{ "id": 8564183, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. NORMAN EUGENE SATTERFIELD", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Satterfield", "decision_date": "1980-07-15", "docket_number": "No. 113", "first_page": "621", "last_page": "631", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "300 N.C. 621" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "186 S.E. 2d 384", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572439 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 S.E. 2d 60", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "287 N.C. 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562667 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/287/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "255 S.E. 2d 168", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570534 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "249 S.E. 2d 387", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564743 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 S.E. 920", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1909, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 N.C. 217", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8654422 ], "year": 1909, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/151/0217-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 S.E. 2d 440", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "284 N.C. 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559993 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/284/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 S.E. 2d 644", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 528", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558765 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0528-01" ] }, { "cite": "244 S.E. 2d 373", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 N.C. 147", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561881 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/295/0147-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 S.E. 2d 442", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "255 N.C. 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567264 ], "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/255/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "180 S.E. 2d 17", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 N.C. 484", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560736 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/278/0484-01" ] }, { "cite": "220 S.E. 2d 320", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 N.C. 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566560 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/289/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "246 S.E. 2d 55", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 N.C. App. 340", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8552649 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/37/0340-01" ] }, { "cite": "240 S.E. 2d 794", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 320", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572801 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0320-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 937, "char_count": 24576, "ocr_confidence": 0.828, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1780424864085786e-06, "percentile": 0.9872699141919085 }, "sha256": "b5b5b0296bce2fdd56bd95204c75b4fe3de78018c41806026b1ee2108483fb90", "simhash": "1:c72fb44a763f9161", "word_count": 3983 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:04:36.297481+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Justice BROCK did not participate in the consideration and decision of this case." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. NORMAN EUGENE SATTERFIELD" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUSKINS, Justice.\nDefendant was served with a nontestimonial identification order on 30 March 1979 directing him to submit to procedures for collection of saliva, blood and pubic hair samples at the Iredell Memorial Hospital Emergency Room. The procedures were conducted on 2 April 1978, and the samples were personally delivered by an officer of the Statesville Police Department to David Hedgecock, a forensic serologist employed by the SBI, for analysis and comparison.\nAt trial, defendant sought to suppress the results of Mr. Hedgecock\u2019s analysis by interposing a general objection to Hedge-cock\u2019s testimony. This objection was overruled and Mr. Hedge-cock was permitted to testify. Defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting this testimony without a showing of compliance with G.S. 15A-279(d), which requires that defendant be advised of his right to counsel before being subjected to any tests pursuant to a nontestimonial identification order issued under G.S. 15A-271, et seq. This contention is without merit. The record indicates that defendant failed to challenge the admissibility of the blood and saliva tests by a proper motion to suppress as required by G.S. 15A-971, et seq. Such failure constitutes a waiver of the objection that the blood and saliva samples were obtained in violation of a provision of Chapter 15A or the United States or North Carolina Constitutions. State v. Hill, 294 N.C. 320, 240 S.E. 2d 794 (1978); State v. Drakeford, 37 N.C. App. 340, 246 S.E. 2d 55 (1978).\nA defendant who seeks to suppress evidence upon a ground specified in G.S. 15A-974 must comply with the procedural requirements outlined in G.S. 15A-971, et seq. See G.S. 15A-972 and 979(d). Moreover, such defendant has the burden of establishing that his motion to suppress is timely and proper in form. Accord, State v. Drakeford, supra. Specifically, a motion to suppress made at trial, whether oral or written, should state the legal ground upon which it is made and should be accompanied by an affidavit containing facts supporting the motion. Compare G.S. 15A-977(e) with G.S. 15A-977(a). If the motion fails to allege a legal or factual basis for suppressing the evidence, it may be summarily dismissed by the trial judge. Compare G.S. 15A-977(e) with G.S. 15A-977(c).\nIn the instant case, defendant merely lodged a general objection to Mr. Hedgecock\u2019s testimony as to the results of tests conducted on defendant\u2019s blood and saliva samples. The objection did not say what specific statutory or constitutional provision had been violated by the State in obtaining the blood and saliva samples from defendant. Nor were any facts presented in support of defendant\u2019s general assertion that the State had failed to inform him of his rights prior to taking his blood and saliva samples. In sum, defendant\u2019s general objection fails to allege a legal or factual basis for his contention that the blood and saliva samples were illegally taken. It follows therefore that the trial judge had statutory authority to summarily deny defendant\u2019s objection. G.S. 15A-977(c).\nIn addition to being proper in form, the motion to suppress must be timely made. As a general rule, motions to suppress must be made before trial. G.S. 15A-975(a) and Official Commentary. A defendant may move to suppress evidence at trial only if he demonstrates that he did not have a reasonable opportunity to make the motion before trial; or that the State did not give him sufficient advance notice (twenty working days) of its intention to use certain types of evidence; or that additional facts have been discovered after a pretrial determination and denial of the motion which could not have been discovered with reasonable diligence before determination of the motion. G.S. 15A-975. In the instant case, defendant failed to bring himself within any of the exceptions to the general rule. Thus, defendant\u2019s objection at trial to the admissibility of the blood and saliva tests is without merit because the objection, treated as a motion to suppress, was not timely made.\nFinally, we note that defendant\u2019s primary contention on this assignment is not that the State actually failed to advise him of his right to counsel prior to withdrawing his blood and saliva but, rather, that the record fails to indicate whether defendant was advised of his rights immediately prior to having the fluid samples removed. However, the failure of the record in this respect is entirely attributable to defendant, who, as previously noted, bears the burden of presenting facts in support of his motion to suppress. In any event, the nontestimonial identification order personally delivered to defendant three days prior to the withdrawal of the fluid samples advised defendant fully as to his right to counsel. Given such advance notice, any failure to remind defendant of his right to counsel prior to the taking of the fluid samples would not likely constitute a \u201csubstantial\u201d violation of G.S. 15A-279(d) requiring suppression of the evidence obtained. See G.S. 15A-974.\nFor the reasons stated, we hold that defendant\u2019s objection to Mr. Hedgecock\u2019s testimony was properly overruled. Defendant\u2019s first assignment has no merit.\nDefendant contends the trial court erred in allowing the district attorney to ask defendant on cross-examination whether he had been previously charged with assault with intent to commit rape. His second assignment rests on this contention.\nOrdinarily, the challenged question would be improper. \u201cA defendant may not be asked on cross-examination for impeachment purposes if he has been accused, arrested or indicted for a particular crime [citations omitted], but he may be asked if he in fact committed the crime.\u201d State v. Poole, 289 N.C. 47, 220 S.E. 2d 320 (1975). However, in the instant case, defendant\u2019s counsel, in his cross-examination of a police officer, was the first to elicit evidence that defendant had been previously charged with assault with intent to commit rape. Moreover, prior to being asked the question to which objection was made, defendant had testified on cross-examination, without objection, that he had once been accused of assault with intent to commit rape. The well established rule is that the benefit of an objection is lost when evidence of like import is admitted without objection. State v. Little, 278 N.C. 484, 180 S.E. 2d 17 (1971). This rule is especially applicable here where defendant, the objecting party, was responsible for introducing the subject of prior criminal charges in the first place. See State v. Williams, 255 N.C. 82, 120 S.E. 2d 442 (1961); 1 Stansbury, N.C. Evidence \u00a7 30 n. 59 at 81 (Brandis rev. 1973). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in instructing defendant to answer the question relating to a prior criminal charge made against him. Defendant\u2019s second assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant contends the trial court prevented meaningful cross-examination of the State\u2019s witnesses on matters relevant to the defense. He asserts six instances in which the trial court improperly sustained objections to questions asked by defendant in his cross-examination of the State\u2019s witnesses. We have carefully examined these exceptions and find no prejudicial error. Two of the questions to which objection was sustained (Exceptions 5 and 11) contained erroneous statements of fact and were difficult to understand; three questions (Exceptions 3, 4 and 9), as phrased, inquired into matters of tenuous relevance; one question (Exception 10) was unduly argumentative and repetitious. Defendant made no attempt to rephrase these questions and make proper inquiry. We cannot say from an examination of this record that the trial judge abused his discretion or deprived defendant of a fair trial by the rulings here challenged. The wide latitude accorded the cross-examiner \u201cdoes not mean that all decisions with respect to cross-examination may be made by the cross-examiner.\u201d 1 Stansbury, supra, \u00a7 35 at 108. Rather, the scope and duration of cross-examination rest largely in the discretion of the trial judge. State v. Abernathy, 295 N.C. 147, 244 S.E. 2d 373 (1978). \u201cThe judge has discretion to ban unduly repetitious and argumentative questioning, as well as inquiry into matters of only tenuous relevance.\u201d 1 Stansbury, supra, \u00a7 35 at 108. Accord, State v. Abernathy, supra; State v. Britt, 291 N.C. 528, 231 S.E. 2d 644 (1977). Defendant\u2019s third assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to qualify a barber as an expert witness on the subject of facial hair and facial hair growth. For reasons which follow, we hold this contention has no merit.\nWhen objection is made to a question calling for the expert opinion of a witness not previously tendered and qualified as an expert, \u201cthe party offering the expert should request a finding of his qualification; and if there is no such request, and no finding or admission that the witness is qualified, the exclusion of his testimony will not be reviewed on appeal.\u201d 1 Stansbury, supra, \u00a7 133 at 432. Accord, Dickens v. Everhart, 284 N.C. 95, 199 S.E. 2d 440 (1973); Lumber Co. v. R.R., 151 N.C. 217, 65 S.E. 920 (1909). In the instant case, objection was made to a question propounded by defendant calling for the expert opinion of a barber who had not been tendered and qualified as an expert. Notwithstanding the State\u2019s objection, defendant did not tender the barber as an expert and failed to request that the witness be qualified as an expert in the field of facial hair growth. Accordingly, the trial court sustained objection to the barber\u2019s opinion as to whether defendant\u2019s facial hair growth was fast or slow. Since the barber was never qualified as an expert, the objection to his testimony was properly sustained.\nIn any event, the record is silent as to what the barber\u2019s opinion would have been had he been permitted to testify. Thus, it is impossible on appellate review to determine whether exclusion of this testimony was prejudicial error. \u201cA showing of the essential content or substance of the witness\u2019s testimony is required before this Court can determine whether the error in excluding evidence is prejudicial.\u201d Currence v. Hardin, 296 N.C. 95, 249 S.E. 2d 387 (1978). Otherwise stated, \u201c[w]hen evidence is excluded, the record must sufficiently show what the purport of the evidence would have been, or the propriety of the exclusion will not be reviewed on appeal.\u201d 1 Stansbury, supra, \u00a7 26 at 62. Defendant\u2019s fourth assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant contends the trial court erred in failing to suppress the in-court identification of defendant by the victim.\nUpon defendant\u2019s objection, the court conducted a voir dire in the absence of the jury at which the testimony of the victim and two police officers was taken. This testimony tends to show, in pertinent part, that on 20 March 1979, six days after commission of the offense, Officer Shawver visited the victim at her home, played a recording of six black male voices, and the victim picked out defendant\u2019s voice. The officer then spread out ten large color photographs of black males, and the victim picked out photographs of defendant and his brother. The officer took up these photographs without comment and spread out a second set of smaller photographs. The victim picked out a photograph of defendant. The photograph of defendant in the first photographic display was different from the one shown in the second display. On 27 March 1979, the victim viewed a physical lineup of six black males of similar height and weight. The men wore identical green coveralls. The victim identified defendant as the man who had raped her. Defendant\u2019s brother was also in the physical lineup; however, the victim eliminated him from consideration.\nThe officers who conducted the various identification procedures never suggested to the victim who she should pick. Nor did the officers ever suggest that the person whose voice she had identified would be in the photographic showing or physical lineup. The victim testified that her in-court identification of defendant was based on seeing him in her apartment on the night of the assault; that a strong light from her bedroom shone into the kitchen where she was assaulted; that she observed defendant the five to ten minutes he spent with her in the kitchen.\nFollowing the hearing the court made findings of fact and concluded, in pertinent part, \u201cthat there were no improper or illegal identification procedures or lineups involving this defendant; that the in-court identification made this day of defendant as the perpetrator is of independent origin, based solely on the prosecuting witness seeing the defendant at the time of the crime and does not result from any out-of-court confrontation or identification nor from any photograph or from any pretrial identification procedures which were suggestive or conducive in nature to a mistaken identification. . . .\u201d Accordingly, the court held that the in-court identification of the victim \u201cwas made in accordance with the law, and [that] the legal and constitutional rights of defendant have been properly protected and afforded him.\u201d\nCareful review of the record indicates that the findings of fact made by the trial court are supported by competent evidence and thus are conclusive on this Court. State v. Gibbs, 297 N.C. 410, 255 S.E. 2d 168 (1979). The findings of fact fully support the conclusion of law that none of defendant\u2019s constitutional rights were violated in the identification procedures and that the evidence was admissible.\nAt the physical lineup on 27 March 1979, the victim noticed that one of the black males in the lineup, defendant\u2019s brother, appeared to be nervous and would not look her in the face. After identifying defendant as the perpetrator of the crime, the victim noted to police officers that one of the men in the lineup seemed extremely nervous. The officers then asked the victim to confront this individual as he stood alone in the lineup. The victim complied with this request. The victim was not asked to make an identification on the basis of this confrontation. The victim testified that looking at this man in isolation did not change her prior identification of defendant as the perpetrator. Defendant argues that the confrontation was impermissibly suggestive and conducive to an irreparably mistaken identification. This contention is without merit. The confrontation took place after the victim had positively identified defendant from a lineup of six black males. Moreover, the victim testified that viewing this male in isolation did not change her initial identification of defendant from the physical lineup. In any event, defendant has no standing to complain of a possible violation of his brother\u2019s constitutional rights.\nDefendant argues that the court erred in admitting, without a voir dire examination, testimony concerning the victim\u2019s identification of defendant\u2019s voice from a number of tape recorded voices played to her by police officers. Defendant, however, acquiesced in the trial court\u2019s decision not to hold a voir dire on the voice identification and failed to lodge objection to testimony concerning the victim\u2019s identification of defendant\u2019s recorded voice. In any event, review of the record indicates that the voice identification procedure was not conducted in an impermissibly suggestive manner. Under these circumstances, a voir dire examination was not necessary, especially since defendant filed no objection and did not request a further voir dire with respect to the state\u2019s references to the voice identification. See State v. Vinson, 287 N.C. 326, 215 S.E. 2d 60 (1975).\nWe note finally that any discrepancies or inconsistencies in Mrs. Fletcher\u2019s identification of defendant went to the weight rather than the competency of her testimony and is thus a matter for the jury. State v. Gibbs, supra; State v. Bass, 280 N.C. 435, 186 S.E. 2d 384 (1972). Defendant\u2019s fifth assignment is overruled.\nAfter careful review, we find no prejudicial error in the trial. The verdicts and judgments must therefore be upheld.\nNo error.\nJustice BROCK did not participate in the consideration and decision of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUSKINS, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Rufus L. Edmisten, Attorney General, by Barry S. McNeill, Associate Attorney, for the State.", "Albert F. Walser, attorney for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. NORMAN EUGENE SATTERFIELD\nNo. 113\n(Filed 15 July 1980)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 55; Searches and Seizures \u00a7\u00a7 4, 43\u2014 analysis of blood and saliva samples \u2014 failure to advise defendant of right to counsel \u2014 insufficient and untimely motion to suppress \u2014no substantial violation of statutes\nThe trial court did not err in the denial of defendant\u2019s general objection to testimony of the results of an expert\u2019s analysis of blood and saliva samples taken from defendant pursuant to a nontestimonial identification order because the record fails to show that defendant was advised of his right to counsel before being subjected to the tests as required by G.S. 15A-279(d) since (1) defendant\u2019s objection, treated as a motion to suppress, failed to allege a legal or factual basis for his contention that the blood and saliva samples were illegally taken as required by G.S. 15A-977(a), (c) and (e); (2) the motion to suppress should have been made before trial and was not timely made at trial; and (3) the nontestimonial identification order delivered to defendant three days prior to the withdrawal of the fluid samples advised defendant fully as to his right to counsel, and any failure to remind defendant of his right to counsel prior to the taking of the fluid samples would not likely constitute a \u201csubstantial\u201d violation of G.S. 15A-279(d) requiring suppression of the evidence obtained.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 86.4\u2014 cross-examination of defendant about prior criminal charge \u2014 evidence first elicited by defense counsel\nWhile ordinarily it would have been improper for the district attorney to ask defendant on cross-examination whether he had been previously charged with assault with intent to rape, the trial court did not err in directing defendant to answer a question relating to the prior criminal charge where defendant\u2019s counsel, in his cross-examination of a police officer, was the first to elicit evidence that defendant had been previously charged with assault with intent to commit rape.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 88.2\u2014 meaningful cross-examination not prevented by court\nThe trial court did not prevent meaningful cross-examination of the State\u2019s witnesses in sustaining objection to six questions asked by defense counsel on cross-examination where two of the questions contained erroneous statements of fact and were difficult to understand; three questions inquired into matters of tenuous relevance; and one question was unduly argumentative and repetitious.\n4. Criminal Law \u00a7 51\u2014 exclusion of expert testimony by barber \u2014 failure to qualify as expert\nThe trial court properly excluded a question propounded by defendant calling for the expert opinion of a barber as to whether defendant\u2019s facial hair growth was fast or slow where the barber was never tendered or qualified as an expert in the field of facial hair growth.\n5. Criminal Law \u00a7 66.14\u2014 in-court identification \u2014 no taint from voice, photographic and lineup identifications\nA rape victim\u2019s in-court identification of defendant as her assailant was of independent origin and not tainted by pretrial voice, photographic and lineup identifications where the victim testified that her in-court identification of defendant was based on seeing him in her apartment on the night of the assault, that a strong light from her bedroom shone into the kitchen where she was assaulted, and that she observed defendant the five to ten minutes he spent with her in the kitchen; the officers who conducted the various identification procedures never suggested to the victim whom she should pick, nor did the officers ever suggest that the person whose voice she had identified would be in the photographic showing or physical lineup; and none of the identification procedures was impermissibly suggestive and conducive to irreparably mistaken identification.\n6. Criminal Law \u00a7 66.6\u2014 lineup identification \u2014 viewing of one participant in isolation \u2014 no suggestiveness\nA lineup was not impermissibly suggestive and conducive to irreparably mistaken identification so as to render inadmissible a rape victim\u2019s lineup identification of defendant because the victim, after identifying defendant, told officers that one of the black males in the lineup, defendant\u2019s brother, appeared to be very nervous, and officers had the victim confront this person in isolation, where the victim testified that viewing this male in isolation did not change her initial identification of defendant from the physical lineup. Furthermore, defendant had no standing to complain of a possible violation of his brother\u2019s constitutional rights.\n7. Criminal Law \u00a7 67\u2014 voice identification \u2014 failure to hold voir dire\nThe trial court did not err in admitting a rape victim\u2019s identification of defendant\u2019s voice from a number of tape recorded voices without a voir dire examination where defendant acquiesced in the trial court\u2019s decision not to hold a voir dire on the voice identification and failed to object to testimony concerning the victim\u2019s identification of defendant\u2019s voice, and where the record shows that the voice identification procedure was not conducted in an impermissibly suggestive manner.\nJustice Bhock did not participate in the consideration and decision of this case.\nAPPEAL by defendant from judgments of Walker (Hal Hammer), J., 15 October 1979 Criminal Session, IREDELL Superior Court.\nDefendant was tried upon indictments charging him with second degree rape and first degree burglary.\nThe State offered evidence tending to show, in pertinent part, that on 14 March 1979, Frances Jane Fletcher finished work at 10:45 p.m., picked up her children, and returned to her apartment at 11:10 p.m. Mrs. Fletcher was married and lived in the apartment with her husband and children. She put one of her children in bed upstairs and sat down to watch television while waiting for her husband to return from work. A younger child stayed downstairs with her.\nAfter speaking with a neighbor, Mrs. Fletcher noticed the kitchen door was ajar. The door lock was broken and the door would not stay closed. Mrs. Fletcher put a chair against the door in order to secure it. She then turned the kitchen lights off and returned to the living room to watch television. About fifteen minutes later she heard a \u201cscooting\u201d sound. Thinking her six-year-old sleeping upstairs had kicked a laundry bag off the foot of his bed, she went to check and saw the laundry bag was still on the bed. She then went to the kitchen to fix coffee and saw the kitchen door standing open and a black man standing in the doorway, a step or two inside the kitchen. The man pointed what appeared to be a weapon at Mrs. Fletcher, told her to be quiet and to do what he wanted if she wanted to live. He grabbed her by the throat, backed her into the wall, pressed the weapon into her side and then proceeded to rape her. After he finished he wiped the wall with a shirt to remove his fingerprints. The intruder then asked Mrs. Fletcher for money. She replied she had none and he left, saying he would be back the next night.\nDuring this time the light in the kitchen was turned off, but Mrs. Fletcher testified there was sufficient light from a downstairs bedroom for her to see the assailant\u2019s face. Moreover, she had been pushed against the light switch on the wall and during the assault the kitchen light kept coming on for short periods of time. Mrs. Fletcher identified defendant as her assailant.\nEvidence was also offered tending to show that semen stains on the victim\u2019s clothing came from someone with defendant\u2019s blood type.\nDefendant testified that on the night in question he shot pool with his uncle until 10:30; that he stayed at his girl friend\u2019s house from 11 p.m. to 12 midnight; that from 12 midnight to 12:30 a.m. he spoke to a friend in front of his house; that he came home at 12:30 a.m. and stayed there the rest of the night. Defendant\u2019s testimony was corroborated by several witnesses.\nThe jury found defendant guilty as charged, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment for the second degree rape and twenty to thirty years for the first degree burglary, to run consecutively. Defendant appeals as of right to this Court.\nRufus L. Edmisten, Attorney General, by Barry S. McNeill, Associate Attorney, for the State.\nAlbert F. Walser, attorney for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0621-01", "first_page_order": 653, "last_page_order": 663 }