{ "id": 8572694, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES BRANTLEY OXENDINE", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Oxendine", "decision_date": "1981-06-02", "docket_number": "No. 16", "first_page": "235", "last_page": "245", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "303 N.C. 235" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "104 S.E. 655", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1920, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "180 N.C. 716", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8654762 ], "year": 1920, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/180/0716-01" ] }, { "cite": "80 S.E. 1060", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1914, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "166 N.C. 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11269419 ], "year": 1914, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/166/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 N.C. 346", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8692110 ], "year": 1875, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/73/0346-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 U.S. 537", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3567645 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1893, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/148/0537-01" ] }, { "cite": "16 S.E. 945", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1892, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 Ga. 347", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga.", "case_ids": [ 367894 ], "year": 1892, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga/90/0347-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 So. 2d 343", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9627331 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/293/0343-01" ] }, { "cite": "14 S.E. 504", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1892, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 N.C. 604", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11274360 ], "year": 1892, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/110/0604-01" ] }, { "cite": "238 S.E. 2d 477", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "293 N.C. 523", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565386 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/293/0523-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 S.E. 2d 231", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 418", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572615 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0418-01" ] }, { "cite": "244 S.E. 2d 414", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 N.C. 96", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561792 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/295/0096-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 S.E. 2d 263", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 441", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572690 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0441-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 S.E. 2d 517", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 515", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562782 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0515-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 L.Ed. 2d 327", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 S.Ct. 433", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "444 U.S. 954", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11403873, 11404100, 11403588, 11403562, 11403627, 11403820, 11403726, 11403538, 11403795, 11404052, 11403674, 11403515, 11403997 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/444/0954-10", "/us/444/0954-13", "/us/444/0954-04", "/us/444/0954-03", "/us/444/0954-05", "/us/444/0954-09", "/us/444/0954-07", "/us/444/0954-02", "/us/444/0954-08", "/us/444/0954-12", "/us/444/0954-06", "/us/444/0954-01", "/us/444/0954-11" ] }, { "cite": "256 S.E. 2d 234", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 584", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572160 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0584-01" ] }, { "cite": "16 L.Ed. 2d 1032", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 S.Ct. 1983", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 1013", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12091749, 12091686, 12091630, 12091858, 12091795, 12091926, 12091962 ], "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/1013-03", "/us/384/1013-02", "/us/384/1013-01", "/us/384/1013-05", "/us/384/1013-04", "/us/384/1013-06", "/us/384/1013-07" ] }, { "cite": "145 S.E. 2d 867", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "266 N.C. 238", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560096 ], "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/266/0238-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 S.E. 2d 693", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 288", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571178 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0288-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 S.E. 2d 752", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 355", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572408 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0355-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 S.E. 2d 745", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 690", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575769 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0690-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 S.E. 2d 118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 642", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574188 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0642-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 S.E. 2d 897", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "274 N.C. 380", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560392 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/274/0380-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 S.E. 2d 185", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 N.C. 712", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572742 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/289/0712-01" ] }, { "cite": "240 S.E. 2d 377", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 270", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572583 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0270-01" ] }, { "cite": "256 S.E. 2d 166", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 539", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571996 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0539-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 S.E. 2d 271", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 529", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572910 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0529-01" ] }, { "cite": "49 S.E. 2d 463", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1948, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "229 N.C. 276", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12165633 ], "year": 1948, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/229/0276-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 S.E. 2d 338", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 503", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574036 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0503-01" ] }, { "cite": "245 S.E. 2d 674", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 N.C. 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563177 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/295/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 S.E. 2d 359", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 N.C. 223", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567692 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/289/0223-01" ] }, { "cite": "51 L.Ed. 2d 573", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 S.Ct. 1160", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "429 U.S. 1123", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 7811, 6954, 6922, 6220, 6484, 7704, 5630 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/429/1123-05", "/us/429/1123-06", "/us/429/1123-04", "/us/429/1123-03", "/us/429/1123-01", "/us/429/1123-02", "/us/429/1123-07" ] }, { "cite": "225 S.E. 2d 786", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "290 N.C. 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560772 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/290/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "241 S.E. 2d 662", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 418", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573313 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0418-01" ] }, { "cite": "255 S.E. 2d 154", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 419", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570604 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0419-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 S.E. 2d 98", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "101" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 700", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573421 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "704" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0700-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1005, "char_count": 27390, "ocr_confidence": 0.803, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.340414866863579e-07, "percentile": 0.7921083429960588 }, "sha256": "b66826657cc27aeb8c71fe2412f12d6f91a15691e50cb9670c7e9d9bc4d282e6", "simhash": "1:0f25d0a7646bbdbf", "word_count": 4500 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:28:49.209015+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES BRANTLEY OXENDINE" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "COPELAND, Justice.\nDefendant argues four assignments of error on appeal. We have carefully considered each assignment and conclude that the trial court committed no error which would entitle defendant to a new trial.\nDefendant first contends that the trial court erred in granting the State\u2019s motion to consolidate the two charges against him for trial. G.S. 15A-926(a) authorizes the consolidation of offenses and provides in pertinent part:\n\u201cTwo or more offenses may be joined . . . for trial when the offenses . . . are based on the same act or transaction or on a series of acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a single scheme or plan.\u201d\nThis Court has held that in deciding whether two or more offenses should be joined for trial, the trial court must determine whether the offenses are \u201cso separate in time and place and so distinct in circumstances as to render the consolidation unjust and prejudicial to defendant.\u201d State v. Johnson, 280 N.C. 700, 704, 187 S.E. 2d 98, 101 (1972). Thus, there must be some type of \u201ctransactional connection\u201d between the offenses before they may be consolidated for trial. State v. Powell, 297 N.C. 419, 255 S.E. 2d 154 (1979); State v. Greene, 294 N.C. 418, 241 S.E. 2d 662 (1978). In addition, the trial judge\u2019s exercise of discretion in consolidating charges will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing that the defendant has been denied a fair trial by the order of consolidation. State v. Phifer, 290 N.C. 203, 225 S.E. 2d 786 (1976), cert. denied., 429 U.S. 1123, 97 S.Ct. 1160, 51 L.Ed. 2d 573 (1977); State v. Taylor, 289 N.C. 223, 221 S.E. 2d 359 (1976).\nWe find the murder and assault charges involved in the present action sufficiently similar in time and circumstances to justify the trial judge\u2019s order consolidating them for trial. The State\u2019s evidence tended to show that both offenses were committed within a short interval of time; Anthony Oxendine was killed between 8:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. on 30 August 1979 and Bunyan Lowery was assaulted at approximately 4:00 a.m. on 31 August 1979. The offenses were similar in nature, in that each involved the shooting of a person with the intent to kill. It appeared from the evidence that defendant committed both offenses after consuming a considerable amount of alcohol and drugs, indicating that the offenses were part of a series of transactions undertaken by defendant while under the influence of intoxicating substances. Defendant confessed to the commission of both offenses in the same interview with law enforcement officers. The witnesses to be presented in both trials were substantially the same. It would have been impractical and nearly impossible to present evidence of the events surrounding one offense without also presenting evidence tending to prove the other offense. Defendant has failed to show that the consolidation unjustly hindered him or deprived him of his ability to present a defense on either charge. Consequently, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State\u2019s motion to consolidate the murder and assault charges for trial and defendant\u2019s assignment of error is overruled.\nBy his second assignment of error, defendant contests the trial court\u2019s admission, over his objection, of several unrelated elements of evidence. He first argues that the trial court erred in allowing State\u2019s witness Luther Thorndyke to relate defendant\u2019s answers to questions listed on the firearms transaction record which defendant was required to fill out before purchasing a .22 caliber rifle on 30 August 1979. Defendant contended that he purchased the rifle as a birthday gift for his son. Mr. Thorndyke was the manager on duty at the time defendant bought the weapon. It is defendant\u2019s belief that by admitting this testimony, the trial court permitted the prosecution to introduce evidence tending to impeach defendant\u2019s character before defendant testified in his own behalf or introduced evidence of his good character as part of his defense.\nEvidence of an accused\u2019s character is not admissible for any purpose if the accused has neither testified nor introduced evidence of his character in his own behalf. State v. Sanders, 295 N.C. 361, 245 S.E. 2d 674 (1978); State v. Fulcher, 294 N.C. 503, 243 S.E. 2d 338 (1978). However, the State may produce evidence relevant for some other purpose which incidentally bears upon the character of the accused. State v. Jones, 229 N.C. 276, 49 S.E. 2d 463 (1948); 1 Stansbury\u2019s North Carolina Evidence \u00a7 104 (Bran-dis Rev. 1973). The firearms transaction record which defendant filled out upon purchasing a .22 caliber rifle was relevant evidence to prove defendant owned the weapon used to kill Anthony Oxendine. Furthermore, we fail to understand how defendant was prejudiced by the witness\u2019 recitation of the questions on the form and defendant\u2019s answers thereto. The questions required that defendant reveal any prior criminal convictions, addictions to alcohol or drugs, or history of mental illness. Defendant gave no answer which could be interpreted by the jury as reflecting adversely on his character; in fact, his answers tended to prove his good character. Therefore, any technical incompetency in Mr. Thorndyke\u2019s testimony was favorable to defendant, and the admission of the testimony is not reversible error. State v. Clark, 298 N.C. 529, 259 S.E. 2d 271 (1979); State v. Logner, 297 N.C. 539, 256 S.E. 2d 166 (1979).\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred in allowing State\u2019s witness Bunyan Lowery to answer the district attorney\u2019s questions concerning his prior convictions of bootlegging. Defendant complains that by these questions the State was permitted to impeach its own witness, which practice is, as a general rule, prohibited in this jurisdiction. State v. Garrison, 294 N.C. 270, 240 S.E. 2d 377 (1978); State v. Scott, 289 N.C. 712, 224 S.E. 2d 185 (1976); State v. Wright, 274 N.C. 380, 163 S.E. 2d 897 (1968). We find that Mr. Lowery\u2019s testimony revealing his five prior convictions of bootlegging was not evidence tending to impeach his credibility, but evidence corroborating his statement that defendant came to his home at 4:00 a.m. on 31 August 1979 to purchase beer because he knew Mr. Lowery was involved in the illegal sale of alcoholic beverages. Mr. Lowery\u2019s statements were thus admissible as relevant evidence tending to prove the events which transpired on 31 August 1979, and defendant\u2019s contentions to the contrary are without merit and overruled.\nDefendant further maintains that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his written and verbal statements made to law enforcement officers subsequent to his arrest on 2 September 1979. It is his position that, because he was intoxicated from the consumption of alcohol and under the influence of drugs at the time of his statements, he was unable to comprehend the reading of his constitutional rights and incapable of intelligently waiving these rights, rendering his subsequent statements inadmissible under the holding in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed. 2d 694 (1966).\nWhen the State offers a defendant\u2019s confession into evidence and defendant objects, the trial court must conduct a voir dire hearing to determine its admissibility. State v. Jones, 294 N.C. 642, 243 S.E. 2d 118 (1978). The trial judge\u2019s finding of fact that an inculpatory statement was freely and voluntarily given is conclusive on appeal when supported by competent evidence presented at the voir dire hearing. State v. Horton, 299 N.C. 690, 263 S.E. 2d 745 (1980); State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 355, 259 S.E. 2d 752 (1979). The fact that defendant was intoxicated at the time of his confession does not preclude the conclusion that defendant\u2019s statements were freely and voluntarily given. An inculpatory statement is admissible unless the defendant is so intoxicated that he is unconscious of the meaning of his words. State v. McClure, 280 N.C. 288, 185 S.E. 2d 693 (1972); State v. Logner, 266 N.C. 238, 145 S.E. 2d 867, cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1013, 86 S.Ct. 1983, 16 L.Ed. 2d 1032 (1966).\nIn the present case, the trial judge conducted a hearing and found no evidence that defendant was unconscious or exhibiting conduct amounting to a mania at the time of his statements to Detectives Sanderson and Maynor at 2:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. on 2 September 1979. The court therefore concluded that defendant\u2019s statements were voluntarily made. We find the trial court\u2019s conclusion supported by competent evidence presented on voir dire. The only evidence tending to prove the quantity of alcohol and drugs which defendant had consumed was defendant\u2019s own testimony. Defendant further stated that despite his condition, he was able to understand his constitutional rights as they were read to him before he made his first statement at 2:00 p.m., except for his right to stop talking during the course of the interview and request the presence of counsel. Defendant was able to relate all the events which took place on 2 September 1979 in a degree of detail that is inconsistent with his contention that he was too intoxicated to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights. It is uncontroverted that defendant consumed no alcohol or drugs for at least two hours prior to making his first statement and for at least six hours prior to his second statement. All of the witnesses who observed defendant prior to and after his arrest stated that he was able to walk and carry on a normal conversation. After considering all the evidence presented at the hearing we find that the trial judge properly found a free, voluntary waiver of defendant\u2019s rights consistent with the requirements set forth in Miranda v. Arizona, supra, as reiterated by this Court in State v. Connley, 297 N.C. 584, 256 S.E. 2d 234, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 954, 100 S.Ct. 433, 62 L.Ed. 2d 327 (1979), and correctly denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred in allowing the district attorney, over defendant\u2019s objection, to question defendant on cross-examination about the details of his prior conviction of common law robbery. When the defendant in a criminal action elects to testify in his own behalf, this Court has consistently held that he may be questioned on cross-examination, for impeachment purposes, about prior specific criminal actions or degrading conduct, provided that the questions are asked in good faith. State v. Royal, 300 N.C. 515, 268 S.E. 2d 517 (1980); State v. Herbin, 298 N.C. 441, 259 S.E. 2d 263 (1979); State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 244 S.E. 2d 414 (1978). Defendant contends that the questions asked in this case concerning defendant\u2019s use of a screwdriver to threaten the victims of a previous robbery were not in good faith and should have been excluded by the trial judge. We disagree. The questions were apparently designed to indicate to the jury that defendant was a person with a propensity to use a weapon. Defendant eventually admitted that he had threatened his victims with a long screwdriver, thus it appears from the record that the questions were based on information properly submitted to the district attorney. It is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial judge to determine whether cross-examination by the State is unfair or in bad faith, and his decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. State v. Herbin, supra; State v. Mayhand, 298 N.C. 418, 259 S.E. 2d 231 (1979); State v. Currie, 293 N.C. 523, 238 S.E. 2d 477 (1977). We find no abuse of discretion in the trial judge\u2019s decision to overrule defendant\u2019s objection to the district attorney\u2019s questions concerning his prior robbery offense, and defendant\u2019s assignment of error is overruled.\nBy his third assignment, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the first degree murder charge on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction on that charge. Defendant argues that his confessions to law enforcement officers on 2 September 1979 were improperly admitted, and without these statements there was not enough evidence of first degree murder for the charge to be submitted to the jury. Since we have held that defendant\u2019s statements were freely and voluntarily given, and therefore correctly admitted, we likewise find defendant\u2019s third assignment of error without merit and overruled.\nDefendant argues under his final assignment that the trial court erred in denying his motions to quash the indictments against him and to declare a mistrial on the ground that one of the members of the grand jury which returned the indictments against him was the brother of Anthony Oxendine, the murder victim, and a witness for the prosecution at defendant\u2019s trial. As a general rule, the fact that a member of the grand jury who actively participated in returning a bill of indictment against defendant was related to the victim of the crime charged does not disqualify that person from serving as a grand juror. State v. Sharp, 110 N.C. 604, 14 S.E. 504 (1892). See also Southward v. State, 293 So. 2d 343 (Miss. 1974); Lascelles v. State, 90 Ga. 347, 16 S.E. 945 (1892), aff'd 148 U.S. 537, 13 S.Ct. 687, 37 L.Ed. 549 (1893). Nor is a bill of indictment rendered objectionable when one of the members of the grand jury subsequently testifies at trial for the prosecution. State v. McDonald, 73 N.C. 346 (1875); State v. Pitt, 166 N.C. 268, 80 S.E. 1060 (1914). Ordinarily, any interest in a particular prosecution other than a direct pecuniary interest will not disqualify a grand juror or justify an objection to an indictment in which he participates. State v. Brewer, 180 N.C. 716, 104 S.E. 655 (1920); State v. Pitt, supra; 38 Am. Jr. 2d Grand Jury \u00a7 7 (1968). Consequently, the fact that grand juror James Lee Oxendine was the brother of the murder victim and a witness for the prosecution at trial in the case sub judice does not compel a finding that the indictment should have been quashed. There is no evidence that the grand jury acted with malice, hatred, or fraud in returning the indictments against defendant. We hold that the trial court acted properly in denying defendant\u2019s motions to quash the indictments and for a mistrial.\nDefendant received a fair trial free from prejudicial error. The defendant was indeed fortunate to have been the beneficiary of a jury that voted eleven to one to inflict capital punishment.\nNo error.", "type": "majority", "author": "COPELAND, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "John Wishart Campbell for defendant.", "Attorney General Rufus L. Edmisten by Special Deputy Attorney General W. A. Raney, Jr., for the State." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES BRANTLEY OXENDINE\nNo. 16\n(Filed 2 June 1981)\n1. Criminal law \u00a7 92.4\u2014 two charges against one defendant \u2014 consolidation proper\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State\u2019s motion to consolidate murder and assault charges for trial where evidence tended to show that both offenses were committed within a short interval of time; the murder victim was killed between 8:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. on 30 August 1979 and the assault victim was assaulted at approximately 4:00 a.m. on 31 August 1979; the offenses were similar in nature in that each involved the shooting of a person with the intent to kill; it appeared from the evidence that defendant committed both offenses after consuming a considerable amount of alcohol and drugs, indicating that the offenses were part of a series of transactions undertaken by defendant while under the influence of intoxicating substances; defendant confessed to the commission of both offenses in the same interview with law enforcement officers; the witnesses presented in both trials were substantially the same; and it would have been impractical and nearly impossible to present evidence of the events surrounding one offense without also presenting evidence tending to prove the other offense.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 85.2; Homicide \u00a7 15\u2014 firearms transaction record \u2014no impeachment of defendant\u2019s character \u2014 admissibility of evidence\nThere was no merit to defendant\u2019s contention that the trial court erred in allowing a State\u2019s witness to relate defendant\u2019s answers to questions listed on a firearms transaction record which defendant was required to fill out before purchasing a .22 caliber rifle, since the firearms transaction record which defendant filled out was relevant evidence to prove that defendant owned the weapon used to kill the murder victim, and the evidence did not tend to impeach defendant\u2019s character before defendant testified in his own behalf or introduced evidence of his good character as part of his defense.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 90\u2014 no impeachment of State\u2019s own witness\nIn a prosecution of defendant for homicide and assault the trial court did not err in allowing a State\u2019s witness to answer the district attorney\u2019s questions concerning his prior convictions of bootlegging, and by these questions the State did not impeach its own witness, since the witness\u2019s testimony revealing his five prior convictions of bootlegging was not evidence tending to impeach his credibility, but was instead evidence corroborating his statement that defendant came to his home on the morning of the crimes to purchase beer because he knew the witness was involved in the illegal sale of alcoholic beverages, and the witness\u2019s statements were thus admissible as relevant evidence tending to prove the events which transpired on the day of the crimes.\n4. Criminal Law \u00a7 75.15\u2014 confession \u2014 waiver of constitutional rights \u2014 effect of intoxication\nThere was no merit to defendant\u2019s position that, because he was intoxicated from the consumption of alcohol and under the influence of drugs at the time of his statements, he was unable to comprehend the reading of his constitutional rights and incapable of intelligently waiving those rights, thus rendering subsequent statements inadmissible, since the only evidence tending to prove the quantity of alcohol and drugs which defendant had consumed was defendant\u2019s own testimony; defendant stated that, despite his condition, he was able to understand his constitutional rights as they were read to him before he made his first statement, except for his right to stop talking during the course of the interview and to request the presence of counsel; defendant was able to relate all the events which took place on the day of the statements in a degree of detail that was inconsistent with his contention that he was too intoxicated to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights; it was un-controverted that defendant consumed no alcohol or drugs for at least two hours prior to making his first statement and for at least six hours prior to his second statement; and all of the witnesses who observed defendant prior to and after his arrest stated that he was able to walk and carry on a normal conversation.\n5. Criminal Law \u00a7 86\u2014 prior conviction of common law robbery \u2014 cross-examination proper\nIn a prosecution of defendant for homicide and assault where defendant allegedly used a rifle to accomplish both crimes, the trial court did not err in allowing the district attorney to question defendant concerning his use of a screwdriver to threaten the victims of a previous robbery, since the questions were apparently designed to indicate to the jury that defendant was a person with a propensity to use a weapon; defendant eventually admitted that he had threatened his victims with a long screwdriver; and it thus appeared from the record that the questions were based on information properly submitted to the district attorney.\n6. Homicide \u00a7 21.5\u2014 first degree murder \u2014sufficiency of evidence\nEvidence was sufficient to be submitted to the jury in a first degree murder prosecution where it tended to show that defendant shot his victim with a .22 caliber rifle; four days later defendant called the police and told them that the body of the victim could be found at the victim\u2019s mobile home; a police officer went to the designated trailer and discovered the victim\u2019s body; and on that same afternoon defendant was informed of his constitutional rights, signed a written waiver, and twice confessed to the murder.\n7. Grand Jury \u00a7 3.5\u2014 grand juror brother of murder victim \u2014motion to quash indictment properly denied\nIn a prosecution of defendant for first degree murder the trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motions to quash the indictment against him and to declare a mistrial on the ground that one of the members of the grand jury which returned the indictments against him was the brother of the murder victim and a witness for the prosecution at defendant\u2019s trial, since, ordinarily, any interest in a particular prosecution other than a direct pecuniary interest will not disqualify a grand juror or justify an objection to an indictment in which he participates, and there was no evidence that the grand jury acted with malice, hatred, or fraud in returning the indictments against defendant.\nDEFENDANT appeals from judgment of McKinnon, J., entered at the 18 February 1980 Session of Superior Court, ROBESON County.\nDefendant was tried upon indictments, proper in form, charging him with first degree murder and with felonious assault with a deadly weapon, with the intent to kill, inflicting serious injuries not resulting in death. The jury found defendant guilty of both offenses. Since the jury could not unanimously agree within a reasonable time whether to impose the death penalty or a sentence of life imprisonment for defendant\u2019s first degree murder conviction, the trial judge imposed a sentence of life imprisonment pursuant to G.S. 15A-2000(b). Defendant was also sentenced to imprisonment for a minimum of fifteen years and a maximum of twenty years for his conviction of felonious assault under G.S. 14-32(a), to be served concurrently with his life imprisonment sentence. Defendant appeals from the trial court\u2019s judgment sentencing him to life imprisonment for first degree murder as a matter of right pursuant to G.S. 7A-27(a). We allowed defendant\u2019s motion to bypass the Court of Appeals on the felonious assault charge on 10 December 1980.\nThe State\u2019s evidence tended to show the following: At approximately 3:30 p.m. on 30 August 1979, defendant met Anthony Oxendine and the two spent the afternoon and evening hours of that day together, driving in Anthony Oxendine\u2019s automobile and consuming a substantial amount of beer. Defendant purchased a .22 caliber rifle from a Lumberton merchant at about 6:30 p.m. on that day. Defendant and Anthony Oxendine then went to Anthony\u2019s mobile home, where they drank more beer until Anthony decided to go to bed. After Anthony was asleep, defendant retrieved his .22 rifle from the back seat of Anthony\u2019s car, returned to the trailer, and shot Anthony twice. Dr. Larry Tate, a pathologist in the Chief Medical Examiner\u2019s office, examined the body and testified that Anthony was killed by one or both of the .22 caliber bullets found in the body.\nAfter shooting Anthony, defendant took Anthony\u2019s car and drove to a convenience store, arriving at approximately 10:00 p.m. that night. Defendant argued with several individuals outside the convenience store and an altercation developed, during which the .22 caliber rifle was taken from him and destroyed. Defendant left the store area without the broken rifle.\nBunyan Lowery testified for the State that defendant awakened him at his home at about 4:00 a.m. on 31 August 1979 and asked to purchase beer. Defendant was. carrying a twelve gauge pump shotgun at that time. After paying for the beer, defendant shot Mr. Lowery twice, hitting him in the back and in the right arm, inflicting serious injuries.\nBetween 12:10 and 12:15 p.m. on 2 September 1979, defendant called the Pembroke Police Station and talked to Sergeant Ray Strickland of the Robeson County Sheriff\u2019s Department. Sergeant Strickland testified that defendant asked if a warrant for his arrest had been issued for the shooting of Bunyan Lowery. When Sergeant Strickland informed him that such a warrant had been issued, defendant stated that he wished to \u201cturn himself in\u201d and gave directions as to his whereabouts. He further stated that the body of Anthony Oxendine could be found at Anthony\u2019s mobile home in the Harris Trailer Park. Sergeant Strickland went to the designated trailer and discovered Anthony\u2019s body in a deteriorated and putrified condition.\nDefendant was apprehended and taken to the Robeson County Sheriff\u2019s Department at approximately 2:00 p.m. on 2 September 1979, at which time he was informed of his constitutional rights and signed a written waiver stating that he understood these rights and agreed to waive them. He was then interviewed by Detective Luther H. Sanderson, during which he gave a written and verbal statement admitting that he killed Anthony Oxendine on 30 August 1979 and shot Bunyan Lowery on 31 August 1979. Defendant was interviewed by Detective Jimmy Maynor at about 6:00 p.m. on 2 September 1979, at which time he again signed a written waiver of his constitutional rights and confessed to both offenses.\nDefendant testified in his own behalf, admitting that he was with Anthony Oxendine during the afternoon and evening of 30 August 1979 and that he purchased a .22 caliber rifle on that day, but denying any participation in or knowledge of the killing of Anthony Oxendine. He stated that he took Anthony\u2019s car after Anthony went to sleep in order to drive to a store and purchase more beer. After arguing with several individuals at a convenience store, during which his rifle was smashed and destroyed, defendant stated that he was afraid of being harmed and drove to his father\u2019s house to borrow a shotgun. He obtained the shotgun and went to Bunyan Lowery\u2019s residence to buy beer. He claimed that when he attempted to carry the beer and the shotgun to Anthony\u2019s car, the shotgun slipped from his arms and struck the ground, accidentally discharging and injuring Mr. Lowery. He fled from the scene because Mr. Lowery had calld for assistance and he was afraid that someone would hurt him.\nAfter fleeing from the Lowery residence on 31 August 1979, defendant testified that he spent the next two days traveling in Anthony Oxendine\u2019s automobile in the southeastern area of North Carolina, continually consuming a large quantity of alcohol and drugs, until he phoned the Pembroke Police Station shortly after noon on 2 September 1979. He stated that he was under the influence of alcohol and drugs when he called the police station and when he was interviewed by detectives at 2:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. on that day, to the point that he did not remember making any statements concerning his involvement in the two offenses. He admitted going to Anthony Oxendine\u2019s mobile home on 1 September 1979 and discovering his body in a decomposed condition, and thus he was able to tell law enforcement officers where to find the body when he called the police station on 2 September 1979. Defendant presented several witnesses who testified to his whereabouts during the entire time period between 30 August and 2 September 1979. He also presented evidence of his intoxicated condition at the time he called the Pembroke Police Station on 2 September 1979.\nOther facts pertinent to the decision will be related in the opinion below.\nJohn Wishart Campbell for defendant.\nAttorney General Rufus L. Edmisten by Special Deputy Attorney General W. A. Raney, Jr., for the State." }, "file_name": "0235-01", "first_page_order": 263, "last_page_order": 273 }