{ "id": 4693853, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. SUPORA WELDON", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Weldon", "decision_date": "1985-09-05", "docket_number": "No. 12PA84", "first_page": "401", "last_page": "412", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "314 N.C. 401" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "309 S.E. 2d 263", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "65 N.C. App. 376", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524090 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/65/0376-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 S.E. 2d 918", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "36 N.C. App. 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8553597 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/36/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 S.E. 2d 433", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 N.C. 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560097 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/278/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 S.E. 2d 354", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "272 N.C. 512", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573817 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/272/0512-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 S.E. 2d 405", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 85", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565770 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 S.E. 2d 356", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 N.C. 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574824 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/281/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 S.E. 2d 283", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 N.C. 220", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564078 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/282/0220-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 S.E. 2d 661", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "263 N.C. 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569961 ], "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/263/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "165 S.E. 2d 481", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 N.C. 77", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8557806 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/275/0077-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 S.E. 84", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1921, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "182 N.C. 855", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8659333 ], "year": 1921, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/182/0855-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 S.E. 2d 926", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1932, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "203 N.C. 11", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8597576 ], "year": 1932, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/203/0011-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 S.E. 2d 43", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "46" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "265 N.C. 319", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575138 ], "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/265/0319-01" ] }, { "cite": "17 Conn., 467", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Conn.", "case_ids": [ 6752990 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/conn/17/0467-01" ] }, { "cite": "11 S.E. 518", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 3, "year": 1890, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "520" }, { "page": "520" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 N.C. 676", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8651972 ], "year": 1890, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/106/0676-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 S.E. 2d 501", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 N.C. App. 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 2644255 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/51/0344-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 S.E. 851", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 2, "year": 1922, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "184 N.C. 768", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11272345 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1922, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/184/0768-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 S.E. 2d 760", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 N.C. App. 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527074 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/55/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 S.E. 2d 788", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "791" }, { "page": "791" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 533", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571526 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "536" }, { "page": "537" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0533-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 S.E. 2d 779", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "782-83" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 451", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4763838 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "456" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0451-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 S.E. 2d 364", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "366-68" }, { "page": "367", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "240 N.C. 171", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8596105 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174-76" }, { "page": "175" }, { "page": "175" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/240/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 S.E. 2d 274", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "284 N.C. 618", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563968, 8563938, 8563951, 8564018, 8563993 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/284/0618-03", "/nc/284/0618-01", "/nc/284/0618-02", "/nc/284/0618-05", "/nc/284/0618-04" ] }, { "cite": "201 S.E. 2d 61", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "20 N.C. App. 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8550648 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "192" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/20/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 S.E. 2d 706", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "714" }, { "page": "714" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573594 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "12" }, { "page": "12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/281/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 S.E. 2d 919", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "922" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 N.C. App. 274", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549989 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/32/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 S.E. 2d 263", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "265" }, { "page": "265" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 N.C. App. 376", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524090 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378" }, { "page": "379" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/65/0376-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 S.E. 2d 918", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "919" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "36 N.C. App. 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8553597 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "375" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/36/0373-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 972, "char_count": 26700, "ocr_confidence": 0.802, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.599563599955244e-07, "percentile": 0.9479205158293013 }, "sha256": "5f25a30922fdc27ff2147107495fce01bce9bc06b95038bd6e57acf5b7e1ab5b", "simhash": "1:0556d03f675f845e", "word_count": 4448 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:20:08.801916+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Justice BILLINGS did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. SUPORA WELDON" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "EXUM, Justice.\nThis case presents two dispositive issues: (1) Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence that on two occasions other than that for which defendant was convicted, police found heroin in or near defendant\u2019s house; and (2) whether the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of police officers that defendant\u2019s house had a reputation as a place where illegal drugs were bought and sold? We answer the first question no and the second yes. However, finding this latter error to be harmless, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.\nI.\nDefendant was arrested and charged with trafficking in heroin on 8 February 1982 after police, armed with a search warrant, discovered thirty (30) bindles (6.1 grams) of heroin hidden beneath a pile of clothing in defendant\u2019s living room. Police obtained the search warrant after an informant advised them that he observed a sale of heroin at defendant\u2019s house earlier in the day. In addition to the heroin, police found $449 in cash on defendant\u2019s person.\nDefendant shared the house, which was leased solely to her, with a boyfriend, four adult children, a teenaged daughter and a nephew. Friends of defendant\u2019s adult children habitually congregated to drink alcoholic beverages beside a large oil drum which stood in front of defendant\u2019s house and in which a fire was maintained in cold weather.\nAt trial, police officers were allowed to testify over objection that defendant\u2019s house had a reputation as a place where illegal drugs could be bought or sold. Police also testified that on two other occasions, a search of defendant\u2019s house led to the discovery of heroin. On 9 December 1981, police discovered a number of bags of heroin beneath a sofa on which defendant was seated with two other people. On a table in front of defendant police on this occasion also found two bags of marijuana, a needle and syringe, and $648. On 30 May 1982, police discovered heroin under a garbage container five feet from the rear door of defendant\u2019s house and found approximately $200 on defendant\u2019s person.\nDefendant testified in her defense. She denied knowing to whom the heroin belonged or how it got into her house. She also testified that on 8 February she had $449 in cash because she had recently received her government fuel assistance check for almost $200, a Social Security check for her grandson for $239; and her daughter had given her $25 to pay off a parking ticket.\nII.\nIn her first assignment of error, defendant contends the trial court erred in allowing police officers to testify about their discoveries at defendant\u2019s premises on two occasions other than the one for which defendant was on trial. Defendant contends this testimony amounted to evidence that defendant committed other distinct crimes and was therefore inadmissible.\nTo convict defendant of trafficking in heroin, a violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(h)(4)a, the state was required to prove that defendant knowingly possessed the 6.1 grams of heroin found in her house on 8 February 1982. \u201cFelonious possession of a controlled substance has two essential elements. The substance must be possessed, and the substance must be knowingly possessed.\u201d State v. Rogers, 32 N.C. App. 274, 278, 231 S.E. 2d 919, 922 (1977). \u201cAn accused\u2019s possession of narcotics may be actual or constructive. He has possession of the contraband material . . . when he has both the power and intent to control its disposition or use.\u201d State v. Harvey, 281 N.C. 1, 12, 187 S.E. 2d 706, 714 (1972). \u201cThe requirements of power and intent necessarily imply that a defendant must be aware of the presence of an illegal drug if he is to be convicted of possessing it.\u201d State v. Davis, 20 N.C. App. 191, 192, 201 S.E. 2d 61, 62 (1973), disc. rev. denied, 284 N.C. 618, 202 S.E. 2d 274 (1974). \u201cWhen such materials are found on the premises under the control of the accused, this fact, in and of itself, gives rise to an inference of knowledge and possession which may be sufficient to carry the case to the jury on a charge of unlawful possession.\u201d State v. Harvey, 281 N.C. at 12, 187 S.E. 2d at 714.\nDefendant here did not deny that the heroin was found on her premises on all three occasions. She does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence. Her entire defense was directed toward persuading the jury that she had no knowledge of the presence of the heroin and, in the words of her brief, \u201cwould not knowingly allow anyone to use drugs in her house.\u201d\nThe Court of Appeals, in upholding the trial court\u2019s admission of the contested evidence, said: \u201cThe evidence complained of was expressly offered by the state to show defendant\u2019s \u2018guilty knowledge\u2019 of the presence and character of the drugs found during the February 1982 search.\u201d 65 N.C. App. at 378, 309 S.E. 2d at 265. The Court of Appeals concluded that evidence of other discoveries of heroin at defendant\u2019s house was relevant to the issue of defendant\u2019s guilty knowledge.\nThe well-established rule in North Carolina is that evidence of other crimes is generally inadmissible on the issue of guilt if its only relevance is to show defendant\u2019s bad character or disposition to commit an offense similar to the one charged. State v. McClain, 240 N.C. 171, 81 S.E. 2d 364 (1954). McClain also teaches, however, as defendant acknowledges, that the general rule prohibiting admission of \u201cother crimes\u201d evidence does have exceptions. See State v. McClain, 240 N.C. at 174-76, 81 S.E. 2d at 366-68. Two of those exceptions, held applicable to the present case by the Court of Appeals, were discussed by this Court in State v. Willis, 309 N.C. 451, 456, 306 S.E. 2d 779, 782-83 (1983):\nThe rule in McClain establishes that evidence of other crimes is inadmissible if its only relevance is to show the character of the accused. The exceptions to this rule of inadmissibility, also set out in McClain, are as well established as the rule itself. Two of these exceptions read as follows:\n2. Where a specific mental intent or state is an essential element of the crime charged, evidence may be offered of such acts or declarations of the accused as tend to establish the requisite mental intent or state, even though the evidence discloses the commission of another offense by the accused. . . .\n3. Where guilty knowledge is an essential element of the crime charged evidence may be offered of such acts or declarations of the accused as tend to establish the requisite guilty knowledge, even though the evidence reveals the commission of another offense by the accused. . . . 240 N.C. at 175.\nDefendant contends that notwithstanding these exceptions, admission of the disputed evidence in this case was error because there is no direct evidence linking defendant to commission of the other crimes offered by the state to show guilty knowledge. Where \u201cother crimes\u201d evidence does not sufficiently connect defendant to the other crimes, it is not admissible for any purpose, defendant argues.\nDefendant relies heavily upon State v. Breedin, 306 N.C. 533, 293 S.E. 2d 788 (1982). In Breedin, defendant was being tried for the armed robbery of Horne\u2019s Grocery and Package Store on Person Street in Fayetteville. The evidence tended to show that defendant and an accomplice entered the store, wearing ski-type masks and, at gunpoint, took money from the cash register and personal items from two employees and two customers. Three of the victims identified defendant as one of the perpetrators. As further evidence of defendant\u2019s identity, the state sought to offer evidence which it contended tended to show that defendant and his accomplice had within fourteen hours of the grocery store robbery also robbed a Wiener King located approximately 100 yards from the grocery store. The state contended that the two robberies were so similar that the jury could infer both offenses were committed by the same persons; therefore evidence that defendant had committed the Wiener King robbery tended to prove that he also committed the grocery store robbery. Further the state argued that the evidence tended to show that both robberies were the product of a common scheme or plan; therefore evidence that defendant committed one tended to show that he also committed the other.\nThe witness to the Wiener King robbery, Thomas Odom, was not able positively to identify defendant as one of the two robbers of that establishment. He testified to certain circumstances which tended to indicate that defendant might have been one of the robbers but as this Court noted there was \u201cno direct evidence that defendant was one of the two men who robbed the Wiener King.\u201d 306 N.C. at 536, 293 S.E. 2d at 791. This Court concluded, therefore, that evidence of the \u201cother crime\u201d was not admissible on the issue of identification. The Court said, \u201cHad the defendant been identified as one of the participants in the Wiener King robbery, the evidence of that crime would have been admissible here on the issue of identification . . . but the failure to identify defendant as a participant in the Wiener King robbery . . . makes the evidence inadmissible. . . .\u201d 306 N.C. at 537, 293 S.E. 2d at 791.\nDefendant argues the evidence offered by the state in this case to show her guilty knowledge suffers from the same fatal flaw as that offered in Breedin to show identity. She says there is no direct evidence that she knowingly possessed the contraband on the other occasions and the evidence relating to these other occasions is at best circumstantial on the issue of her guilt of these other possessions, like it was in Breedin.\nDefendant fails to appreciate the difference between the theories upon which admissibility of the evidence rested in Breedin and the theory upon which it rests in the instant case. In Breedin one theory of admissibility was that defendant allegedly had committed two crimes under circumstances so similar that evidence of defendant\u2019s commission of one tended to show that he also committed the other. The other theory was that the evidence tended to show that both crimes arose out of a common plan or scheme; therefore evidence that defendant committed the other crime tended to prove that he committed the crime charged. In Breedin, therefore, admissibility under both theories rested on proving that defendant did, in fact, commit the other crimes.\nIn the instant case admissibility of evidence of the discovery of other controlled substances on other occasions on defendant\u2019s premises rests on an entirely different theory. At issue here is not defendant\u2019s identity. At issue is her guilty knowledge. Guilty knowledge, being a state of mind, is almost never provable by direct evidence. Its existence almost always must be proved, if at all, by circumstantial evidence. Thus \u201c[w]here guilty knowledge is an essential element of the crime charged, evidence may be offered of such acts or declarations of the accused as tend to establish the requisite guilty knowledge, even though the evidence reveals the commission of another offense by the accused.\u201d State v. McClain, 240 N.C. at 175, 81 S.E. 2d at 367 (emphasis added). Any fact or facts tending to prove defendant\u2019s guilty knowledge may be offered against defendant when guilty knowledge is, as here, an issue in the case. Such facts may or may not show that defendant is guilty of another crime. Obviously such a showing is not prerequisite to admissibility. The only prerequisite to admissibility is that the evidence be probative on the question of defendant\u2019s guilty knowledge.\nThe challenged evidence is probative of defendant\u2019s guilty knowledge in connection with the crime for which she was being tried. The evidence was that on two separate occasions, one occurring before defendant\u2019s arrest on the present charge and one after, police discovered heroin in or near defendant\u2019s house. On one occasion the heroin was in close proximity to defendant, as were marijuana and drug paraphernalia. On both occasions defendant had relatively large amounts of cash on her person as she did on the occasion for which she was being tried. The likelihood of defendant\u2019s knowledge of the drugs at her premises increases as the instances of discovery of drugs there accumulate. Her excuse for having a large sum of money on the occasion for which she was tried also loses weight before the trier of fact in the face of evidence that on two other occasions both drugs on defendant\u2019s premises and large amounts of cash on her person coexisted. As instances of the coexistence of drugs at her premises and cash on her person accumulate, the more likely it becomes that defendant knowingly possessed the drugs. The challenged evidence tends strongly to negate defendant\u2019s claim that she was unaware of the presence at her premises of that heroin which is the basis for the trafficking charge. The evidence is strongly probative on the major contested issue in the case, defendant\u2019s guilty knowledge.\nWe take this opportunity, however, to correct a misstatement of the law occurring in the Court of Appeals\u2019 opinion. In its discussion of the exception to the prohibition of \u201cother crimes\u201d evidence stated in State v. McClain, 240 N.C. 171, 81 S.E. 2d 364, the Court of Appeals said: \u201cOn drug cases, however, \u2018evidence of other drug violations is relevant and admissible if it tends to show plan or scheme, disposition to deal in illicit drugs, knowledge of the presence and character of the drug, or presence at and possession of the premises where the drugs are found.\u2019 State v. Richardson, 36 N.C. App. 373, 375, 243 S.E. 2d 918, 919 (1973).\u201d (Emphasis added.) In State v. Willis, 309 N.C. 451, 306 S.E. 2d 779 (1983), this Court expressly disapproved that portion of the Richardson language quoted above allowing admission of evidence of other drug offenses to show \u201cdisposition to deal in illicit drugs.\u201d We note, as we did in Willis, that the Court of Appeals itself disapproved this language and declared it dictum in State v. Bean, 55 N.C. App. 247, 284 S.E. 2d 760 (1981). We now reiterate our disapproval of this language.\nThe validity of the Court of Appeals\u2019 decision is not affected by inclusion of this language since the court correctly identified a permissible purpose for which the disputed evidence in this case was admitted, ie., to show defendant\u2019s guilty knowledge.\nIII.\nDefendant next contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence that defendant\u2019s house had a reputation as a place where heroin and other illegal drugs could be bought or sold. We agree. The applicable general rule is that in a criminal prosecution evidence of the reputation of a place or neighborhood is ordinarily inadmissible hearsay. State v. Springs, 184 N.C. 768, 114 S.E. 851 (1922). The Court of Appeals held, however, that \u201cevidence concerning the reputation of a place or neighborhood is admissible where it goes to show the intent of the person charged,\u201d 65 N.C. App. at 379, 309 S.E. 2d at 265, citing State v. Lee, 51 N.C. App. 344, 276 S.E. 2d 501 (1981).\nIn Lee, defendant was charged with felonious possession of a controlled substance. The evidence tended to show that defendant presented a forged prescription to a pharmacist for Talwin, a controlled substance. Defendant testified at trial that a woman he knew as Katie Cummings gave him the prescription and asked him to get it filled. The Katie Cummings who lived at the address shown on the prescription did not know defendant and had never given him a prescription in her name. Defendant denied knowing the prescription was forged or that Talwin was a controlled substance. The state was allowed to introduce evidence that the area where defendant claimed he received the prescription from Katie Cummings was known as a \u201cdrug-use\u201d area. On appeal, the Court of Appeals noted the general rule prohibiting the admission of such evidence. It held, however, that the evidence was admissible to refute defendant\u2019s claim of ignorance regarding the forged prescription and the nature of the drug he sought to acquire. The Court of Appeals supported this result by citing, without discussion, State v. Chisenhall, 106 N.C. 676, 11 S.E. 518 (1890).\nAn examination of Chisenhall leads us to conclude that the Court of Appeals\u2019 reliance upon it in Lee, and therefore its reliance upon Lee in the present case, was misplaced. In Chisenhall, defendant was charged with abduction of defendant\u2019s 13-year-old sister in violation of what is now codified as N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-41. The statute makes it a crime for anyone to \u201cinduce a child under the age of fourteen years ... to leave\u201d a person with whom or school where the child \u201cresides.\u201d Although the statute does not require \u201cthat the abduction ... be with a particular intent . . .,\u201d id. at 682, 11 S.E. at 520, the state\u2019s theory was that Chisenhall\u2019s motive in abducting her sister was to take her to a house of prostitution. The state offered in evidence Chisenhall\u2019s out-of-court declaration that: one Mag Bush had requested Chisenhall to bring her sister to Mag Bush\u2019s house; Chisenhall did so in response to the request; and Chisenhall \u201cknew the character of Mag\u2019s house and it was a \u2018whore-house.\u2019 \u201d The state also offered evidence from another witness that Mag Bush\u2019s house had a reputation as a house of prostitution.\nThe Court in Chisenhall first concluded that there was no error in offering defendant\u2019s out-of-court declaration against her. In finding no error in the admission of the testimony as to the reputation of Mag Bush\u2019s house, the Court said:\nIt is also objected that the court erred in allowing a witness to testify as to the general reputation of Mag Bush\u2019s house. Such evidence is held to be admissible in Connecticut, even against a defendant charged with the keeping of a house of ill-fame. Cadwell v. State, 17 Conn., 467. Such is not, however, the law in this State, but we think it competent when the character of the house is only collaterally involved, and is attended with evidence of scienter, on the part of the defendant, and is only used for the purpose of showing the intent with which an act is done, as, in this case, to show that the defendant\u2019s object was to prostitute the child. Moreover, the defendant could not have been prejudiced by the evidence, as it was shown by her own declaration that Mag Bush was a common prostitute and kept a house of prostitution. Besides, it was unnecessary for the State to have shown the intent of the defendant. There is nothing in our statute which requires that the abduction should be with a particular intent. It is only necessary to allege and prove that the child was abducted, or by any means induced \u201cto leave\u201d its custodian. We think the exception is without merit.\nId. at 681-82, 11 S.E. at 520.\nChisenhall does not hold that the reputation of a place is admissible to show the intent or guilty knowledge of one charged with illicit possession of contraband in that place. Chisenhall expressly recognized that the law in North Carolina did not permit evidence of a place\u2019s reputation to be admitted against a defendant charged with maintaining the place as a house of prostitution. Chisenhall held only that in light of competent evidence that defendant said she knew the place where she took her sister to be a brothel, it was permissible on the question of defendant\u2019s motive, which was not an element of the crime, to show the place did have such a reputation. The great bulk of the quoted passage from Chisenhall demonstrates why the reputation evidence was not prejudicial to defendant in that case. In any event, insofar as Chisenhall holds that such reputation evidence is competent, the holding should be limited to the particular theory which the Court enunciated in light of the peculiar facts of the case.\nThe general rule in this state may be found in State v. Tessnear, 265 N.C. 319, 144 S.E. 2d 43 (1965), a case indistinguishable in principle from the instant case. In Tessnear, defendant was charged with possession of non-taxpaid liquor after officers discovered numerous containers of liquor in defendant\u2019s home. The defense was that the liquor belonged to someone else who, unbeknownst to defendant, had placed it in defendant\u2019s home moments before the officers seized it. Police had observed the house, noting large amounts of traffic to and from the residence, and had arrested several intoxicated persons as they left defendant\u2019s house. At trial, several of the state\u2019s witnesses testified that defendant\u2019s house had the reputation of having whiskey for sale. This Court held the admission of that evidence error and granted defendant a new trial. It said, \u201cNorth Carolina is included among those jurisdictions which hold \u2018that evidence of the general reputation of defendant\u2019s premises is inadmissible in prosecutions for liquor law violations involving a charge of unlawful sale or possession of intoxicants at particular premises.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 322, 144 S.E. 2d at 46. The same rule is articulated in a number of our cases involving violations of the state\u2019s liquor laws. See, State v. Turpin, 203 N.C. 11, 164 S.E. 2d 926 (1932); State v. Springs, 184 N.C. 768, 114 S.E. 851 (1922); State v. McNeill, 182 N.C. 855, 109 S.E. 84 (1921).\nWe perceive no factual distinctions between violations of the state\u2019s liquor laws and our drug laws which would justify application of a different rule. We therefore hold that the trial court erred in admitting at defendant\u2019s trial for trafficking in heroin evidence that defendant\u2019s house had a reputation as a place where illegal drugs could be bought and sold.\nWe conclude, however, that the error is not such as to warrant a new trial. Trial errors not amounting to constitutional violations do not warrant awarding a new trial unless \u201cthere is a reasonable possibility that, had the error in question not been committed, a different result would have been reached at the trial. . . .\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1443. Erroneous admission of evidence may be harmless where there is an abundance of other competent evidence to support the state\u2019s primary contentions, State v. Williams, 275 N.C. 77, 165 S.E. 2d 481 (1969); State v. Rowland, 263 N.C. 353, 139 S.E. 2d 661 (1965), or where there is overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt. State v. Knight, 282 N.C. 220, 192 S.E. 2d 283 (1972); State v. Cox, 281 N.C. 275, 188 S.E. 2d 356 (1972). Moreover, the admission of testimony over objection may be harmless where defendant elicits similar testimony on cross-examination. State v. Fletcher, 279 N.C. 85, 181 S.E. 2d 405 (1971); State v. Brown, 272 N.C. 512, 158 S.E. 2d 354 (1968).\nIn the instant case, the state offered abundant evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt. The house in which 30 bindles of heroin were discovered was leased solely to defendant. Defendant testified that she had control of the house. Police informants observed a heroin sale take place at defendant\u2019s home on the day of her arrest. Defendant admitted that her house was a place where many friends of her adult children congregated and that heroin had been discovered by police at the house on two other occasions. On one of these occasions the heroin was beneath a sofa where defendant sat and in front of which on a table were marijuana, drug paraphernalia and a large amount of cash. Although defendant testified that she had no regular employment, she had large sums of money either on her person or in close proximity to her both on the night of her arrest and the two other occasions on which police discovered heroin at her home. We do not believe it can be said that, absent the admission of the disputed reputation evidence, a different result would have likely ensued. State v. Jones, 278 N.C. 259, 179 S.E. 2d 433 (1971).\nMoreover, on cross-examination of one of the state\u2019s witnesses who had testified about the reputation of defendant\u2019s house, defendant asked, \u201cYou only know \u2014 you do not know the reputation of the house when she (defendant) is there, do you?\u201d The witness\u2019s response was, \u201cThe information that I received would indicate that her reputation, as well as the reputation of the house, is related to the sale and use of illegal drugs.\u201d The effect of this question was that defense counsel put before the jury the very reputation evidence which he contends was prejudicially admitted when offered by the state. Introduction of this evidence by the state was, therefore, made harmless by the defendant\u2019s solicitation of the same evidence on cross-examination.\nThe decision of the Court of Appeals is\nAffirmed.\nJustice BILLINGS did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "EXUM, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Rufus L. Edmisten, Attorney General, by George W. Lennon, Assistant Attorney General, for the state.", "Adam Stein, Appellate Defender, by Lorinzo L. Joyner and Gordon Widenhouse, Assistant Appellate Defenders, for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. SUPORA WELDON\nNo. 12PA84\n(Filed 5 September 1985)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 34.7; Narcotics \u00a7 3.1\u2014 heroin found in defendant\u2019s house on other occasions \u2014 admissibility to show guilty knowledge\nIn a prosecution for trafficking in heroin, evidence that police found heroin in or near defendant\u2019s house on two occasions other than the one for which defendant was on trial was properly admitted for the purpose of showing defendant\u2019s guilty knowledge even though it revealed defendant\u2019s commission of other offenses.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 34.1; Narcotics \u00a7 3.1\u2014 other drug offenses \u2014 disposition to deal in drugs \u2014 disapproval of language in Court of Appeals cases\nLanguage in State v. Richardson, 36 N.C. App. 373, 243 S.E. 2d 918, quoted by the Court of Appeals in this case, to the effect that evidence of other drug offenses is admissible to show \u201cdisposition to deal in illicit drugs\u201d is disapproved.\n3. Narcotics \u00a7 3.1\u2014 reputation of house for narcotics \u2014 inadmissible hearsay\u2014 harmless error\nIn a prosecution for trafficking in heroin, testimony by police officers that defendant\u2019s house had a reputation as a place where illegal drugs were bought and sold was inadmissible hearsay, but the admission of such testimony was harmless error where the State offered abundant evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt and a different result would not have likely ensued absent such testimony, and where defendant solicited the same evidence on cross-examination. G.S. 15A-1443.\nJustice Billings did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.\nOn discretionary review, pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31, of a decision of the Court of Appeals, 65 N.C. App. 376, 309 S.E. 2d 263 (1983), finding no error in defendant\u2019s conviction of trafficking in heroin and sentence of fourteen (14) years\u2019 imprisonment, entered at the 3 August 1982 Criminal Session of WAKE County Superior Court, Judge Braswell presiding.\nRufus L. Edmisten, Attorney General, by George W. Lennon, Assistant Attorney General, for the state.\nAdam Stein, Appellate Defender, by Lorinzo L. Joyner and Gordon Widenhouse, Assistant Appellate Defenders, for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0401-01", "first_page_order": 445, "last_page_order": 456 }