{ "id": 4691739, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LAWRENCE CURTIS HINES", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Hines", "decision_date": "1985-10-01", "docket_number": "No. 73A84", "first_page": "522", "last_page": "527", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "314 N.C. 522" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "261 S.E. 2d 803", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 126", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574128 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0126-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 S.E. 2d 689", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "701", "parenthetical": "emphasis in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 584", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565300 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "603", "parenthetical": "emphasis in original" }, { "page": "600, 602" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0584-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 S.E. 2d 260", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 N.C. App. 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519699 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/61/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 S.E. 2d 265", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 N.C. App. 21", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520056 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/62/0021-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 S.E. 2d 755", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 N.C. App. 512", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525630 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/63/0512-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 S.E. 2d 588", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "64 N.C. App. 554", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527229 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/64/0554-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 S.E. 2d 783", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "786", "parenthetical": "emphasis in the original" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4761533 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0410-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 546, "char_count": 11188, "ocr_confidence": 0.834, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.0060470885235084e-07, "percentile": 0.9059964499860803 }, "sha256": "a4a04397c94adeebac5bdc6de0c23cf0694aad710093561b4470dbfe8ac0e423", "simhash": "1:e2084f2a60d16c54", "word_count": 1860 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:20:08.801916+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Justice BILLINGS did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LAWRENCE CURTIS HINES" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "EXUM, Justice.\nThis case arises under the Fair Sentencing Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1340.4 (1983). That section establishes for certain felonies presumptive prison terms which must be imposed unless the sentencing judge determines after consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors, that a term longer or shorter than the presumptive term should be imposed. The trial judge found as aggravating factors in this case that defendant\u2019s crime was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, G.S. 15A-1340.4(f), that the victim was very old, G.S. 15A-1340.4(j), and another factor not contested. He then imposed life imprisonment, a sentence in excess of the presumptive term for second degree murder. Defendant appeals from the imposition of life imprisonment. The issue is whether there is sufficient evidence to prove (1) that the crime was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel and (2) that the victim was very old. We find the evidence sufficient to prove only the first of these two aggravating factors and therefore remand the case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing.\nI.\nSometime during the night on 3 April 1983 Paul Stewart was strangled. He was found the following morning lying on a couch with a six-foot long extension cord wrapped around his neck.\nPaul Stewart was average in height, 5 feet 10 inches, weighed 125 pounds and was sixty-two years old when his life was cut short. He had been a brickmason until he retired in 1978 after he was struck with a lead pipe and a bone was removed from one of his wrists. Since then he had been conducting a lively business selling liquor by the drink from his home. His son testified that occasionally \u201c[h]e might go out fishing or something like that.\u201d There was no evidence he suffered from poor health and his autopsy did not reveal any debilitating condition.\nAfter Stewart\u2019s body was found, defendant Curtis Hines visited the home of Harold and Geraldine Watson. Harold Watson had a conversation with Hines about the murder. He asked Hines if he killed Stewart. After first denying responsibility, Hines confessed he did it. Watson testified that Hines told him he \u201casked Paul Stewart, he wanted a drink, a drink of liquor for fifty cent.\u201d When Stewart refused to sell him a drink, Hines slapped Stewart. Hines then \u201cwent in\u201d and \u201che choked, he choked him first.\u201d He left the room with Stewart lying on the couch gasping for breath. After \u201che thought about it,\u201d \u201c[h]e went back\u201d Hines told Watson. \u201cThat is when he took and choked him five times like this with a cord.\u201d\nII.\nDefendant contends there is insufficient evidence to support two aggravating factors relied upon by the trial judge to impose a sentence in excess of the presumptive term. Defendant argues the evidence does not prove the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel or that the victim was very old.\nA.\nIn State v. Blackwelder, 309 N.C. 410, 306 S.E. 2d 783 (1983), we set forth a standard for determining whether a murder is especially heinous, atrocious or cruel:\n[T]he focus should be on whether the facts of the case disclose excessive brutality or physical pain, psychological suffering, or dehumanizing aspects not normally present in that offense.\nId. at 414, 306 S.E. 2d at 786 (emphasis in the original). Whether death resulted from multiple acts of violence and was immediate are factors properly considered under that standard.\nWe think the facts of this case demonstrate the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel under the Blackwelder standard. Defendant murdered Stewart by choking him once and then strangling him five times with a cord. Defendant confessed to Watson that he first slapped and choked Stewart with his hands and then left him on the couch gasping for breath. Later he returned with an extension cord and finished the deed. Defendant strangled Stewart five times with the cord before finally choking off his air supply. Choking a victim on two different occasions and five times on the second occasion is excessive brutality not necessary even to the offense of murder by strangulation.\nAlthough we do not decide whether strangulation is in itself more heinous, atrocious or cruel than other murders, the grisly facts of this case disclose excess brutality, pain and suffering not normally present in murders of this type. The trial judge, therefore, did not err in characterizing this defendant\u2019s crime as especially heinous, atrocious or cruel.\nB.\nDefendant also contends the evidence does not prove as an aggravating factor that the victim was \u201cvery old.\u201d He argues that the sole evidence upon which the prosecutor asked for and the trial judge found the victim\u2019s age to be an aggravating factor was a statement by the prosecutor that Paul Stewart was sixty-two years old. Defendant asserts the trial judge should not have applied mechanically a chronological measure in deciding if age was an aggravating factor. Rather, the judge should have determined if the victim by reason of his years was more vulnerable to the assault committed against him than he otherwise would have been.\nOne of the purposes of sentencing is to impose a punishment commensurate with the offender\u2019s culpability. N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 15A-1340.4(a) (1983). Age should not be considered as an aggravating factor in sentencing unless it makes the defendant more blameworthy than he or she already is as a result of committing a violent crime against another person. A victim\u2019s age does not make a defendant more blameworthy unless the victim\u2019s age causes the victim to be more vulnerable than he or she otherwise would be to the crime committed against him or her, as where age impedes a victim from fleeing, fending off attack, recovering from its effects, or otherwise avoiding being victimized. Unless age has such an effect, it is not an aggravating factor under the Fair Sentencing Act. See State v. Rivers, 64 N.C. App. 554, 307 S.E. 2d 588 (1983); State v. Monk, 63 N.C. App. 512, 305 S.E. 2d 755 (1983); State v. Mitchell, 62 N.C. App. 21, 302 S.E. 2d 265 (1983); State v. Gaynor, 61 N.C. App. 128, 300 S.E. 2d 260 (1983).\nAs this Court observed in State v. Ahearn, 307 N.C. 584, 603, 300 S.E. 2d 689, 701 (1983) (emphasis in original), \"vulnerability is clearly the concern addressed by this factor [of the victim\u2019s age].\u201d Aheam was a felonious child abuse case in which we sustained a finding as an aggravating factor that a 24-month-old victim was very young. Without the need for any special showing by the prosecution that the victim was vulnerable, the victim\u2019s vulnerability was established simply by the victim\u2019s especially tender age and the nature of the crime. A 24-month-old child obviously was more vulnerable to child abuse than an older child would have been. In cases like Aheam involving victims near the beginning or end of the age spectrum, the prosecution may establish vulnerability merely by relating the victim\u2019s age and the crime committed.\nIn this case the prosecution asked the sentencing judge to find as an aggravating factor, based on Paul Stewart\u2019s sixty-two-year-old age, that the victim was very old. Stewart\u2019s age, by itself, does not demonstrate that he was more vulnerable to the assault at issue in this case than a younger person would have been. Many sixty-two-year-old men lead robust, active lives. Paul Stewart was a brickmason until the five years preceding his death. In those years he maintained a lively business selling drinks. He occasionally went fishing. There was no evidence he was in poor health or disabled. Although Stewart\u2019s son testified his father retired from his job when a bone was removed from his wrist following an injury caused by a lead pipe, that disability was not age-related. In short, we do not believe the mere fact that Paul Stewart was sixty-two years old would support finding in this case as an aggravating factor that he was \u201cvery old.\u201d\nBecause the sentencing judge improperly relied upon age as an aggravating factor, this case must be remanded to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing. Any error with respect to finding an aggravating factor necessarily is prejudicial because the weight given to each aggravating and mitigating factor is within the discretion of the sentencing judge. Reliance on an aggravating factor determined to be erroneous may have affected the balancing of mitigating and aggravating factors which resulted in a sentence in excess of the presumptive term. Ahearn, 307 N.C. at 600, 602, 300 S.E. 2d at 699, 701.\nIII.\nDefendant also assigns as error the trial court\u2019s exclusion of jurors who had scruples against capital punishment from the jury panel. Defendant contends such exclusion deprived him of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and his Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury as guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Although acknowledging that this Court considered and rejected this argument in State v. Avery, 299 N.C. 126, 261 S.E. 2d 803 (1980), defendant asks us to reconsider our decision there. The Court declines to reconsider that decision at this time.\nThe case is remanded to the Superior Court, Wake County, for a new sentencing hearing conducted consistent with this opinion.\nRemanded for a new sentencing hearing.\nJustice BILLINGS did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "EXUM, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Rufus L. Edmisten, Attorney General, by Thomas J. Ziko, Assistant Attorney General, for the state.", "Ann B. Petersen for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LAWRENCE CURTIS HINES\nNo. 73A84\n(Filed 1 October 1985)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 138.21\u2014 aggravating factor \u2014 especially heinous, atrocious or cruel \u2014 no error\nThe trial court did not err by finding that a second degree murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel where defendant confessed that he first slapped, then choked the victim with his hands, left him on the couch gasping for breath, and later returned with an extension cord and choked him five times with the cord before finally choking off his air supply.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 138.24\u2014 aggravating factor \u2014 victim very old \u2014 error\nThe trial court erred by finding as an aggravating factor that a sixty-two-year-old victim of a second degree murder was very old where the victim had been a brickmason until he retired five years before his death, his retirement was due to a disability that was not age related, and he maintained a lively business selling drinks after his retirement and occasionally went fishing. A victim\u2019s age does not make a defendant more blameworthy unless the victim\u2019s age causes the victim to be more vulnerable than he or she otherwise would be to the crime committed. G.S. 15A-1340.4(a) (1983).\n3. Constitutional Law \u00a7 63; Jury \u00a7 7.11\u2014 exclusion of jurors opposed to death penalty \u2014 no error\nThe trial court did not err by excluding jurors who had scruples against capital punishment.\nJustice Billings did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.\nBEFORE Farmer, J., at 14 November 1983 Criminal Session of Superior Court, WAKE County, defendant was convicted of second degree murder. Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7A-27 (1981), he appeals from a judgment sentencing him to life imprisonment.\nRufus L. Edmisten, Attorney General, by Thomas J. Ziko, Assistant Attorney General, for the state.\nAnn B. Petersen for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0522-01", "first_page_order": 566, "last_page_order": 571 }