{
  "id": 4718744,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WALTER SHELTON GOODSON",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Goodson",
  "decision_date": "1985-04-02",
  "docket_number": "No. 303A84",
  "first_page": "318",
  "last_page": "320",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "313 N.C. 318"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "400 N.E. 2d 132",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "case_ids": [
        11338569
      ],
      "year": 1980,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ne2d/400/0132-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "272 Ind. 547",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ind.",
      "case_ids": [
        1825390
      ],
      "year": 1980,
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ind/272/0547-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "320 N.W. 2d 226",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.W.2d",
      "year": 1981,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "228",
          "parenthetical": "per curiam"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "115 Mich. App. 228",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Mich. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        2207385
      ],
      "year": 1981,
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "234",
          "parenthetical": "per curiam"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/mich-app/115/0228-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 286,
    "char_count": 3902,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.783,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 1.0393424527923187e-07,
      "percentile": 0.5503237833557092
    },
    "sha256": "fc04292fa5017c2271d00470509e7580c651042ac9417783392632a3ad7d880f",
    "simhash": "1:c3fc5c306171558f",
    "word_count": 675
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:24:31.098159+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WALTER SHELTON GOODSON"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "VAUGHN, Justice.\nDefendant\u2019s first assignment of error attacks the sufficiency of the evidence. He does not argue that he did not do precisely what the State\u2019s witness testified he did. He argues instead that the testimony does not describe a sexual offense. In particular, he appears to argue that the evidence relied on to show that a sexual act took place was ambiguous and insufficient to take the case to the jury. The argument is without merit.\nAmong other ways, a person is guilty of a first degree sexual offense when he (1) engages in a sexual act with another by force and against the will of that person and (2) employs or displays a dangerous weapon in the process. G.S. 14-27.4(a)(2).\nThe evidence tends to show that defendant forcibly and with the threatened use of a knife made his victim disrobe and, in her words, perform \u201coral sex on him\u201d against her will. This testimony alone was sufficient to take the case to the jury. The term \u201csexual act\u201d as defined in G.S. 14-27.1(4) includes fellatio. The term \u201coral sex\u201d is recognized as describing a sexual act involving \u201ccontact between the mouth of one party and the sex organs of another.\u201d People v. Dimitris, 115 Mich. App. 228, 234, 320 N.W. 2d 226, 228 (1981) (per curiam). When a female is said to perform oral sex on a male the term is reasonably taken to mean fellatio. See, e.g. Johnson v. State, 272 Ind. 547, 400 N.E. 2d 132 (1980).\nQuite aside from the reasonable meaning of the term, the sexual act described by the witness in this case is perfectly clear. The evidence shows that defendant and his victim were in the front seat of a car. Defendant put his hand around the back of her head and pulled her over to him where he forced her to perform oral sex on him. He subsequently ejaculated in her mouth.\nIn his other assignment of error defendant challenges, on relevancy grounds only, the admission of identification cards which were found in defendant\u2019s possession. All but one of the cards bore a name other than defendant\u2019s correct name. He was seen tearing all the cards (except the one that bore his real name) and throwing them in a trash basket at the police station. Several of the cards bore the first name \u201cDavid,\u201d the name defendant had used when he approached his victim. Evidence is relevant if it has any logical tendency to prove a fact in issue. 1 Brandis on North Carolina Evidence \u00a7 77 (2d rev. ed. 1982). The evidence was relevant because, among other things, it tended to show that although defendant\u2019s name is Walter Shelton Goodson, he possessed identification showing him to be someone named \u201cDavid,\u201d the same name used by the perpetrator of the crime.\nNeither of the arguments disclose prejudicial error.\nNo error.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "VAUGHN, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General Thornburg, by David E. Broome, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for the State.",
      "Calvin B. Hamrick, for defendant appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WALTER SHELTON GOODSON\nNo. 303A84\n(Filed 2 April 1985)\n1. Rape and Allied Offenses \u00a7 1\u2014 evidence of sexual act unambiguous \u2014 sufficient\nThe State\u2019s evidence was sufficient to describe a sexual offense and to take the case to the jury where defendant forcibly and with the threatened use of a knife made his victim disrobe and perform oral sex on him. G.S. 14-27.4(a)(2); G.S. 14-21.1(4).\n2. Rape and Allied Offenses \u00a7 4\u2014 identification card with false name \u2014 relevant\nEvidence that defendant was seen tearing and throwing into a trash basket identification cards bearing the name \u201cDavid\u201d was relevant since defendant had used that name when he approached his victim.\nAppeal by defendant pursuant to G.S. 7A-27(a) from Griffin, J., at the 9 January 1984 Criminal Session of LINCOLN County Superior Court.\nDefendant was indicted and tried on charges of first degree rape and first degree sexual offense. He was convicted of first degree sexual offense and judgment was entered imposing the appropriate prison sentence.\nAttorney General Thornburg, by David E. Broome, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nCalvin B. Hamrick, for defendant appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0318-01",
  "first_page_order": 348,
  "last_page_order": 350
}