{ "id": 2398008, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHARLES DAVID STANLEY", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Stanley", "decision_date": "1984-03-06", "docket_number": "No. 635A82", "first_page": "332", "last_page": "353", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "310 N.C. 332" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "305 S.E. 2d 703", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 26", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4763650 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0026-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 S.E. 2d 170", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 674", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4761257 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0674-01" ] }, { "cite": "275 S.E. 2d 450", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "483" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 223", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565360 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "271" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0223-01" ] }, { "cite": "52 U.S.L.W. 3423", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "U.S.L.W.", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "No. 83-113" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "706 F. 2d 311", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1116928 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/706/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "685 F. 2d 1227", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 525657 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/685/1227-01" ] }, { "cite": "455 U.S. 104", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11304091 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "109, n. 4" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/455/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "416 U.S. 943", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 84225, 84137, 84345, 84523, 84653, 84656, 84722, 84188, 84564, 84277, 84089, 84092, 84543 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/416/0943-04", "/us/416/0943-06", "/us/416/0943-03", "/us/416/0943-02", "/us/416/0943-08", "/us/416/0943-13", "/us/416/0943-11", "/us/416/0943-10", "/us/416/0943-12", "/us/416/0943-09", "/us/416/0943-01", "/us/416/0943-07", "/us/416/0943-05" ] }, { "cite": "283 So. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9716455 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/283/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 U.S. 349", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12124278 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "358" }, { "page": "433", "parenthetical": "footnote omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/430/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 S.E. 2d 339", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "245 Ga. 856", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga.", "case_ids": [ 1174610 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga/245/0856-01" ] }, { "cite": "297 S.E. 2d 217", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "339" }, { "page": "220" }, { "page": "340" }, { "page": "220" }, { "page": "221", "parenthetical": "footnote omitted" }, { "page": "220" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "250 Ga. 336", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga.", "case_ids": [ 1190946 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "338" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga/250/0336-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E. 2d 607", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "615" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567420 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "277 S.E. 2d 376", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 75", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571418 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0075-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 U.S. 307", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6182418 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319", "parenthetical": "emphasis original" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/443/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 S.E. 2d 835", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "838" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 500", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574086 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "504-05" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0500-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 S.E. 2d 500", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "502", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Jones, 303 N.C. 500, 504-05, 279 S.E. 2d 835, 838 (1981)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 534", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569411 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "538", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Jones, 303 N.C. 500, 504-05, 279 S.E. 2d 835, 838 (1981)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0534-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 S.E. 2d 114", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "117" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573434 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "428 So. 2d 649", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9532452 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "651" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/428/0649-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 S.E. 2d 304", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "346" }, { "page": "318" }, { "page": "319", "parenthetical": "footnote omitted" }, { "page": "319" }, { "page": "318" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4760257 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "257 S.E. 2d 597", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568416 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 S.E. 2d 338", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "347" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 490", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567551 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0490-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 S.E. 2d 783", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "786" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4761533 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "414" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "274 S.E. 2d 183", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "204", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Goodman, 298 N.C. at 30, 257 S.E. 2d at 588, and holding that the \"especially heinous\" factor should not have been submitted in the Hodge murder" }, { "page": "204" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 28", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563765 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "61", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Goodman, 298 N.C. at 30, 257 S.E. 2d at 588, and holding that the \"especially heinous\" factor should not have been submitted in the Hodge murder" }, { "page": "61" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0028-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 U.S. 420", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6183794 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "428-29" }, { "page": "425" }, { "page": "426" }, { "page": "432" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/446/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "455 U.S. 1038", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11385393, 11385354 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/455/1038-02", "/us/455/1038-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 S.E. 2d 732", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "747-48" }, { "page": "747" }, { "page": "747-48" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567383 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "224" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "257 S.E. 2d 569", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "585" }, { "page": "585" }, { "page": "588" }, { "page": "585" }, { "page": "585" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568313 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "24-26" }, { "page": "25" }, { "page": "30" }, { "page": "26" }, { "page": "25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 S.Ct. 474", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 S.E. 2d 203", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "228" }, { "page": "228" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567373 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "35" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 U.S. 933", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6423035, 6422924, 6423181 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/454/0933-02", "/us/454/0933-01", "/us/454/0933-03" ] }, { "cite": "278 S.E. 2d 214", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "219" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 246", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572740 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "246" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0246-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 U.S. 420", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6183794 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/446/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 U.S. 941", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6277664, 6275708, 6276260, 6274984, 6278350, 6275343, 6278644, 6279286, 6278967, 6277367, 6276539, 6275996, 6278014 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/us/446/0941-08", "/us/446/0941-03", "/us/446/0941-05", "/us/446/0941-01", "/us/446/0941-10", "/us/446/0941-02", "/us/446/0941-11", "/us/446/0941-13", "/us/446/0941-12", "/us/446/0941-07", "/us/446/0941-06", "/us/446/0941-04", "/us/446/0941-09" ] }, { "cite": "257 S.E. 2d 551", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 86", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568503 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0086-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 L.Ed. 2d 622", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "154 S.E. 730", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1930, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "731" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "199 N.C. 429", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8603127 ], "year": 1930, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "431" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/199/0429-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 S.E. 2d 679", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "271 N.C. 379", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564082 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/271/0379-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 S.E. 2d 289", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 573", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571231 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0573-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 S.E. 2d 649", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560587 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "237 S.E. 2d 822", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "293 N.C. 321", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564024 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/293/0321-01" ] }, { "cite": "240 S.E. 2d 391", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 220", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572419 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0220-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 S.E. 2d 304", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4760257 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 U.S. 420", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6183794 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/us/446/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "455 U.S. 1038", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11385393, 11385354 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/us/455/1038-02", "/us/455/1038-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 S.E. 2d 732", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567383 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "257 S.E. 2d 569", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568313 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "292 S.E. 2d 203", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "228", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567373 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1528, "char_count": 47749, "ocr_confidence": 0.813, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.7156797856216737e-07, "percentile": 0.7030732293658819 }, "sha256": "c4979fdbbea5eb94008fc7b09faf89fb9ca5150783d1f15530cdf3b11227ebb0", "simhash": "1:02012e2aa03f9e58", "word_count": 7946 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:57:26.657763+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Justice COPELAND joins in this dissent." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHARLES DAVID STANLEY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "EXUM, Justice.\nThe dispositive issue in this appeal concerns the propriety of permitting the jury to consider whether the murder committed by defendant was \u201cespecially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,\u201d as those terms are used in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(9). After a careful review of the facts and our prior decisions, we conclude this aggravating factor should not have been submitted to the jury. Since this is the only aggravating circumstance submitted and there is no evidence of any other which could have been submitted, we vacate the judgment imposing a sentence of death and in lieu thereof impose a sentence of life imprisonment.\nI.\nAt the time of her death, the victim, Joyce Stanley, was married to but legally separated from defendant, pursuant to a separation agreement entered in November 1981. They had been married for over nineteen years and had two children, Tracy Garnett Stanley and Hope Denice Stanley. The victim\u2019s son (defendant\u2019s stepson), James Allen Joyner, had lived with them until his graduation from high school. The Stanleys had lived in Rocky Mount since 1977, when they moved from Baltimore, Maryland. Defendant had retired from work in 1979 under total and permanent disability caused by heart disease and cancers of the nose, ear, and liver.\nIn mid-March 1982, some six weeks before the murder, the victim caused defendant to be arrested as a result of an incident which occurred in Rocky Mount: When her sister, Sandra Taylor, and the victim arrived at the victim\u2019s home, defendant was in a car parked in front of the house. The two women entered the house and watched defendant through the windows. Defendant got out of his car and walked into the yard, carrying a rifle. He was obviously intoxicated. The victim called the police. Defendant dropped the rifle at the corner of the house. When police arrived, they found him in the yard, playing with his dogs.\nOn 25 April 1982 the victim, her sister, Sandra Taylor, and two of the victim\u2019s children, Hope Stanley and James Joyner, left Rocky Mount to visit and have Sunday dinner with the victim\u2019s mother, Lottie Pope, in Tarboro. As they drove through Tarboro, they spotted defendant in a car parked at a laundromat some three blocks from Ms. Pope\u2019s house. After they arrived and during the meal, they noticed defendant driving back and forth on the street in front of the house. Defendant passed by the house five or six times.\nAfter the meal, most of the family went to sit on the front porch. The victim, Sandra and James went for a walk. As they started up the sidewalk, with James slightly ahead of his mother and aunt, defendant turned the corner onto the street in front of Ms. Pope\u2019s house. Sandra, determined to get the license number of the car so she could call the police, ran out in the street behind defendant\u2019s car as he pulled next to the curb. She hollered, \u201cGet the license plate number.\u201d As James turned toward the car, Sandra exclaimed, \u201cOh God, he\u2019s got a gun.\u201d\nShots rang out. James picked up a brick and ran toward the car, counting seven shots as he covered the 20 to 30 feet to the car. The bullets struck the victim, spinning her around and onto the ground, killing her.\nJames threw the brick, shattered the windshield, jumped in the passenger\u2019s side of the car, and grabbed the gun. With the gun pointing straight up, defendant fired a shot which went through the car\u2019s roof. As James forced the gun barrel through the window on the driver\u2019s side, Sandra grabbed the gun with her left hand. She beat defendant in the face with her right hand and took the gun out of the car. She turned the gun on defendant and pulled the trigger. The gun clicked but did not fire. Defendant said something to the effect of, \u201cThat\u2019s all right, I killed the bitch.\u201d\nTestimony conflicted regarding whether the victim spoke to defendant just before he shot her. Immediately before the first shot, Sandra heard the victim say \u201cPlease Stan.\u201d She did not, however, mention this fact in her detailed statement given to the police on 28 April 1982. Although James and Hope heard Sandra say, \u201cOh God, he\u2019s got a gun,\u201d neither of them heard the victim utter any words before the shooting started. James testified that no one said anything to defendant before the defendant started shooting. Lowell Gunter, Lottie Pope\u2019s husband, testified that he heard no one speak to defendant before the shooting.\nAfter the shooting, defendant drove to the Tarboro police station and surrendered.\nDefendant was convicted of first degree murder. After presentation of evidence and arguments in the penalty phase of the proceedings, the trial court submitted one aggravating and several mitigating factors to the jury. Upon finding the existence of the one aggravating factor, ie., that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, and finding no factors in mitigation, the jury recommended that defendant be sentenced to death. The trial court entered judgment accordingly.\nII.\nDefendant\u2019s appeal is directed only to the penalty phase of his trial. He assigns several errors; but the dispositive assignment of error is to the submission of the aggravating factor that the murder \u201cwas especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,\u201d as these terms are used in section 15A-2000(e)(9) of our capital punishment statute.\nAlthough we have determined that section 15A-2000(e)(9) is not unconstitutionally vague, State v. Martin, 303 N.C. 246, 278 S.E. 2d 214, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 933 (1981), the application of this aggravating circumstance to particular cases is sometimes difficult. The propriety of submitting this aggravating factor turns on \u201cthe peculiar surrounding facts of the capital offense under consideration.\u201d State v. Pinch, 306 N.C. 1, 35, 292 S.E. 2d 203, 228, cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 474 (1982).\nNot every capital offense is \u201cespecially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.\u201d State v. Goodman, 298 N.C. 1, 24-26, 257 S.E. 2d 569, 585 (1979). Indeed,\n[w]hile we recognize that every murder is, at least arguably, heinous, atrocious, and cruel, we do not believe that this subsection is intended to apply to every homicide. By using the word \u2018especially\u2019 the legislature indicated that there must be evidence that the brutality involved in the murder in question must exceed that normally present in any killing before the jury would be instructed upon this subsection.\nId. The circumstance is appropriate for a \u201cconscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the victim.\u201d Id.; accord, State v. Rook, 304 N.C. 201, 224, 283 S.E. 2d 732, 747-48 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1038 (1982).\n\u201cA person of ordinary sensibility could fairly characterize almost every murder as being [especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel].\u201d Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428-29 (1980). That persons holding precisely this perception might comprise the jury in a capital case highlights the need for caution in tendering this aggravating circumstance to a jury and underscores the critical function served by our review of its submission on appeal. Id. This factor must \u201cnot become a \u2018catch-all\u2019 provision which can always be employed in cases where there is no evidence of other aggravating circumstances.\u201d Goodman, 298 N.C. at 25, 257 S.E. 2d at 585. And when \u201cit is doubtful whether a particular aggravating circumstance should be submitted, the doubt should be resolved in favor of defendant. When \u2018a person\u2019s life is at stake . . . the jury should not be instructed upon one of the [aggravating] statutory circumstances in a doubtful case.\u2019 \u201d State v. Oliver, 302 N.C. 28, 61, 274 S.E. 2d 183, 204 (1981) (quoting State v. Goodman, 298 N.C. at 30, 257 S.E. 2d at 588, and holding that the \u201cespecially heinous\u201d factor should not have been submitted in the Hodge murder).\nThe cases cited above make it clear that to submit this aggravating factor to a jury, the capital offense must not be merely heinous, atrocious, or cruel; it must be especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. The defendant\u2019s acts must be characterized by \u201cexcessive brutality, or physical pain, psychological suffering, or dehumanizing aspects not normally present\u201d in a first degree murder case. State v. Blackwelder, 309 N.C. 410, 414, 306 S.E. 2d 783, 786 (1983). Any murder shocks our conscience. Yet, for us to review the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury\u2019s finding that a particular murder is \u201cespecially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,\u201d we must harden our perceptions and feelings to the legal proposition that not all murders may be so characterized. Only after accepting this view may we then differentiate among murders on the basis of their respective brutality, winnowing case by case those which are merely heinous, atrocious or cruel, from those which the jury could find are especially so. It is a grisly duty.\nIn support of submission of the \u201cespecially heinous\u201d circumstance here, the state argues the evidence is sufficient to permit the jury to find: (1) The victim suffered a prolonged, unnecessarily torturous death at the hands of her assailant. (2) She pled for her life before she was shot. (3) Defendant tortured her psychologically immediately before the killing by \u201cstalking\u201d her in his automobile. Similar facts, involving physical and psychological torture and a merciless killing of one begging for his life, have been deemed enough under our prior cases to support a jury\u2019s conclusion that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel.\nWe have recognized the excessive cruelty and especial heinousness of circumstances in which a victim endured prolonged suffering at the assailant\u2019s hands before death. In Martin, 303 N.C. at 246, 278 S.E. 2d at 219, the victim was paralyzed from the waist down by the first gunshots. Defendant then, over a 25-minute period, dragged her into another room, beat her with a pistol, threw her repeatedly against a wall, beat her on the head with his fists, and beat her again with the pistol before he finally fired the fatal shots.. In Goodman, 298 N.C. at 26, 257 S.E. 2d at 585, defendant shot the victim a number of times and cut him repeatedly with a knife. Defendant then placed him, alive, in the trunk of a car where he remained for a number of hours while en route to another county. There defendant removed him from the trunk and shot him twice through the head.\nThat death is not instantaneous, however, does not alone make a murder especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. In State v. Hamlette, 302 N.C. 490, 276 S.E. 2d 338 (1981), defendant shot the victim three times as the victim talked on a public telephone in the parking lot of a store in Roxboro. Defendant had been riding around and drinking beer most of the evening. He shot the victim from behind without any established motive and then fled. The victim lingered for twelve days before ultimately dying because of the gunshot wounds. This Court concluded that the \u201cespecially heinous\u201d aggravating circumstance should not have been submitted to the jury. The Court characterized the murder as \u201cheinous but not \u2018especially heinous\u2019 within the meaning of that term as used in the statute. . . . [I]t was not unnecessarily tortuous [sic] or outrageously wanton or vile. Contrast State v. Goodman, supra, and State v. Johnson, [298 N.C. 47, 257 S.E. 2d 597 (1979)], with State v. Oliver and Moore, 302 N.C. 28, 274 S.E. 2d 183 (1981).\u201d Id. at 504, 276 S.E. 2d at 347.\nIn State v. Oliver, 302 N.C. 28, 61, 274 S.E. 2d 183, 204 (1981), the victim of an armed robbery said to his assailants, \u201cPlease don\u2019t shoot me. Go ahead and take the money.\u201d We characterized this statement as being one in which the victim \u201cbegged for his life.\u201d We said, \u201cWith Watts [the victim] pleading for his life defendant . . . mercilessly shot him to death.\u201d We concluded that these circumstances were enough to support the jury\u2019s finding that the murder was \u201cespecially heinous, atrocious or cruel.\u201d On the second appeal in State v. Oliver, 309 N.C. 326, 307 S.E. 2d 304 (1983), a majority of the Court again concluded that submission of the \u201cespecially heinous\u201d aggravating factor was proper. The Court then characterized the murder of the pleading victim as one \u201ccalculated to leave the victim in his last moments as a sentient being, aware but helpless to prevent impending death, focusing on the deliberate, intentional and senseless aspect of a conscienceless and pitiless murder inflicting psychological torture.\u201d Id. at 346, 307 S.E. 2d at 318. The Court in Oliver II relied on circumstances present in the case other than the victim\u2019s having pleaded \u201cPlease don\u2019t shoot me.\u201d The Court said:\nIn the case sub judice, the evidence justifies a conclusion that the murder of Allen Watts, committed in total disregard for the value of human life, was a senseless murder, executed in cold blood as the victim pleaded \u2018please don\u2019t shoot me\u2019; and that defendant showed no remorse. In fact, defendant Moore later laughingly boasted to his fellow inmates that he pointed the gun at Watts who begged not to be shot and offered defendant more money, and that defendant \u2018kind of liked the idea of it.\u2019 As recently stated in Magill v. State, 428 So. 2d 649, 651 (Fla. 1983), \u2018[i]t is not merely the specific and narrow method in which a victim is killed which makes a murder heinous, atrocious, and cruel; rather, it is the entire set of circumstances surrounding the killing.\u2019 We therefore hold with respect to defendant Moore\u2019s murder of Watts that under the peculiar circumstances of this case, including but not limited to the victim\u2019s imploring \u2018please don\u2019t shoot me,\u2019 the evidence was sufficient to support the submission to the jury of the factor that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.\nId. at 347, 307 S.E. 2d at 319 (footnote omitted).\nThe question before us is whether the evidence is sufficient to permit a jury to find, as the state argues, that the victim here (1) suffered a prolonged, unnecessarily torturous death as in Martin and Goodman; (2) begged for her life before being \u201cmercilessly shot ... to death\u201d under circumstances evidencing the infliction of psychological torture and an unusually depraved defendant as in Oliver, or (3) was psychologically tortured by being \u201cstalked\u201d by defendant before he killed her.\nWhen we determine, in criminal cases, whether the evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt of a particular offense is sufficient to be submitted to the jury, we apply the following rules:\nThe evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the State; the State is entitled to every reasonable intendment and every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom; contradictions and discrepancies are for the jury to resolve and do not warrant dismissal; and all of the evidence actually admitted, whether competent or incompetent, which is favorable to the State is to be considered ....\nState v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 99, 261 S.E. 2d 114, 117 (1980). When the evidence is so viewed, there must be \u201c \u2018substantial evidence of all material elements of the offense\u2019 in order to create a jury question on defendant\u2019s guilt or innocence.\u201d State v. Locklear, 304 N.C. 534, 538, 284 S.E. 2d 500, 502 (1981) (quoting State v. Jones, 303 N.C. 500, 504-05, 279 S.E. 2d 835, 838 (1981)). The United States Supreme Court has articulated the test of the sufficiency of evidence in a criminal case as being whether, \u201cafter viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis original). This Court, in turn, has said that \u201c \u2018[substantial evidence\u2019 is that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\u201d State v. Cox, 303 N.C. 75, 87, 277 S.E. 2d 376, 384 (1981). The state\u2019s evidence must do more than raise merely a suspicion or conjecture as to the existence of the necessary elements of the charged offense. State v. LeDuc, 306 N.C. 62, 75, 291 S.E. 2d 607, 615 (1982).\nWe think this same approach to the evidence should be used in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support a finding by the jury of certain essential facts which, in turn, would support its conclusion that a first degree murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.\nTaking this approach, we are satisfied the evidence here is insufficient. It leaves the existence of the facts essential to support the ultimate conclusion in a state of conjecture and surmise. The evidence shows defendant fired nine shots at the victim, all in rapid succession, from an automobile which he never left. He inflicted no other injuries. According to the pathologist, the lethal wound, which entered the victim\u2019s back and lacerated the aorta, rendered her unconscious within minutes. Though death was not instantaneous, the victim did not linger and suffer for any prolonged period before death. There is no evidence that defendant intended that his wife suffer a prolonged, torturous death, or that she in fact suffered a prolonged, torturous death. The only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence is that defendant intended her death to be as instantaneous as he could make it. That she might have remained conscious for a matter of minutes after being shot does not distinguish this case from the ordinary death-by-shooting cases. See Hamlette, 302 N.C. 490, 276 S.E. 2d 338 (where the victim lingered twelve days after being shot).\nThere is evidence that the victim said \u201cPlease Stan\u201d sometime before she was shot. This evidence does not support a reasonable inference that the victim was mercilessly shot to death while begging for her life. What the words \u201cPlease Stan\u201d might have referred to remains in the realm of conjecture and surmise. The words could have been uttered in an effort to get defendant to leave the area before the victim was aware that defendant intended to shoot her. The words also could have been uttered with reference to some other momentary conflict between the victim and her estranged husband. Likewise, the evidence does not support a reasonable inference that defendant, who never left his car, heard these words uttered by the victim who was standing on the curb. Since no eyewitness other than Sandra Taylor heard this utterance, it is not reasonable to infer that defendant heard it. Neither is there any evidence which supports an inference that defendant boasted after the shooting, as did the defendant in Oliver II, that he had killed someone begging for his life and \u201ckind of liked the idea of it.\u201d 309 N.C. at 347, 307 S.E. 2d at 319. The evidence is simply that defendant stated immediately after the shooting, \u201cthat\u2019s all right, I killed the bitch.\u201d Thereafter, he immediately drove to the Tarboro Police Department and surrendered. When advised that he was charged with the first degree murder of his wife, defendant said he did not know he had killed her and, if he had known, he would have killed himself.\nFinally, there is no evidence from which it could be reasonably inferred that defendant \u201cstalked\u201d his victim, torturing her psychologically before the shooting. The evidence shows simply that defendant drove past the house, where the victim was located, several times. The victim and her family, knowing of defendant\u2019s presence in the area, nevertheless went outside the house \u201cfor a walk.\u201d Obviously they were not being tortured psychologically by defendant\u2019s actions in driving back and forth in front of the house. At no time before the shooting did defendant threaten the victim or any of her family. Rather, he shot the victim suddenly, nine times in rapid succession, and she died shortly thereafter.\nThe murder here was indeed cruel and unpardonable, as is every unlawful, deliberate taking of human life. But there is no evidence that defendant inflicted suffering upon the victim, either physically or psychologically, beyond that ordinarily suffered by anyone who is shot to death. Neither is there any evidence of unusual brutality exceeding that normally present in first degree murder. There is no evidence that defendant himself was unusually depraved.\nThe Georgia Supreme Court has reached the same result on quite similar facts in Phillips v. State, 250 Ga. 336, 297 S.E. 2d 217 (1982). Phillips was convicted of the first degree murder of his estranged wife who was in the process of obtaining a divorce that Phillips did not want. The Georgia Supreme Court recited the facts as follows:\nPhillips related to friends shortly before the murder that his life was in a mess and that if his wife did not return to him, he would probably kill her. On the morning of the murder, Phillips went to the school where his wife worked to discuss a bill for attorney fees of $150. He left, but returned later that morning, carrying, on a hanger, clothes that she had left behind when she moved out. Inside the clothes, Phillips had concealed a .22 rifle suspended from a coat hanger. When his wife entered the hall to speak to Phillips, she apparently saw the gun, because she screamed \u201cOh, no!\u201d before Phillips fired 5 times in rapid succession. He grabbed her and shook her, then left.\nId. at 339, 297 S.E. 2d at 220. Less than an hour after the murder Phillips surrendered himself at the sheriffs office. A physician who conducted the autopsy testified that the deceased \u201chad been shot 4 times: in the right shoulder, the left ear, the back, and the left side of the head; she lived at least 5 minutes from the onset of the injuries.\u201d Id. at 340, 297 S.E. 2d at 220.\nThe Georgia Supreme Court concluded that the evidence did not support submission of its statutory aggravating circumstance that the \u201coffense of murder was outrageously and wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman in that it involved torture to the victim and depravity of mind on the part of the defendant.\u201d The Georgia Court said:\nTorture may be found where the victim is subjected to serious physical, sexual, or psychological abuse before death. Hance v. State, [245 Ga. 856, 268 S.E. 2d 339 (1980)]. Depravity of mind may be found where the victim is subjected to serious psychological abuse before death, or to mutilation, serious disfigurement, or sexual abuse after death. Ibid.\nHere it is undisputed that there was no sexual abuse and that the victim died after Phillips left. Thus, the trial court\u2019s finding of torture and depravity of mind must rest upon serious physical or psychological abuse before death.\nThe state argues that, since Mrs. Phillips suffered pain and anticipated the prospect of death, she suffered serious physical and psychological abuse before death. Such an interpretation of \u00a7 (b)(7) would allow the trier of fact to find \u00a7 (b)(7) in almost every murder case. We cannot so broadly construe \u2018physical\u2019 or \u2018psychological\u2019 abuse.\nId. at 340-41, 297 S.E. 2d at 221 (footnote omitted).\nThis case is very nearly controlled by Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980), which establishes a constitutionally mandated limit beyond which aggravating factors like our \u201cespecially heinous\u201d factor may not be submitted. Both here and in Godfrey, defendant murdered his estranged wife. Each victim had obtained warrants against her husband shortly before the murders. Court appearances resulting from these charges were imminent in each case. Even the manner of the killings are similar. In Godfrey, defendant\ngot out his shotgun and walked with it down the hill from his home to the trailer where his mother-in-law lived [and where his wife was staying]. Peering through a window, he observed his wife, his mother-in-law, and his 11-year-old daughter playing a card game. He pointed the shotgun at his wife through the window and pulled the trigger. The charge from the gun struck his wife in the forehead and killed her instantly. He proceeded into the trailer, striking and injuring his fleeing daughter with the barrel of the gun. He then fired the gun at his mother-in-law, striking her in the head and killing her instantly.\n[Defendant] then called the local sheriffs office, identified himself, said where he was, explained that he had just killed his wife and mother-in-law, and asked that the sheriff come and pick him up.\nId. at 425. In the instant case, defendant drove his car to the place where his wife, her sister and his stepson were walking. He pulled alongside the curb, pointed his rifle at his wife, and shot her a number of times in rapid succession. He departed the scene without leaving his car, drove to the Tarboro police station, and surrendered.\nDefendant in Godfrey, like defendant here, was sentenced to death by reason of the jury\u2019s determination that one statutory aggravating factor existed. In Godfrey the jury determined, under the language of the Georgia sentencing statute, that the murder \u201cwas outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman.\u201d Id. at 426. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence asserting simply that the verdict was \u201cfactually substantiated.\u201d Id. at 432. The United States Supreme Court concluded that in so doing, the Georgia Supreme Court had unconstitutionally construed the \u201coutrageously vile\u201d aggravating factor in the Georgia sentencing statute. The Court said:\nThe petitioner\u2019s crimes cannot be said to have reflected a consciousness materially more \u2018depraved\u2019 than that of any person guilty of murder. His victims were killed instantaneously. They were members of his family who were causing him extreme emotional trauma. Shortly after the killings, he acknowledged his responsibility and the heinous nature of his crimes. These factors certainly did not remove the criminality from the petitioner\u2019s acts. But, as was said in Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358, 51 L.Ed. 2d 393, 97 S.Ct. 1197, it \u2018is of vital importance to the defendant and to the community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion.\u2019\nThat cannot be said here. There is no principled way to distinguish this case, in which the death penalty was imposed, from the many cases in which it was not. Accordingly, the judgment of the Georgia Supreme Court insofar as it leaves standing the petitioner\u2019s death sentences is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings.\nId. at 433 (footnote omitted).\nWe recognize the difference in language in the Georgia \u201coutrageously vile\u201d factor and our own \u201cespecially heinous\u201d factor. But the essence of the Georgia aggravating factor and our own, as we have interpreted it in earlier cases, is the same. The Georgia statute mentions expressly \u201ctorture to the victim and depravity of mind ... of the defendant.\u201d Phillips v. State, 250 Ga. at 338, 297 S.E. 2d at 220. Interpreting our \u201cespecially heinous\u201d factor, we have said that it connotes a \u201cconscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the victim.\u201d State v. Goodman, 298 N.C. 1, 25, 257 S.E. 2d 569, 585 (1979), quoting with approval State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943 (1974). We have approved a jury instruction defining the factor as follows:\nYou are instructed that the words \u2018especially heinous, atrocious or cruel\u2019 means extremely or especially or particularly heinous or atrocious or cruel. You\u2019re instructed that \u2018heinous\u2019 means extremely wicked or shockingly evil. Atrocious means marked by or given to extreme wickedness, brutality or cruelty, marked by extreme violence or savagely fierce. It means outrageously wicked and vile. \u2018Cruel\u2019 means designed to inflict a high degree of pain, utterly indifferent to or enjoyment of the suffering of others.\nId. The circumstance \u201cdoes not arise in cases in which death was immediate and in which there was no unusual infliction of suffering upon the victim.\u201d Rook, 304 at 226, 283 S.E. 2d at 747. Submission of the circumstance is appropriate \u201cwhen there is evidence of excessive brutality, beyond that normally present in any killing . . . .\u201d Pinch, 306 at 34, 292 S.E. 2d at 228. \u201cA conscienceless and pitiless murder inflicting psychological torture\u201d upon the victim qualifies for the \u201cespecially heinous\u201d factor. Oliver II, 309 N.C. at 346, 307 S.E. 2d at 318. The Court in Oliver II also thought it significant that defendant had boasted after the crime that he had murdered someone begging for his life and \u201ckind of liked the idea of it\u201d \u2014a boast which demonstrates an unusual depravity of mind. Thus, both the Georgia factor and ours apply to those murders which are particularly painful or torturous to the victim, either psychologically or physically, or which demonstrate an unusual depravity of mind on the part of the defendant beyond that normally present in first degree murder.\nFurther, in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 109, n. 4 (1982), a majority of justices noted that the application of the Oklahoma \u201cheinous, atrocious or cruel\u201d factor in that case most likely violated Godfrey. In Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F. 2d 1227 (11th Cir. 1982), modified on other grounds, 706 F. 2d 311 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3423 (U.S. Nov. 28, 1983) (No. 83-113), the court applied Godfrey to Florida\u2019s \u201cheinous, atrocious or cruel\u201d factor and found that Florida had unconstitutionally applied that factor under the reasoning of Godfrey. In both Oliver II and State v. Rook, 304 at 225-26, 283 S.E. 2d at 747-48, this Court analyzed the application of the \u201cespecially heinous\u201d factor in light of the decision in Godfrey.\nWe conclude that it was error in this case to submit the \u201cespecially heinous\u201d aggravating factor.\nSince there is no evidence in the case to support any aggravating circumstance, we must overturn the sentence of death and in lieu thereof impose a sentence of life imprisonment. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-2000(d)(2); State v. Silhan, 302 N.C. 223, 271, 275 S.E. 2d 450, 483 (1981). Accordingly, the judgment below imposing a sentence of death is vacated and defendant is hereby sentenced to a term of imprisonment for the remainder of his natural life. Defendant is entitled to credit for any time spent in confinement as a result of these charges before the date of this judgment. See State v. Bondurant, 309 N.C. 674, 309 S.E. 2d 170 (1983). The Superior Court of Edgecombe County shall issue an amended commitment in accordance with this judgment. See State v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 305 S.E. 2d 703 (1983).\nDefendant assigns and we find no error in the guilt-innocence phase of his trial.\nGuilt-Innocence Phase: No error.\nSentencing Phase: Death sentence vacated; sentence of life imprisonment imposed.\n. The court submitted the following mitigating factors: (1) Defendant has no significant prior criminal history; (2) defendant committed the murder while under the influence of a mental or emotional disturbance; and (3) defendant lacked the capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-2000(f)(l), (2) & (6) (1983).\n. The trial court, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-2000(f)(9), also instructed the jury to determine if there were other circumstances which it found to have mitigating value. The jury responded negatively.", "type": "majority", "author": "EXUM, Justice." }, { "text": "Justice MITCHELL\nconcurring in the result.\nI find most of the reasoning and arguments advanced by Justice Martin in his dissent to be correct. If we were construing the statute in isolation, I would be compelled to join him. I concur in the result reached by the majority, however, solely because I am unable to distinguish satisfactorily this case from Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980), which establishes a constitutionally mandated limit on aggravating factors to be considered in capital cases.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "Justice MITCHELL" }, { "text": "Justice MARTIN\ndissenting.\nI cannot concur in the conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to submit the aggravating circumstance that the killing was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. The question before us is whether, as a matter of law, there is sufficient evidence to submit the issue to the jury for its determination. In making this decision, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, discrepancies and contradictions are disregarded, the state\u2019s evidence is taken as true, and the state is entitled to every inference of fact that may be reasonably deduced therefrom. State v. Lester, 294 N.C. 220, 240 S.E. 2d 391 (1978); State v. Witherspoon, 293 N.C. 321, 237 S.E. 2d 822 (1977). The defendant\u2019s evidence, unless favorable to the state, is not to be considered in deciding the question. State v. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62, 296 S.E. 2d 649 (1982). If there is substantial evidence of each element of the issue under consideration, the issue must be submitted to the jury for its determination. State v. Roseman, 279 N.C. 573, 184 S.E. 2d 289 (1971). If the evidence only raises a suspicion or conjecture as to the existence of the fact to be found, the issue should not be submitted. State v. Cutler, 271 N.C. 379, 156 S.E. 2d 679 (1967).\nChief Justice Stacy stated the applicable rule as follows:\n[I]f there be any evidence tending to prove the fact in issue, or which reasonably conduces to its conclusion as a fairly logical and legitimate deduction, and not merely such as raises a suspicion or conjecture' in regard to it, the case should be submitted to the jury.\nState v. Johnson, 199 N.C. 429, 431, 154 S.E. 730, 731 (1930).\nThe majority fails to properly apply the rule. Rather, it analyzes the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant. This is demonstrated by the following excerpts from its opinion:\n1. \u201c[D]efendant fired nine shots at the victim ...\u201d (Emphasis added.) In the light most favorable to the state, defendant hit Joyce with each of the nine bullets. The medical doctor testified she was shot nine times, leaving eleven wounds in her body.\n2. \u201c[T]he lethal wound . . . rendered her unconscious within minutes.\u201d True, but in the view most favorable to the state, Joyce experienced the pain of each of the nine bullets entering her body. The medical doctor testified that she was conscious during the entire incident.\n3. \u201cThere is no evidence that defendant intended that his wife suffer a prolonged, torturous death . . . .\u201d In the light most favorable to the state, the circumstantial evidence indicates that defendant intended his wife, Joyce, to suffer, not die instantaneously. Although he shot her nine times, striking her in various parts of her body, she remained conscious for several minutes. The doctor testified she was conscious during the entire incident. Immediately after the killing, the defendant laughed and said, \u201cThat\u2019s all right. I killed the bitch.\u201d Furthermore, defendant\u2019s intention is not relevant as to whether there is sufficient evidence to submit the issue to the jury.\n4. \u201cThe words [\u201cPlease, Stan\u201d] also could have been uttered with reference to some other momentary conflict between the victim and her estranged husband.\u201d I assume that the majority is indicating that Joyce Stanley, under these circumstances \u2014 with defendant pointing a gun out of the car window at her \u2014meant \u201cPlease, Stan, go pay the light bill.\u201d True, the jury could so find, but applying the rule as we are bound to do, the logical inference is: \u201cPlease, Stan, don\u2019t kill me.\u201d\n5. \u201c[T]he evidence does not support a reasonable inference that defendant, who never left his car, heard these words uttered by the victim who was standing on the curb.\u201d In the light most favorable to the state, the inference is that defendant did hear the plea, but ignored it, and proceeded to gun down Joyce Stanley. Joyce was ten to twelve feet from Stanley at the time.\n6. \u201cSince no eyewitness other than Sandra Taylor heard this utterance, it is not reasonable to infer that defendant heard it.\u201d This infers that numerous persons were in the area of the killing. Only one other witness, Joyce\u2019s son, James, was in the immediate vicinity. Other persons were on the porch of a house some distance from the street. In the light most favorable to the state, since Sandra heard what Joyce said, the defendant also heard it. He was only ten to twelve feet from her.\n7. \u201cNeither is there any evidence which supports an inference that defendant boasted after the shooting . . . that he had killed someone begging for his life . . . .\u201d True, he did not use those words. Whether he was boasting when he laughed and said \u201cThat\u2019s all right. I killed the bitch,\u201d was for the jury.\n8. \u201c[T]he victim did not linger and suffer for any prolonged period before death.\u201d The medical doctor testified that Joyce was conscious during the entire incident. The mortal wound ruptured the main blood vessel from the heart, causing Joyce to bleed to death internally. She was conscious for several minutes before she died, according to the doctor. Several minutes can be a prolonged or extended period of time, depending upon what is happening and whose point of view is being considered. The time in question may have passed very quickly for defendant, but agonizingly slow and painful for Joyce before she mercifully slipped into unconsciousness. Joyce was not killed instantaneously. Having been shot nine times, the inference most favorable to the state is that she did indeed suffer.\n9. \u201cThe victim and her family, knowing of defendant\u2019s presence in the area, nevertheless went outside the house \u2018for a walk.\u2019 Obviously they were not being tortured psychologically by defendant\u2019s actions ...\u201d Actually, Sandra testified that they went into the street to get the license number on defendant\u2019s car. James did say, \u201cWe were all going out for a walk.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Defendant\u2019s arrival altered their intentions. They then resolved to get the license number. Again, discrepancies in the evidence are to be disregarded.\nOther examples may be found in the opinion, the point being that the majority abandoned the proper rule with respect to the issue. It resolved all the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant.\nMoreover, it appears that the majority seeks to perform the task of the jury and make the determination of whether the killing was in fact especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. The majority states: \u201cOnly after accepting this view may we then differentiate among murders on the basis of their respective brutality, winnowing case by case those which are merely heinous, atrocious or cruel, from those which the jury could find are especially so. It is a grisly duty.\u201d Our duty on the issue presently before us is not to \u201cdifferentiate among murders\u201d with respect to the heinousness of the crime. That task is properly our duty when we undertake a proportionality review. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-2000(d)(2) (1983). Here, we have only to determine if there is sufficient evidence to submit the issue to the jury. State v. Oliver, 309 N.C. 326, 307 S.E. 2d 304 (1983).\nThe author of the majority opinion expresses concern that jurors of \u201cordinary sensibility\u201d might characterize almost every murder as especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. He urges us to consider this in determining the issue before us in this case. Our speculation as to how a jury would answer an issue has no proper place in our determination of whether the issue should be submitted to the jury. Nevertheless, there are at least three safeguards to protect the administration of justice from this possibility that troubles the majority: (1) Jurors may be examined on voir dire with respect to this question and removed from the jury in proper instances. (2) The trial court must instruct the jury with respect to the issue, and nothing else appearing, we assume that the jury follows such instructions. (3) This Court may correct such a result, either by finding error in the jury selection, the court\u2019s jury instructions, or upon proportionality review, as the circumstances of a case may require.\nIn passing, I note that in two places the majority appears to be limiting the key factor on this issue to the brutality of the murder: \u201cThe defendant\u2019s acts must be characterized by more brutality than is inherent in every murder\u201d; \u201cdifferentiate among murders on the basis of their respective brutality.\u201d Of course, brutality is a factor to be considered, along with the facts of the killing and the entire set of circumstances surrounding the killing. But it is not conclusive. State v. Oliver, supra, 309 N.C. 326, 307 S.E. 2d 304 (1983). The correct standard is expressed in State v. Pinch, 306 N.C. 1, 292 S.E. 2d 203, cert. denied, 74 L.Ed. 2d 622 (1982). The aggravating circumstance \u201c \u2018does not arise in cases in which death was immediate and in which there was no unusual infliction of suffering upon the victim.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 34, 292 S.E. 2d at 228 (citation omitted). It is appropriate only when there is evidence of \u201cexcessive brutality, beyond that normally present in any killing, or when the facts as a whole portray the commission of a crime which was conscienceless, pitiless or unnecessarily torturous to the victim.\u201d Id. See State v. Rook, 304 N.C. 201, 283 S.E. 2d 732 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1038 (1982); State v. Goodman, 298 N.C. 1, 257 S.E. 2d 569 (1979).\nThe majority relies heavily upon Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Setting aside the question of whether the language in the Georgia statute, \u201coutrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman,\u201d means the same as \u201cespecially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,\u201d I do note that the Georgia statute is written in the conjunctive, evidently requiring the jury to find that the crime was vile and horrible and inhuman, whereas our statute is written in the disjunctive, only requiring that the killing be especially heinous, or especially atrocious, or especially cruel. Moreover, the cases are factually different. In Godfrey, both victims were killed instantly upon being shot once. Joyce remained conscious for several minutes after the first shot struck her, and was shot eight more times. The victims in Godfrey did not speak; Joyce said \u201cPlease, Stan,\u201d arguably pleading for her life. After the killing, Godfrey said nothing at the scene; Stanley laughed and said to Joyce\u2019s sister and son, \u201cThat\u2019s all right. I killed the bitch.\u201d Defendant fired nine shots into Joyce; Godfrey only shot each victim once. Godfrey evidently shot his first victim from ambush; Stanley drove back and forth in front of the house where Joyce was visiting her mother. He did this five or six times, arguably causing apprehension to Joyce and her family. I do not find Godfrey controlling.\nThe evidence, when considered in accordance with the rule set out above, supports the following facts and inferences:\n1. Joyce was shot nine times with a rifle. From this, it can be reasonably inferred that the killing was unusually brutal.\n2. She remained conscious as each shot struck her and for some time thereafter.\n3. Joyce bled to death internally.\n4. It can be reasonably inferred from these three facts that Joyce suffered both physical and mental pain and anguish before she lapsed into unconsciousness.\n5. Before the shooting, Joyce saw defendant drive back and forth in front of the house five or six times. In an effort to get defendant\u2019s car license number, Joyce, Sandra, and James went down to the street, and defendant turned the corner into the street they were on. From this, it can be reasonably inferred that Joyce suffered apprehension as to her safety.\n6. Joyce was killed in the presence of her family.\n7. After the gun was taken from Stanley, he laughed and said, \u201cThat\u2019s all right. I killed the bitch.\u201d From this, it can be reasonably inferred that defendant had no remorse and that the killing was pitiless or conscienceless. It was not until defendant was talking to the officers that he said he \u201cloved his wife.\u201d\n8. After Sandra said, \u201cOh God, he\u2019s got a gun\u201d, Joyce, some ten or twelve feet from defendant, said \u201cPlease, Stan.\u201d Defendant then shot her. From this, it can be reasonably inferred that Joyce, understanding the danger she was facing, was pleading for her life. It also supports the conclusion that the killing was pitiless or conscienceless.\nI cannot find as a matter of law that the evidence is insufficient to submit this issue to the jury for its determination. Joyce\u2019s death was not immediate, and the evidence supports the inference that she endured unusual suffering by reason of being shot nine times before she became unconscious. The evidence is sufficient for the jury to find that the killing was excessively brutal, beyond that normally present in a killing, and that it was conscienceless, pitiless, or unnecessarily torturous to Joyce Stanley and therefore especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. State v. Pinch, supra, 306 N.C. 1, 292 S.E. 2d 203, cert. denied, 74 L.Ed. 2d 622 (1982). The jury under proper instructions remains free to reject or find the circumstance. State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. 86, 257 S.E. 2d 551 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 941 (1980). Certainly, in resolving the question of law as to whether this aggravating circumstance should be submitted to the jury, it is not our province to consider how the jury should have answered the issue. That is the proper function of the jury under proper instructions from the trial court. What the outcome of this case would be on proportionality review is not before us, as we have not reached that stage of the proceedings. The evidence supporting the jury\u2019s finding that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel goes far beyond mere speculation or conjecture and was properly submitted to the jury.\nJustice COPELAND joins in this dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Justice MARTIN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Rufus L. Edmisten, Attorney General, by Joan H. Byers, Assistant Attorney General, for the state.", "Adam Stein, Appellate Defender, by Ann B. Petersen and Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Assistant Appellate Defenders; James R. Glover, Assistant Appellate Defender, Appellate Defender Clinic, for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHARLES DAVID STANLEY\nNo. 635A82\n(Filed 6 March 1984)\nCriminal Law \u00a7 135.4\u2014 aggravating factor of especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel \u2014 insufficiency of evidence to support\nIn a prosecution for murder in the first degree in which defendant received a death sentence, the trial court erred in permitting the jury to consider whether the murder committed by defendant was \u201cespecially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,\u201d as those terms are used in G.S. 15A-2000(e)(9). In the instant case, defendant drove his car to the place where his wife, her sister and his stepson were walking; he pulled alongside the curb, pointed his rifle at his wife, and shot her a number of times in rapid succession; he then departed the scene without leaving his car, drove to the Tarboro Police Station, and surrendered. Although the murder was indeed cruel and unpardonable, there was no evidence that defendant inflicted suffering upon the victim, either physically or psychologically, beyond that ordinarily suffered by anyone who is shot to death. Neither was there any evidence of unusual brutality exceeding that normally present in first degree murder. Further, there was no evidence that defendant himself was unusually depraved. Previous cases have made it clear that to submit this aggravating factor to a jury, the capital offense must not be merely heinous, atrocious, or cruel; it must be especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. The defendant\u2019s acts must be characterized by \u201cexcessive brutality, or physical pain, psychological suffering, or dehumanizing aspects not normally present\u201d in a first degree murder case.\nJustice Mitchell concurring in the result.\nJustice Martin dissenting.\nJustice Copeland joins in this dissent.\nAPPEAL of right from a death sentence imposed by Judge Thomas H. Lee, presiding at the 4 October 1982 Criminal Session of EDGECOMBE Superior Court. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-30 (1981).\nRufus L. Edmisten, Attorney General, by Joan H. Byers, Assistant Attorney General, for the state.\nAdam Stein, Appellate Defender, by Ann B. Petersen and Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Assistant Appellate Defenders; James R. Glover, Assistant Appellate Defender, Appellate Defender Clinic, for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0332-01", "first_page_order": 368, "last_page_order": 389 }