{ "id": 8572887, "name": "RAYMOND BURGESS, on behalf of himself and all other persons similarly situated v. JOSEPH SCHLITZ BREWING COMPANY", "name_abbreviation": "Burgess v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co.", "decision_date": "1979-11-06", "docket_number": "No. 21", "first_page": "520", "last_page": "528", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "298 N.C. 520" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "250 S.E. 2d 687", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "39 N.C. App. 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8553155 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/39/0481-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 S.E. 800", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1912, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "160 N.C. 263", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11271146 ], "year": 1912, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/160/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "200 S.E. 2d 40", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "284 N.C. 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560879 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/284/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 S.E. 2d 2", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "274 N.C. 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560662 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/274/0473-01" ] }, { "cite": "240 S.E. 2d 367", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570942 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 S.E. 2d 291", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "287 N.C. 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561054 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/287/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "250 S.E. 2d 250", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566069 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "250 S.E. 2d 271", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566139 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0366-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 740, "char_count": 17708, "ocr_confidence": 0.815, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.8296383252842205e-07, "percentile": 0.8390616595793808 }, "sha256": "59e37887e52e670b9c152ffb0d350b9529b6ee4c361c6e5e839d46824de7f02d", "simhash": "1:b92be6eb7cf5e324", "word_count": 2790 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:32:45.067536+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Justice BROCK did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case." ], "parties": [ "RAYMOND BURGESS, on behalf of himself and all other persons similarly situated v. JOSEPH SCHLITZ BREWING COMPANY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUSKINS, Justice.\nIn Chapter 168 of the General Statutes the General Assembly has granted a number of rights to \u201chandicapped persons.\u201d Among these rights is the right to employment. This right is granted by G.S. 168-6, which provides, in pertinent part, that \u201chandicapped persons shall be employed ... on the same terms and conditions as the ablebodied, unless it is shown that the particular disability impairs the performance of the work involved.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nPlaintiff alleges that defendant violated G.S. 168-6 by refusing to hire him upon discovering that plaintiff suffered from a case of simple glaucoma which did not interfere with plaintiff\u2019s job performance. Defendant had been \u201cinformed by competent medical authority\u201d that plaintiffs glaucoma \u201cwould in no way interfere with plaintiff\u2019s job performance and that in fact plaintiff had 20/20 vision in both eyes with glasses.\u201d Nonetheless, plaintiff was told by defendant that it was against company policy to hire an indiviudal afflicted with glaucoma.\nIn order to state a cause of action for violation of the right to employment granted in G.S. 168-6, plaintiff must establish that he is a \u201chandicapped person\u201d to whom such rights are granted. The central issue in this appeal is whether a person who suffers from \u201csimple glaucoma,\u201d but has 20/20 vision in both eyes with glasses, is a \u201chandicapped person\u201d as defined in Chapter 168.\nResolution of this issue requires consideration of G.S. 168-1, which states the purpose of Chapter 168 and defines the term \u201chandicapped person\u201d:\n\u201cThe State shall encourage and enable handicapped persons to participate fully in the social and economic life of the State and to engage in remunerative employment. The definition of \u2018handicapped persons\u2019 shall include those individuals with physical, mental and visual disabilities. For the purposes of this Article the definition of \u2018visually handicapped\u2019 in G.S. 111-11 shall apply.\u201d\nThe definition of \u201cvisually handicapped\u201d in G.S. 111-11 referred to in G.S. 168-1 reads as follows:\n\u201c[Visually handicapped persons are those persons who are totally blind or whose vision with glasses is so defective as to prevent the performance of ordinary activity for which eyesight is essential.\u201d\nFrom the above summary it is evident that \u201cthe definition of \u2018handicapped person\u2019 shall include those indivudals with . . . visual disabilities.\" G.S. 168-1. (Emphasis added.) However, G.S. 168-1 further provides that \u201cfor the purposes of [Article 1 in Chapter 168] the definition of \u2018visually handicapped\u2019 in G.S. 111-11 shall apply\u2019\u2019\nDefendant contends that the definition of \u201cvisually handicapped\u201d in G.S. 111-11 limits the meaning of \u201cvisual disabilities\u201d in G.S. 168-1. According to defendant, the only form of \u201cvisual disability\u201d covered by G.S. 168-1 is blindness or functional blindness as defined in G.S. 111-11. Defendant points to plaintiff\u2019s allegation that he has \u201c20/20 vision in both eyes with glasses\u201d and concludes that plaintiff is not a \u201chandicapped person\u201d within the meaning of G.S. 168-1.\nPlaintiff contends that the sole purpose of the reference to G.S. 111-11 is to indicate that whenever the specific phrase \u201cvisually handicapped\u201d is used in the statute, then the definition given in G.S. 111-11 shall apply. Whenever that specific phrase is not used, then the broader term \u201cvisual disabilities,\u201d unrestricted by reference to G.S. 111-11, shall apply to define a \u201chandicapped person.\u201d\nLiterally read, the statement in G.S. 168-1 making the definition of \u201cvisually handicapped\u201d in G.S. 111-11 applicable \u201c[f]or the purposes of this Article\u201d can be interpreted in either the manner suggested by plaintiff or defendant. To resolve this ambiguity, we must therefore construe the statutory language in question in light of the applicable canons of statutory construction.\n. The intent of the legislature controls the interpretation of a statute. Realty Co. v. Trust Co., 296 N.C. 366, 250 S.E. 2d 271 (1979); Mazda Motors v. Southwestern Motors, 296 N.C. 357, 250 S.E. 2d 250 (1979). \u201cA construction which operates to defeat or impair the object of the statute must be avoided if that can reasonably be done without violence to the legislative language.\u201d State v. Hart, 287 N.C. 76, 213 S.E. 2d 291 (1975). To this end, the words and phrases of a statute must be interpreted contextually, in a manner which harmonizes with the other provisions of the statute and which gives effect to the reason and purpose of the statute. In re Hardy, 294 N.C. 90, 240 S.E. 2d 367 (1978); Underwood v. Howland, Commr. of Motor Vehicles, 274 N.C. 473, 164 S.E. 2d 2 (1968). Finally, this statute, being remedial, should be construed liberally, in a manner which assures fulfillment of the beneficial goals for which it is enacted and which brings within it all cases fairly falling within its intended scope. Hicks v. Albertson, 284 N.C. 236, 200 S.E. 2d 40 (1973); Weston v. Lumber Co., 160 N.C. 263, 75 S.E. 800 (1912).\nApplication of the above principles leads us to conclude that the restrictive definition of \u201cvisually handicapped\u201d in G.S. 111-11 should not be applied in a manner which limits the meaning of \u201cvisual disability\u201d in G.S. 168-1. Significantly, the opening sentence in G.S. 168-1 announces in the broadest possible terms the legislative purpose in granting certain rights to the handicapped: \u201cThe State shall encourage and enable handicapped persons to participate fully in the social and economic life of the State and to engage in remunerative employment.\u201d (Emphasis added.) In the same vein, the second sentence indicates that the term handicapped person is to be defined expansively: \u201cThe definition of \u2018handicapped person\u2019 shall include those individuals with physical, mental and visual disabilities.\" (Emphasis added.) Moreover, when we focus attention on those sections of the statute which enumerate the various rights of the handicapped, it becomes apparent that the narrowly defined term \u201cvisually handicapped,\u201d which refers only to persons who are blind or functionally blind, see G.S. 111-11, is used solely in connection with those sections of the statute dealing exclusively with problems unique to the type of handicap identified by that term.\n\u201c\u00a7 168-4. May be accompanied by guide dog. \u2014 Every visually handicapped person shall have the right to be accompanied by a guide dog, especially trained for the purpose, in any of the places listed in G.S. 168-3 provided that he shall be liable for any damage done to the premises or facilities by such dog.\n\u00a7 168-5. Traffic and other rights of persons using certain canes. \u2014The driver of a vehicle approaching a visually handicapped pedestrian who is carrying a cane predominantly white or silver in color (with or without a red tip) or using a guide dog shall take all necessary precautions to avoid injury to such pedestrian.\n* * * *\n\u00a7 168-7. Guide dogs. \u2014 Every visually handicapped person who has a guide dog, or who obtains a guide dog, shall be entitled to keep the guide dog on the premises leased, rented or used by such handicapped person. He shall not be required to pay extra compensation for such guide dog but shall be liable for any damage done to the premises by such a guide dog. No person, firm or corporation shall refuse to sell, rent, lease or otherwise disallow a visually handicapped person to use any premises for the reason that said visually handicapped person has or will obtain a guide dog for mobility purposes.\u201d (1977 Cum. Supp.) (Emphasis added.)\nOn the other hand, those sections of the statute which address problems common to all handicapped citizens utilize the broadly defined term \u201chandicapped person,\u201d which encompasses all persons \u201cwith physical, mental and visual disabilities\u201d:\n\u201c\u00a7 168.2. Right of access to and use of public places . \u2014 Handicapped persons have the same right as the ablebodied to the full and free use of the streets, highways, sidewalks, walkways, public buildings, public facilities, and all other buildings and facilities, both publicly and privately owned, which serve the public.\n\u00a7 168.3. Right to use of public conveyances, accommodations, etc. \u2014The handicapped and physically disabled are entitled to accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of all common carriers, airplanes, motor vehicles, railroad trains, motor buses, streetcars, boats, or any other public conveyances or modes or transportation; hotels, lodging places, places of public accommodation, amusement or resort to which the general public is invited, subject only to th\u00e9 conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons.\n* * * $\n\u00a7 168.6. Right to employment. \u2014 Handicapped persons shall be employed in the State service, the service of the political subdivisions of the State, in the public schools, and in all other employment, both public and private, on the same terms and conditions as the ablebodied, unless it is shown that the particular disability impairs the performance of the work involved.\n* * * 4\u00ab\n\u00a7 168.8. Right to habilitation and rehabilitation services. \u2014 Handicapped persons shall be entitled to such habilitation and rehabilitation services as available and needed for the development or restoration of their capabilities to the fullest extent possible. Such services shall include, but not be limited to, education, training, treatment and other services to provide for adequate food, clothing, housing and transportation during the course of education, training and treatment. Handicapped persons shall be entitled to these rights subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons.\n\u00a7 168.9. Right to housing. \u2014 Each handicapped citizen shall have the same right as any other citizen to live and reside in residential communities, homes, and group homes, and no person or group of persons, including governmental bodies or political subdivisions of the State, shall be permitted, or have the authority, to prevent any handicapped citizen, on the basis of his or her handicap, from living and residing in residential communities, homes, and group homes on the same basis and conditions as any other citizen. Nothing herein shall be construed to conflict with provisions of Chapter 122 of the General Statutes.\n\u00a7 168.10. Eliminate discrimination in treatment of handicapped and disabled. \u2014 Each handicapped person shall have the same consideration as any other person for individual accident and health insurance coverage, and no insurer, solely on the basis of such person\u2019s handicap, shall deny such coverage or benefits. The availability of such insurance shall not be denied solely due to the handicap, provided, however, that no such insurer shall be prohibited from excluding by waiver or otherwise, any pre-existing conditions from such coverage, and further provided that any such insurer may charge the appropriate premiums or fees for the risk insured on the same basis and conditions as insurance issued to other persons. Nothing contained herein or in any other statute shall restrict or preclude any insurer governed by Chapter 57 or Chapter 58 of the General Statutes from setting and charging a premium or fee based upon the class or classes of risks on sound actuarial and underwriting principles as determined by such insurer, or from applying its regular underwriting standards applicable to all classes of risks. The provisions of this section shall apply to both corporations governed by Chapter 57 and Chapter 58 of the General Statutes.\u201d (1977 Cum. Supp.) (Emphasis added.)\nThus, when we read the statute contextually, it is clear that the General Assembly did not intend the narrow definition of \u201cvisually handicapped\u201d in G.S. 111-11 to control the meaning of the term \u201cvisual disabilities\u201d in G.S. 168-1; rather, the General Assembly intended that the definition in G.S. 111-11 would apply only when the specific term \u201cvisually handicapped\u201d was used.\nSuch a reading of the statute harmonizes the definition of \u201cvisually handicapped\u201d in G.S. 111-11 with the remaining provisions of the statute and gives full effect to the reason and purpose of the statute. See In re Hardy, supra. The broadly expressed goal of this statute is \u201cto encourage and enable handicapped persons to participate fully in the social and economic life of the State and to engage in remunerative employment.\u201d G.S. 168-1. Given such a broad expression of legislative intent, exclusion from coverage of persons suffering from \u201cvisual disabilities\u201d less severe than blindness would be contrary to the spirit of the statute. Such exclusion would fail to bring under the statute all cases falling within its intended scope. See Hicks v. Albertson, supra.\nWe must now determine whether plaintiff has \u201cvisual disabilities\u201d within the meaning of the statute.\nAs used in this statute, the term \u201cdisability\u201d refers to a present, non-correctible loss of function which substantially impairs a person\u2019s ability to function normally. Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from a case of simple glaucoma. However, he further alleges that he has 20/20 vision in both eyes with glasses. Essentially, plaintiff has indicated in his pleadings that he has an eye disease but that his vision is functioning normally with glasses. Accordingly, we must conclude that plaintiff is not visually disabled within the meaning of the statute.\nPlaintiff asks us to extend the coverage of the statute to those who suffer from potentially disabling conditions, irrespective of whether those conditions have in fact resulted in \u201cphysical, mental, or visual disabilities.\u201d G.S. 168-1. Such an interpretation, if adopted, would exceed the intended scope of this statute. Fairly construed, the remedial provisions of this statute are intended to aid only those who are presently disabled. The problems of individuals, not presently disabled, who suffer from conditions which may or may not disable them in the future are beyond the scope of the statute. Such individuals are not \u201chandicapped persons\u201d within the meaning of the statute as presently written.\nPlaintiff does not allege sufficient facts to establish himself as a \u201chandicapped person\u201d within the meaning of G.S. 168-1. His complaint, therefore, fails to state a claim under G.S. 168-6 upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Rules of Civil Procedure, was properly granted by the trial court.\nFor the reasons stated, the judgment of the trial court must be reinstated. To that end, the decision of the Court of Appeals is\nReversed.\nJustice BROCK did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUSKINS, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Pfefferkorn & Cooley, P.A., by William G. Pfefferkorn; J. Wilson Parker and Jim D. Cooley, attorneys for plaintiff appellee.", "Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice, by Charles F. Vance, Jr. and W. Andrew Copenhaver, attorneys for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "RAYMOND BURGESS, on behalf of himself and all other persons similarly situated v. JOSEPH SCHLITZ BREWING COMPANY\nNo. 21\n(Filed 6 November 1979)\n1. Master and Servant \u00a7 1\u2014 visually disabled \u2014 right of employment\nThe General Assembly did not intend the narrow definition of \u201cvisually handicapped\u201d in G.S. 111-11, which refers only to persons who are blind or functionally blind, to control the meaning of the term \u201cvisual disabilities\u201d in the statute defining \u201chandicapped persons,\u201d G.S. 168-1; rather, the General Assembly intended that the definition in G.S. 111-11 would apply only when the specific term \u201cvisually handicapped\u201d was used.\n2. Master and Servant \u00a7 1\u2014 visual disability \u2014simple glaucoma \u2014 20/20 vision-handicapped person \u2014 right of employment\nA person who suffers from simple glaucoma but has 20/20 vision in both eyes with glasses does not have a \u201cvisual disability\u201d within the meaning of G.S. 168-1 and is thus not a \u201chandicapped person\u201d who is granted a right of employment by G.S. 168-6.\nJustice Brock did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.\nOn petition for discretionary review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, 39 N.C. App. 481, 250 S.E. 2d 687 (1979), reversing judgment of McConnell, J., entered 7 February 1978, FORSYTH Superior Court.\nThis is a class action in which plaintiff asserts that defendant\u2019s acts, policies, practices and procedures violated the rights of plaintiff and the class he represents as secured by G.S. 168-6, which grants to \u201chandicapped persons\u201d the right to employment.\nPlaintiff alleges, in pertinent part, that on 16 February 1975, he applied for employment with defendant. On 18 February 1976, defendant informed plaintiff that it wanted him to go to work and requested him to report for a pre-employment physical examination. On 20 February 1976, defendant informed plaintiff that he would not be hired because the physical examination indicated that plaintiff had a case of simple glaucoma. Plaintiff was told that it was against defendant\u2019s policy to hire individuals who had glaucoma. Defendant was informed by competent medical authority that plaintiff\u2019s glaucoma would in no way interfere with plaintiff\u2019s job performance and that in fact plaintiff had 20/20 vision in both eyes with glasses.\nDefendant filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Rules of Civil Procedure, for failure to state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted. In support of its motion, defendant contended that plaintiff\u2019s complaint affirmatively established that plaintiff was not a \u201chandicapped person\u201d as that term was defined in G.S. 168-1. Defendant\u2019s motion was granted by the trial court.\nOn plaintiff\u2019s appeal the Court of Appeals reversed. Defendant\u2019s petition for discretionary review was allowed by this Court.\nPfefferkorn & Cooley, P.A., by William G. Pfefferkorn; J. Wilson Parker and Jim D. Cooley, attorneys for plaintiff appellee.\nWomble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice, by Charles F. Vance, Jr. and W. Andrew Copenhaver, attorneys for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0520-01", "first_page_order": 544, "last_page_order": 552 }