{ "id": 8570254, "name": "LAURA Y. CLINE v. CALVIN C. CLINE", "name_abbreviation": "Cline v. Cline", "decision_date": "1979-06-12", "docket_number": "No. 74", "first_page": "336", "last_page": "348", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "297 N.C. 336" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "34 N.C. App. 495", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550090 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/34/0495-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 S.E. 2d 8", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "13-14" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "247 N.C. 310", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626896 ], "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "317-18" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/247/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 S.E. 2d 438", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 123", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565893 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0123-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 S.E. 2d 222", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "226" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "245 N.C. 669", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8618500, 8618303 ], "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "674" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/245/0669-02", "/nc/245/0669-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 S.E. 2d 321", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "241 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8599903 ], "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/241/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "87 S.E. 2d 265", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1955, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "242 N.C. 206", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8611775 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1955, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/242/0206-01" ] }, { "cite": "250 S.E. 2d 245", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566231 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 S.E. 2d 562", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "567" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "273 N.C. 189", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574914 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195-96" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/273/0189-01" ] }, { "cite": "140 S.E. 2d 708", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "264 N.C. 20", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570243 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/264/0020-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 S.E. 2d 478", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1947, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "228 N.C. 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8622856 ], "year": 1947, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/228/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 S.E. 2d 289", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "241 N.C. 11", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8600024 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/241/0011-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 S.E. 2d 441", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 N.C. 174", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574497 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/281/0174-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1133, "char_count": 30785, "ocr_confidence": 0.794, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.298832352107153e-07, "percentile": 0.9423230852455105 }, "sha256": "18baabd44a3c16b5669b4f9cd817a156c0ac789056036164dd3884f4184b5ee1", "simhash": "1:2b57c2bbe33e384b", "word_count": 5394 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:00:46.792762+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Justices BRITT and BROCK took no part in the consideration or decision of this case." ], "parties": [ "LAURA Y. CLINE v. CALVIN C. CLINE" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "SHARP, Chief Justice.\nWe consider first defendant-appellee\u2019s contention, brought to this Court in his brief under App. R. 16(a), that plaintiff\u2019s evidence was insufficient to establish either a resulting or a constructive trust, and that the trial court erred therefore in denying his motion for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence. See Investment Properties v. Allen, 281 N.C. 174, 188 S.E. 2d 441 (1972).\nThe evidence in this case would permit the jury to find the following facts:\n(1) After the death of defendant\u2019s father, defendant\u2019s mother was unable to farm their land and to make the annual payments on the mortgage. She told defendant, whose family consisted of his wife, the plaintiff, and their three young sons, that if he would move on the land with her and make the mortgage payments she would convey the property to him, subject to her life estate.\n(2) Defendant discussed the situation with his wife and told her that if they would move on his mother\u2019s place with her, farm the land, and pay the mortgage, the property would then be theirs. He asked her to move \u201cup there\u201d with him. She agreed to the proposition defendant had stated to her, and the move was made.\n(3) In less than 15 days after the move was accomplished and before the first payment was made on the mortgage, defendant caused his mother to convey the land, subject to her life estate, to him alone. The consideration for this conveyance was defendant\u2019s promise to move on the land and to pay the mortgage which encumbered it. Plaintiff had no knowledge of this conveyance at the time it was made and first learned of it in the latter part of July 1975.\n(4) In performance of the agreement plaintiff made with defendant preceding their move to his mother\u2019s farm, and in reliance upon defendant\u2019s representations to her that when they had satisfied the mortgage on the land it would belong to them jointly, plaintiff by her labor assisted defendant in caring for his mother and in cultivating and harvesting tobacco, their annual cash crop. By her labor on the farm and her contributions in money, which she earned in \u201cpublic work\u201d off the farm, plaintiff paid one-half of the original mortgage indebtedness on the farm and also of subsequent encumbrances securing loans for the purchase of farm machinery and making improvements on the land. In addition, from her wages plaintiff made cash contributions to the support of the family.\nOnce proven, the foregoing facts are sufficient to establish either a constructive or a resulting trust in plaintiff\u2019s favor in the land described in the complaint. See Bowen v. Darden, 241 N.C. 11, 84 S.E. 2d 289 (1954); Davis v. Davis, 228 N.C. 48, 44 S.E. 2d 478 (1947).\nWhenever one obtains legal title to property in violation of a duty he owes to another who is equitably entitled to the land or an interest in it, a constructive trust immediately comes into being. Such a trust ordinarily arises from actual or presumptive fraud and usually involves an abuse of a confidential relationship. Courts of equity will impose a constructive trust to prevent the unjust enrichment of the holder of the legal title to property acquired through a breach of duty, fraud, or other circumstances which make it inequitable for him to retain it against the claim of the beneficiary of the constructive trust. See Fulp v. Fulp, 264 N.C. 20, 140 S.E. 2d 708 (1965); Davis v. Davis, supra; 13 Strong\u2019s North Carolina Index 3d Trusts \u00a7 14 (1978); V Scott, Law of Trusts \u00a7 461-462.4 (3d Ed. 1967).\nThe parties to this action are husband and wife. The law recognizes that \u201c[t]he relationship between husband and wife is the most confidential of all relationships, and transactions between them to be valid, must be fair and reasonable.\u201d Eubanks v. Eubanks, 273 N.C. 189, 195-96, 159 S.E. 2d 562, 567 (1968); Fulp v. Fulp, supra. Taking plaintiff\u2019s evidence as true \u2014 as we must when considering a motion for a directed verdict, Rappaport v. Days Inn, 296 N.C. 382, 250 S.E. 2d 245 (1979) - defendant clearly breached this confidential relationship when he took title to the farm in his name alone after representing to his wife that the land would be theirs jointly after the mortgage was paid. A constructive trust arose, therefore, in her favor at the time defendant wrongfully took title solely in his name. Thereafter, in accordance with plaintiff\u2019s understanding with defendant that they were both obligated to pay off the mortgage which encumbered the property at the time defendant agreed to move on his mother\u2019s farm, plaintiff\u2019s contributions in labor and money paid at least one-half of the mortgage. Thus the equities remained with her and she is entitled to enforce the constructive trust which arose in her favor. Otherwise, defendant would be unjustly enriched at her expense.\nThe classic example of a resulting trust is the purchase-money resulting trust. In such a situation, when one person furnishes the consideration to pay for land, title to which is taken in the name of another, a resulting trust commensurate with his interest arises in favor of the one furnishing the consideration. The general rule is that the trust is created, if at all, in the same transaction in which the legal title passes, and by virtue of the consideration advanced before or at the time the legal title passes. See Fulp v. Fulp, 264 N.C. 20, 140 S.E. 2d 708 (1965); Rhodes v. Baxter, 242 N.C. 206, 87 S.E. 2d 265 (1955); Deans v. Deans, 241 N.C. 1, 84 S.E. 2d 321 (1954); V Scott, Law of Trusts \u00a7\u00a7 440-440.1 (3d Ed. 1967); Bogert, Trusts and Trustees \u00a7 455 (2d Ed. 1977) (hereinafter cited as Bogert). See generally 13 Strong N.C. Index 3d Trusts \u00a7\u00a7 13-13.5 (1978).\nIf A and C pay for a parcel of land, but only C takes title, the theory of the law is that at the time title passed A and C intended that both would have an interest in the land. \u201cA resulting trust is a creature of equity, and arises by implication or operation of law to carry out the presumed intention of the parties, that he, who furnishes the consideration for the purchase of land, intends the purchase for his own benefit.\u201d Waddell v. Carson, 245 N.C. 669, 674, 97 S.E. 2d 222, 226 (1957). This rule does not apply where A and C agree to buy a tract of land but A pays the purchase price and takes title in his name. In this situation, while it is possible \u2014 depending upon the circumstances \u2014 that he may have other remedies, no resulting trust arises in C\u2019s favor when consideration passes from him to A thereafter. Bryant v. Kelly, 279 N.C. 123, 181 S.E. 2d 438 (1971); Rhodes v. Baxter, 242 N.C. 206, 87 S.E. 2d 265 (1955).\nHowever, as Bogert points out, \u00a7 456 at 669-673, in a large number of cases the person claiming a resulting trust proves a payment on the purchase price made to the grantee or grantor after the delivery of the deed but pursuant to a promise made to the grantee before the deed was delivered. Although it seems that this Court has not considered the application of the resulting trust doctrine to this specific situation other jurisdictions have. See Bogert, \u00a7 456, n. 25, where the authorities are collected. In discussing the \u201clarge group of cases [in which] the person claiming a resulting trust proves payment after the delivery of the deed, pursuant to a promise made to the grantee . . . before delivery of the deed,\u201d Bogert offered the following example and comments:\n\u201cA is bargaining for land to be bought from B, and A seeks the aid of C in financing the sale. It is agreed between A and C that A shall pay part of the price at the time of the delivery of the deed from B to A, and that A shall give a note and mortgage to B for the remainder of the purchase price; and C agrees with A that C will make payments to A in the future which A agrees to use to help him in meeting his obligations to B. Here C, the third party, does not promise the grantor, B, anything. The consideration received by the grantor for his deed consists of cash paid by the grantee, A, and a note and mortgage executed by the grantee, A, alone. C\u2019s promise to the grantee, A, is not to pay the purchase price, because technically one can pay the purchase price only to the seller of the land. C\u2019s agreement with A is to make a payment to A which will enable A to pay the purchase price.\u201d Bogert \u00a7 456 at 673.\n\u201cIf the promise of C has been performed by the making of the agreed payment to A, the grantee, after delivery of the deed to A, the authorities hold that C obtains a resulting trust arising at the date of C\u2019s payment, but relates back in effect to the time of the taking of title by the grantee, A.\u201d Bogert justifies this result in either of two ways: \u201c(1) by a finding that C\u2019s promise to A and his performance of it are equivalent in practical effect to a payment of part of the price of the land at the time of the delivery of the deed; or (2) by an argument that even if C\u2019s conduct is something totally distinct from paying part of the purchase price to the grantor, there is ground for an inference or presumption of an agreement between the prospective grantee and C that C should have an equitable interest in the land corresponding to the amount of his payment to the grantee.\u201d Id. at 674. Certainly the logic of such an inference is as cogent in this situation as it is in that of the classic purchase-money resulting trust. There is no difference in principle between paying money toward the purchase price at the time of the delivery of a deed and contracting at that time to pay the same sum later and then paying it as promised. See Id. at 672, 673.\nIt was the foregoing theory of a resulting trust which the trial judge attempted to explain to the jury in his charge upon the first issue. We agree with the Court of Appeals, which approved the theory, that the charge was an insufficient and somewhat confusing explanation of the applicable law, and that from it the jury might well have concluded plaintiff\u2019s right to have a resulting trust established in her favor depended solely on the contributions which she made subsequent to the delivery of the deed to defendant without determining whether a promise was made to defendant before he obtained title. For this reason the jury\u2019s answer to the first issue must be vacated. Notwithstanding, we affirm the judgment of the trial court upon the jury\u2019s answer to the second issue, which established plaintiff\u2019s right \u201cto have a constructive trust imposed upon the land described in the complaint so as to create a joint ownership in said property by the plaintiff and defendant.\u201d\nConcededly the charge on the second issue is not a model of clarity and organization. However, when it is read as a whole we think the judge made it clear that for plaintiff to prevail on the second issue she must satisfy the jury by clear, strong, and convincing evidence that there was an agreement, either express or implied, between the parties; that the title to the land was to have been placed in their names jointly and that they were to pay off the mortgage jointly; that thereafter defendant breached the confidential or fiduciary relation the law presumes to exist between a husband and wife by having the deed made to himself alone without her knowledge; that, in ignorance of his breach of trust, she contributed at least one-half of the funds used to pay off the mortgage which encumbered the land at the time of the purchase. The judge specifically informed the jury that any funds plaintiff might have invested in improvements on the property did not bear upon the issue of constructive trust, which arose only in connection with the actual purchase of the land itself.\nIn this Court defendant\u2019s contentions with reference to the charge on the second issue are that \u201cthe trial judge engaged in the academics of constructive trusts and the contentions of the parties\u201d and that \u201cthere is insufficient evidence to support the judge\u2019s charge on this issue.\u201d He reargues the sufficiency of the evidence to withstand his motion for a directed verdict and questions the credibility and weight of plaintiff\u2019s evidence.\nIn the final analysis, despite the somewhat complicated questions of trust law involved, this case resolved itself into simple issues of fact: (1) Did plaintiff and defendant agree, before they moved to the farm and before he procured title in himself (as plaintiff testified), that they would pay off the mortgage and title would then be taken in their names jointly; or, did defendant tell plaintiff (as he testified) that when his mother died the property would belong to him? (2) If the agreement was made as plaintiff testified, did she \u2014 pursuant to their agreement and in ignorance of the fact that he had taken title in himself \u2014 contribute to defendant for the purpose of paying off the mortgage at least half the amount due; or did she \u201cnever bring in any money\u201d for that purpose, as defendant testified? The jury, who heard the evidence and observed the demeanor of the witnesses, resolved all issues in favor of plaintiff. On the second issue submitted to the jury we find no prejudicial error in the court\u2019s instructions on constructive trusts.\nFinally, we find no merit in defendant\u2019s contention that plaintiff\u2019s action is barred by the statute of limitations. \u201cA resulting or constructive trust, as distinguished from an express trust, is governed by the ten-year statute of limitations. G.S. 1-56. . . . Moreover it is established by authoritative decisions of this Court that the statute of limitations does not run against a cestui que trust in possession.\u201d Bowen v. Darden, 241 N.C. 11, 17, 84 S.E. 2d 289, 294 (1954). So long as an equitable owner retains possession, nothing else appearing, the statute of limitations does not run against him. The statute begins to run only from the time the trustee disavows the trust and knowledge of his disavowal is brought home to the cestui que trust, who will then be barred at the end of the statutory period. Solon Lodge v. Ionic Lodge, 247 N.C. 310, 317-18, 101 S.E. 2d 8, 13-14 (1957).\nThe record discloses that defendant\u2019s mother deeded the land in suit to him on 15 January 1951, and that plaintiff has remained in possession continuously. Further, plaintiff testified that she did not learn defendant had taken title in his name alone until the latter part of July 1975 when the parties separated. Defendant, of course, contends that she knew this from the date of the deed. Thus, the issue of the bar of the ten-year statute of limitations was properly submitted to the jury, which answered it in favor of plaintiff.\nFor the reasons stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals awarding defendant a new trial is reversed. The cause will be returned to that court with instructions that it be remanded to the District Court of Yadkin County with directions that the judgment in this case, filed 23 May 1976, be reinstated.\nReversed.\nJustices BRITT and BROCK took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "SHARP, Chief Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Finger, Park & Parker by Raymond A. Parker II and M. Neil Finger for plaintiff.", "Franklin Smith and Henry B. Shore for defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LAURA Y. CLINE v. CALVIN C. CLINE\nNo. 74\n(Filed 12 June 1979)\n1. Trusts \u00a7 19\u2014 wife\u2019s action to establish resulting or constructive trust \u2014sufficiency of evidence\nEvidence was sufficient to establish either a constructive or a resulting trust in plaintiff\u2019s favor in the land described in the complaint where it tended to show that defendant breached the confidential relationship of husband and wife when he took from his mother title to a farm in his name alone after representing to his wile that the land would be theirs jointly after the mortgage thereon was paid; plaintiff moved onto the farm with defendant and their children and there cared for defendant\u2019s mother; and plaintiff by her contributions and labor paid at least one-half of the mortgage.\n2. Trusts \u00a7 13.1\u2014 resulting trust \u2014promise made before deed delivered \u2014subsequent payment\nA resulting trust arises where the person claiming it proves a payment on the purchase price made to the grantee or grantor after the delivery of the deed but pursuant to a promise made to the grantee before the deed was delivered, since there is no difference in principle between paying money toward a purchase price at the time of the delivery of a deed and contracting at that time to pay the same sum later and then paying it as promised.\n3. Trusts \u00a7 20\u2014 constructive trust \u2014 jury instructions adequate\nThough the trial court\u2019s instruction with respect to the establishment of a constructive trust was not a model of clarity and organization, it did sufficiently inform the jury that for plaintiff to prevail on her claim of a constructive trust she must satisfy the jury by clear, strong and convincing evidence that: (1) there was an agreement, either express or implied, between the parties that title to the land in question was to have been placed in their names jointly and that they were to pay off the mortgage thereon jointly; (2) thereafter, defendant breached the confidential or fiduciary relation the law presumes to exist between a husband and wife by having the deed made to himself alone without plaintiff\u2019s knowledge; and, (3) in ignorance of defendant\u2019s breach of trust, plaintiff contributed at least one-half of the funds used to pay oil' the mortgage which encumbered the land at the time of the purchase.\n4. Trusts \u00a7 15\u2014 equitable owner in possession of land \u2014action to establish trust \u2014 statute of limitations\nWhere the evidence disclosed that defendant\u2019s mother deeded the land in question to him on 15 January 1951, that plaintiff wife remained in possession of the land continuously, and that plaintiff did not learn that defendant had taken title in his name alone until the latter part of July 1975 when the parties separated, there was no merit to defendant\u2019s contention that plaintiff\u2019s action was barred by the statute of limitations, since, so long as an equitable owner retains possession, nothing else appearing, the statute of limitations does not run against him but begins to run only from the time the trustee disavows the trust and knowledge of his disavowal is brought home to the cestui que trust.\nJustices BRITT and Brock took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.\nOn plaintiff\u2019s petition under G.S. 7A-31(a) for discretionary review of the decision of the Court of Appeals vacating the judgment entered on 9 August 1976 by Osborne, J., in the District Court of YADKIN. The opinion by Vaughn, J., Hedrick and Clark, JJ., concurring, is reported in 34 N.C. App. 495 (1977). The appeal was docketed and argued as Case No. 47 at the Spring Term 1978.\nOn 12 September 1975 the plaintiff, Laura Y. Cline, instituted this action against her husband, Calvin C. Cline, the defendant, for the purpose of obtaining (1) a divorce from bed and board, alimony, and alimony pendente lite, and (2) an equitable lien in the amount of $25,000 on a specifically described 48-acre tract of land in Booneville Township, Yadkin County, North Carolina. In his answer defendant denied the material allegations in the complaint and asserted a counterclaim for divorce from bed and board, alimony, and alimony pendente lite. In addition, he prayed for the possession of the land described in the complaint.\nOn 9 August 1976 the Court permitted plaintiff to amend her complaint to allege a third claim, ie., that she is entitled to have established in her favor a resulting trust or, in the alternative, a constructive trust in one-half of the 48 acres previously described. In his reply, defendant denied every allegation in plaintiff\u2019s third claim and specifically pled the three and ten-year statutes of limitations in bar of her right to subject the land to an equitable lien or trust in her favor.\nWhen the case came on for trial on 10 August 1976, the trial judge severed the parties\u2019 respective claims for divorce and alimony from plaintiff\u2019s claim of an equitable lien, a resulting trust or a constructive trust in the 48 acres and elected to try the latter. Plaintiff\u2019s evidence tended to show the facts detailed below.\nPlaintiff and defendant were married in 1944. Defendant\u2019s parents, Charlie and Eva Cline, bought the land in suit (which then contained about 70 acres) in February 1950. They financed the purchase with a $3,500 loan, secured by a deed of trust to the Veterans Administration. Mr. Charlie Cline made one payment on the note and died in December 1950. Thereafter, at a family meeting held to determine what arrangements could be made to save the land and to care for their mother, it was determined that none of defendant\u2019s brothers and sisters were willing to move on the land or to pay for it.\nPlaintiff testified that after the family caucus defendant said to her, \u201cWe\u2019ll have to live up there and farm the land and finish paying for the place, then it will be ours.\u201d Plaintiff agreed to these conditions. Early in January 1951 she and defendant moved on the farm with Mrs. Eva Cline, who lived there until her death during the spring of 1976. Plaintiff said, \u201cShe lived with us. We kept her up. I done the buying of the groceries. I kept her up and the kids too.\u201d\nIn 1951 the farm contained approximately 60 acres and the unpaid balance due on the deed of trust was $3,000, payable in annual installments of about $300. Plaintiff and defendant raised tobacco every year and made the annual payments to the Veterans Administration from the proceeds of the tobacco sales. Prior to May 1964, when defendant received serious injuries in an automobile accident, plaintiff and defendant \u201cworked equally.\u201d A \u201cnumber of times\u201d over the years defendant said to plaintiff, \u201cWhen the property is paid for it will be \u2018ours\u2019.\u201d\nPlaintiff testified, \u201cI hung tobacco, I strung tobacco, I sacked tobacco, I oiled tobacco, I hoed tobacco ... I took it off the sticks.\u201d During the two or three years they leased their tobacco allotment she continued to work in tobacco by \u201chiring out to people in the summer to make enough money to get on our feet.\u201d Neighbors and others corroborated plaintiff\u2019s testimony as to her labors on and off the farm. She was described as \u201calways having been a hard-working woman both at home and away from home.\u201d Since 1950, except for about five months preceding the birth of her third and last child in April 1952, the six or seven months following defendant\u2019s automobile accident in 1964, and the time she necessarily spent working in tobacco, plaintiff worked away from the farm at \u201cpublic work\u201d for wages of from $80 to $120 a week.\nOn 16 May 1959 plaintiff and defendant paid off the deed of trust to the Veterans Administration. However, in April 1959 plaintiff, defendant, and Mrs. Eva Cline had executed a note and deed of trust on the property to secure a loan of $3,500 from the Federal Land Bank. This money was paid back \u201cout of tobacco\u201d at the rate of $175 annually and was paid off on 22 December 1974. Plaintiff testified that the Veterans Administration loan was never really paid off until the 22nd of December 1974. In addition to this loan, between 4 August 1959 and 7 December 1965, plaintiff, defendant, and Mrs. Cline executed notes and deeds of trust to the Production Credit Corporation to secure loans in the amount of $300, $2,470, and $3,000. The proceeds from these loans were used to buy a tractor, to erect a tobacco barn and packing house, and to complete the dwelling in which plaintiff and defendant were living at the time of the separation. This dwelling was begun in 1953 or 1954 and completed in 1959. The money to repay the loans from the Federal Land Bank and.the Production Credit Association came mostly out of tobacco and from plaintiff\u2019s earnings. To pay for the roof and storm doors on the new house plaintiff sold 10 shares of R. J. Reynolds stock which she had acquired during the five years she worked for that company. The original cost of the house was approximately $11,000 and plaintiff testified that she was \u201cresponsible\u201d for half of that amount. At the time of the trial plaintiff\u2019s evidence tended to show that the fair market value of the land (then 48 acres), with its improvements, was $70,000 to $82,600.\nOn several occasions prior to 1975 plaintiff, along with her husband and his mother, had signed deeds to purchasers of a small portion (or lot) of the land.\nOn or about 1 June 1975, defendant separated himself from plaintiff and left the marital home. Thereafter, in the latter part of July, plaintiff first learned that on 15 January 1951 Mrs. Eva Cline had conveyed the land in suit, subject to her life estate, to defendant and that plaintiff was not named as a grantee in the deed. This deed had been recorded on 27 January 1951.\nDefendant\u2019s testimony tended to show the facts to be as follows:\nIn 1951, after his father\u2019s death, he told plaintiff he \u201chad to go up there and look after [his] mother because she couldn\u2019t take care of the place,\u201d which his father had farmed. He also told her he had to \u201ctake over\u201d because he, along with his parents, had signed the deed of trust which encumbered the farm. (On cross-examination, defendant conceded that plaintiff\u2019s Exhibit No. 1, a certified copy of the purchase-money deed of trust which his parents had executed to the Veterans Administration, did not show his signature. Notwithstanding, he said he was sure that he had signed a deed of trust.) When he asked plaintiff to move \u201cup there\u201d with him she agreed to go, and they and their three sons moved to the farm. Before they moved she told him twice that \u201cshe didn\u2019t want no part of it [the land] and wouldn\u2019t help pay for it\u201d; and after they moved \u201cshe kept saying she wasn\u2019t going to help pay for it.\u201d\nDefendant testified that he never, at any time, told plaintiff that the farm would some day be theirs or that any part of it would be hers. On the contrary, he had told her specifically that at his mother\u2019s death the property would belong to him. Plaintiff had full knowledge of the deed in suit from the time it was executed; that on 15 January 1951 he told his wife he and his mother were \u201cgoing over to town to translate our deed.\u201d Plaintiff did not accompany them, but upon their return, they \u201cset down with her and explained to her how the deed was. . . . She said she did not care about the deed. She did not want no part of it. She wasn\u2019t going to help pay for it.\u201d The consideration recited in the deed was one dollar and the grantee\u2019s assumption of \u201cthe debt to the Veterans Administration.\u201d After the deed was recorded it was kept in defendant\u2019s top bureau drawer, \u201cfree for everybody to see it.\u201d The drawer was never locked. Over the years, he thought the deed \u201chad been discussed three or maybe four times.\u201d\nDefendant asserted that although plaintiff had \u201cworked at public work ever since 1951 and up until this day,\u201d her money all went for \u201cautomobiles, clothes, and getting her hair fixed up\u201d at the beauty parlor; that she \u201cnever brought in any money that she earned at her employment for the purpose of making' any payments on the house or the land either one.\u201d Proceeds from the sale of timber on the land ($2,800) and the money he recovered in 1957 in a personal injury action ($4,800) went into the house. Further, defendant said he could not recall plaintiff contributing any amount to the family budget since 1961; that she \u201cnever paid a cent\u201d on any deed of trust on the land; that \u201cshe hardly did any work on the farm\u201d; and that he couldn\u2019t get her \u201cto pull a bloom\u201d out of the plant bed.\nAccording to defendant\u2019s testimony, in 1964 he had another serious automobile accident which left him 90% totally and permanently disabled. Since then he has been receiving social security benefits. In consequence of this accident the crops have been \u201chired done,\u201d and plaintiff has \u201cspent mighty little time doing farm labor.\u201d Out of the proceeds of the tobacco and other crops defendant paid the labor and all other farm expenses, gave his mother a portion of the profits from the farm, and defrayed all the family living expenses. From time to time he, his wife, and mother borrowed money, all of which was paid back with the proceeds of the sale of tobacco. All the money from the tobacco was put back into the farm.\nAs a witness for defendant, his sister, Ruby Block, testified that in 1957 or 1958 she heard plaintiff tell defendant that the reason she would not help him with the farm was because her mother-in-law had \u201csigned it over to him and her name was not on the deed and she didn\u2019t have any part in it.\u201d\nDean Cline, the parties\u2019 26-year-old son, testified that when he was 12 or 13 years old he learned that the deed to the farm was in his father\u2019s name but his grandmother had a life estate in the land. His mother, he said, worked most of the time at \u201cpublic work,\u201d but she did help some with the farm. She had bought groceries, had bought him clothes, and had bought his children clothes. However, as far as he knew, it was always his father who went to the Production Credit and to the Federal Land Bank to make payments on the mortgage against the property. Representatives of these institutions and of the Iredell Insurance Agency, which carried the insurance on the crop and farm building, testified that it was always defendant who came in and paid the installments due on the loans and the insurance premiums. They did not know, however, \u201cwhere the money came from.\u201d\nRobert Cline, the parties\u2019 31-year-old son, testified that over the years his mother worked at both \u201cpublic work\u201d and on the farm; that he never knew of her refusing to work in the tobacco; that his \u201cmother was a hard working woman; when she worked she worked.\u201d She \u201cpitched in and helped with everything.\u201d She bought groceries and his father bought groceries. Robert Cline recalled hearing his father say he had a deed to the place, but he \u201cdid not know until recently, a few years back, that his mother\u2019s name was not on the deed.\u201d He had heard his parents arguing about the deed, but he had never seen it.\nThe jury\u2019s verdict was that plaintiff was entitled to have both a resulting and a constructive trust imposed upon the land in her favor and that her claim for relief was not barred by the ten-year statute of limitations.\nUpon defendant\u2019s appeal, the Court of Appeals held the evidence sufficient to support the verdict as to a resulting trust but ordered a new trial because, it said, \u201cThe jury was never instructed that it must find that plaintiff advanced the consideration [her promises] before legal title was placed in defendant.\u201d In its opinion the Court of Appeals suggested that upon retrial of the case the judge would be \u201cwell advised not to attempt to instruct on the theory of a constructive trust.\u201d We allowed plaintiff\u2019s petition for discretionary review.\nFinger, Park & Parker by Raymond A. Parker II and M. Neil Finger for plaintiff.\nFranklin Smith and Henry B. Shore for defendant." }, "file_name": "0336-01", "first_page_order": 368, "last_page_order": 380 }