{ "id": 4767830, "name": "RICKEY LILES, Employee-Plaintiff v. CHARLES LEE BYRD LOGGING COMPANY, Employer, Self-Insurer (HEWITT, COLEMAN & ASSOCIATES, Servicing Agent), Defendants", "name_abbreviation": "Liles v. Charles Lee Byrd Logging Co.", "decision_date": "1983-08-09", "docket_number": "No. 673PA82", "first_page": "150", "last_page": "158", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "309 N.C. 150" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "296 S.E. 2d 485", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "59 N.C. App. 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526381 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/59/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 S.E. 2d 604", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "22 S.E. 2d 570", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1942, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "576" }, { "page": "570" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "222 N.C. 257", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8629768 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1942, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "257" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/222/0257-01" ] }, { "cite": "25 S.E. 2d 865", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1943, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "869" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "223 N.C. 233", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8604451 ], "year": 1943, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/223/0233-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 S.E. 2d 683", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "241 N.C. 441", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8611925 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "448" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/241/0441-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 S.E. 2d 40", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "43", "parenthetical": "emphases original" }, { "page": "43" }, { "page": "44", "parenthetical": "emphases added" }, { "page": "44", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "42" }, { "page": "43" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "247 N.C. 332", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626948 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "336" }, { "page": "337" }, { "page": "337" }, { "page": "335" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/247/0332-01" ] }, { "cite": "267 N.C. 560", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559875 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/267/0560-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 S.E. 2d 485", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "486" }, { "page": "486" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 N.C. App. 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526381 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "331-32" }, { "page": "332" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/59/0330-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 655, "char_count": 19287, "ocr_confidence": 0.832, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.513466640164502e-07, "percentile": 0.8107785434594835 }, "sha256": "a8a241a0f05b05c4c416fa23c91ac3dc751d015ca266dc75b10c0a93d4021d27", "simhash": "1:2949e7ea8531b65a", "word_count": 3161 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:05:00.577130+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "RICKEY LILES, Employee-Plaintiff v. CHARLES LEE BYRD LOGGING COMPANY, Employer, Self-Insurer (HEWITT, COLEMAN & ASSOCIATES, Servicing Agent), Defendants" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "FRYE, Justice.\nThe question for decision is whether two scars around plaintiffs knee constitute \u201cserious bodily disfigurement\u201d and thus are compensable disfigurements under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-31(22) (1979). We hold that, under the facts of this case, these scars are not compensable disfigurements.\nI.\nDuring the hearing conducted to determine if his scars were compensable disfigurements, plaintiff, Rickey Liles, testified as follows:\nHe was working for the Charles Lee Byrd Logging Co. when, in the course of cutting down a tree with a chain saw, he cut himself. This injury required stitches, and, as a result, Liles was left with \u201ca scar or blemish\u201d on his leg. After recovering for about two weeks, Liles testified that he \u201creturned to work doing basically the same thing that I was doing before the injury. My job was to cut down trees with a chain saw and I returned to the same job after the accident as before the accident. I made the same wages after the accident as I made before the accident.\u201d\nLiles also testified that he is 25 years old. He quit school after the 11th grade. He has worked on an assembly line, painted, logged for five years, farmed with his father, and done some electrical work. He has no special training for any type of employment. Currently, he is unemployed.\nBased upon this evidence, Morgan R. Scott, a Deputy Commissioner at the North Carolina Industrial Commission, made the following findings of fact:\n1. Plaintiff sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with defendant-employer when a chain saw cut into his right leg while he was cutting down trees.\n2. As a result of the aforesaid injury, plaintiff sustained serious and permanent bodily disfigurement described as follows:\nOn Plaintiff\u2019s left [sic] leg just above the kneecap is a scar that is approximately 3 inches long, and slightly over 74 inch wide. It is redder than the surrounding skin but does not appear to be raised. It is noticeable from a distance of 6 feet.\nImmediately below that scar is a shorter scar that is approximately 172 inch in length. It varies up to 74 inch in width. It, too, is redder than the surrounding skin. It is noticeable from a distance of 6 feet but does not appear to be raised.\n3. Plaintiff is 25 years old and completed the 11th grade. He has had no special job training. He has worked on the assembly plant for Sylvania, has painted, has farmed, and has worked in logging for 5 years. He is presently unemployed.\n4. The scar does not cause discomfort except for occasional itching. However, plaintiff is somewhat self-conscious whenever the scar is visible.\n5. As a result of the aforesaid injury, plaintiff has suffered serious and permanent bodily disfigurement which mars his appearance to such an extent that it may reasonably be presumed to lessen his future opportunities for remunerative employment and so reduce his future earning capacity. The fair and equitable amount of compensation for said disfigurement under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act is $575.00.\nBased upon these findings of fact, the Commissioner then made the following conclusion of law:\nAs a result of injury by accident giving rise hereto, plaintiff has sustained serious and permanent bodily disfigurement for which he is entitled to compensation in the amount of $575.00. G.S. 97-31(22); Cates v. Hunt Construction Co., Inc., 267 N.C. 560 (1966).\nThe Full Commission affirmed the Deputy Commissioner\u2019s award to Liles. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the Commission\u2019s determination and held that Liles is not entitled to compensation because the evidence does not support a finding that the scars around Liles\u2019 knee were a \u201cserious bodily disfigurement\u201d within the meaning of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-31(22).\nThe question in this case is whether the Commission\u2019s findings of fact support the conclusion of law made that Liles has sustained \u201cserious and permanent bodily disfigurement\u201d for which he is entitled to compensation. For the reasons discussed below, we hold that these findings do not support such a conclusion.\nII.\nThe applicable provision of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act governing \u201cserious bodily disfigurement,\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-31(22), provides as follows:\n(22) In case of serious bodily disfigurement for which no compensation is payable under any other subdivision of this section, but excluding the disfigurement resulting from permanent loss or permanent partial loss of use of any member of the body for which compensation is fixed in the schedule contained in this section, the Industrial Commission may award proper and equitable compensation not to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000).\nIn articulating the standard under which a \u201cdisfigurement\u201d is to be considered \u201cserious,\u201d and thus compensable under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-31(22), this Court held in Davis v. Sanford Constr. Co., 247 N.C. 332, 101 S.E. 2d 40 (1957), as follows:\nUnder our decisions, there is a serious disfigurement in law only when there is a serious disfigurement in fact. A serious disfigurement in fact is a disfigurement that mars and hence adversely affects the appearance of the injured employee to such extent that it may be reasonably presumed to lessen his opportunities for remunerative employment and so reduce his future earning power. True, no present loss of wages need be established; but to be serious, the disfigurement must be of such nature that it may be fairly presumed that the injured employee has suffered a diminution of his future earning power. Stanley v. Hyman-Michaels Co., supra; Branham v. Panel Co., supra; Larson, Workmen\u2019s Compensation Law, Vol. 2, Sec. 58.32; also see (dictum) Marshburn v. Patterson, 241 N.C. 441, 448, 85 S.E. 2d 683.\nId. at 336, 101 S.E. 2d at 43 (emphases original).\nIndeed, fourteen years before the Davis decision, this Court quoted an analogous definition of \u201cserious\u201d disfigurement, a definition which had been stated in more elemental terms: \u201cTo warrant compensation for disfigurement it must be so permanent and serious that it, in some manner, hampers or handicaps the person in his earning or in securing employment, or it must be such as to make the person repulsive to other people.\u201d Branham v. Denny Roll and Panel Co., 223 N.C. 233, 239, 25 S.E. 2d 865, 869 (1943), quoting Poston v. Amer. Enka Corp., 1 I.C. 53. In stating that the disfigurement must be such \u201cas to make the person repulsive to other people,\u201d the Court was impliedly noting that one who is so disfigured as to be considered \u201crepulsive\u201d to others is less likely to be hired and thus is hampered or handicapped in his earning or securing employment.\nIn short, then, to be serious, a bodily disfigurement \u201cmust be of such nature that it may be fairly presumed that the injured employee has suffered a diminution of his future earning power.\u201d Davis v. Sanford Constr. Co., supra, 247 N.C. at 336, 101 S.E. 2d at 43.\nIn determining if a particular disfigurement is of such a nature that it may be fairly presumed that the injured employee has suffered a diminution of his future earning power, this Court has articulated several factors to be examined. In Stanley v. Hyman-Michaels Co., 222 N.C. 257, 22 S.E. 2d 570 (1942), this Court held:\nIn awarding compensation for serious disfigurement, we think the Commission, in arriving at the diminution of earning power for disfigurement and making its award, should take into consideration the natural physical handicap resulting from the disfigurement, the age, training, experience, education, occupation and adaptability of the employee to obtain and retain employment.\nId. at 266, 22 S.E. 2d at 576.\nThis Court indicated in Stanley that these factors \u2014 \u201cnatural physical handicap resulting from the disfigurement, the age, training, experience, education, occupation and adaptability of the employee to obtain and retain employment\u201d \u2014 were factors to be used \u201cin arriving at the diminution of earning power\u201d \u2014the amount of an award. It follows, however, that these same factors are to be used as well to determine if any award is to be made, that is, whether the disfigurement is in fact \u201cserious\u201d and thus compensable under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-31(22) because it is such as to give rise to the presumption that the worker has suffered a diminution of his future earning power. Indeed, this Court held in Davis, after quoting the factors articulated in Stanley, that \u201cwhether an injured employee has suffered a \u2018serious facial or head disfigurement\u2019 is a question of fact to be determined by the Commission, after taking into consideration the factors indicated above . . . .\u201d 247 N.C. at 337, 101 S.E. 2d at 44 (emphases added).\nIn this case, the Commission, through its Deputy Commissioner, examined all of the necessary factors and included them in its findings of fact. That is, the Commission noted the \u201cnatural physical handicap resulting from the disfigurement\u201d by including in its findings a description of the scars: one scar being about three inches long and about one-quarter inch wide, the other being about one and one-half inches long and up to one-quarter inch wide, both appearing redder than the surrounding skin and noticeable at a distance of six feet. The Commission also properly noted plaintiff\u2019s age of 25, the fact that he has no special job training, his experience on the assembly line for Sylvania, and his experiences painting, farming and logging. The Commission also noted Liles\u2019 education level \u2014 that he had completed the 11th grade. The Commission further recognized the \u201cadaptability of the employee to obtain and retain employment\u201d in setting out not only the factors above, but also in stating that Liles was unemployed at the time of the hearing. Thus, it appears that the Commission\u2019s findings of fact included all of the necessary factors that it was to consider in reaching a conclusion as to whether Liles\u2019 scar qualified as a \u201cserious bodily disfigurement\u201d and thus was compensable under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-31(22). Nevertheless, these findings of fact do not support the Commission\u2019s conclusion of law that Liles is entitled to compensation. This is so because there is no rational connection, no nexus, no relation between these factors and the scars themselves which would give rise to the presumption that Liles has suffered a diminution of his future earning power. In Davis this Court held that \u201cwhether an injured employee has suffered a \u2018serious facial or head disfigurement\u2019 is a question of fact to be determined by the Commission, after taking into consideration the factors indicated above, in relation to whether it may be fairly presumed to cause a diminution of his future earning power.\u201d Davis v. Sanford Constr. Co., supra, 247 N.C. at 337, 101 S.E. 2d at 44 (emphasis added).\nThe description of Liles\u2019 scars contained in the Commission\u2019s findings of fact is not such that, standing alone, it would appear that Liles has been rendered \u201crepulsive to other people\u201d because of the scars. The description of Liles\u2019 scars thus fails to give rise to the presumption that he has suffered a diminution of his future earning power because of these scars. Likewise, the particularities of the other factors the Commission examined, Liles\u2019 own age, training, experience, education, occupation and adaptability to obtain and retain employment, are not of the type which would give rise to the presumption that Liles has suffered a diminution of his future earning power because of the scars around his knee. In short, then, we hold that, based on these findings of fact, it cannot be reasonably presumed that a man 25 years of age with an 11th grade education who has worked as a farmer, painter, electrician, assembly line worker and logger, would have suffered a diminution of his future earning power because of these two scars around his knee. Therefore, we hold that Liles is not entitled to compensation under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-31 (22).\nIn reviewing the opinion of the Court of Appeals, we note two points which need to be clarified in this area of the law. In holding that it did \u201cnot believe there has been any showing that the scars would handicap the plaintiff in obtaining or performing any job for which he is otherwise qualified,\u201d the Court of Appeals appears to have placed undue emphasis on the fact that Liles \u201creturned to the same job he had before the accident at the same wages.\u201d Liles v. Charles Lee Byrd Logging Co., supra, 59 N.C. App. at 331-32, 296 S.E. 2d at 486. Although this fact is some evidence which would tend to negate the presumption that Liles had suffered a diminution of his future earning power, it is not dispositive of the issue. As articulated above, there are a multitude of factors that must be considered. In its opinion, however, the Court of Appeals appears to have rested its determination solely on the fact that Liles had \u201creturned to the same job he had before the accident at the same wages.\u201d\nIn addition, the Court of Appeals also wrote that \u201cthe scars around the plaintiff\u2019s knee are not accompanied by any other disability to work,\u201d in distinguishing the case at bar from the decision in Cates v. Hunt Constr. Co., 267 N.C. 560, 148 S.E. 2d 604 (1966). Liles v. Charles Lee Byrd Logging Co., supra, 59 N.C. App. at 332, 296 S.E. 2d at 486. When Cates was decided, however, the statute governing compensation for serious bodily disfigurement provided that the Commission may award compensation in cases of serious bodily disfigurement, \u201cincluding the loss of, or permanent injury to, any important external or internal organ or part of the body . . . .\u201d In Cates, plaintiff was compensated for the loss of his kidney and the accompanying scar. Currently, however, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-31(22), provides explicitly that its terms apply only to those cases of \u201cserious bodily disfigurement for which no compensation is payable under any other subdivision of this section, but excluding the disfigurement resulting from permanent loss or permanent partial loss of use of any member of the body for which compensation is fixed in the schedule contained in this section . . . .\u201d (emphases added). Thus, by its terms, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-31(22) applies only to \u201cserious bodily disfigurements\u201d which are not accompanied by any other disability which would already have been compensated for under another provision of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. In recognizing this distinction, we hold that the Court of Appeals\u2019 reliance on the fact that plaintiffs scars are not accompanied by any other disability to work was misplaced.\nIn sum, therefore, we affirm the Court of Appeals\u2019 determination that the scars around Liles\u2019 knee are not a \u201cserious bodily disfigurement\u201d within the meaning of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-31(22), and in so doing, modify the Court of Appeals\u2019 decision to the extent that its reasoning is inconsistent with the analysis set out above.\nModified and affirmed.\n. The difference between N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-31(21), the statute providing compensation for \u201cserious facial or head disfigurement\u201d and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-31(22), the statute providing compensation for \u201cserious bodily disfigurement\u201d is that once it is found as a fact that an injured employee has suffered \u201cserious facial or head disfigurement\u201d an award of compensation is mandatory. Under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-31(22), however, the decision whether to award compensation for \u201cserious bodily disfigurement\u201d lies within the Commission\u2019s discretion. Davis v. Sanford Constr. Co., supra, 247 N.C. at 335, 101 S.E. 2d at 42. At any rate, under both statutes the determination of whether an injured employee has suffered a \u201cserious\u201d disfigurement is a question of fact which must be determined by the Commission after taking into consideration the factors articulated above. See Id. at 336, 101 S.E. 2d at 43; Stanley v. Hyman-Michaels Co., supra, 222 N.C. at 257, 22 S.E. 2d at 570.\n. The result in this case might have been different had Liles been a fashion model, a factor which would give rise to the presumption that he had suffered a diminution of his future earning power \u2014employers might be reluctant to hire models with scars around their knees. Also, the result in this case might have been different if the scars were such as to render Liles \u201crepulsive\u201d to others, a factor which would also give rise to the presumption that Liles has suffered a diminution of his future earning power \u2014employers might be less likely to hire \u201crepulsive\u201d people.", "type": "majority", "author": "FRYE, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Hassell, Hudson & Lore, by R. James Lore; and Robert L. Anderson, Attorneys for plaintiff-appellant.", "Hedrick, Feerick, Eatman, Gardner & Kincheloe, by Scott M. Stevenson, Attorney for defendant-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "RICKEY LILES, Employee-Plaintiff v. CHARLES LEE BYRD LOGGING COMPANY, Employer, Self-Insurer (HEWITT, COLEMAN & ASSOCIATES, Servicing Agent), Defendants\nNo. 673PA82\n(Filed 9 August 1983)\n1. Master and Servant \u00a7 74\u2014 scars on knee \u2014no serious bodily disfigurement\nFindings by the Industrial Commission did not support its conclusion that two scars around plaintiffs knee constituted \u201cserious bodily disfigurement\u201d compensable under G.S. 97-31(22) where the description of the scars contained in the findings was not such that, standing alone, it would appear that plaintiff has been rendered \u201crepulsive to other people\u201d so as to give rise to the presumption that he has suffered a diminution of his future earning power because of the scars, and the Commission\u2019s findings that plaintiff was 25 years old, had an eleventh grade education, and had worked as a farmer, painter, electrician, assembly line worker and logger would not support a presumption that plaintiff suffered a diminution of his future earning power because of the scars.\n2. Master and Servant \u00a7 74\u2014 serious bodily disfigurement \u2014 return to same job\nThe fact that plaintiff returned to the same job at the same wages after an accident was not dispositive of the issue as to whether plaintiff suffered a diminution of his future earning power from scars received in the accident but was only one of many factors to be considered on that issue.\n3. Master and Servant \u00a7 74\u2014 serious bodily disfigurement \u2014 absence of accompanying disability\u2014 irrelevancy\nSince G.S. 97-31(22) by its terms applies only to \u201cserious bodily disfigurements\u201d which are not accompanied by any other disability which would already have been compensated for under another provision of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, the Court of Appeals erred in relying on the fact that plaintiff\u2019s scars were not accompanied by any other disability to work in determining that they did not constitute serious bodily disfigurement entitling plaintiff to compensation.\nOn discretionary review, pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 7A-31, of a decision of the Court of Appeals, 59 N.C. App. 330, 296 S.E. 2d 485 (1982), reversing an award of compensation by the North Carolina Industrial Commission.\nA Deputy Commissioner of the North Carolina Industrial Commission awarded $575 in compensation to plaintiff for scars around plaintiffs knee. The Full Commission affirmed this award. In an opinion by Judge Hill with Judges Arnold and Wells concurring, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Industrial Commission and determined that plaintiff was not entitled to relief. On 28 January 1983 this Court granted plaintiffs petition for discretionary review to review the Court of Appeals\u2019 decision.\nHassell, Hudson & Lore, by R. James Lore; and Robert L. Anderson, Attorneys for plaintiff-appellant.\nHedrick, Feerick, Eatman, Gardner & Kincheloe, by Scott M. Stevenson, Attorney for defendant-appellees." }, "file_name": "0150-01", "first_page_order": 178, "last_page_order": 186 }