{ "id": 4687691, "name": "JULIUS R. CAUBLE v. CITY OF ASHEVILLE", "name_abbreviation": "Cauble v. City of Asheville", "decision_date": "1985-11-05", "docket_number": "No. 150PA84", "first_page": "598", "last_page": "608", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "314 N.C. 598" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "311 S.E. 2d 889", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "66 N.C. App. 537", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525597 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/66/0537-01" ] }, { "cite": "12 S.E. 2d 260", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1940, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "218 N.C. 653", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8623293 ], "year": 1940, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/218/0653-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 S.E. 2d 263", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "250 N.C. 565", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625048 ], "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/250/0565-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 U.S. 268", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11314095 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/393/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 S.E. 2d 147", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 N.C. 468", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565007 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/271/0468-01" ] }, { "cite": "50 S.E. 279", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 3, "year": 1905, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "282" }, { "page": "282" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 N.C. 503", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8656947 ], "year": 1905, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/137/0503-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 S.E. 2d 763", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "765" }, { "page": "765" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 N.C. 491", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8630643 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "493-94" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/231/0491-01" ] }, { "cite": "137 N.C., 508", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "585" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 N.C., 689", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8661637 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/126/0689-01" ] }, { "cite": "51 S.E. 956", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 3, "year": 1905, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "956", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "956", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 N.C. 583", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8653214 ], "year": 1905, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/139/0583-01" ] }, { "cite": "271 S.E. 2d 261", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 S.E. 2d 630", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 S.E. 2d 258", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Cauble II" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 340", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566211 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Cauble II" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0340-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 S.E. 2d 8", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "45 N.C. App. 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8547914 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/45/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 S.E. 2d 889", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Cauble III" }, { "page": "893" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 N.C. App. 537", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525597 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Cauble III" }, { "page": "543" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/66/0537-01" ] }, { "cite": "8 N.W. 2d 908", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1943, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "909" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "305 Mich. 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich.", "case_ids": [ 1818481 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1943, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/mich/305/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-4", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "36 S.E. 158", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 2, "year": 1900, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "159" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "126 N.C., 689", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8661637 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "692" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/126/0689-01" ] }, { "cite": "271 S.E. 2d 258", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 340", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566211 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "343-45" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0340-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 925, "char_count": 22402, "ocr_confidence": 0.809, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1056205133791628e-07, "percentile": 0.5694916962340275 }, "sha256": "bf0e3a85944bf5459c6450c252d702fc7983b906792d51ae09ddefef8971e422", "simhash": "1:2a616402a43fe064", "word_count": 3718 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:20:08.801916+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Justice MARTIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case." ], "parties": [ "JULIUS R. CAUBLE v. CITY OF ASHEVILLE" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BRANCH, Chief Justice.\nThis action was brought in the name of plaintiff, for himself, and for the citizens, residents and taxpayers of the City of Ashe-ville to compel the City of Asheville to pay into the County School Fund of Buncombe County all fines and forfeitures paid for overtime parking to be used exclusively for maintaining free public schools in Buncombe County.\nAt a pretrial conference held before Judge Robert D. Lewis, Resident Superior Court Judge of the Twenty-Eighth District, it was stipulated, inter alia,\nthat this civil action would be tried in two steps. First, a hearing would be held to determine whether or not Article IX, Section 7 of the Constitution of North Carolina applies to the civil penalties for overtime parking. If the Court should rule in favor of the Plaintiff in that respect, a second hearing would be held at which a determination of the \u2018clear proceeds\u2019 of the civil penalties could be made.\nDefendant in apt time moved for summary judgment and the motion was heard by Judge R. Michael Bruce at the 23 October 1978 Civil Session of Buncombe County Superior Court. After considering the documents introduced, stipulations of the parties and argument of counsel, Judge Bruce, after noting that there remained an unresolved issue, found facts, entered conclusions of law, and ordered that\nthe Board of Education of the County of Buncombe have and recover of the Defendant City of Asheville an amount equal to the clear proceeds of all penalties, forfeitures, or fines collected for the violation of parking ordinances under color of the provisions of Ordinance 914 and Ordinance 384 of the City of Asheville at such time as said amounts have been determined pursuant to the provisions of this Order.\nIt was further ordered that until final determination of this litigation all proceeds collected under the City\u2019s Ordinance 914 be retained in a separate fund.\nDefendants appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Cauble v. City of Asheville, 45 N.C. App. 152, 263 S.E. 2d 8 (1980). This Court allowed defendant\u2019s petition for discretionary review and affirmed the principal issue. We reversed that part of the Court of Appeals\u2019 decision which affirmed the portion of Judge Bruce\u2019s order directing that the \u201cclear proceeds\u201d be paid directly to the Board of Education of Buncombe County rather than to the Buncombe County Finance Officer for distribution according to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115-100.35 (repealed 1981). The cause was remanded for entry of judgment consistent with the Court\u2019s opinion. Cauble v. City of Asheville, 301 N.C. 340, 271 S.E. 2d 258 (1980) (Cauble II).\nUpon remand this matter came on to be heard before Judge Robert D. Lewis, Resident Judge of the Twenty-Eighth Judicial District, who, sitting without a jury, reviewed the record proper, received additional evidence, heard argument of counsel and after finding additional facts, in pertinent part, concluded as a matter of law that:\n1. The term \u201cclear proceeds\u201d means the amount collected by the City for overtime parking and delinquent overtime parking violations undiminished by direct and indirect costs or expenses of collection.\nDefendant appealed, assigning as error the trial judge\u2019s definition of the term \u201cclear proceeds.\u201d In a unanimous opinion by Chief Judge Vaughn (later Associate Justice), reported at 66 N.C. App. 537, 311 S.E. 2d 889 (1984) (Cauble III), the Court of Appeals defined \u201cclear proceeds\u201d and formulated a test for determining the \u201cclear proceeds\u201d of monies received from all parking violations. The Court of Appeals thereupon reversed the trial court\u2019s definition of \u201cclear proceeds\u201d and the trial court\u2019s holding that the proceeds from all parking violations collected between 22 April 1975 and 30 June 1982 was res judicata upon the Board of Education. The cause was remanded for an accounting consistent with the Court of Appeals\u2019 definition of \u201cclear proceeds.\u201d\nPlaintiff Julius R. Cauble petitioned this Court for discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31(c) and we allowed his petition on 28 August 1984. After hearing oral arguments this Court ordered that the parties submit new briefs addressing the following question: \u201cDoes the money penalty collected by the City of Asheville from a motorist who violates its ordinance prohibiting overtime parking constitute a penalty or fine collected for the breach of a State penal law, if the motorist has not been convicted for violating N.C.G.S. 14-4?\u201d Cauble v. City of Asheville, --- N.C. ---,326 S.E. 2d 630 (1985).\nWe had heretofore answered this question in Cauble II. There we stated that:\nThe Asheville Code makes it unlawful to park overtime. G.S. 14-4 specifically makes criminal the violation of a city ordinance, unless \u2018the council shall provide otherwise\u2019 pursuant to G.S. 160A-175(b). Thus, where, as here, the ordinances do not provide otherwise, a person who violates the overtime parking ordinance also breaches the penal law of the State. . . . Consequently, fines collected for overtime parking constitute fines collected for a breach of the penal laws of the State. We, therefore, hold that the clear proceeds of all penalties, forfeitures and fines collected for breaches of the ordinances in question remain in Buncombe County and be used exclusively for the maintenance of free public schools.\nId. at 345, 271 S.E. 2d 261 (citations omitted).\nWe reaffirm that holding and therefore answer the question posed in the affirmative.\nHaving determined that the \u201cclear proceeds\u201d of all funds received from traffic violations must be paid to the Buncombe County Finance Officer for distribution pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115C-437 (replacing former N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115-100.35), we now turn to the original principal question presented by this appeal, that is, the meaning and determination of \u201cclear proceeds.\u201d\nArticle IX, Section 7 of the North Carolina Constitution provides as follows:\nAll moneys, stocks, bonds, and other property belonging to a county school fund, and the clear proceeds of all penalties and forfeitures and of all fines collected in the several counties for any breach of the penal laws of the State, shall belong to and remain in the several counties, and shall be faithfully appropriated and used exclusively for maintaining free public schools.\nIn State v. Maultsby, 139 N.C. 583, 51 S.E. 956 (1905), the Court considered a statute which provided that an informant should receive one half of the fine imposed as a result of a conviction based on information furnished by him. Holding the statute to be unconstitutional, the Court, in part, stated:\n[I]t is otherwise as to \u2018fines.\u2019 From their very nature, being punishment for violation of the criminal law, they are imposed in favor of the State and belonging to the State, the General Assembly cannot appropriate the clear proceeds of fines to any other purpose than the school fund. By \u2018clear proceeds\u2019 is meant the total sum less only the sheriff\u2019s fees for collection, when the fine and costs are collected in full. This also has been fully discussed and settled. Board of Education v. Henderson, 126 N.C., 689; School Directors of Asheville, 137 N.C., 508.\nId. at 585, 51 S.E. at 956 (emphasis added).\nOur Court considered the disposition of funds upon forfeiture of an appearance bond in a criminal case in Hightower v. Thompson, 231 N.C. 491, 57 S.E. 2d 763 (1950). There the Court held that \u201c[t]he clear proceeds of this forfeiture are for the use of the public school fund; . . . and the \u2018clear proceeds\u2019 have been judicially defined as the amount of the forfeit less the cost of collection, meaning thereby the citations and process against the bondsman usual in the practice.\u201d Id. at 493-94, 57 S.E. 2d at 765.\nWe find this interesting and pertinent language in School Directors v. Asheville, 137 N.C. 503, 50 S.E. 279 (1905). We quote:\nIf we adopt the argument of counsel, we must hold that fines are in the same class as penalties, and, following Katzenstein\u2019s case, we would be forced to the conclusion that the disposition of both are entirely within the power of the Legislature, which nullifies the clearly expressed purpose of the people, that they shall go into the county school fund. If we stop short of this conclusion and limit the words \u2018clear proceeds\u2019 to the power to dispose of only a part of the fine, we might well say that the power of the Legislature is exhausted by giving to the clerk or sheriff a reasonable commission for collecting the fines \u2014 to be deducted from the amount before paying it over to the treasurer of the school fund. The words \u2018clear proceeds\u2019 could thus have full force and operation without giving the unlimited power claimed by the defendant. By reference to section 3739 of The Code, regulating the fees of the clerk, we find that he is given \u20185 per cent commission on all fines, penalties, amercements, and taxes paid to him by virtue of his office.\u2019 We might well conclude that the 95 per cent of the fines constitutes the \u2018clear proceeds,\u2019 and that this, or such other reasonable commission as should be fixed, exhausted the power of the Legislature to appropriate the amount so collected and was in the contemplation of the draftsman in using the term \u2018clear proceeds\u2019 as applied to fines.\nId. at 511-12, 50 S.E. at 282.\nThe Court of Appeals interpreted these cases to hold that the term \u201cclear proceeds\u201d as used in Article IX, Section 7 is synonymous with net proceeds and further concluded that the costs of collection should be deducted from the gross proceeds of monies received for traffic violations in order to determine the net or \u201cclear proceeds.\u201d Cauble III. We agree with the reasoning of the Court of Appeals and therefore hold that reasonable costs of collection constitutionally may be deducted from the gross proceeds of the fines collected by the City of Asheville for overtime parking. There remains the question of what deductions are permissible.\nThe Court of Appeals in Cauble III, after noting that the General Assembly had not seen fit to provide municipalities with a formula for determining \u201cclear proceeds,\u201d held \u201c[t]hat the test for determining permissible deductions from gross monies taken in is that the item to be deductible must bear a reasonable relation to the costs of collection of the fine.\u201d 66 N.C. App. at 543, 311 S.E. 2d at 893. In so holding the Court of Appeals must have realized the difficulty in balancing the equities between the constitutionally mandated directive to set aside revenues for the public schools as declared in Article IX, Section 7 and the possible resulting economic penalties which might be forced upon the municipalities charged with the collection of fines as a result of overtime parking. The Court also apparently recognized, and we think correctly so, the futility of trying to fashion a court-made specific mathematical formula for determining costs of collection and left the application of the formula to trained accountants.\nWe believe that the well reasoned and fully documented opinion in Cauble III reached the proper result by holding that the test for determining permissible deductions must bear a reasonable relation to the cost of collection of the fine and by noting that qualified accountants might properly resolve the question.\nIn reviewing the cases cited by Chief Judge Vaughn in Cauble III, we found some evidence of the types of expenses that this Court has considered to be proper costs of collection. In Maultsby the Court stated that \u201c[b]y \u2018clear proceeds\u2019 is meant the total sum less only the sheriffs fees for collection, when the fine and cost are collected in full.\u201d 189 N.C. at 585, 51 S.E. at 956 (emphasis added). In Hightower the Court stated that \u201cthe \u2018clear proceeds\u2019 have been judicially defined as the amount of the forfeit less the cost of collection, meaning thereby the citations and process against the bondsman usual in the practice.\u201d 231 N.C. at 493-94, 57 S.E. 2d at 765. In School Directors v. Asheville, we emphasize the language \u201cthat the power of the Legislature is exhausted by giving to the clerk or sheriff a reasonable commission for collecting the fines \u2014 to be deducted from the amount before paying it over to the treasurer of the school fund.\u201d 137 N.C. at 511-12, 50 S.E. at 282. In our opinion these cases indicate that the costs of collection do not include the costs associated with enforcing the ordinance but are limited to the administrative costs of collecting the funds. If we were to take the position that the costs of enforcing the penal laws of the State were a part of collection of fines imposed by the laws, there could never by any clear proceeds of such fines to be used for the support of the public schools. This would in itself contravene that portion of Article IX, Section 7 of the North Carolina Constitution which directs that clear proceeds of penalties, forfeitures and fines collected for any breach of the penal laws of the State shall be applied to the public schools. We do not believe that the framers of our Constitution intended such a result. Conversely it would be an impractical and harsh rule to deny municipalities the reasonable costs of collections.\nWe have examined the remaining assignments of error and conclude that the Court of Appeals correctly decided each of them.\nThe decision of the Court of Appeals is\nAffirmed.\nJustice MARTIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.\n. Subsequent to the filing of the opinion in Cauble III the General Assembly enacted legislation affecting the proceeds of parking violations.\nOn the 15th day of July 1985 the General Assembly ratified Chapter 764, H.B. 533, entitled \u201cAn Act to Classify Minor Traffic Offenses as Infractions and to Provide a Procedure for the Disposition of Such Infractions by the Courts.\u201d The Act, inter alia, amended Chapter 14 of the General Statutes by adding a new section 14-3.1 defining an infraction as follows: an infraction is a non-criminal violation of the law not punishable by imprisonment. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-4 was also amended by adding a new subsection (b) which provided that violators of parking ordinances shall be responsible for an infraction and shall be required to pay a penalty of not more than $50.00. The amending act also provided that \u201c[t]he proceeds of penalties for infractions are payable to the county in which the infraction occurred for the use of the public schools.\u201d This act was made effective on 1 July 1986.\nOn the 17th day of July 1985 the General Assembly enacted Chapter 779, H.B. 1079. This bill provides:\n\u201cAn act to clarify G.S. 115C-437 by adding a definition of clear proceeds.\nThe General Assembly of North Carolina enacts:\nSection 1. G.S. 115C-437 is amended by adding the following language at the end of the first sentence: \u2018The clear proceeds of all penalties and forfeitures and of all fines collected for any breach of the penal laws of the State, as referred to in Article IX, Sec. 7 of the Constitution, shall include the full amount of all penalties, forfeitures or fines collected under authority conferred by the State, diminished only by the actual costs of collection, not to exceed ten percent (10%) of the amount collected.\u2019\nSec. 2. This act shall become effective upon ratification.\nIn the General Assembly read three times and ratified, this the 17th day of July, 1985.\u201d\nThe enactment of these amendments is not under attack in the case before us. Further it is generally recognized that a statute or an amendment to a statute will be given prospective effect only, and will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless such intent is clearly expressed or arises by necessary implication from its terms. Housing Authority v. Thorpe, 271 N.C. 468, 157 S.E. 2d 147 (1967), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 393 U.S. 268, 21 L.Ed. 2d 474, 89 S.Ct. 518 (1969); Lester Brothers v. Insurance Company, 250 N.C. 565, 109 S.E. 2d 263 (1959); Bank v. Derby, 218 N.C. 653, 12 S.E. 2d 260 (1940). We find nothing in the language of these Acts which clearly expresses or by necessary implication indicates that the legislature intended that either of the acts be retroactive. Therefore, the Act defining \u201cclear proceeds\u201d could only be effective as to monies collected because of traffic violations occurring on and after 17 July 1985. The Act decriminalizing traffic violations by its terms is effective on 1 July 1986.", "type": "majority", "author": "BRANCH, Chief Justice." }, { "text": "Justice EXUM\ndissenting.\nFor the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Cauble v. City of Asheville, 301 N.C. 340, 271 S.E. 2d 258 (1980), I continue to believe that the parking penalties voluntarily paid by motorists who violate the city\u2019s parking ordinances are neither penalties nor fines collected \u201cfor any breach of the penal laws of the state\u201d under Article IX, Section 7 of the North Carolina Constitution.\nContrary to the majority\u2019s earlier reading of it in 301 N.C. at 343-45, 271 S.E. 2d at 259-61, I think Board of Education v. Henderson, 126 N.C. 689, 36 S.E. 158 (1900), supports my view of the matter. The Court there held that monies the city collected for violating its ordinances were \u201cnot penalties collected for the violation of a law of the state, but of a town ordinance,\u201d even though violations of town ordinances were made criminal offenses by section 3820 of the Code, the predecessor to N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 14-4. 126 N.C. at 692, 36 S.E. at 159. (Emphasis original.) Relying on Board of Education v. Henderson, an expert in the field of local government finance has written:\nArticle IX, \u00a7 7, of the State Constitution directs that \u2018the clear proceeds of all penalties and forfeitures and all fines collected in the several counties for any breach of the penal laws of the state\u2019 (emphasis added) remain in the county of collection, to be used for maintaining the public school system. A fine, of course, is imposed by a court when a person has been convicted of violating a state law. An example of a forfeiture occurs when a person free on bail does not appear in court; the bail is forfeited.\nPenalties create some confusion. A penalty is recoverable in a civil action; the unit brings the action much as an individual might sue to recover a debt. A penalty therefore differs from a fine, which results from a criminal action. Several state statutes provide for their enforcement by suit for a penalty; for example, G.S. 143-215.114 permits enforcement of the air pollution control statutes in this manner. It is the \u2018clear proceeds\u2019 of penalties recovered in these actions to which the school fund is entitled. Confusion occasionally arises, however, because the statutes authorize cities (G.S. 160A-175) and counties (G.S. 153A-123) to enforce their ordinances by \u2018penalties. \u2019 The most common use of this power is with parking ordinances. This type of penalty need not, despite its label, be remitted to the schools. It is assessed to enforce local ordinances, while the Constitution intends penalties that enforce the penal laws of the state.\nD. Lawrence, Local Government Finance in North Carolina 57 (Institute of Government 1977) (emphasis supplied).\nA holding of the Supreme Court of Michigan in Delta County v. City of Gladstone, 305 Mich. 50, 8 N.W. 2d 908 (1943), also bolsters my view. The issue in that case was whether certain fines received by the city as a result of prosecutions for violations of city ordinances for various offenses, such as \u201cdrunk and disorderly,\u201d \u201creckless driving,\u201d \u201cdisorderly\u201d and \u201cdrunk,\u201d were fines collected \u201cfor any breach of the penal laws,\u201d as those terms were used in the Michigan Constitution. The cases in which the fines were imposed were also punishable, but had not been punished or prosecuted, under state statutes. The Court held that such fines were not collected for any breach of the penal laws of the state since they were collected \u201cunder ordinances enacted by the city, a creature of the sovereignty, and were not the direct result of the exercise of sovereign or state legislative power.\u201d 305 Mich, at 54, 8 N.W. 2d at 909.\nI would hold that none of the parking fines collected are properly allocable to the Buncombe County School Fund.\nJustice MEYER\njoins in this dissenting opinion.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Justice EXUM Justice MEYER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Swain, Stevenson and Freeman, by Joel B. Stevenson and Robert S. Swain, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Patla, Straus, Robinson & Moore, P.A., by Victor W. Buchanan and Harold K. Bennett, for defendant-appellee.", "Tharrington, Smith & Hargrove, by Richard A. Schwartz and Ann L. Majestic, for Amicus Curiae North Carolina School Boards Association, Inc.", "Fred P. Baggett and Laura Kranifeld, for Amicus Curiae North Carolina League of Municipalities." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JULIUS R. CAUBLE v. CITY OF ASHEVILLE\nNo. 150PA84\n(Filed 5 November 1985)\n1. Penalties \u00a7 1; Schools \u00a7 1\u2014 fines for overtime parking \u2014 breach of State penal law \u2014use for county schools\nThe money penalty collected by the City of Asheville from a motorist who violates its ordinance prohibiting overtime parking constitutes a penalty or fine collected for a breach of a State penal law although the motorist has not been convicted for violating G.S. 14-4. Therefore, the \u201cclear proceeds\u201d of funds received from overtime parking violations must be paid to the Buncombe County Finance Officer for distribution pursuant to G.S. 115C-437 (replacing former G.S. 115-100.35).\n2. Penalties \u00a7 1; Schools \u00a7 1\u2014 fines for overtime parking \u2014 clear proceeds \u2014deductions for costs of collection\nReasonable costs of collection may constitutionally be deducted from the gross proceeds of the fines collected by a municipality for overtime parking in determining the \u201cclear proceeds\u201d of such fines which must be paid by the municipality to the county finance officer for maintaining free public schools. However, the costs of collection do not include the costs associated with enforcing the ordinance but are limited to the administrative costs of collecting the funds. Art. IX, \u00a7 7 of the N. C. Constitution.\nJustice Martin did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.\nJustice Exum dissenting.\nJustice Meyer joins in this dissenting opinion.\nOn discretionary review, pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31, of the unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, reported at 66 N.C. App. 537, 311 S.E. 2d 889 (1984), reversing and remanding the judgment entered by Lewis, J., on 14 October 1982 at Asheville, Buncombe County. The judgment was entered out of session pursuant to a stipulation of the parties.\nSwain, Stevenson and Freeman, by Joel B. Stevenson and Robert S. Swain, for plaintiff-appellant.\nPatla, Straus, Robinson & Moore, P.A., by Victor W. Buchanan and Harold K. Bennett, for defendant-appellee.\nTharrington, Smith & Hargrove, by Richard A. Schwartz and Ann L. Majestic, for Amicus Curiae North Carolina School Boards Association, Inc.\nFred P. Baggett and Laura Kranifeld, for Amicus Curiae North Carolina League of Municipalities." }, "file_name": "0598-01", "first_page_order": 642, "last_page_order": 652 }