{ "id": 8572874, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ERNEST THOMAS \"PETE\" CORN", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Corn", "decision_date": "1981-06-02", "docket_number": "No. 46", "first_page": "293", "last_page": "298", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "303 N.C. 293" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "197 S.E. 2d 539", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 N.C. 589", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559660 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/283/0589-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 S.E. 2d 817", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 N.C. 256", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563941 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/285/0256-01" ] }, { "cite": "50 S.E. 283", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1905, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "289" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 N.C. 599", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11270082 ], "year": 1905, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "618" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/138/0599-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 S.E. 2d 769", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "772" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "254 N.C. 101", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624570 ], "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "106-07" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/254/0101-01" ] }, { "cite": "169 S.E. 2d 858", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 N.C. 537", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559179 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/275/0537-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 S.E. 2d 65", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 N.C. 391", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565528 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/277/0391-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 S.E. 2d 768", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 671", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575737 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0671-01" ] }, { "cite": "264 S.E. 2d 40", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 707", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575806 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0707-01" ] }, { "cite": "272 S.E. 2d 859", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 709", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570338 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0709-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 S.E. 2d 114", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573434 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 S.E. 2d 164", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559773 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "237 S.E. 2d 827", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "293 N.C. 307", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563970 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/293/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 S.E. 2d 227", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 541", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572962 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0541-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 S.E. 2d 745", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 690", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575769 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0690-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 589, "char_count": 12611, "ocr_confidence": 0.775, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.979804104128858e-07, "percentile": 0.9355863990526089 }, "sha256": "59f6e595e31588ccad13117b7eb7b5c4890fbed382e9889dc22d2c3e5768445b", "simhash": "1:bf61d820f64fbe7e", "word_count": 2063 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:28:49.209015+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ERNEST THOMAS \u201cPETE\u201d CORN" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "COPELAND, Justice.\n. Defendant presents seven assignments of error for our consideration on appeal. We find merit in defendant\u2019s third assignment and remand the case to the trial court for a new trial.\nDefendant assigns as error the trial court\u2019s denial of his motion to dismiss the first degree murder charge. He maintains that the State presented insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation to sustain a conviction of first degree murder.\nIn order for the trial court to submit a charge of first degree murder to the jury, there must have been substantial evidence presented from which a jury could determine that the defendant intentionally shot and killed the victim with malice, premeditation and deliberation. State v. Horton, 299 N.C. 690, 263 S.E. 2d 745 (1980); State v. Heavener, 298 N.C. 541, 259 S.E. 2d 227 (1979); State v. Baggett, 293 N.C. 307, 237 S.E. 2d 827 (1977). \u201cSubstantial evidence\u201d is that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion. State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 265 S.E. 2d 164 (1980); State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 261 S.E. 2d 114 (1980). In ruling upon defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss on the grounds of insufficient evidence, the trial court is required to interpret the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, drawing all reasonable inferences in the State\u2019s favor. State v. Fletcher, 301 N.C. 709, 272 S.E. 2d 859 (1981); State v. King, 299 N.C. 707, 264 S.E. 2d 40 (1980).\nPremeditation has been defined by this Court as thought beforehand for some length of time, however short. No particular length of time is required; it is sufficient if the process of premeditation occurred at any point prior to the killing. State v. Myers, 299 N.C. 671, 263 S.E. 2d 768 (1980); State v. Reams, 277 N.C. 391, 178 S.E. 2d 65 (1970); State v. Robbins, 275 N.C. 537, 169 S.E. 2d 858 (1969). An unlawful killing is committed with deliberation if it is done in a \u201ccool state of blood,\u201d without legal provocation, and in furtherance of a \u201cfixed design to gratify a feeling of revenge, or to accomplish some unlawful purpose.\u201d State v. Faust, 254 N.C. 101, 106-07, 118 S.E. 2d 769, 772 (1961). The intent to kill must arise from \u201ca fixed determination previously formed after weighing the matter.\u201d State v. Exum, 138 N.C. 599, 618, 50 S.E. 283, 289 (1905). See also State v. Baggett, supra; State v. Britt, 285 N.C. 256, 204 S.E. 2d 817 (1974).\nSince premeditation and deliberation are processes of the mind, they are not susceptible to direct proof and must almost always be proved by circumstantial evidence. Among the circumstances which may be considered as tending to prove premeditation and deliberation are: lack of provocation by the deceased; defendant\u2019s acts and comments before and after the killing; the use of grossly excessive force or the infliction of lethal blows after the deceased has been felled; and any history of altercations or ill will between the parties. State v. Myers, supra; State v. Baggett, supra; State v. Van Landingham, 283 N.C. 589, 197 S.E. 2d 539 (1973).\nAfter carefully considering the evidence presented in the case sub judice in the light most favorable to the State, we find that the State has failed to show by substantial evidence that defendant killed Lloyd F. Melton with premeditation and deliberation. The shooting was a sudden event, apparently brought on by some provocation on the part of the deceased. The evidence is uncontroverted that Melton entered defendant\u2019s home in a highly intoxicated state, approached the sofa on which defendant was lying, and insulted defendant by a statement which caused defendant to reply \u201cyou son-of-a-bitch, don\u2019t accuse me of that.\u201d Defendant immediately jumped from the sofa, grabbing the .22 caliber rifle which he normally kept near the sofa, and shot Melton several times in the chest. The entire incident lasted only a few moments.\nThere is no evidence that defendant acted in accordance with a fixed design or that he had sufficient time to weigh the consequences of his actions. Defendant did not threaten Melton before the incident or exhibit any conduct which would indicate that he formed any intention to kill him prior to the incident in question. There was no significant history of arguments or ill will between the parties. Although defendant shot deceased several times, there is no evidence that any shots were fired after he fell or that defendant dealt any blows to the body once the shooting ended.\nAll the evidence tends to show that defendant shot Melton after a quarrel, in a state of passion, without aforethought or calm consideration. Since the evidence is insufficient to show premeditation and deliberation, we find that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that they could find defendant guilty of first degree murder and defendant is awarded a new trial for a determination of whether or not defendant is guilty of second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter or not guilty.\nDefendant\u2019s remaining assignments of error are unlikely to recur at retrial, therefore we deem it unnecessary to discuss them at this time.\nFor the reasons stated above, this case is remanded to the Superior Court, Transylvania County, for a\nNew trial.", "type": "majority", "author": "COPELAND, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "John R. Hudson, Jr. for defendant.", "Attorney General Rufus L. Edmisten by Assistant Attorney General Douglas A. Johnston for the State." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ERNEST THOMAS \u201cPETE\u201d CORN\nNo. 46\n(Filed 2 June 1981)\n1. Homicide \u00a7 4\u2014 elements of first degree murder\nIn order for the trial court to submit a charge of first degree murder to the jury, there must have been substantial evidence presented from which a jury could determine that the defendant intentionally shot and killed the victim with malice, premeditation and deliberation.\n2. Homicide \u00a7 4.3\u2014 premeditation defined\nPremeditation is thought beforehand for some length of time, however short, but no particular length of time is required, it being sufficient if the process of premeditation occurred at any point prior to the killing.\n3. Homicide \u00a7 4.3\u2014 deliberation defined\nAn unlawful killing is committed with deliberation if it is done in a \u201ccool state of blood,\u201d without legal provocation, and in furtherance of a fixed design to gratify a feeling of revenge or to accomplish some unlawful purpose.\n4. Homicide \u00a7 4.4\u2014 specific intent to kill\nThe intent to kill must arise from a fixed determination previously formed after weighing the matter.\n5. Homicide \u00a7 18\u2014 proof of premeditation and deliberation\nSince premeditation and deliberation are processes of the mind, they are not susceptible to direct proof and must almost always be proved by circumstantial evidence. Among the circumstances which may be considered as tending to prove premeditation and deliberation are lack of provocation by the deceased, defendant\u2019s acts and comments before and after the killing, the use of grossly excessive force or the infliction of lethal blows after the deceased has been felled, and any history of altercations or ill will between the parties.\n6. Homicide \u00a7 21.5\u2014 first degree murder case \u2014insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation\nThere was insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation to sustain defendant\u2019s conviction of first degree murder where the evidence was un-controverted that deceased entered defendant\u2019s home in a highly intoxicated state, approached the sofa on which defendant was lying, quarreled with defendant, and accused defendant of being a homosexual, and that defendant replied, \u201cYou son-of-a-bitch, don\u2019t accuse me of that,\u201d immediately jumped from the sofa, grabbed a .22 caliber rifle which he normally kept near the sofa, and shot deceased several times in the chest; there was no evidence that defendant acted in accordance with a fixed design or that he had sufficient time to weigh the consequences of his actions; there was no evidence that defendant threatened deceased before the incident or exhibited any conduct which would indicate that he formed any intention to kill him prior to the incident in question; there was no significant history of arguments or ill will between the parties; and although defendant shot deceased several times, there was no evidence that any shots were fired after deceased fell or that defendant dealt any blows to the body once the shooting ended.\nDEFENDANT appeals from judgment of Howell, J., entered at the 24 March 1980 Special Criminal Session of Superior Court, Transylvania County.\nDefendant was tried upon an indictment, proper in form, charging him with first degree murder of Lloyd F. Melton on 20 November 1979. The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder and recommended that a sentence of life imprisonment be imposed. From the trial court\u2019s judgment sentencing him to life imprisonment, defendant appeals as a matter of right pursuant to G.S. 7A-27(a).\nThe State\u2019s evidence tended to show that Lloyd F. Melton arrived at defendant\u2019s house between 11:00 and 11:30 on the morning of 20 November 1979. Defendant and Roy Ward were present at the house when Melton arrived. Shortly thereafter Melton and Ward left in Ward\u2019s truck and bought a fifth of vodka and some grapefruit juice. They returned to defendant\u2019s house and drank some of the vodka and grapefruit juice. Defendant did not drink any alcoholic beverages during this time. Melton and Ward then left defendant\u2019s house and drove around Transylvania County for several hours, continuing to drink alcoholic beverages as they traveled.\nAt approximately 5:00 that afternoon they returned to defendant\u2019s home. Ward testified that defendant opened the window and looked out as they arrived. When Ward and Melton entered the house, defendant was lying on a sofa in the living room with his hands behind his head. Melton went over to the couch, sat beside defendant, and began to argue with him. During the argument defendant jumped up, pulled a .22 caliber rifle from a crack between the sofa cushion and the back of the sofa, and shot Melton eight to ten times across the chest, killing him instantly. Ward left defendant\u2019s house immediately after the shooting and contacted law enforcement officers at the Brevard Police Department and at the Transylvania County Sheriff\u2019s Department. Several officers testified that upon arriving at defendant\u2019s house to investigate the shooting, they found defendant in the yard, repeatedly stating that he \u201ckilled the son-of-a-bitch.\u201d Melton was found dead on the floor beside the sofa in the living room.\nDefendant testified in his own behalf, claiming that he shot Melton in self defense. He stated that when Melton and Ward arrived at his home at about 5:00 p.m. on 20 November 1979, Melton walked over to the couch on which defendant was lying, grabbed defendant, and began slinging him around and attempting to hit him. At some point during the altercation, Melton apparently accused defendant of being a homosexual. Defendant replied by stating \u201cyou son-of-a-bitch, don\u2019t accuse me of that.\u201d Ward, who had entered the house just before Melton, arose from the chair in which he was sitting and moved toward defendant with a clenched fist. Defendant reached under the sofa and grabbed the .22 caliber rifle which he normally kept in that location. He shot at Melton\u2019s leg, and when Melton kept moving toward him, he shot him several times in the chest. After the shooting defendant walked across the street to his sister\u2019s house and called the Brevard Police Department. He then returned to his home and waited for law enforcement officers to arrive. Several officers testified that defendant was calm and cooperative during their investigation of the incident.\nDefendant\u2019s evidence further tended to show that he was five feet seven inches tall and weighed \u25a0 approximately 140 pounds. Melton was five feet ten inches tall and weighed from 180 to 200 pounds. The evidence indicated that Melton had a propensity to commit violent acts after drinking alcoholic beverages and that defendant was aware of this tendency. Roy Ward testified that he was six feet two inches tall and weighed 247 pounds. Defendant stated that he knew Ward had been trained in karate' during his service in the military.\nThe trial judge instructed the jury that they could find defendant guilty of first degree murder, guilty of second degree murder, guilty of voluntary manslaughter, or not guilty. During deliberations the jury returned to the courtroom several times for a repetition of the instructions on first and second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. Defendant was found guilty of first degree murder.\nJohn R. Hudson, Jr. for defendant.\nAttorney General Rufus L. Edmisten by Assistant Attorney General Douglas A. Johnston for the State." }, "file_name": "0293-01", "first_page_order": 321, "last_page_order": 326 }