{ "id": 4683093, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM RAY RIDDLE", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Riddle", "decision_date": "1984-08-28", "docket_number": "No. 84PA84", "first_page": "734", "last_page": "739", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "311 N.C. 734" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "310 S.E. 2d 396", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "66 N.C. App. 60", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522927 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/66/0060-01" ] }, { "cite": "277 S.E. 2d 390", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571552 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "310 S.E. 2d 587", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2393544 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 S.E. 2d 335", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 N.C. 646", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566320 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/271/0646-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 S.E. 2d 458", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 163", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566096 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0163-01" ] }, { "cite": "241 S.E. 2d 65", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "70" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572384 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0210-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 598, "char_count": 10958, "ocr_confidence": 0.798, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5334460934762437e-07, "percentile": 0.6715727442024613 }, "sha256": "6751f363ea2c00b3437626d0bccf26642c4ae6388505e8c5665e9d39beaed1b2", "simhash": "1:023a81e4762465fd", "word_count": 1855 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:17:48.934020+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM RAY RIDDLE" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MARTIN, Justice.\nThis case comes before us upon two issues. For their resolution, only a short summary of the evidence is required.\nOn 21 July 1982 at about 4:30 a.m., Howard Lee Hollifield discovered an intruder in his bedroom. When Hollifield turned on a light, the intruder ran. Although Hollifield followed the intruder, he was unable to capture him and did not see him again. Hollifield\u2019s wallet was missing after the intruder left. He described the intruder to the officers as six feet tall, weighing 130 to 140 pounds, skinny or slender build, thin-faced with dark brown hair, dressed in Levi\u2019s, possibly tennis shoes, without a shirt, and wearing a red headband. Later Hollifield identified defendant in a photographic lineup.\nAlthough defendant did not testify, he presented evidence of alibi. This evidence indicated that defendant was at a house next to the Hollifield residence until about 2:30 a.m., when he went home. A woman who lives in the home of defendant and his mother testified that she saw him asleep in a chair when she left for work about 4:00 a.m. She also saw defendant in the kitchen about 2:00 a.m. Other witnesses also corroborated defendant\u2019s alibi.\nThe State in rebuttal offered Maxine Teague, a neighbor, who said that at about 3:30 a.m. she and her husband saw a car leave defendant\u2019s home, go a short distance, and heard the motor cut off. About one-half hour later, the car restarted and returned to the Riddle residence.\nThe jury found defendant guilty of burglary in the second degree. Following the decision by a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, this Court allowed discretionary review on the additional question of the validity of the judgment entered against defendant.\nWe discuss first the issue raised by the dissent in the Court of Appeals. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing the solicitor to assert his personal beliefs to the jury as to the credibility of the witnesses. The solicitor\u2019s argument, in part, follows:\nNow, in a case like this, ladies and gentlemen, when you decide who you\u2019ll believe and that\u2019s a simple question before the jury. I think it is important you look at the character of the individuals that you\u2019re asked to believe and the life style and any criminal convictions, if that be the case. . . .\nMr. (sic) Teague took the stand and you will recall her testimony, she talked about how the car left here sometime the next around quarter of 4 and went down this road and stayed about 45 minutes and then she heard it return to the house. She said 45 minutes later. That would be right at 4:30. Mrs. Teague was an extremely important witness. The reason I didn\u2019t put Mrs. Teague on this morning is that I knew that if I put Mrs. Teague on, this line of six witnesses they put on would explain that away too.\nMr. GOLDSMITH: Objection to that. I would like His Honor out here.\n(Judge comes back on the bench.)\nMr. Goldsmith: Your Honor, I objected to Mr. Leonard\u2019s arguing on the grounds he was injecting his personal opinion as to the veracity of witnesses. I heard him, him say or understood him to say that the reason he didn\u2019t put on Mrs. Teague this morning was because if he did our witnesses would come in and change their stories to conform with what she said.\nCOURT: Sustained. You won\u2019t consider that portion of the Solicitor\u2019s argument at any point in your deliberations, members of the jury. I was on the phone trying to correct a problem in my own district, so I will be out here.\nMr. LEONARD: Members of the jury, you will recall that this morning I put on testimony relating to the headband and defendant\u2019s witnesses took the stand and they said, \u201cOh, yes, Barry Hensley had on a headband.\u201d In light of that, I waited to put the other witness on and I submit to you that if I had put Mrs. Teague on this morning, in all likelihood the evidence would be, \u201cOh, yes, Barry Hensley was driving that car that night.\u201d\nMr. Goldsmith: Objection.\nCOURT: Overruled.\nOr somebody would say, \u201cOh, yes, I took the car about quarter \u2019til 4 in the morning just exactly like that lady said I took the car and went down this road and on down here several miles to visit some friend of mine.\u201d I submit to you, members of the jury, that that would have been covered also.\nIf this man was righteous and didn\u2019t commit this crime, why did he disappear from McDowell County\u2014\nMr. Goldsmith: Objection.\nCOURT: Overruled.\nThere\u2019s not one bit of explanation for that. They\u2019ve put on six witnesses and not one of those witnesses went on the stand and said, \u201cOh, he was there all the time.\u201d\nDefendant argues that the foregoing statements constitute expressions by the solicitor of his personal beliefs as to the credibility of the witnesses. \u201c[T]he prosecutor may not determine matters of credibility and announce the result in open court\u2014that is the jury\u2019s prerogative. The district attorney\u2019s private opinion that defendant\u2019s witness Leonard was lying \u2018was a step out of bounds.\u2019 \u201d State v. Locklear, 294 N.C. 210, 218, 241 S.E. 2d 65, 70 (1978).\nWe disagree with defendant\u2019s characterization of the prosecutor\u2019s argument. The prosecutor was not referring to anything defendant\u2019s witnesses said, but was arguing what they might have testified if he had not saved his witness for rebuttal. This is not a case such as Locklear, supra, in which the prosecutor is arguing that the defendant\u2019s witnesses have lied or that he does not believe them. Nor did he argue that defendant\u2019s witnesses would change their stories after hearing the State\u2019s witness. When a prosecutor becomes abusive and injects his personal views and opinions into the argument before the jury, he violates the rules of fair debate, and it becomes the duty of the trial judge to intervene to stop improper argument. State v. Smith, 279 N.C. 163, 181 S.E. 2d 458 (1971). Such is not the case here. We do not perceive that the solicitor\u2019s argument unfairly prejudiced the jury against defendant. See State v. Miller, 271 N.C. 646, 157 S.E. 2d 335 (1967). We note that the judge was not in the courtroom when the first objection was made. He did not hear the argument or ask that it be read by the reporter but sustained the objection based upon the statement of defendant\u2019s counsel. Thereafter he remained in the courtroom and heard the remainder of the challenged argument. This explains why he overruled the second objection.\nDefendant also contends that the State\u2019s argument was improper in asserting that defendant disappeared from McDowell County after the crime. The evidence discloses that deputy sheriffs Fineburg, Cline, and Edwards spent a \u201ccouple of weeks\u201d looking for defendant after the crime was committed. They checked the neighborhood, going to all the houses and talking with the people. They did not see defendant during that period. Defendant turned himself in for probation violation on 6 August 1982 and was thereafter arrested for the burglary charge on 10 September 1982.\nThis evidence is sufficient to support the State\u2019s argument that defendant disappeared after the crime was committed.\nArgument of counsel must be left largely to the control and discretion of the trial judge, and counsel must be allowed wide latitude in their arguments which are warranted by the evidence and are not calculated to mislead or prejudice the jury. State v. Adcock, 310 N.C. 1, 310 S.E. 2d 587 (1984). We find no prejudicial error in the challenged argument.\nWe turn now to the question of the validity of the judgment entered. In the judgment and commitment form, the trial judge ordered that \u201cthe defendant be imprisoned [f]or a term of: 14 years as a regular committed youthful offender. The Court finds that he would not benefit as a committed youthful offender.\u201d The judgment also contains the following:\n(check all that apply)\n\u25a1 The defendant shall serve as a committed youthful offender (CYO) pursuant to G.S. Chapter 148 Article 3B.\nThe trial judge did not check this block.\nDefendant argues that the judgment is ambiguous and void. While it is true that ambiguity in a \u201cno benefit\u201d finding creates error in the judgment, State v. Bracey, 303 N.C. 112, 277 S.E. 2d 390 (1981), here the no benefit finding by the trial judge is not ambiguous. Although the trial judge used the phrase \u201cregular committed youthful offender\u201d instead of \u201cregular youthful offender,\u201d he immediately found that defendant would not benefit as a committed youthful offender. This is a clear and plain no benefit finding manifesting that defendant was not sentenced as a committed youthful offender. The judge further demonstrated his no benefit finding by not checking the block that would have ordered the sentence to be served as a committed youthful offender. It is clear that the trial judge did not sentence defendant as a committed youthful offender and that he fully complied with the terms and intent of N.C.G.S. 15A-1340.4(a) and 148-49.14. Defendant\u2019s assignment of error is overruled.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "MARTIN, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Rufus L. Edmisten, Attorney General, by Guy A. Hamlin, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "C. Frank Goldsmith, Jr. for defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM RAY RIDDLE\nNo. 84PA84\n(Filed 28 August 1984)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 102.7\u2014 prosecutor\u2019s jury argument\u2014no expression of personal beliefs\nThe prosecutor\u2019s argument as to what defendant\u2019s witnesses might have testified if he had not saved a State\u2019s witness for rebuttal did not constitute an improper expression of the prosecutor\u2019s personal beliefs as to the credibility of the witnesses where the prosecutor did not refer to anything defendant\u2019s witnesses said and did not argue that defendant\u2019s witnesses would change their stories after hearing the State\u2019s witness.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 46.1\u2014 argument concerning flight\u2014supporting evidence\nThe prosecutor\u2019s jury argument that defendant disappeared from McDowell County after a burglary was supported by evidence that three deputy sheriffs spent a couple of weeks looking for defendant after the crime was committed, and that they checked the neighborhood, going to all the houses and talking with the people, but they did not see defendant during that period.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 134.4\u2014 youthful offender \u2014sufficiency of no benefit finding\nAlthough the trial judge used the phrase \u201cregular committed youthful offender\u201d instead of \u201cregular youthful offender\u201d in the judgment and commitment form, it is clear that the trial judge did not sentence defendant as a committed youthful offender where he found that defendant would not benefit as a committed youthful offender and he failed to check the block which would have ordered the sentence to be served as a committed youthful offender.\nAPPEAL of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 66 N.C. App. 60, 310 S.E. 2d 396 (1984), which found no error in the judgment entered by Thornburg, J., at the 29 November 1982 session of Superior Court, McDowell County. Heard in the Supreme Court 12 June 1984.\nRufus L. Edmisten, Attorney General, by Guy A. Hamlin, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nC. Frank Goldsmith, Jr. for defendant." }, "file_name": "0734-01", "first_page_order": 778, "last_page_order": 783 }