{ "id": 4749024, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM LEE HANNAH", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Hannah", "decision_date": "1984-11-06", "docket_number": "No. 56A84", "first_page": "286", "last_page": "296", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "312 N.C. 286" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "180 S.E. 2d 745", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "753" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 N.C. 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560474 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "347" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/278/0334-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 S.E. 2d 448", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "457" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2397685 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0384-01" ] }, { "cite": "165 S.E. 2d 481", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 N.C. 77", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8557806 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/275/0077-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 S.E. 2d 185", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 N.C. 332", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558785 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/283/0332-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 S.E. 2d 404", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 N.C. 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560114 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/278/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "295 S.E. 2d 462", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 673", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573417 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0673-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 S.E. 2d 902", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "270 N.C. 726", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570501 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/270/0726-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 S.E. 2d 384", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572439 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 S.E. 2d 629", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "638" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "290 N.C. 313", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561442 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "324" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/290/0313-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 S.E. 2d 139", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4766892 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "245 S.E. 2d 706", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 N.C. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563440 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/295/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "287 S.E. 2d 832", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 213", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567260 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "301 S.E. 2d 91", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4710741 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "308 S.E. 2d 293", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 606", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4760471 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0606-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 882, "char_count": 24125, "ocr_confidence": 0.818, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.1164956376119946e-07, "percentile": 0.9102654247409792 }, "sha256": "1db1502bab82d00150b6881a3258a1c988aeea347641e6fc88f3d22c22f0b306", "simhash": "1:3f27f1e21effec5e", "word_count": 3917 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:10:57.145273+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM LEE HANNAH" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BRANCH, Chief Justice.\nBy his first assignment of error, defendant challenges the witness Donald Killian\u2019s in-court identification testimony. He contends that the circumstances under which the witness observed the person on Section House Road were conducive to misidentification. He further argues that a pretrial photographic identification procedure and a pretrial in-court confrontation were so impermissibly suggestive as to taint the witness\u2019s identification testimony at trial and to render inadmissible any evidence as to the photographic identification and the pretrial in-court confrontation.\nThis Court has consistently held that identification procedures which are so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of misidentification violate a defendant\u2019s right to due process. State v. Grimes, 309 N.C. 606, 308 S.E. 2d 293 (1983); State v. Harris, 308 N.C. 159, 301 S.E. 2d 91 (1983). This Court employs a two-step process in evaluating such claims of denial of due process. First we must determine whether an impermissibly suggestive procedure was used in obtaining the out-of-court identification. If this question is answered in the negative, we need proceed no further. State v. Leggett, 305 N.C. 213, 287 S.E. 2d 832 (1982). If it is answered affirmatively, the second inquiry is whether, under all the circumstances, the suggestive procedures employed gave rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Id.; State v. Headen, 295 N.C. 437, 245 S.E. 2d 706 (1978).\nWe first address defendant\u2019s contention that the pretrial identifications were impermissibly suggestive. The test is whether the totality of the circumstances reveals a pretrial procedure so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identity as to offend fundamental standards of decency and justice. State v. Grimes, 309 N.C. 606, 308 S.E. 2d 293 (1983); State v. Leggett, 305 N.C. 213, 287 S.E. 2d 832 (1982).\nThe defendant contends that the pretrial photographic identification procedure was conducted in an impermissibly suggestive way. Defendant points to Mr. Killian\u2019s testimony that he was able to eliminate more than half of the photographs in the photographic lineup because of hair color or a lack of facial hair.\nOn voir dire the trial court concluded, after finding facts, that the photographic identification procedure did not violate defendant\u2019s due process rights. The trial court\u2019s findings of fact when supported by competent evidence are binding on this Court on appeal. State v. Corbett, 309 N.C. 382, 307 S.E. 2d 139 (1983). Those findings with regard to the photographic identification procedure were as follows:\n[Thereafter he [Killian] went back on the 22nd of April, 1983 and that at that time the witness talked with Officer Setzer and that he was not aware at that time that anyone was in custody for the offense the defendant is charged for or with today; that Officer Setzer talked with the witness but in no way indicated to Mr. Killian the identity of any suspect which the Newton Police Department may have had in the matter; nine, that Officer Setzer asked the witness, Killian, to sit at his desk and placed before the witness a pictorial lineup consisting of eight photographs in color of eight white males all of whom had some facial hair and that Officer Setzer directed the witness not to pick up the photographs or touch them in any way; that the pictures were in a folder in which they were placed; that Officer Setzer requested the witness to observe the pictorial lineup, that the person suspected of taking the vehicle may be in the lineup or that the person may not be in the lineup; that Officer Setzer then left the presence of the witness, Killian and was gone for about ten to fifteen minutes and that approximately five minutes after the witness first observed the pictorial lineup, that he selected a photograph, number six, as being the photograph of the person that he observed on the unnamed street on . . . April 14, 1983.\nTen, that the picture in the pictorial lineup, number six, is a picture of the defendant in this case, William Lee Hannah.\nOur examination of the record evidence and the photographs used in the pretrial photographic procedure fails to disclose any substantial evidence of impermissible suggestiveness. To the contrary there is plenary evidence to support the trial judge\u2019s findings and conclusions that the photographic procedure did not violate defendant\u2019s due process rights.\nWe next consider defendant\u2019s contention that the identification made by the witness in the preliminary hearing was impermissibly suggestive because defendant was seated at the defense table and was wearing prison clothes.\nWe have held that the viewing of a defendant in a courtroom during varying stages of a criminal proceeding by witnesses who are offered to testify as to the identity of the defendant is not in and of itself such a confrontation as will taint an in-court identification unless other circumstances are shown which are so \u201cunnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification\u201d as would deprive defendant of his due process rights. State v. Covington, 290 N.C. 313, 324, 226 S.E. 2d 629, 638 (1976); State v. Bass, 280 N.C. 435, 186 S.E. 2d 384 (1972).\nThe trial court\u2019s findings of fact with regard to the in-court confrontation were that:\nthereafter the defendant appeared in the courtroom with trial proceedings now being held, at a probable cause hearing ... on May 2, 1983, as indicated by the Court records . . . that a probable cause hearing was conducted and the defendant was present at the defense table and that the presence of the defendant at the defense table was for the purpose of the parties participating in a preliminary hearing and at that time the witness, Killian, observed the defendant at the hearing; that he had already made an identification of the defendant in the case from the pictorial lineup exhibited to him on April 22, 1983.\nDefendant has shown no \u201cother circumstances\u201d which would convert the witness\u2019s view of defendant at the preliminary hearing into an unnecessarily suggestive confrontation. Further, there was ample evidence to support the trial judge\u2019s findings which in turn support his conclusion that the pretrial in-court identification was not unnecessarily suggestive or violative of defendant\u2019s due process rights. The trial court correctly ruled that the pretrial in-court confrontation was admissible.\nHaving determined that no impermissibly suggestive procedure was used in the courtroom confrontation, or in the photographic identification procedure, it follows that neither procedure could give rise to a \u201csubstantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.\u201d State v. Leggett, 305 N.C. 213, 287 S.E. 2d 832 (1982).\nEven so, defendant argues that there was a substantial likelihood of misidentification because of the circumstances under which the witness observed a person on Section House Road on 14 April 1983. We find this contention to be without merit.\nIn this connection the trial court found that although Mr. Killian\u2019s opportunity to observe the man on Section House Road was somewhat impaired by darkness and rain, he viewed the man in the light of his headlights and was able to determine that the man appeared to be drunk. Mr. Killian observed the man for a period of time for the purpose of determining whether he needed help. He was able to see the right side of the man\u2019s face, and watched him long enough to see him walk from the front of the vehicle to the rear, open the trunk, get something out of the trunk, and close it. The court found that at one point Mr. Killian described the man he saw as weighing approximately 160 to 180 pounds; the witness later estimated the man\u2019s weight to be 110 to 120 pounds. The trial court found that the witness indicated that the man he observed was small and young, a little over five feet tall, with facial hair and carrying a leather wallet with a chain. At the photographic identification session, the witness selected defendant\u2019s picture five minutes after being shown a photographic lineup of eight men. Mr. Killian viewed the lineup only eight days after observing the man beside the car on Section House Road.\nWe believe the facts as found by the trial court demonstrate that there was not a substantial likelihood of misidentification by the witness Killian. There was a reasonable possibility of observation sufficient to permit subsequent identification, although the period of observation was brief. Where such a possibility exists, the credibility of the witness and the weight to be given his identification testimony is for the jury to decide. State v. Corbett, 309 N.C. 382, 307 S.E. 2d 139 (1983); State v. Miller, 270 N.C. 726, 154 S.E. 2d 902 (1967).\nDefendant further contends that the district attorney\u2019s request for certain stipulations at the end of the voir dire on this issue had the effect of ensuring the unreliability of the witness\u2019s testimony. The district attorney, without advance warning and before the court and identification witness, tendered as a requested stipulation the fact that the defendant\u2019s fingerprints were found in Mrs. Lehman\u2019s car. The defense counsel rejected the offer. Defendant argues that the district attorney\u2019s actions had the effect of bolstering the confidence of the identification witness, Killian. We find no merit in this argument. We note again that the witness had already identified defendant in a non-suggestive identification procedure and in the voir dire. We find no reasonable likelihood that the district attorney\u2019s offer of stipulation tainted the witness\u2019s in-court testimony.\nSince we find the pretrial identification procedures free of the taint of impermissible suggestiveness, we hold that the trial court properly admitted the in-court identification of defendant by the witness Killian. We find no error in the trial court\u2019s allowing Killian to testify about the pretrial photographic identification procedure and no error in the admission of the photographs used in that procedure.\nThe defendant next assigns as error the admission of testimony involving a head hair found in the sheet knotted around the victim\u2019s neck. SBI Agent Scott Worsham testified that a hair found within the folds of the bedsheet was \u201cmicroscopically consistent\u201d with a head hair taken from defendant. Worsham also testified that the hair found in the sheet was microscopically inconsistent with the victim\u2019s head hair. Defendant argues that the prejudicial effect of that testimony outweighed its probative value. He contends that since no evidence was presented concerning how frequently hair microscopically consistent with the defendant\u2019s would be found in the Caucasian population, the jury was free to speculate that that percentage was small. Defendant also argues that continued references to the knotted bedsheet were inflammatory and suggested sexual activity not supported by the evidence.\nWe reject defendant\u2019s arguments. This Court has consistently approved similar expert testimony regarding the comparison of hair samples. See State v. Pratt, 306 N.C. 673, 295 S.E. 2d 462 (1982); State v. Barber, 278 N.C. 268, 179 S.E. 2d 404 (1971). It is axiomatic that evidence is relevant if it has any logical tendency, however slight, to prove a fact in issue in the case. 1 Brandis on North Carolina Evidence \u00a7 77 (1982). Agent Worsham\u2019s testimony tended to place defendant in the victim\u2019s presence at the time of the murder and the evidence is therefore relevant. The condition of the body when found is made no more inflammatory by the fact that a head hair consistent with the defendant\u2019s was found on the body. We overrule this assignment of error.\nBy his next assignment of error, defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a pubic hair sample taken from him. During voir dire Agent Worsham testified about comparisons he had made between a pubic hair found on the victim\u2019s chest and known pubic hair samples taken from defendant. The trial court refused to allow the jury to hear evidence concerning the comparison of the hairs. Worsham was allowed to testify before the jury, however, without objection from defendant, 4bout receiving a known pubic hair sample from defendant. The 'trial court later admitted the known sample into evidence over defendant\u2019s objection. Defendant contends the evidence had little probative value and was unduly prejudicial because allusions to sexual activities were again raised despite the absence of evidence of sexual activities.\nAlthough it is not clear from the record why the trial court allowed defendant\u2019s known pubic hair sample into evidence while disallowing the comparison evidence, we do not believe defendant has shown that he was prejudiced by its admission. We have often stated that where there is abundant evidence to support the main contentions of the State, the admission of evidence, though technically incompetent, will not be held prejudicial where the defendant does not make it appear that he was prejudiced or that the admission of the evidence could have affected the result. See, e.g., State v. Braswell, 283 N.C. 332, 196 S.E. 2d 185 (1973); State v. Williams, 275 N.C. 77, 165 S.E. 2d 481 (1969). Given the other compelling evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt, we are not persuaded that the admission of this evidence affected the verdict.\nThe defendant finally assigns as error the admission into evidence of photographs showing the victim\u2019s nude body with a sheet tied around her neck. Defendant contends that continuing references to and pictures of the victim\u2019s body aroused inflammatory images of sexual activity in the minds of the jury even though no evidence of such activity was presented.\nThe State introduced three photographs showing the victim\u2019s body. The photographs were used to illustrate both the testimony of law enforcement officers who testified about their observations of the crime scene and the testimony of the medical examiner. It is well settled that:\nProperly authenticated photographs of the body of a homicide victim may be introduced into evidence under instructions limiting their use to the purpose of illustrating the witness\u2019 testimony. Photographs are usually competent to be used by a witness to explain or illustrate anything that it is competent for him to describe in words. The fact that the photograph may be gory, gruesome, revolting or horrible does not prevent its use by a witness to illustrate his testimony.\nState v. Watson, 310 N.C. 384, 397, 312 S.E. 2d 448, 457 (1984); State v. Cutshall, 278 N.C. 334, 347, 180 S.E. 2d 745, 753 (1971).\nIn this case, the trial court properly limited the use of the photographs to the purpose of illustrating the witness\u2019s testimony. The photographs were neither excessive in number nor unduly inflammatory. This assignment of error is overruled.\nHaving reviewed defendant\u2019s trial and convictions, we find no error.\nNo error.", "type": "majority", "author": "BRANCH, Chief Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Rufus L. Edmisten, Attorney General, by Joan H. Byers, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "Keith Bridges for the defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM LEE HANNAH\nNo. 56A84\n(Filed 6 November 1984)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 66.9\u2014 pretrial photographic identification \u2014 not impermissibly suggestive \u2014 no violation of due process\nThe trial court properly concluded that a pretrial photographic identification procedure did not violate defendant\u2019s due process rights where there was plenary evidence to support the court\u2019s findings that the witness did not know of any suspect or that anyone was in custody when he made the identification, that the witness sat at a desk and observed eight photographs of eight white males with facial hair, that the witness was told that the suspect might or might not be in the lineup, that the officer left the presence of the witness, and that the witness selected a picture of defendant about five minutes after first observing the pictorial lineup.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 66.12\u2014 identification at probable cause hearing \u2014 defendant seated at defense table \u2014 not unduly suggestive\nAlthough a witness observed defendant at the defense table during a probable cause hearing, the trial court correctly ruled that the identification at the hearing was not unduly suggestive or violative of defendant\u2019s due process rights because the witness had already identified defendant from a pictorial lineup.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 66.1\u2014 opportunity for observation by witness \u2014sufficient\nThere was not a substantial likelihood of misidentification by the witness where the court found that: the witness\u2019s opportunity to observe defendant was somewhat impaired by darkness and rain, but he viewed defendant in the light of his headlights and was able to observe that defendant appeared drunk; the witness observed defendant for a period of time for the purpose of determining whether he needed help; the witness was able to see the right side of defendant\u2019s face and watched him long enough to see him walk from the front of his vehicle to the rear, open the trunk, get something out of the trunk, and close it; the witness described defendant\u2019s size and age; the witness observed facial hair and a leather wallet with a chain; and the witness selected defendant\u2019s picture five minutes after being shown a photographic lineup of eight men eight days after observing defendant.\n4. Criminal Law \u00a7 66.1\u2014 opportunity for observation by witness \u2014 credibility and weight of testimony determined by jury\nWhere there is a reasonable possibility of observation sufficient to permit subsequent identification, although the period of observation is brief, the credibility of the witness and the weight to be given his identification testimony is for the jury to decide.\n5. Criminal Law \u00a7 66.17\u2014 request for stipulation in presence of witness \u2014 defendant\u2019s fingerprints at scene \u2014 no prejudice\nThere was no prejudice when the district attorney tendered, in the presence of the identification witness, a stipulation that defendant\u2019s fingerprints had been found in the victim\u2019s car because the witness had already identified defendant in a non-suggestive identification procedure and in a voir dire.\n6. Criminal Law \u00a7 68\u2014 hair sample comparison \u2014 relevant\nTestimony that a hair found in the sheet knotted around the victim\u2019s neck was consistent with a hair taken from defendant and inconsistent with the victim\u2019s hair was relevant because it tended to place defendant in the victim\u2019s presence at the time of the murder. The condition of the body when found was made no more inflammatory by the fact that a head hair consistent with defendant\u2019s was found on the body.\n7. Criminal Law \u00a7 169\u2014 technically incompetent evidence \u2014 no effect on result\u2014 no prejudice\nThere was no prejudice from the admission of testimony about a pubic hair sample taken from defendant, although a comparison with a pubic hair found on the victim was excluded, because there was other compelling evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt. Where there is abundant evidence to support the main contentions of the State, the admission of technically incompetent evidence will not be held prejudicial where the defendant does not show prejudice or that the admission of the evidence could have affected the result.\n8. Criminal Law \u00a7 43.4\u2014 admission of photographs of crime scene \u2014 no error\nThere was no error from the admission of photographs showing the victim\u2019s nude body with a sheet tied around her neck where the use of photographs was limited to illustrating testimony and the photographs were neither excessive in number nor unduly inflammatory.\nAppeal by Defendant from Judge Gaines at the 6 September 1983 Criminal Session of Superior Court, CATAWBA County.\nDefendant was charged in indictments, proper in form, with first-degree burglary, felonious breaking and entering of a motor vehicle, felonious larceny of an automobile and first-degree murder. He entered a plea of not guilty to each charge.\nEvidence for the State tended to show that on 15 April 1983 at approximately 5:30 p.m., Robert and Sherry Smith, family friends of the deceased, discovered the nude body of Iris Cleo Lehman on her bedroom floor. A twisted bedsheet was knotted around Mrs. Lehman\u2019s neck. The Smiths notified the authorities who came to the scene. Local police and SBI agents discovered that all of the windows in the victim\u2019s house were closed except for the window leading into a front bedroom. They found freshly disturbed dirt and mud outside that window and also found mud on a bedspread inside the house. Officers lifted fingerprints inside the house on the windowsill and on the telephone which were later identified as being defendant\u2019s fingerprints. There was no evidence of sexual activity.\nDavid Leatherman, a neighbor of the deceased, last saw her alive at approximately 6:30 p.m. on 14 April 1983. At that time, Mrs. Lehman\u2019s car was in her carport. Sometime after 11:00 p.m. on the same night Mr. Leatherman heard a noise and upon looking toward the Lehman house, he observed that the lights were off. About 30 to 45 minutes later, he heard a noise that sounded like tires squealing. The following morning, at around 6:00 a.m., Mr. Leatherman noticed that the Lehman car was not in the carport.\nAround 11:20 p.m. on the night of 14 April 1983, Donald Killian, who lived near Hickory on Section House Road, heard a vehicle hit a railroad tie in front of his house and heard a sound similar to that of a tire blowing out. Mr. Killian got in his car and drove down Section House Road to see if anyone was hurt. He observed a car and a man he later identified as the defendant changing a tire. The car was a yellowish Ford LTD with a vinyl top. The man who appeared to Mr. Killian to be drunk had long dark hair and facial hair. He was wearing a baseball cap, blue jeans and a jacket and was carrying a wallet with a chain attached. Mr. Killian thereafter selected defendant\u2019s picture from a photographic lineup as the man he saw on the night of 14 April 1983.\nA yellowish Ford LTD registered in the name of Iris Cleo Lehman was found stuck in the yard of Colleen Blackburn on the morning of 15 April 1983. Mrs. Blackburn, who also lived on Section House Road, had heard a crash and the sound of wheels spinning at about 12:30 to 1:00 a.m. on the morning of 15 April. The defendant\u2019s fingerprints were found on the steering wheel of the Ford automobile which was later identified as Mrs. Lehman\u2019s car. Officers obtained a white and red baseball cap and a wallet with a chain during a search of defendant\u2019s home on 19 April 1983. Defendant made a statement to the officers that he had not been in Mrs. Lehman\u2019s bedroom and that he had not been in her automobile.\nAt the close of the State\u2019s evidence the trial judge ruled that the charge of breaking and entering an automobile was merged with the charge of felonious larceny of an automobile.\nDefendant offered nine witnesses, mostly family members, who gave evidence in the nature of an alibi. The witnesses testified that defendant was either asleep or on trips to nearby convenience stores from the afternoon of 14 April 1983 to the late morning of 15 April 1983. Two convenience store managers also testified that they had seen defendant, along with others, in their stores playing video games between 10:00 and 11:00 p.m. on 14 April 1983.\nThe jury returned verdicts of guilty of murder in the first degree, guilty of first-degree burglary and guilty of felonious larceny of an automobile. The trial judge entered judgment imposing sentences of life imprisonment upon the verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree, fourteen years imprisonment upon the verdict of guilty of first-degree burglary and three years imprisonment upon the verdict of guilty of larceny of an automobile, the sentences for burglary and larceny of an automobile to run consecutively.\nThe defendant appealed to this Court as a matter of right from his sentence of life imprisonment and we allowed his Motion to Bypass the Court of Appeals on the burglary and larceny convictions on 4 April 1984.\nRufus L. Edmisten, Attorney General, by Joan H. Byers, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nKeith Bridges for the defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0286-01", "first_page_order": 316, "last_page_order": 326 }