{ "id": 8571423, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JERRY FRANCISCO BOOHER", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Booher", "decision_date": "1982-05-04", "docket_number": "No. 42A81", "first_page": "554", "last_page": "564", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "305 N.C. 554" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "187 S.E. 2d 785", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 N.C. 131", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573974 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/281/0131-01" ] }, { "cite": "260 S.E. 2d 427", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430", "parenthetical": "sufficiency of evidence reviewed but no reversal" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 783", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574147 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "787", "parenthetical": "sufficiency of evidence reviewed but no reversal" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0783-01" ] }, { "cite": "246 S.E. 2d 748", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 N.C. 510", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564751 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/295/0510-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 S.E. 2d 507", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1955, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "243 N.C. 216", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8623019 ], "year": 1955, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/243/0216-01" ] }, { "cite": "256 S.E. 2d 683", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 652", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573566 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0652-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 S.E. 162", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 2, "year": 1911, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "157 N.C. 624", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8659506 ], "year": 1911, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/157/0624-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 N.E. 1041", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "251 Ill. 185", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3435096 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/251/0185-01" ] }, { "cite": "43 N.E. 710", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 L.R.A. 139", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L.R.A.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "160 Ill. 501", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3130465 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/160/0501-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 N.E. 1049", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1911, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "252 Ill. 398", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3440258 ], "year": 1911, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/252/0398-01" ] }, { "cite": "87 S.E. 2d 191", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195-96" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "242 N.C. 164", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8611419 ], "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "170-71" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/242/0164-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 S.E. 2d 626", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "628" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "232 N.C. 602", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8611085 ], "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "604" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/232/0602-01" ] }, { "cite": "86 S.E. 2d 424", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1955, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "241 N.C. 650", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8616136 ], "year": 1955, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/241/0650-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 S.E. 2d 483", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 323", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567571 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0323-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 S.E. 2d 500", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 534", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569411 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0534-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 915, "char_count": 19809, "ocr_confidence": 0.794, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2757007565451676e-07, "percentile": 0.6157938165506947 }, "sha256": "bc3563c3e3c815e9b0443c89b7b85a59a604fdaee221452356c8ac79fd92cf84", "simhash": "1:8b03e153ad3390fa", "word_count": 3444 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:52:50.465071+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Justice MITCHELL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JERRY FRANCISCO BOOHER" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "EXUM, Justice.\nThe question dispositive of this appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to be submitted to the jury on the question of defendant\u2019s guilt of a first degree sexual offense. We conclude that it was not.\nThe state\u2019s evidence consisted almost entirely of the testimony of Timothy Moore. According to Moore, he first met defendant on 30 May 1980 at a \u201cWelcome Aboard\u201d meeting upon Moore\u2019s arrival at Camp Lejeune. At the time of trial Moore was a twenty-one-year-old sergeant in the Marine Corps with three years and two months\u2019 service in the Corps. During the Welcome Aboard meeting, defendant invited Moore out that evening to drink beer and shoot pool. Moore agreed, and the two spent the evening together. They both returned to defendant\u2019s home where defendant grabbed Moore and bit him on the neck. Upset, Moore left defendant\u2019s home on foot. Shortly thereafter, defendant approached Moore in defendant\u2019s vehicle and gave Moore a ride to Moore\u2019s vehicle. During the ride Moore expressed concern about the bite on his neck and wondered out loud what he would tell his wife. When Moore arrived home he explained to his wife what had happened with defendant.\nOn 1 July 1980, Moore saw Booher again on base and Booher apologized for what had happened earlier. On 16 July 1980, two days after Moore\u2019s wife had given birth to a child and was still hospitalized, defendant called Moore and invited him out. Upon defendant\u2019s assurance that \u201cthere would be no funny business,\u201d Moore agreed to go. They rode around, drank beer, smoked marijuana, got together with other friends of defendant and finally arrived at defendant\u2019s home. Defendant asked Moore to remove his clothes, and Moore refused. Defendant told Moore that if he didn\u2019t disrobe, defendant would report Moore to military officials as being a homosexual. Moore left, arriving at his home at approximately 1 a.m.\nAfter Moore arrived home, defendant drove up. Moore turned on his tape recorder. Defendant came to the door and Moore invited him inside \u201cfor two reasons. Number one, I wanted documentation that I was not having an affair with him, and two, I just, you know, wanted to talk with him and maybe try to straighten things out a little bit. When he came in the tape recorder was playing.\u201d\nA transcription of the tape-recorded conversation that ensued between Moore and defendant was offered into evidence. According to the transcription, much of what defendant said in response to Moore\u2019s statements was inaudible. In essence, the transcription shows that Moore invited defendant into his home by saying, \u201cLet\u2019s rap man, let\u2019s talk. Hey, come here. I wanna see what I can do for ya, man. ... I\u2019d like to talk with ya, I\u2019d like to talk with ya.\u201d Defendant replied, \u201cYou want to hurt me.\u201d Moore assured defendant that he did not want to hurt him but only wanted to talk. The two talked at length. The conversation dealt with: defendant\u2019s concern that Moore was going to hurt him and Moore\u2019s protestations to the contrary; the prior encounters of the two men; homosexual relationships in general; defendant\u2019s expressions of affection for and attempts at physical contact with Moore and Moore\u2019s verbal protestations; the relationship between love and hate; and the introduction of a knife belonging to Moore. According to Moore, the conversation took place while the men \u201cwere sitting on ... a small couch, called a loveseat.\u201d During it, defendant \u201cwas trying to slide his hands and arms . . . above my waist and on my shoulders.\u201d\nThe transcript shows that the first discussion regarding the knife proceeded as follows:\nB I need you.\nM But you can\u2019t have me.\nB So?\nM If you need me, kill me.\nB (Inaudible)\nM Jerry Booher, are you gonna kill me with that knife?\nB Are you gonna give me what I want?\nM Huh?\nB Are you gonna give me what I want?\nM No.\nB Yes you are.\nM I can\u2019t give you what you want, whether you\u2019re holding that knife or not.\nB Yes you will.\nM I can\u2019t and I won\u2019t.\nB Yes you will.\nM I can\u2019t and I won\u2019t.\nB Yes you will.\nM No I won\u2019t.\nB You will.\nM I won\u2019t.\nB Yes you will.\nM I can\u2019t and I won\u2019t. No, I can\u2019t give it to you.\nB (Inaudible)\nM I\u2019m glad, man.\nB (Inaudible)\nM I\u2019m glad you don\u2019t want it, what I\u2019m saying is man \u2014\n\u2022 B (Inaudible)\n(Emphasis supplied.)\nThe knife, described by Moore as a twenty-first birthday present, later entered into the transcribed portions of the conversation as follows:\nM Do you wanna die?\nB Yes.\nM No, you don\u2019t.\nB You don\u2019t know how much.\nM You want to die?\nB You bet.\nM If you want to die, man, this here was my 21st birthday present.\nB Will you [obscenity omitted] do it or you don\u2019t.\nM I\u2019m not gonna do it, man. I\u2019m not gonna kill nobody.\nB Put it back. You\u2019re just [obscenity omitted], then, put it back.\nM I like you, man.\nB Well, put it back.\nM But I don\u2019t love you.\nB So?\nM Can you understand?\nB You love me or you\u2019d kill me right now.\nM No.\nB And don\u2019t give me no [obscenity omitted].\nM No.\nB Yes, you do.\nM You just can\u2019t go killing people.\nB Yes, you love me.\nM I can\u2019t kill\u2014\nB You love me.\nM I don\u2019t love you.\nB Yes, you do.\nM No, I don\u2019t. I can\u2019t.\nB Yes, you do.\nM Okay, if I didn\u2019t love you, I\u2019d kill you, right?\nB That\u2019s right.\nM No, that\u2019s [obscenity omitted).\nShortly thereafter the tape transcript ended and Moore\u2019s trial testimony continued. Moore said that when defendant entered the apartment the knife was underneath the loveseat where he and defendant were sitting and talking. Eventually the knife appeared \u201ceither on the big coffee table ... in front of the loveseat or . . . directly underneath it.\u201d Moore said, \u201cI either handed this knife to Mr. Booher or sat it down right next to him. I did that to show him that he didn\u2019t really mean what he said about wanting to die. . . . The knife that was used was my knife.\u201d\nMoore then testified that defendant \u201creached over, picked up the knife off the coffee table and put it in my side and told me to drop my drawers. At this time we were still seated on the loveseat.\u201d Defendant then held the knife against Moore\u2019s arm. Moore said, \u201cI really didn\u2019t think we was going to do it and he said that he would stick me with the knife, cut me, and so we stood up and he stood up right next to me and at that time, I reached with my free hand and unsnapped my trousers. I let them fall about my knees and . . . took my underwear down and he pushed me back on the couch. The knife always remained right there. Well, it moved a little bit, but it always remained in my side. The pressure from the knife remained about the same. I was very afraid. After that he lowered his head to my penis and performed oral sex.\u201d Moore said this lasted for a couple of minutes, that he \u201cdid not have an orgasm or anything\u201d and that defendant \u201craised his head and dropped the knife right there on the floor.\u201d Moore got up, dressed himself, and told the defendant to \u201cget the hell out.\u201d Defendant refused to leave. Moore continued to insist that defendant leave; defendant remained adamant in his refusal to do so. Moore finally called the police.\nAccording to officers who responded to the call, both Moore and defendant were engaged in a bitter verbal dispute when they arrived at Moore\u2019s home. The officers had difficulty ascertaining what had happened. Both parties were taken to the magistrate\u2019s office by a Jacksonville police officer, Walter Lamb. Lamb, despite the magistrate\u2019s request, wouldn\u2019t sign an arrest warrant. Instead, Lamb called his supervisor who agreed to assign a detective to the case.\nJacksonville detective William Whitehead arrived at the magistrate\u2019s office at approximately 3:45 a.m. on July 17 and talked with the magistrate, Moore and the defendant. Whitehead sent Lamb and Moore to pick up Moore\u2019s tape recorder. After listening to the tape, Whitehead placed defendant under arrest and later signed an arrest warrant charging defendant with a first degree sexual offense under G.S. 14-27.4.\nDefendant, testifying on his own behalf, denied committing the crime charged against him. According to defendant Moore invited him to his home on the evening in question to celebrate the birth of Moore\u2019s baby. When defendant arrived Moore was nude, but later put on his underwear. Defendant said he never threatened Moore or forced him \u201cto have sexual relations with me. ... I couldn\u2019t do that kind of thing. He told me he wanted to be friends. I wanted to be friends and he wants to be friends.\u201d Defendant, a Marine Corps corporal with approximately eight years of service, testified, \u201c[B]ut if I talk to him about something I don\u2019t want it to be going into nothing and he thinks his rank is going to back him up. It\u2019s like a tug of war. I talk to him, he talks to me. He says he wants to be friends, you know. He said he wants me to talk to him. I wanted to talk to him too. I went to a psychiatrist on base. I tried to get out.\u201d\nBecause of the bizarre and unique facts of this case, we are satisfied the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. Both a first and second degree sexual offense, insofar as they may be committed against an adult not physically or mentally handicapped, have as an essential element the lack of the victim\u2019s consent because they must be committed \u201cby force and against the will\u201d of the victim. G.S. 14-27.4(a)(2); G.S. 14-27.5(a)(1); State v. Locklear, 304 N.C. 534, 284 S.E. 2d 500 (1981); State v. Jones, 304 N.C. 323, 283 S.E. 2d 483 (1981). In Locklear, we said the phrase \u201cby force and against the will,\u201d as used in both the new rape statutes, G.S. 14-27.2 and 14-27.3, and the new sexual offense statutes, \u201cmeans the same as it did at common law when it was used to describe some of the elements of rape.\u201d 304 N.C. at 539, 284 S.E. 2d at 503. The words \u201cagainst her will\u201d as used in the law of rape connote the victim\u2019s lack of consent. State v. Barefoot, 241 N.C. 650, 86 S.E. 2d 424 (1955).\nNo criminal offense which requires the victim\u2019s lack of consent may be committed upon a person who \u201carranges for a crime to be committed against himself, and aids, encourages or solicits the commission of it.\u201d State v. Nelson, 232 N.C. 602, 604, 61 S.E. 2d 626, 628 (1950). A more complete statement of the principle was given in State v. Burnette, 242 N.C. 164, 170-71, 87 S.E. 2d 191, 195-96 (1955), as follows:\nIn certain crimes consent to the criminal act by the person injured eliminates an essential element of the offense, and is, therefore, a good defense. Where a person arranges for a crime to be committed against himself or his property and aids, encourages or solicits the commission thereof, such facts are a good defense to the accused. However, if a person knows a crime is contemplated against his person or property, he may wait passively and permit matters to go on, or create the conditions under which the crime against himself may be committed, for the purpose of apprehending the criminal without being held to have assented to the act. [Citations omitted.]\nIn People v. Hartford L. Ins. Co., [252 Ill. 398, 96 N.E. 1049 (1911)], the Illinois Supreme Court said: \u2018One cannot arrange for a crime to be committed against himself or his property, and aid, encourage, or solicit the commission of the crime (Love v. People, 160 Ill. 501, 32 L.R.A. 139, 43 N.E. 710 [1896]), but if he does not induce or advise the commission of the crime, and merely creates the condition under which an offense against the public may be committed, the rule does not apply (People v. Smith, 251 Ill. 185, 95 N.E. 1041 [1911]).\u2019\nBoth Nelson and Burnette were sexual assault cases.\nThe principle was applied in State v. Goffney, 157 N.C. 624, 73 S.E. 162 (1911), in which the state\u2019s evidence showed that defendant was apprehended as he broke and entered a store owned by a Mr. Barnes. The state\u2019s evidence also showed that Barnes had instructed one of his employees to induce defendant, a former employee, to commit the offense. The Court held that a directed verdict of not guilty should have been entered, stating, id. at 626, 73 S.E. at 163:\nIn the case at bar the owner himself gave permission for the defendant to enter, which destroyed the criminal feature and made the entry a lawful one.\nUpon the facts in evidence no crime was committed, because the entry was with the consent and at the instance of the owner of the property.\nThe principle was most recently applied in State v. Boone, 297 N.C. 652, 256 S.E. 2d 683 (1979), another felonious entry case.\nThe principle applies only to criminal acts where want of consent of the victim is an essential element. It is not the same as, and should not be confused with, the doctrine of entrapment. See State v. Jackson, 243 N.C. 216, 90 S.E. 2d 507 (1955); State v. Burnette, supra. Entrapment, as a defense to criminal conduct, applies to crimes whether or not want of consent is an element of the offense and arises out of actions of law enforcement authorities or their agents. State v. Walker, 295 N.C. 510, 246 S.E. 2d 748 (1978); State v. Burnette, supra.\nWhen considered as a whole, Moore\u2019s testimony is to this effect: Defendant, a Marine Corps corporal, before the incident for which he was tried, had attempted to persuade Moore, a Marine Corps sergeant, to engage in consensual homosexual acts. Moore refused. Moore, concerned that defendant might bring accusations that he was homosexual to military authorities, decided to arrange a tape-recorded encounter with defendant to document the fact that Moore was not a homosexual and was not, voluntarily at least, engaging in homosexual acts with defendant. It was thus important to Moore to demonstrate not only that defendant was the aggressor, but that Moore was an unwilling participant. To do this Moore first invited defendant into his apartment, saying among other things, \u201cI want to see what I can do for ya, man.\u201d A lengthy conversation ensued while both men were sitting on Moore\u2019s loveseat, and during which defendant made sexual overtures. Moore\u2019s knife, which had been under the loveseat, was introduced into the conversation by Moore, who said, \u201cJerry Booher are you going to kill me with that knife?\u201d Later, Moore again called defendant\u2019s attention to the knife in connection with their discussion about whether defendant wanted to die and whether Moore would kill him. At this point apparently Moore handed the knife to defendant or sat it down next to him. Defendant then, according to Moore, later took it from the coffee table and used it to force Moore to engage in fellatio.\nThe only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from this evidence is that Moore arranged for, aided, encouraged, and actually induced defendant to use the knife against him. We do not intend to suggest that Moore desired to have a sexual encounter with defendant under circumstances designed to give the appearance that he was forced. We accept as true Moore\u2019s statement that he did not desire such encounters. The principle governing the case remains the same. For, by all the state\u2019s evidence, Moore induced defendant to force Moore to engage in a homosexual act, not because Moore desired to participate in the act, but because he desired to document the fact that he was an unwilling participant. In essence, then, Moore consented to defendant\u2019s acts of force, which, in law, robs defendant\u2019s actions of those elements necessary for a conviction of a first or second degree sexual offense. In light of all the evidence we can give no weight to Moore\u2019s puny protestation, \u201cI was very afraid.\u201d\nThis is not a case where the victim of a crime, knowing one is contemplated against his person or property, waits passively and permits the crime to occur in order to apprehend the criminal. It is clear from the evidence that Moore had no intention of having defendant arrested for his acts. He sought only to document certain facts relative to their relationship. Moore determined to call the police only after defendant adamantly continued to remain on Moore\u2019s premises after Moore had asked him to leave. Further, Moore did not passively permit the crime against him to be committed. He actively encouraged and ultimately induced defendant to commit the crime.\nWe recognize that the precise point here decided was not argued on appeal. Defendant did move at trial for dismissal of all charges at the close of the state\u2019s evidence and again at the close of all the evidence because of evidentiary insufficiency. Both motions were denied. Defendant on appeal argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of a first degree sexual offense on the ground that there was insufficient evidence of the use of a deadly weapon. Nevertheless, when this Court firmly concludes, as it has here, that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a criminal conviction, even on a legal theory different from that argued, it will not hesitate to reverse the conviction, sua sponte, in order to \u201cprevent manifest injustice to a party.\u201d N.C. R. App. P. 2. See, e.g., State v. Samuels, 298 N.C. 783, 787, 260 S.E. 2d 427, 430 (1979) (sufficiency of evidence reviewed but no reversal); State v. Cox, 281 N.C. 131, 187 S.E. 2d 785 (1972).\nDefendant\u2019s conviction of a first degree sexual offense is, therefore,\nReversed.\nJustice MITCHELL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "EXUM, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Rufus L. Edmisten, Attorney General, by William W. Melvin, Deputy Attorney General, and William B. Ray, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "Adam Stein, Appellate Defender, by Malcolm R. Hunter, Jr., Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JERRY FRANCISCO BOOHER\nNo. 42A81\n(Filed 4 May 1982)\nRape and Allied Offenses \u00a7 5\u2014 first degree sexual offense \u2014 insufficiency of evidence-encouraging and inducing defendant to commit crime\nThe evidence of a first degree sexual offense was insufficient to be submitted to the jury where the facts indicated the prosecuting witness actively encouraged and ultimately induced defendant to commit the crime. The evidence tended to show that defendant, a Marine Corps corporal, before the incident for which he was tried had attempted to persuade the prosecuting witness, a Marine Corps sergeant, to engage in consensual homosexual acts and the prosecuting witness had refused. The witness decided to arrange a tape-recorded encounter with defendant to document the facts that he was not a homosexual and was not, voluntarily at least, engaging in homosexual acts with defendant. The prosecuting witness first invited defendant into his apartment, and a lengthy conversation ensued while both men were sitting on the prosecuting witness\u2019s loveseat, during which defendant made sexual overtures. The prosecuting witness\u2019s knife, which had been under the loveseat, was introduced into the conversation by the witness, who said to the defendant, \u201cAre you going to kill me with that knife?\u201d Later the prosecuting witness apparently handed the knife to the defendant or sat it down next to him, and defendant then took it from the coffee table and used it to force the prosecuting witness to engage in fellatio.\nJustice Mitchell took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.\nBEFORE Judge Robert D. Rouse, Jr., presiding at the 22 September 1980 Session of Onslow Superior Court defendant was tried on an indictment charging him with a first degree sexual offense. He was convicted of first degree sexual offense and sentenced to life imprisonment. He appeals.\nRufus L. Edmisten, Attorney General, by William W. Melvin, Deputy Attorney General, and William B. Ray, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nAdam Stein, Appellate Defender, by Malcolm R. Hunter, Jr., Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant appellant.\n. According to the record, the state offered defendant a plea bargain arrangement whereby in return for a plea of guilty to the offense of crime against nature, for which he was separately indicted, defendant would receive a three-to-five year sentence and the state would dismiss the charge of first degree sexual offense. Defendant declined the offer, and the state proceeded to trial only on the first degree sexual offense indictment." }, "file_name": "0554-01", "first_page_order": 586, "last_page_order": 596 }