904); see also State v. Potter, 295 N.C. 126, 244 S.E. 2d 397 (1978); compare State v. Brown, 207 N.C. 156, 176 S.E. 260 (1934) (first degree murder conviction; error in instructions on second degree murder not cured by verdict).\nWe have carefully considered defendant\u2019s remaining two assignments of error (1) that the trial judge failed on his own motion to declare a mistrial \u201cfor improper communication with the jury during the deliberations\u201d and (2) that the defendant was denied due process because of \u201chostile sentiment in the audience of the courtroom against the defendant during . . . the trial.\u201d It is enough to say that these contentions are simply without foundation in the record. As to the first the trial court conducted a full inquiry. It disclosed only that the jury during its deliberations opened the jury room door and requested that it be allowed to review a certain exhibit that had been offered in evidence. The bailiff reported this request to the trial judge, who in turn properly instructed the jury on the point. In support of the second contention defendant brings forward only three instances in the record where the trial judge admonished those present in the courtroom to be quiet.\nThe jury has resolved evidentiary conflicts against the defendant. In the trial there is\nNo error.\n. Compare State v. Pope, 287 N.C. 505, 215 S.E. 2d 139 (1975) in which the State did attempt impeachment of one of its witnesses by showing prior statements made by the witness inconsistent with his trial testimony. The rules regarding this kind of impeachment are ably discussed therein in an opinion by Chief Justice Sharp.\n. A representative sample of the direct examination is reproduced in the record as follows:\n\u201cQ. After the truck backed out of Mrs. Moore\u2019s driveway, what did you see then?\nMR. SCOTT: Objection.\nCOURT: Overruled.\nA. Took out his gun.\n\u201cQ. After you saw the gun, what did you see then? Did you see what he did with the gun?\nMR. SCOTT: Objection.\nCOURT: Overruled.\nA. Loaded it up.\n\u201cQ. What direction, what direction was he going in at the time you saw him going around the side of the house?\nMR. SCOTT: Objection.\nCOURT: Overruled.\n\u201cQ. Was he, tell us whether or not he was walking toward this Shady Rest piccolo place?\nMR. SCOTT: Objection.\nCOURT: Sustained.\n\u201cQ. Could you tell where he went? Could you see where he went?\nMR. SCOTT: Objection.\nCOURT: Overruled.\nA. Around the house.\n\u201cQ. After you last saw him Kelvin, did you hear anything?\nMR. SCOTT: Objection.\nCOURT: Overruled.\nA. Yes sir.\n\u201cQ. What did you hear?\nMR. SCOTT: Objection.\nCOURT: Overruled.\nA. Shots.\n\u201cQ. How many shots did you hear?\nMR. SCOTT: Objection.\nCOURT: Overruled.\nA. Three.\n\u201cQ. Could you see anything at that time, could you see the place where the pool table is, the piccolo place, the Shady Rest, at that time from where you were?\nMR. SCOTT: Objection.\nCOURT: Overruled.\nA. No sir.\u201d", "type": "majority", "author": "EXIJM, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Rufus L. Edmisten, Attorney General, by James E. Magner, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "LeRoy Scott and Stephen A. Graves, Attorneys for Defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES H. BERRY\nNo. 62\n(Filed 29 August 1978)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 90\u2014 no impeachment by State of own witness\nThe State did not impeach its own witness when an eleven-year-old witness first testified that he did not see defendant on the day in question and did not know him, the district attorney conferred with the witness in private, and the witness was recalled and testified that, on the day of the shooting, he saw defendant take a gun out of a truck, load it, and walk out of sight, and that he thereafter heard \u201cshots,\u201d since whatever initial confusion existed in the witness\u2019s mind was apparently dissipated during the conference with the district attorney, and the State did not attempt to discredit any testimony which the witness gave after being recalled.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 87.1\u2014 leading question \u2014 youthful witness\nThe district attorney was properly allowed to ask an eleven-year-old witness several leading questions on direct examination when the witness had difficulty understanding questions because of his age or immaturity.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 99.5\u2014 instruction to counsel not to interrupt witness \u2014 no expression of opinion\nThe trial judge did not express an opinion in violation of G.S. 1-180 when he sustained the State\u2019s objection to defense counsel\u2019s interruption of a witness, instructed defense counsel to let the witness finish his answer, and responded in the negative when defense counsel complained that the witness was \u201cthrowing in something extra besides what I\u2019m asking him.\u201d\n4. Homicide \u00a7 24.1\u2014 instructions \u2014 presumptions of unlawfulness and malice\nThe trial court\u2019s instruction that the jury could infer that a killing was unlawful and with malice if the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant intentionally killed deceased with a deadly weapon or intentionally inflicted a wound upon deceased with a deadly weapon that proximately caused his death comported with the decision of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 and was not improper.\n5. Homicide \u00a7 32.1\u2014 definition of involuntary manslaughter \u2014error cured by verdict of first degree murder\nDefendant was not prejudiced by the trial court\u2019s instruction erroneously defining involuntary manslaughter as the \u201cintentional,\u201d rather than \u201cunintentional,\u201d killing of a human being by an unlawful act not amounting to a felony where defendant was convicted by the jury of first degree murder.\n6. Criminal Law \u00a7 130\u2014 motion for mistrial \u2014 communications with jury\nThe trial judge did not err in failing on his own motion to declare a mistrial \u201cfor improper communication with the jury during deliberations\u201d where the jury, during its deliberations, opened the jury room door and requested that it be allowed to review a certain exhibit, the bailiff reported this request to the trial judge, and the trial judge then properly instructed the jury on the point.\n7. Constitutional Law \u00a7 28\u2014 due process \u2014 hostile audience \u2014 admonishing audience to be quiet\nDefendant was not denied due process because of hostile sentiment against him by the courtroom audience during the trial where the record shows only three instances where the trial judge admonished those present in the courtroom to be quiet.\nBEFORE Small, J., at the 28 February 1977 Criminal Session of WASHINGTON Superior Court and on a bill of indictment proper in form, defendant was tried and convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. He appeals under General Statute 7A-27(a). This case was argued as No. 53 at the Fall Term 1977.\nRufus L. Edmisten, Attorney General, by James E. Magner, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nLeRoy Scott and Stephen A. Graves, Attorneys for Defendant." }, "file_name": "0534-01", "first_page_order": 566, "last_page_order": 575 }