{
  "id": 2397521,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DAVID BUCK",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Buck",
  "decision_date": "1984-04-03",
  "docket_number": "No. 277A83",
  "first_page": "602",
  "last_page": "607",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "310 N.C. 602"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "261 S.E. 2d 789",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1980,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "299 N.C. 151",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8574152
      ],
      "year": 1980,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/299/0151-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "185 S.E. 2d 129",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1971,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "279 N.C. 676",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8571995
      ],
      "year": 1971,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/279/0676-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "247 S.E. 2d 905",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1978,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "295 N.C. 559",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8566309
      ],
      "year": 1978,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/295/0559-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "203 S.E. 2d 815",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1974,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "820"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "285 N.C. 158",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8562638
      ],
      "year": 1974,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "165-66"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/285/0158-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "251 S.E. 2d 430",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "weight": 3,
      "year": 1979,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "433"
        },
        {
          "page": "433"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "296 N.C. 559",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8568184
      ],
      "weight": 3,
      "year": 1979,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "564"
        },
        {
          "page": "563-64"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/296/0559-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "305 S.E. 2d 548",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1983,
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "309 N.C. 141",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        4767552
      ],
      "year": 1983,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/309/0141-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 558,
    "char_count": 12629,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.821,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 1.4405219330059853e-07,
      "percentile": 0.6530413549206923
    },
    "sha256": "def8bca094c2e459ef17b2f5fbb3afa0f3b1998a8453bd6cf3c98b3839b50b98",
    "simhash": "1:c093b621a2668c74",
    "word_count": 2034
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:57:26.657763+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DAVID BUCK"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "EXUM, Justice.\nThe question dispositive of this appeal is whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter as a possible verdict. Concluding that it did, we order a new trial.\nI.\nThe victim, Rudolph Saunders, died on 20 November 1982 from a stab wound to the chest which he suffered during a struggle with defendant in the home of Janie Richardson. Other than the deceased, three people, including defendant, were present when the wound was inflicted. All three testified, describing two conflicting accounts of the deceased\u2019s death.\nMs. Richardson, Saunders\u2019 girl friend, testified that defendant and his girl friend, Irma Clark, were temporarily living with her on 20 November 1982. That day a disagreement developed between Saunders and defendant regarding some damage defendant had done to Ms. Richardson\u2019s apartment. According to Ms. Richardson, she and Saunders walked into the kitchen where defendant was standing near a counter. Defendant picked up a butcher knife off the counter and advanced on Saunders, who was unarmed. Defendant stabbed Saunders in the face, tripped him, and stabbed him several times while Saunders was on the floor. Ms. Richardson told defendant to put the knife down, which he did. Saunders then arose and left the apartment. He died shortly thereafter from the stab wounds.\nDefendant\u2019s account of the incident was different. According to defendant, Saunders came from the upstairs of the apartment into the kitchen where defendant was standing. Saunders had an open pocketknife in his hand and was acting abusively, threatening to kill Ms. Richardson. Saunders\u2019 conduct scared defendant, and defendant told Saunders that he should not harm Ms. Richardson. According to defendant, Saunders came toward him brandishing the open pocketknife. Defendant instinctively grabbed the butcher knife off the counter, hoping to scare Saunders. The two men struggled, each holding a knife. Defendant testified that he threw Saunders to the floor and fell on top of him. Defendant said, \u201cWhen I fell down the [butcher] knife was in my hand. I must have fell [sic] on top of the knife because when I fell down I noticed the knife had wounded\u201d Saunders. Defendant said he observed the butcher knife sticking in Saunders\u2019 left chest, \u201cpulled it out\u201d and \u201ctossed it on the table.\u201d He and Saunders continued to struggle on the floor. Finally defendant told Saunders, \u201cDrop the [pocket] knife and I\u2019ll let you up.\u201d Saunders said, \u201cLet me up.\u201d Defendant said, \u201cThrow the knife down.\u201d Saunders dropped the knife and defendant threw it over to the other side of the room by a cabinet in the corner. Saunders then got up and walked out of the apartment. Defendant testified that he did not intentionally stab Saunders with the knife. Defendant learned that Saunders had died later that day.\nMs. Clark also testified. She essentially corroborated defendant\u2019s testimony regarding how the struggle ensued and that Saunders was armed with a pocketknife.\nWithin hours of Saunders\u2019 death, a New Bern police officer interviewed Ms. Richardson, went with her to her apartment, searched the kitchen, and retrieved the butcher knife used by defendant. He testified that he did not see a pocketknife. The day after the killing, Ms. Richardson and her son, James Nelson, returned to the apartment and went into the kitchen. Nelson testified that he found an open pocketknife \u201cjammed against the cabinet\u201d on the kitchen floor underneath the cabinet\u2019s overhanging ledge. The police eventually came and seized the pocketknife.\nOther evidence showed that on autopsy Saunders\u2019 blood alcohol content was 250 milligrams percent which would have produced a breathalyzer reading of .25 percent. The autopsy also revealed Saunders had two superficial lacerations \u2014 one on his forehead one inch long and another on his neck three-eighths of an inch long \u2014 in addition to the fatal stab wound in his chest.\nThe jury found defendant guilty of second degree murder.\nII.\nDefendant assigns two errors to the trial court\u2019s charge to the jury, one error to the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument, and one error to the sentencing hearing regarding the finding of certain aggravating circumstances. Because we conclude that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to submit involuntary manslaughter as a possible verdict, we find it unnecessary to reach defendant\u2019s other assignments of error inasmuch as they are not likely to arise on a new trial.\nAt a conference between court and counsel on jury instructions held at the close of evidence and before final arguments, defendant, through counsel, requested that the trial court charge only on second degree murder and not guilty by reason of self-defense. The court concluded that a charge on voluntary manslaughter should be given. Defendant then requested that a charge on involuntary manslaughter also be given. The trial court, after considerable discussion with counsel, finally determined that it would not submit involuntary manslaughter as an alternative verdict. Defendant excepted. The case was submitted to the jury on theories of second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter and not guilty by reason of both self-defense and accident.\nThe question whether involuntary manslaughter should have been submitted in this case is controlled by State v. Wallace, 309 N.C. 141, 305 S.E. 2d 548 (1983), and State v. Fleming, 296 N.C. 559, 251 S.E. 2d 430 (1979). These cases, among many others, support the proposition that involuntary manslaughter can be committed by the wanton and reckless use of a deadly weapon such as a firearm (Wallace) or a knife (Fleming). In Fleming the state\u2019s evidence tended to show that defendant intentionally stabbed deceased to death with a knife. Defendant\u2019s evidence, on the other hand, tended to show the deceased was stabbed while she and defendant struggled with a knife. Defendant said he did not intentionally stab deceased. This Court concluded that defendant\u2019s testimony \u201cwould support a finding of either (1) an accidental killing or (2) perhaps an unintentional homicide resulting from the reckless use of a deadly weapon under circumstances not evidencing a heart devoid of a sense of social duty.\u201d 296 N.C. at 564, 251 S.E. 2d at 433. In Wallace the state\u2019s evidence tended to show an intentional, malicious shooting of the deceased. Defendant\u2019s evidence, however, tended to show that defendant grabbed a gun from the deceased\u2019s hand and as he was attempting to throw it across the room it fired accidentally, the bullet striking and killing the deceased. The trial court there submitted possible verdicts of guilty of second degree murder, guilty of voluntary manslaughter, or not guilty by reason of both self-defense and accident. The jury convicted Wallace of second degree murder. This Court held it was error warranting a new trial for the trial court not to submit involuntary manslaughter as an alternative verdict. We concluded expressly that the error was not cured by defendant\u2019s having been found guilty of second degree murder nor by the judge\u2019s instructions on accidental killing.\nIn the present case defendant\u2019s evidence, if believed, could support a verdict of involuntary manslaughter on the theory that the killing was the result of his reckless, but unintentional use of the butcher knife. In essence, defendant\u2019s position in the case is that the killing was unintentional and accidental for which no criminal responsibility should attach. At most, the killing was the result of his reckless use of the knife which would amount to involuntary manslaughter. If, however, the jury should conclude that he intentionally wielded the knife, then it should acquit him on the grounds of self-defense. We think all of these alternatives are supported by the evidence in addition to second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter.\nThis case differs from Fleming where we held there was no evidence of self-defense or voluntary manslaughter. In Fleming defendant\u2019s evidence tended to show that he chased the deceased who was running away from him, unarmed and naked; he picked up a knife which the deceased had dropped during her flight; he caught the deceased, they struggled with the knife, and the fatal stabbing occurred during the struggle. The Court said, \u201cDefendant in his testimony makes no contention that he cut the deceased in the heat of passion or in self-defense.\u201d 296 N.C. at 563-64, 251 S.E. 2d at 433. This case also differs from Wallace where we also held the evidence would not support instructions on voluntary manslaughter or self-defense. In Wallace defendant\u2019s evidence tended to show that he was in the act of throwing a gun across the room when it accidentally discharged, killing deceased.\nIn the instant case defendant\u2019s evidence tends to show that the fatal stabbing occurred during a struggle in which both deceased and defendant were armed with knives and in which deceased so armed aggressively advanced first upon Ms. Richardson and next upon defendant. Deceased, who \u201cwas very intoxicated . . . and acted like he was going out of his head or something,\u201d told Ms. Richardson, \u201cI ought to kill you\u201d; he told defendant, \u201cWell, I [sic] f-k you up man.\u201d Defendant also testified, \u201cI was scared ... I didn\u2019t know what [the deceased] was going to do.\u201d Defendant then picked up the butcher knife to defend himself against deceased\u2019s advances. Although defendant was wielding the butcher knife generally to defend against a felonious assault upon him, the actual infliction of the fatal wound, according to defendant, was not intentional.\nWhile we find it unnecessary to address defendant\u2019s other assignments of error, we reiterate that it is important for the trial court to include the possible verdict of not guilty by reason of self-defense in its final mandate to the jury.\nThe failure of the trial judge to include not guilty by reason of self-defense as a possible verdict in his final mandate to the jury was not cured by the discussion of the law of self-defense in the body of the charge. By failing to so charge, the jury could have assumed that a verdict of not guilty by reason of self-defense was not a permissible verdict in the case.\nState v. Dooley, 285 N.C. 158, 165-66, 203 S.E. 2d 815, 820 (1974).\nConcluding that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to charge the jury on involuntary manslaughter, we order a\nNew trial.\n. A killing resulting from an act which is so reckless that it evidences a heart devoid of social duty is second degree murder, even though the killing be unintentional. State v. Wilkerson, 295 N.C. 559, 247 S.E. 2d 905 (1978); State v. Wrenn, 279 N.C. 676, 185 S.E. 2d 129 (1971).\n. This case also differs from State v. Ray, 299 N.C. 151, 261 S.E. 2d 789 (1980), where we held it reversible error to submit involuntary manslaughter as a permissible verdict. In Ray all the evidence demonstrated that defendant intentionally shot deceased after deceased had shot and wounded defendant\u2019s brother and had threatened to shoot defendant. There was no evidence of an unintentional shooting. The entire defense was self-defense.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "EXUM, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Rufus L. Edmisten, Attorney General, by Evelyn M. Coman, Assistant Attorney General, for the state.",
      "Adam Stein, Appellate Defender, by Lorinzo L. Joyner, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DAVID BUCK\nNo. 277A83\n(Filed 3 April 1984)\nHomicide \u00a7 30.3\u2014 second degree murder case \u2014 error in failure to submit involuntary manslaughter\nIn a prosecution for second degree murder in which the case was submitted to the jury on theories of second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter and not guilty by reason of both self-defense and accident, the trial court committed prejudicial error in failing to submit involuntary manslaughter as a possible verdict on the theory that the killing was the result of defendant\u2019s reckless but unintentional use of a butcher knife where defendant presented evidence tending to show that deceased, intoxicated and armed with a pocketknife, aggressively advanced first upon a third person and next upon defendant; defendant then picked up the butcher knife to defend himself against deceased\u2019s advances; and although defendant was wielding the butcher knife generally to defend against a felonious assault upon him, the actual infliction of the fatal wound was not intentional.\nAppeal by right from a judgment imposing a life sentence entered by Judge Bruce, presiding at the 28 February 1983 Session of CRAVEN Superior Court, upon defendant\u2019s conviction of second degree murder. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-27(a).\nRufus L. Edmisten, Attorney General, by Evelyn M. Coman, Assistant Attorney General, for the state.\nAdam Stein, Appellate Defender, by Lorinzo L. Joyner, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0602-01",
  "first_page_order": 638,
  "last_page_order": 643
}
