{ "id": 8567608, "name": "GILBERT SHUGAR v. H. L. GUILL", "name_abbreviation": "Shugar v. Guill", "decision_date": "1981-11-03", "docket_number": "No. 44", "first_page": "332", "last_page": "341", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "304 N.C. 332" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "65 S.W. 2d 667", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1933, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "668" }, { "page": "669" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 S.W. 823", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "year": 1902, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "20 N.C. 388", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8697961 ], "year": 1839, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/20/0388-01" ] }, { "cite": "27 Kan. 355", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Kan.", "case_ids": [ 611180 ], "year": 1882, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/kan/27/0355-01" ] }, { "cite": "25 S.E. 2d 463", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1943, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "223 N.C. 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8601025 ], "year": 1943, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/223/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "251 S.E. 2d 452", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 533", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567991 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0533-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 S.E. 570", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1922, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "184 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11268844 ], "year": 1922, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/184/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 Utah 416", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Utah", "case_ids": [ 8870962 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1951, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/utah/120/0416-01" ] }, { "cite": "240 S.W. 241", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "year": 1922, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "209 Mo. App. 450", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mo. App.", "case_ids": [ 1788624 ], "year": 1922, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mo-app/209/0450-01" ] }, { "cite": "242 S.W. 155", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "year": 1922, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "210 Mo. App. 429", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mo. App.", "case_ids": [ 1786612 ], "year": 1922, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mo-app/210/0429-01" ] }, { "cite": "15 Ariz. App. 83", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ariz. App.", "case_ids": [ 1223315 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ariz-app/15/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 S.E. 2d 611", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568312 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 S.E. 2d 297", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 105", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8557369 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0105-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 S.E. 2d 333", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1955, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "242 N.C. 332", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8614735 ], "year": 1955, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/242/0332-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 S.E. 2d 345", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 288", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566776 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0288-01" ] }, { "cite": "260 S.E. 2d 611", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 715", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573981 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0715-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 S.E. 2d 161", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "167" }, { "page": "167" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 N.C. 94", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561932 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "104" }, { "page": "104" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/277/0094-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 S.E. 2d 721", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "725" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 N.C. 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573719 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "56" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/281/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "147 S.E. 2d 910", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "915-16" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "267 N.C. 166", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558766 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "172" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/267/0166-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 S.E. 2d 761", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "767" }, { "page": "767" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "274 N.C. 416", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560473 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "424" }, { "page": "424" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/274/0416-01" ] }, { "cite": "16 A.L.R. 771", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R.", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 A.L.R. 1115", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R.", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 S.E. 583", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1916, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "172 N.C. 540", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11254550 ], "year": 1916, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/172/0540-01" ] }, { "cite": "134 S.E. 2d 186", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "261 N.C. 31", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571586 ], "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/261/0031-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 S.E. 2d 640", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "261 N.C. 539", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574525 ], "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/261/0539-01" ] }, { "cite": "225 S.E. 2d 797", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "290 N.C. 118", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560682 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/290/0118-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 S.E. 771", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1936, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "210 N.C. 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627353 ], "year": 1936, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/210/0498-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 989, "char_count": 18684, "ocr_confidence": 0.817, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.1548606305277845e-07, "percentile": 0.9116531504346392 }, "sha256": "14ba1149249d9a53f3ed3404bfeca62c6c54abf3be384ab116c1998df387d178", "simhash": "1:3b26d0231b72289d", "word_count": 3117 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:27:48.249821+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Justice CARLTON did not participate in the decision of this case." ], "parties": [ "GILBERT SHUGAR v. H. L. GUILL" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BRANCH, Chief Justice.\nWe first consider whether plaintiff\u2019s complaint stated a cause of action for punitive damages.\nThe rationale permitting recovery of punitive damages is that such damages may be awarded in addition to compensatory damages to punish a defendant for his wrongful acts and to deter others from committing similar acts. A civil action may not be maintained solely for the purpose of collecting punitive damages but may only be awarded when a cause of action otherwise exists in which at least nominal damages are recoverable by the plaintiff. Worthy v. Knight, 210 N.C. 498, 187 S.E. 771 (1936).\nIt is well established in this jurisdiction that punitive damages may be recovered for an assault and battery but are allowable only when the assault and battery is accompanied by an element of aggravation such as malice, or oppression, or gross and wilful wrong, or a wanton and reckless disregard of plaintiffs rights. Oestreicher v. American Nat. Stores, Inc., 290 N.C. 118, 225 S.E. 2d 797 (1976); Van Leuven v. Motor Lines, 261 N.C. 539, 135 S.E. 2d 640 (1964); Allred v. Graves, 261 N.C. 31, 134 S.E. 2d 186 (1964); Trogden v. Terry, 172 N.C. 540, 90 S.E. 583 (1916). See also 123 A.L.R. 1115 and 16 A.L.R. 771; 6A C.J.S. Assault & Battery \u00a7 33 (1975).\nThe complaint reads as follows:\nThe plaintiff, complaining of the defendant, alleges and says as follows:\n1. Plaintiff and defendant are both citizens and residents of Edgecombe County, North Carolina.\n2. That on or about the 19th day of October, 1978, the defendant, without just cause, did intentionally, willfully and maliciously assault and batter the plaintiff, inflicting upon him serious and permanent personal injuries thereby causing him to suffer both in body and in mind and that he did aggravate a preexisting injury which has caused the plaintiff additional mental anguish, and suffering.\n3. Plaintiff has incurred medical bills in an amount not yet determined and he is informed and believes and so alleges that additional expenses will be forthcoming in the future.\nWHEREFORE, the plaintiff prays the Court that he have and recover of the defendant the amount of $25,000 as actual damages and the amount of $50,000 as punitive damages, together with the costs of this action.\nPrior to the adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure on 1 January 1970, our decisions required that a plaintiff plead facts showing aggravating circumstances which would justify an award of punitive damages if supported by the evidence. Clemmons v. Insurance Co., 274 N.C. 416, 163 S.E. 2d 761 (1968); Allred v. Graves, supra.\nIn Clemmons v. Insurance Co., supra, this Court held that it was not sufficient to state a cause of action for punitive damages to allege that the defendant\u2019s conduct was \u201cwillful, wanton and gross\u201d and further set forth the then prevailing pleading rule that:\nWhile it seems that punitive damages need not be specifically pleaded by that name in the complaint, it is necessary that the facts justifying a recovery of such damages be pleaded.\nId., 274 N.C. at 424, 163 S.E. 2d at 767.\nIndeed, Cook v. Lanier, 267 N.C. 166, 172, 147 S.E. 2d 910, 915-16 (1966), stated that plaintiffs complaint must allege facts or elements showing the aggravating circumstances which would justify the award of punitive damages.\nUnquestionably, under our decisions prior to the adoption of the 1970 Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiff\u2019s pleadings in this case could not have withstood defendant\u2019s motions to dismiss.\n\u201cBy enactment of G.S. 1A-1, the legislature adopted the \u2018notice theory of pleading.\u2019 \u201d Roberts v. Memorial Park, 281 N.C. 48, 56, 187 S.E. 2d 721, 725 (1972).\nIn our first case which considered the \u201cnotice pleading\u201d theory of the new Rules of Civil Procedure, Justice Sharp (later Chief Justice) wrote:\nA pleading complies with the rule if it gives sufficient notice of the events or transactions which produced the claim to enable the adverse party to understand the nature of it and the basis for it, to file a responsive pleading, and \u2014 by using the rules provided for obtaining pretrial discovery \u2014 to get any additional information he may need to prepare for trial.\nSutton v. Duke, 277 N.C. 94, 104, 176 S.E. 2d 161, 167 (1970). Accord: Presnell v. Pell, 298 N.C. 715, 260 S.E. 2d 611 (1979); Brewer v. Harris, 279 N.C. 288, 182 S.E. 2d 345 (1971).\nIn instant case, the Court of Appeals held that the complaint did not state a claim for punitive damages. In reaching this result, the Court of Appeals first reviewed cases decided prior to the adoption in 1970 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, Clemmons v. Insurance Co., supra; Cook v. Lanier, supra; Lutz Ind. v. Dixie Home Stores, 242 N.C. 332, 88 S.E. 2d 333 (1955), and relying on the cases of Newton v. Insurance Co., 291 N.C. 105, 229 S.E. 2d 297 (1976), and Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181, 254 S.E. 2d 611 (1979), concluded that this Court intended to follow the general rules laid down in cases involving punitive damages which predated the 1970 Rules of Civil Procedure. We do not agree. Newton and Stanback are distinguishable from the case before us in that both of those cases dealt with the pleading of sufficient facts to warrant punitive damages when related to tortious conduct involved in a breach of contract.\nNewton involved the tort of fraud as it related to a breach of contract action involving failure to pay insurance policy proceeds, while Stanback rested upon the intentional infliction of emotional distress as related to breach of a separation agreement contract.\nSince punitive damages may not be awarded in North Carolina for breach of contract, it was imperative in both Newton and Stanback that the pleading set forth with specificity the allegations and facts of the tortious conduct which would justify the awarding of punitive damages. In such cases, even \u201cnotice pleading\u201d requires that the complaint be more precise and the facts and allegations be sufficiently pleaded so as to prevent confusion and surprise to the defendant and preclude the recovery of punitive damages for breach of contract where there is no tortious conduct.\nHere under the \u201cnotice pleading\u201d theory there was sufficient information in the complaint from which defendant could take notice and be apprised of \u201cthe events and transactions which produce the claim to enable [him] to understand the nature of it and the basis for it.\u201d Sutton v. Duke, 277 N.C. at 104, 176 S.E. 2d at 167. Defendant was not \u201cambushed\u201d at trial nor was he presented with an issue for which he was not prepared. He knew what happened on 19 October 1978 and was therefore cognizant of all the aggravating circumstances which might have been presented at trial.\nWe therefore hold that plaintiffs complaint was sufficient to state a claim for punitive damages.\nWe turn now to the question of whether there was sufficient evidence to carry the issue of punitive damages to the jury.\nIn our consideration of this question, we deem it necessary to restate and examine the rule that in cases involving assault and battery, punitive damages are recoverable only when the assault and battery is accompanied by an element of aggravation such as malice or the other aggravating circumstances.\nSome jurisdictions permit the recovery of punitive damages on the theory of implied or imputed malice when a person intentionally does an act which naturally tends to be injurious. These jurisdictions thus infer the malice necessary to support recovery of punitive damages from any assault and battery. Barker v. James, 15 Ariz. App. 83, 486 P. 2d 195 (1971); Robbs v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 210 Mo. App. 429, 242 S.W. 155 (1922); Custer v. Kroeger, 209 Mo. App. 450, 240 S.W. 241 (1922); Mecham v. Foley, 120 Utah 416, 235 P. 2d 497 (1951). We do not adhere to this rule. To justify the awarding of punitive damages in North Carolina, there must be a showing of actual or express malice, that is, a showing of a sense of personal ill will toward the plaintiff which activated or incited a defendant to commit the alleged assault and battery. Baker v. Winslow, 184 N.C. 1, 113 S.E. 570 (1922). See also Clemmons v. Insurance Co., 274 N.C. at 424, 163 S.E. 2d at 767.\nIn jury trials the usual rules governing motions for a directed verdict apply when there is such a motion as to a claim for punitive damages on the grounds of insufficiency of evidence, and the trial judge must determine as a matter of law whether the evidence when considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff is sufficient to carry the issue of punitive damages to the jury. Arnold v. Sharpe, 296 N.C. 533, 251 S.E. 2d 452 (1979); Ward v. Smith, 223 N.C. 141, 25 S.E. 2d 463 (1943). Application of this rule is difficult under the particular facts of the case sub judice, and we therefore find it helpful to review the types of cases in which punitive damages have been allowed. Punitive damages were recovered in cases where a clergyman while peacefully walking down a street was attacked by the defendant and severely injured, Tucker v. Green, 27 Kan. 355 (1882); where the plaintiff while eating in a hotel dining room was compelled to sign a retraction by a show of violence, accompanied with offensive and threatening language, Trogden v. Terry, supra; where defendant assaulted a weak and old person with a stick loaded with lead for the reason that defendant thought plaintiff was a trespasser, Causee v. Anders, 20 N.C. 388 (1839); where a twelve year old boy was assaulted in public in the presence of others without justification or excuse, Hollins v. Gorham, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 2185, 66 S.W. 823 (1902). We note that all of these cases contain a thread of unprovoked humiliating assaults, assaults on children, assaults on weaker persons, or assaults where a deadly weapon was callously used. Such is not the case before us.\nThe case of Riepe v. Green, 65 S.W. 2d 667 (Mo. App. 1933), is most instructive toward decision because of its strong factual similarity to the case before us. There plaintiff brought a civil action against defendant seeking compensatory and punitive damages. The evidence of the plaintiff disclosed that there had been some difficulty between plaintiff and defendant and that plaintiff \u201chad no good feeling toward him (defendant) for over a year.\u201d Id., 65 S.W. 2d at 668. On the day that the incident complained of occurred, defendant was talking to some men on the street when plaintiff called him and asked \u201chave you found any more victims?\u201d Plaintiff then drove his wagon across the sidewalk so that defendant could not move. After some further conversation, plaintiff told defendant that he did not want any dealings with him because of his refusal to pay for some cow pasture. Plaintiff testified that he might have called defendant an \u201cS.O.B.\u201d and a damned crook. Thereafter, a fight ensued which resulted in plaintiffs alleged injuries. The jury answered issues awarding plaintiff compensatory and punitive damages, and defendant appealed. In reversing and remanding, the Kansas City Court of Appeals reasoned:\nThe general rule, as to punitive damages, is to the effect that the question is one for the jury and not for the court. This general rule is predicated upon the presumption that wantonness, recklessness, oppression, or express malice be shown by some fact or circumstance in evidence from which one of these elements may be inferred. (Citation omitted.)\n* * *\nWe fail to find any evidence in the record before us that justifies the submission of the issue of punitive damages. In so far as words and conduct could provoke such a state of mind as above, the plaintiff is shown to be the aggressor. One who drives a wagon across the pathway of another with the int\u00e9nt expressed by plaintiff furnishes a poor subject for smart money. While foul words and epithets do not justify assault, yet such words and epithets mitigate, and, in the absence of any showing that defendant was actuated by will-full, wanton, and malicious state of mind, it was error to submit the issue of punitive damages.\nId., 65 S.W. 2d at 669.\nApplying the above-stated principles of law to the facts presented by this appeal, we conclude that the evidence presented was not sufficient to permit the jury reasonably to infer that defendant\u2019s actions were activated by personal ill will toward plaintiff or that his acts were aggravated by oppression, insult, rudeness, or a wanton and reckless disregard of plaintiffs rights. To the contrary, the evidence shows that two adults acting as adolescents engaged in an affray which was precipitated by plaintiffs \u201cbaiting\u201d of defendant and plaintiffs invitation that he be ejected from defendant\u2019s premises. Thus, the trial court erred by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss on the ground that there was not sufficient evidence to carry the issue of punitive damages to the jury. We affirm the Court of Appeals\u2019 action in vacating for the reasons set forth herein.\nThere will be a new trial on the issue of compensatory damages since there was no appeal from the Court of Appeals\u2019 decision on that phase of the case.\nModified and affirmed.\nJustice CARLTON did not participate in the decision of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "BRANCH, Chief Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Fields, Cooper and Henderson, by Milton P. Fields, for plaintiff-appe llant.", "Bridgers, Horton and Simmons, by Edward B. Simmons for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "GILBERT SHUGAR v. H. L. GUILL\nNo. 44\n(Filed 3 November 1981)\n1. Damages \u00a7 12.1\u2014 assault and battery \u2014 pleading punitive damages\nIn a civil action in which plaintiff alleged assault and battery, his complaint was sufficient to state a cause of action for punitive damages under G.S. 1A-1 as defendant could take notice and be apprised of \u201cthe events and transactions which produce the claim to enable [him] to understand the nature of it and the basis for it\u201d even though all the aggravating circumstances were not specifically pleaded.\n2. Damages \u00a7 17.7\u2014 punitive damages \u2014 evidence insufficient to go to jury\nThe evidence presented on the issue of punitive damages in plaintiffs action for assault and battery was not sufficient to permit the jury reasonably to infer that defendant\u2019s actions were activated by personal ill will toward plaintiff or that his acts were aggravated by oppression, insult, rudeness, or a wanton reckless disregard of plaintiffs rights. To the contrary, the evidence showed that two adults acting as adolescents engaged in an affray which was precipitated by plaintiffs \u201cbaiting\u201d of defendant and plaintiffs invitation that he be ejected from defendant\u2019s premises.\nJustice Carlton did not participate in the decision of this case.\nAPPEAL by plaintiff pursuant to G.S. 7A-30(2) from a decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals which vacated that portion of the judgment entered by Bruce, J., at the 8 February 1981 Session of EDGECOMBE Superior Court awarding plaintiff punitive damages.\nThe portion of the Court of Appeals\u2019 decision reversing and remanding the issue of compensatory damages for a new trial is not before this Court since there was no appeal from this phase of the case.\nPlaintiff instituted this civil action on 5 January 1979 seeking damages for injuries allegedly caused by an assault and battery committed by defendant. At trial defendant duly moved to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s claim for punitive damages on the ground that plaintiff had failed properly to plead or prove such claim. The trial judge denied these motions and submitted to the jury the issues of liability, punitive damages, and compensatory damages.\nPlaintiffs evidence tended to show that on 19 October 1978 around 9:25 a.m. he entered the defendant\u2019s restaurant in Tarboro known as \u201cCotton\u2019s Grill\u201d for the purpose of joining several regular customers for coffee. After serving himself a cup of coffee, he joined the group. Plaintiff moved toward the table where the men sat without paying for his cup of coffee. Defendant was seated at the table, and as plaintiff took a seat at the table, he said to defendant, \u201cThis cup of coffee is on the house.\u201d Plaintiff then told defendant to \u201ccharge it against the formica that you owe me for.\u201d\nPlaintiffs remarks were in reference to a dispute between himself and defendant regarding a piece of formica that a contractor had removed from a job at plaintiffs place of business with his permission to use it in the completion of a job at defendant\u2019s restaurant in March, 1978. Plaintiff had billed defendant twice for the formica, but the $6.25 bill remained unpaid at the time of the October 1978 incident. Defendant had refused to pay for the for-mica and had in turn sent plaintiff a bill for what defendant claimed was lost time for a painter who had been conversing with plaintiff while he was working on a job for defendant. Plaintiff had not honored defendant\u2019s request to reimburse him for the painter\u2019s lost time although defendant had offered to pay plaintiff for the formica after plaintiff had paid defendant for the claimed lost time.\nFollowing plaintiff\u2019s comment regarding the charging of the coffee against the formica cost, defendant commented on plaintiffs cheapness and demanded that plaintiff leave the restaurant immediately. Plaintiff responded by saying, \u201cMake me.\u201d Defendant then picked plaintiff up in a \u201cbear hug\u201d and started toward the door. Plaintiff managed to free himself and blows were exchanged. Plaintiff was struck about the eyes twice, and defendant\u2019s glasses were broken when he was hit in the face during the scuffle. A bystander attempted to intervene, and plaintiff, apparently thinking the melee over, dropped his hands to his side at which point defendant struck plaintiff squarely in the face breaking his nose and causing it to bleed profusely.\nPlaintiff lost consciousness momentarily after being struck in the nose. Thereafter, he continued to struggle while he was moved to a chair and a wet compress was applied to his nose. Plaintiff ceased struggling when he heard defendant say, \u201cGilbert, I am trying to help you.\u201d The entire incident lasted less than sixty seconds. Later that day, plaintiff visited a Tarboro physician who referred him to a specialist in Greenville.\nPlaintiff s nose was particularly sensitive owing to a deviated septum, a condition from which he had suffered as a child and for which he had undergone four operations.\nPlaintiff\u2019s nose was treated by straightening, packing, and bandaging. The medical treatment involved was quite painful, and plaintiff experienced a partial loss of breathing capacity as a result of the blow to the nose. Plaintiff\u2019s medical expenses to-talled $234.\nThe jury answered the issue of liability in plaintiff\u2019s favor and awarded him $2,000 in compensatory damages and $2,500 in punitive damages.\nFields, Cooper and Henderson, by Milton P. Fields, for plaintiff-appe llant.\nBridgers, Horton and Simmons, by Edward B. Simmons for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0332-01", "first_page_order": 356, "last_page_order": 365 }