{ "id": 4681526, "name": "WILKES COUNTY, By and Through Its Child Support Enforcement Agency, ex rel., SHIRLEY WHITAKER NATIONS and BETTY WHITAKER, Plaintiffs v. JUNIOR GENTRY, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Wilkes County v. Gentry", "decision_date": "1984-08-28", "docket_number": "No. 478PA83", "first_page": "580", "last_page": "585", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "311 N.C. 580" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "305 S.E. 2d 207", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "63 N.C. App. 432", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525334 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/63/0432-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 49-14", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "21 S.E. 2d 822", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1942, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "222 N.C. 11", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8628087 ], "year": 1942, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/222/0011-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 S.E. 2d 145", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1944, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "224 N.C. 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8595046 ], "year": 1944, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/224/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 S.E. 2d 191", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 N.C. App. 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8552237 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/30/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 S.E. 2d 457", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "260 N.C. 674", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575938 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/260/0674-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 S.E. 2d 145", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 N.C. 727", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4679919 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/311/0727-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 S.E. 2d 207", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "212" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 488, "char_count": 11270, "ocr_confidence": 0.797, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.112724912833455e-08, "percentile": 0.42721293789715153 }, "sha256": "bee5cbfb258e7dfde28c3814715b90ea97e96fb79ddd82096f4092f057e11442", "simhash": "1:abf437e20ee76e6a", "word_count": 1888 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:17:48.934020+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "WILKES COUNTY, By and Through Its Child Support Enforcement Agency, ex rel., SHIRLEY WHITAKER NATIONS and BETTY WHITAKER, Plaintiffs v. JUNIOR GENTRY, Defendant" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MEYER, Justice.\nThe minor child was born out of wedlock on 27 September 1973. Shortly thereafter the child\u2019s mother initiated a criminal action against the defendant for nonsupport of an illegitimate child. The record contains a certified copy of defendant\u2019s plea of guilty to this charge on 27 June 1974. The court ordered that prayer for judgment be continued on the condition that defendant pay a lump sum settlement of $2,500.00 to the mother, in addition to the medical expenses incident to the child\u2019s birth.\nThe record further discloses that Wilkes County DSS is currently paying $127.00 a.month for the support of the minor child and had paid a total of $1,352.50 as of 26 February 1982.\nIn November 1981 Wilkes County DSS filed a complaint asking that the defendant be adjudicated the father of the minor child; that he be ordered to indemnify the State for all past public assistance paid on behalf of the minor child; and that he be ordered to provide such continuing support for the minor child as may be adequate and reasonable.\nDefendant\u2019s answer denied paternity and pled the statute of limitations as a bar. On 11 March 1982 the trial judge granted defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment.\nWilkes County DDS appealed to the Court of Appeals. That court reversed, holding that \u201csummary judgment was improperly entered for the defendant and should have been entered for the plaintiff.\u201d Id. at 438, 305 S.E. 2d at 212. The Court of Appeals remanded the case for a finding on the reasonable needs of the minor child and the ability of the defendant to pay.\nDefendant argued to the Court of Appeals, as he does to this Court, that plaintiff is precluded from recovering in this civil action because following his 1974 plea of guilty, the payment of the lump sum amount essentially satisfied his obligation to support the minor child. Plaintiff argued that the criminal action established paternity and should estop further litigation on that issue and that defendant\u2019s lump sum payment in 1974 did not preclude a subsequent civil action for past (1974 to present) and continuing future support. The Court of Appeals gave collateral estoppel effect to the \u201cimplicit determination\u201d of paternity in the criminal action and, based on this holding, concluded that defendant was liable to the plaintiff for past and future support rendered on behalf of the minor child.\nWhile we agree with the result reached by the Court of Appeals, we find it unnecessary to determine whether defendant\u2019s 1974 plea of guilty to the criminal charge of nonsupport must be given collateral estoppel effect. See State v. Lewis, 311 N.C. 727, 319 S.E. 2d 145 (1984) which addresses that issue. At the hearing on the motion for summary judgment the plaintiff submitted the Transcript of Plea Negotiations and Order for Judgment in the prior criminal case as evidence of defendant\u2019s paternity. Defendant made no attempt to refute or explain this evidence and it was therefore uncontroverted. The plea of guilty may therefore be considered as an evidentiary admission by the defendant on the issue of paternity. See 2 Brandis on N.C. Evidence \u00a7 177 (1982); Grant v. Shadrick, 260 N.C. 674, 133 S.E. 2d 457 (1963); Boone v. Fuller, 30 N.C. App. 107, 226 S.E. 2d 191 (1976). We believe that in this case the credible, uncontroverted evidence of defendant\u2019s plea of guilty to a criminal charge of nonsupport of the minor child is sufficient to establish paternity so as to bring defendant within the definition of \u201cresponsible parent\u201d under G.S. \u00a7 110-129. That definition includes \u201cthe father of an illegitimate child.\u201d Our holding is not dependent upon the determination of defendant\u2019s guilt in the 1974 criminal case.\nG.S. \u00a7 110-135 provides the authority under which plaintiff is entitled to recover for past public assistance rendered on behalf of the minor child. That section provides in pertinent part that:\nAcceptance of public assistance by or on behalf of a dependent child creates a debt, in the amount of public assistance paid, due and owing the State by the responsible parent or parents of the child. . . . This liability shall attach only to public assistance granted subsequent to June 30, 1975, and only with respect to the period of time during which public assistance is granted, and only if the responsible parent or parents were financially able to furnish support during this period.\nThe United States, the State of North Carolina, and any county within the State which has provided public assistance to or on behalf of a dependent child shall be entitled to share in any sum collected under this section, and their proportionate parts of such sum shall be determined in accordance with the matching formulas in use during the period for which assistance was paid.\nNo action to collect such debt shall be commenced after the expiration of five years subsequent to the receipt of the last grant of public assistance. The county attorney or an attorney retained by the county and/or State shall represent the State in all proceedings brought under this section.\nThe record discloses that defendant\u2019s minor child, as of 26 February 1982, had received $1,352.50 in past public assistance paid.\nG.S. \u00a7 110-137 provides that:\nBy accepting public assistance for or on behalf of a dependent child or children, the recipient shall be deemed to have made an assignment to the State or to the county from which such assistance was received of the right to any child support owed for the child or children up to the amount of public assistance paid. The State or county shall be subrogated to the right of the child or children or the person having custody to initiate a support action under this Article and to recover any payments ordered by the court of this or any other state.\nPlaintiff instituted this action well within the five year limitation period and defendant, as a responsible parent, is liable for the amount of public assistance paid.\nWe do not accept defendant\u2019s contention that the payment of the lump sum amount ordered as a result of the 1974 conviction for nonsupport of an illegitimate child relieves defendant\u2019s responsibility for future support. The 1974 action was brought pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 49-2 and the lump sum payment was ordered pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 49-7. G.S. \u00a7 49-7 provides, in pertinent part, that:\nCompliance by the defendant with any or all of the further provisions of this Article or the order or orders of the court requiring additional acts to be performed by the defendant shall not be construed to relieve the defendant of his or her responsibility to pay the sum fixed or any modification or increase thereof. (Emphasis added.)\nSee State v. Dill, 224 N.C. 57, 29 S.E. 2d 145 (1944); State v. Duncan, 222 N.C. 11, 21 S.E. 2d 822 (1942). G.S. \u00a7 49-7, read together with G.S. \u00a7 50-13.7, which provides for the modification of an order for child support, clearly contemplates a continuing obligation on the part of the parents of an illegitimate child to provide support, including when necessary the modification or increase of payments ordered to satisfy this obligation. We therefore hold that, having been conclusively determined a \u201cresponsible parent,\u201d as that term is defined in G.S. \u00a7 110-129, defendant must necessarily remain liable for the future support of his minor child. See G.S. \u00a7 50-13.4(b) and (c) (providing that the father and the mother shall be primarily liable for the support of a minor child and authorizing the court to order the parties to provide support).\nThe case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further remand to the trial court for findings on the reasonable needs of the minor child and the ability of the defendant to pay them.\nModified and affirmed.\n. In its brief to this Court, defendant argues that plaintiff is barred by the limitation period in G.S. \u00a7 49-14. When this suit was instituted, G.S. \u00a7 49-14(c) provided that: \u201c(a) The paternity of a child born out of wedlock may be established by civil action. Such establishment of paternity shall not have the effect of legitimation. . . (c) Such action shall be commenced within one of the following periods: (1) Three years next after the birth of the child; or (2) Three years next after the date of the last payment by the putative father for the support of the child, whether such last payment was made within three years of the birth of such child or thereafter. Provided, that no such action shall be commenced nor judgment entered after the death of the putative father.\u201d We note first that this statute has been amended to remove the 3-year limitation period. See N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 49-14(c) (Cum. Supp. 1983). Furthermore, we have treated plaintiffs action as one instituted pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 110-128, et seq., to recover past public assistance. It was not a civil action to establish paternity pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 49-14. Finally, defendant did not raise or argue this issue in the Court of Appeals and is therefore precluded from making the argument to this Court. N.C. Rules of App. Proc. 16(a).", "type": "majority", "author": "MEYER, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Franklin Smith, attorney for defendant-appellant.", "Paul W. Freeman, Jr., attorney for plaintiff-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "WILKES COUNTY, By and Through Its Child Support Enforcement Agency, ex rel., SHIRLEY WHITAKER NATIONS and BETTY WHITAKER, Plaintiffs v. JUNIOR GENTRY, Defendant\nNo. 478PA83\n(Filed 28 August 1984)\nBastards \u00a7 1\u2014 failure to support illegitimate child\u2014prior criminal action establishing paternity and ordering lump sum settlement\nDefendant\u2019s 1974 plea of guilty to a criminal charge of nonsupport of an illegitimate child, pursuant to G.S. 49-2, did not bar an action by the Wilkes County Department of Social Services for child support pursuant to G.S. 110-128, et seq. Credible, uncontroverted evidence of defendant\u2019s plea of guilty to a criminal charge of nonsupport of the minor child was sufficient to establish paternity so as to bring defendant within the definition of \u201cresponsible parent\u201d under G.S. 110-129. Plaintiff instituted this action well within the five-year limitation period and defendant, as a responsible parent, was liable for the amount of public assistance paid. Further, a payment of the lump sum amount ordered as a result of the 1974 conviction for nonsupport of an illegitimate child did not relieve defendant of responsibility for further support. G.S. 110-135, G.S. 110-137, G.S. 49-14, G.S. 49-2, G.S. 49-7, G.S. 50-13.7, and G.S. 50-13.4(b)(c).\nDEFENDANT appeals from a decision of the Court of Appeals, 63 N.C. App. 432, 305 S.E. 2d 207 (1983), one judge dissenting, which reversed summary judgment entered for defendant by Osborne, J, at the 22 February 1982 Session of District Court, Wilkes County.\nThe action was instituted by the Wilkes County Department of Social Services to recover past public assistance paid for the support of an illegitimate minor child, and to secure an order for continuing child support from the defendant.\nThe sole issue on appeal is whether the defendant\u2019s 1974 plea of guilty to a criminal charge of nonsupport of an illegitimate child, pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 49-2, bars this action by Wilkes County DSS for child support pursuant to G.S. \u00a7 110-128, et seq. We hold that it does not. For the reasons set forth below we modify and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.\nFranklin Smith, attorney for defendant-appellant.\nPaul W. Freeman, Jr., attorney for plaintiff-appellee." }, "file_name": "0580-01", "first_page_order": 624, "last_page_order": 629 }