{
  "id": 8569918,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MATHIAS BOLLING WINFREY, JR.",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Winfrey",
  "decision_date": "1979-10-03",
  "docket_number": "No. 23",
  "first_page": "260",
  "last_page": "263",
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      "cite": "298 N.C. 260"
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    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
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    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
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      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
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      "cite": "77 N.C. 473",
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      "year": 1978,
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    {
      "cite": "295 N.C. 66",
      "category": "reporters:state",
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      "year": 1978,
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  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 414,
    "char_count": 6900,
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:32:45.067536+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Justice BROCK took no part in the consideration or decision of this case."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MATHIAS BOLLING WINFREY, JR."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "BRANCH, Chief Justice.\nThe sole question presented by this appeal is whether the trial judge erred in excluding testimony of the victim\u2019s former wife that he was a dangerous man and that she had told defendant of the victim\u2019s reputation prior to the time he was killed. Defendant contends that the excluded testimony was admissible (1) to show that deceased was the aggressor; (2) to show that defendant\u2019s fear of deceased was reasonable; (3) to corroborate defendant\u2019s claim that he carried the gun with him because of his fear of the deceased; and (4) to corroborate defendant\u2019s version of the shooting.\nThe general rule is that evidence of the character of a third person who is not a witness or a party to an action is inadmissible. State v. Barbour, 295 N.C. 66, 243 S.E. 2d 380 (1978); State v. Johnson, 270 N.C. 215, 154 S.E. 2d 48 (1967). See Stansbury\u2019s N. C. Evidence (Brandis Rev. 1973), \u00a7 105 and cases cited therein. Well-settled exceptions to the general rule are recognized in cases where there is a plea of self-defense. In such a case, evidence of a deceased\u2019s violent or dangerous character is admissible where (1) such character was known to the accused, or (2) the evidence of the crime is all circumstantial or the nature of the transaction is in doubt. State v. Turpin, 77 N.C. 473 (1877). The same rules are equally applicable to homicide cases and to both criminal and civil assault and battery cases. See Stansbury, supra, \u00a7 106 and cases cited therein.\nGenerally, evidence of a victim\u2019s violent character is irrelevant, but when the accused knows of the violent character of the victim, such evidence is relevant and admissible to show to the jury that defendant\u2019s apprehension of death and bodily harm was reasonable. State v. Johnson, 270 N.C. 215, 154 S.E. 2d 48 (1967). Clearly, the reason for this exception is that, \u201ca jury should, as far as is possible, be placed in defendant\u2019s situation and possess the same knowledge of danger and the necessity for action, in order to decide if defendant acted under reasonable apprehension of danger to his person or his life.\u201d Id. at 219, 154 S.E. 2d at 52.\nThe second of the recognized exceptions to the general rule permits evidence of the violent character of a victim because it tends to shed some light upon who was the aggressor since a violent man is more likely to be the aggressor than is a peaceable man. The admission of evidence of the violent character of a victim which was unknown to the accused at the time of the encounter has been carefully limited to situations where all the evidence is circumstantial or the nature of the transaction is in doubt. See Stansbury, supra, \u00a7 106; State v. Blackwell, 162 N.C. 672, 78 S.E. 316 (1913). The relevancy of such evidence stems from the fact that in order to sustain a plea of self-defense, it must be made to appear to the jury that the accused was not the aggressor. See State v. Wynn, 278 N.C. 513, 180 S.E. 2d 135 (1971).\nDefendant contends that the exception should be extended to cases involving defenses other than self-defense, and more specifically, that the exceptions should apply where the defense of accident is raised. We disagree.\nThe North Carolina courts have consistently limited the recognized exceptions to the general rule to cases involving self-defense and in the case of State v. Rawley, 237 N.C. 233, 74 S.E. 2d 620 (1953), this Court specifically declined to extend the exception to the defense of accident.\nIn the instant case, defendant does not rely on self-defense. He relies solely on the defense of accident which, in effect, says that the homicide did not result from any volitional act on his part. Thus, there could be no relevancy in evidence tending to show that he acted reasonably. The only issue before the jury was whether the pistol discharged accidentally and, therefore, evidence of the victim\u2019s character traits could shed no light on whether the pistol accidentally discharged and inflicted the fatal wounds.\nWe hold that the trial judge properly excluded testimony from the victim\u2019s former wife to the effect that he was a dangerous man and that she had made defendant aware of the victim\u2019s reputation for violence prior to 3 November 1977.\nThe decision of the Court of Appeals is\nAffirmed.\nJustice BROCK took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "BRANCH, Chief Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Rufus L. Edmisten, Attorney General, by Donald W. Stephens, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.",
      "Van Camp, Gill & Crumpler, P.A., by James R. Van Camp, for defendant appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MATHIAS BOLLING WINFREY, JR.\nNo. 23\n(Filed 3 October 1979)\nHomicide \u00a7 19.1\u2014 defense of accident \u2014 evidence of deceased\u2019s reputation inadmissible\nIn a homicide prosecution in which defendant relied on the defense of accident, the trial court properly excluded testimony by the victim\u2019s former wife that the victim was a dangerous man and that she had told defendant of the victim\u2019s reputation prior to the time of the killing, since evidence of the victim\u2019s character traits is admissible under certain circumstances only in cases involving self-defense and is not relevant to a determination of whether defendant\u2019s pistol discharged accidentally and inflicted the fatal wounds.\nJustice Brock took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.\nAPPEAL by defendant from Baley, S. J., 22 May 1978 Session of Montgomery Superior Court.\nDefendant was charged in an indictment, proper in form, with the first degree murder of William John Janieri. He entered a plea of not guilty.\nThe evidence in this case may be summarized as follows: Defendant and Donna Small had dated and were engaged to be married during the period from January, 1977, to May, 1977. Thereafter, Ms. Small began dating the victim. On 3 November 1977, defendant went to Janieri\u2019s place of business to talk with him about accusations by Janieri that defendant had set fire to his store. He carried a loaded semi-automatic pistol in his raincoat because, according to him, he knew Janieri had a violent, unpredictable temper. He was afraid of him and carried the gun only.as a \u201cprop.\u201d\nDefendant stated to an S.B.I. agent that the pistol discharged accidentally when Janieri reached \u201cdouble handed\u201d for him, touching the gun.\nThere was expert medical testimony that Janieri died as a result of two gunshot wounds to the head, fired at a range of six to ten inches from the victim\u2019s head.\nAt trial, defendant did not contend that he acted in self-defense but relied on the defense of accident. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree, and defendant appealed from judgment imposing a sentence of imprisonment for a period of sixty years. The Court of Appeals in an opinion by Judge Erwin with Judge Martin (Robert M.) concurring and Judge Mitchell dissenting found no error in the trial. Defendant appealed to this Court pursuant to G.S. 7A-30(2).\nRufus L. Edmisten, Attorney General, by Donald W. Stephens, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nVan Camp, Gill & Crumpler, P.A., by James R. Van Camp, for defendant appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0260-01",
  "first_page_order": 284,
  "last_page_order": 287
}