{ "id": 4686938, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KIM RILEY McGILL", "name_abbreviation": "State v. McGill", "decision_date": "1985-11-05", "docket_number": "No. 163A85", "first_page": "633", "last_page": "638", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "314 N.C. 633" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "326 S.E. 2d 345", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "73 N.C. App. 206", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522898 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/73/0206-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 744", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574149, 8574186, 8574160, 8574203, 8574172 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0744-01", "/nc/306/0744-04", "/nc/306/0744-02", "/nc/306/0744-05", "/nc/306/0744-03" ] }, { "cite": "292 S.E. 2d 744", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "746" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "58 N.C. App. 146", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523664 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "148" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/58/0146-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 S.E. 2d 253", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "255" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 N.C. App. 512", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527044 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "514" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/72/0512-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-138.1", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "167 S.E. 459", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1933, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "204 N.C. 33", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8610596 ], "year": 1933, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/204/0033-01" ] }, { "cite": "210 S.E. 2d 407", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 N.C. 304", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565329 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/286/0304-01" ] }, { "cite": "230 S.E. 2d 152", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "153" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 319", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558004 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "321" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0319-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 S.E. 2d 789", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 N.C. 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563608 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/277/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 S.E. 456", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 4, "year": 1933, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "458" }, { "page": "458" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "204 N.C. 28", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8610419 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1933, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "31" }, { "page": "31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/204/0028-01" ] }, { "cite": "27 S.E. 2d 638", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1943, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "640", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "641", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "641" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "223 N.C. 598", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8614123 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1943, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "601" }, { "page": "603" }, { "page": "603" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/223/0598-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 S.E. 2d 345", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "350" }, { "page": "349" }, { "page": "350" }, { "page": "350" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "73 N.C. App. 206", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522898 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "213" }, { "page": "211" }, { "page": "213" }, { "page": "213" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/73/0206-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 613, "char_count": 13089, "ocr_confidence": 0.795, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.6260748950255533e-07, "percentile": 0.8217795709325139 }, "sha256": "c81bc099aeda83b1c1adc5e7e4c34637ce065b5663ac65153e2c8bbe15147ae9", "simhash": "1:2ebcaf974563645a", "word_count": 2152 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:20:08.801916+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KIM RILEY McGILL" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MARTIN, Justice.\nThe single issue before this Court is whether, in a prosecution for manslaughter, the state must prove not only that the defendant was driving under the influence and that this proximately caused the victim\u2019s death, but that the defendant\u2019s intoxication caused him to violate some other rule of the road that in turn caused the death. We hold that only one causal link must be shown \u2014 that between the intoxication and the death. No additional misconduct need be alleged.\nAround midnight of 26 April 1983, a state trooper arrived at the scene of a two-car accident on a paved, rural road. He found defendant and a passenger standing beside a Chrysler automobile, watching the other car, up-ended, burn in a roadside ditch. Defendant told the officer that he had rounded a curve, driven a short distance, and suddenly seen a car parked in the middle of the road with its lights off. Defendant said he had then slammed on his brakes and skidded into the other car, flipping it into the ditch. He told the officer that he and his passenger had attempted to free the occupants of the burning car but were prevented from doing so by an explosion and flames. The occupants of the car were killed.\nThe trooper noticed a strong odor of alcohol on defendant\u2019s breath and saw that defendant was unsteady on his feet. He found a half-gallon bottle of whiskey, its seal broken, in defendant\u2019s car. A breathalyzer test administered two hours later revealed defendant\u2019s blood alcohol level to be 0.19 percent. Defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license had been permanently revoked, and his record indicated numerous driving violations, including five convictions for driving under the influence.\nAn investigation of the accident scene revealed that defendant\u2019s car had been travelling about 55 m.p.h., the speed limit, and that it had travelled 450 feet after the curve before colliding with the victims\u2019 car. Investigators found defendant\u2019s car had left forty-eight feet of skid marks before the impact and thirty feet after, and they determined that defendant\u2019s car had been travel-ling at 35 m.p.h. on impact. Inspection of the victims\u2019 car revealed that both the lights and ignition were in the \u201con\u201d position and that the transmission was in \u201cdrive.\u201d\nThe Court of Appeals considered a number of defendant\u2019s motions challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. It found ample evidence to support the jury\u2019s guilty verdicts regarding defendant\u2019s driving while his license was permanently revoked, driving under the influence of alcoholic beverages, and transporting liquor with the seal broken.\nDefendant also challenged his conviction of two counts of involuntary manslaughter, based upon what he contended were erroneous jury instructions. The trial judge had instructed the jury that, in order to find defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter, it must find three things: (1) that defendant had violated any one of the motor vehicle laws of this state; (2) that the violation constituted culpable negligence; and (3) that the violation of that law was the proximate cause of the deaths in this case.\nThe Court of Appeals found that circumstantial and expert evidence concerning the accident was sufficient to support the jury\u2019s verdict of involuntary manslaughter, but not to compel that verdict. The trial judge\u2019s jury instructions were held to be in error. We agree that the evidence is sufficient to support defendant\u2019s conviction for manslaughter; however, we find the reasoning of the Court of Appeals concerning the jury instructions to be misguided.\nThe chief concern of the Court of Appeals\u2019 review was the causal connection between defendant\u2019s intoxication and the accident. Certainly causation is an indispensable element of the proof of manslaughter, as this Court has consistently held. See, e.g., State v. Lowery, 223 N.C. 598, 27 S.E. 2d 638 (1943); State v. Cope, 204 N.C. 28, 167 S.E. 456 (1933). In this instance, however, the appellate court\u2019s legitimate concern with causation seems to have engendered its error.\nThe Court of Appeals held that the jury must find not only a causal link between defendant\u2019s driving under the influence of alcohol and the victim\u2019s death, but another, interconnecting violation: \u201cin order to convict an impaired driver of involuntary manslaughter based upon his impairment, the state must show that while driving impaired defendant violated some other rule of the road, and that this violation was the proximate cause of the accident.\u201d State v. McGill, 73 N.C. App. 206, 213, 326 S.E. 2d 345, 350 (emphases added).\nThe court below relied for its holding upon a rule reportedly set out in Lowery, 223 N.C. 598, 27 S.E. 2d 638, which the Court of Appeals interpreted to require \u201cthat the evidence must also show reckless driving or other misconduct on the part of defendant resulting from the intoxication which shows a proximate causal relation between the breach of the drunk-driving statute and the death of the victim.\u201d 73 N.C. App. at 211, 326 S.E. 2d at 349. In Lowery, the two statutes that allegedly had been violated were one prohibiting driving under the influence and one requiring the use of turn signals. The court\u2019s concern in that case was twofold: the causal relation between the violation and the death, and a rule from Cope, 204 N.C. 28, 167 S.E. 456, that the inadvertent or careless accomplishment of an act prohibited by statute but not in itself dangerous would not signify culpable negligence. The language in Lowery upon which the Court of Appeals relied was focused not upon the culpable negligence element, as the appellate court assumed, but upon the indispensable causal link: \u201cThe violation of the statutes referred to herein, if conceded, is not sufficient to sustain a prosecution for involuntary manslaughter unless a causal relation is shown between the breach of the statute and the death . . . .\u201d 223 N.C. at 601, 27 S.E. 2d at 640 (emphasis added).\nBy its decision the Court of Appeals seeks to engraft an additional requirement to the proof of involuntary manslaughter while driving under the influence of alcohol. Neither Lowery nor Atkins v. Moye, 277 N.C. 179, 176 S.E. 2d 789 (1970), supports the holding in McGill, 73 N.C. App. at 213, 326 S.E. 2d at 350, that \u201cthe state must show that while driving impaired defendant violated some other rule of the road, and that this violation was the proximate cause of the accident.\u201d All that is required is that the state show that defendant willfully violated N.C.G.S. 20-138 and that this conduct was one of the proximate causes of the death of the victim. Proof of proximate cause may involve the violation of an additional safety statute, but it is not an essential element of involuntary manslaughter.\nWe have held that \u201c[i]nvoluntary manslaughter is the unintentional killing of a human being without malice, proximately caused by (1) an unlawful act not amounting to a felony nor naturally dangerous to human life, or (2) a culpably negligent act or omission.\u201d State v. Redfern, 291 N.C. 319, 321, 230 S.E. 2d 152, 153 (1976); State v. Ward, 286 N.C. 304, 210 S.E. 2d 407 (1974). Under the first alternative in this definition, one who causes the death of another merely by violating the statutory prohibition against driving while impaired would be guilty of involuntary manslaughter. However, this Court generally has considered violations of safety statutes in terms of culpable negligence, the second alternative: \u201cAn intentional, wilful or wanton violation of a statute or ordinance, designed for the protection of human life or limb, which proximately results in injury or death, is culpable negligence.\u201d Cope, 204 N.C. at 31, 167 S.E. at 458.\nThere is no question that N.C.G.S. 20-138, which is included in Part 10, \u201cOperation of Vehicles and Rules of the Road,\u201d of the motor vehicle chapter, is a statute designed for the protection of human life and limb, as is its successor, N.C.G.S. 20-138.1. As such, it is a matter of law that a violation of its provisions constitutes culpable negligence.\nWe therefore hold that when a death is caused by one who was driving under the influence of alcohol, only two elements must exist for the successful prosecution of manslaughter: a willful violation of N.C.G.S. 20-138 and the causal link between that violation and the death. See State v. Dills, 204 N.C. 33, 167 S.E. 459 (1933). If these elements are present, the state need not demonstrate that defendant violated any other rule of the road nor that his conduct was in any other way wrongful. In this regard, the instructions of the trial judge were essentially proper.\nThe decision of the Court of Appeals is\nReversed.\n. The trial judge instructed that this requisite could be satisfied by a finding that the violation of a safety statute resulting in injury or death was willful, wanton or intentional.\n. In Lowery, the Court found (1) that under the circumstances defendant had had no obligation to signal and that his failure to do so therefore did not amount to criminal negligence, and (2) that, although there was evidence that defendant had been drinking, there was no evidence linking that misconduct to the accident: \u201cconceding that there is some evidence of the intoxication of the defendant, there is no evidence on this record of reckless driving or other misconduct on the part of the defendant resulting from intoxication which shows such proximate causal relation between the breach of the statute and the death . . . .\u201d 223 N.C. at 603, 27 S.E. 2d at 641 (emphasis added).\n. In both Cope and Lowery the Court was concerned with the defendant\u2019s intent to break the law. \u201cBut an unintentional violation of a prohibitory statute or ordinance, unaccompanied by recklessness or probable consequences of a dangerous nature, when tested by the rule of reasonable prevision, is not such negligence as imports criminal responsibility.\u201d State v. Cope, 204 N.C. 28, 31, 167 S.E. 456, 458 (1933). See State v. Lowery, 223 N.C. 598, 603, 27 S.E. 2d 638, 641 (1943). This latter rule is inapplicable in the case at bar: one who drives under the influence cannot be said to do so inadvertently. The act (and the violation) is willful by its very nature.\n. It is no different in this case: driving under the influence is not sufficient to sustain a conviction of manslaughter. A causal relation between the breach and the death must be shown.\n. The Court of Appeals has itself held that the violation of the driving while impaired statute constitutes culpable negligence. \u201c[I]t is clear that driving while impaired, see N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 20-138.1 (1983), is culpable negligence . . . .\u201d State v. McGill, 73 N.C. App. 206, 213, 326 S.E. 2d 345, 350 (1985). \u201cWe believe that... the violation of a statute prohibiting driving while intoxicated is culpable negligence. . . . We hold that driving under the influence of alcohol constitutes a \u2018thoughtless disregard of consequences or a heedless indifference to the safety and rights of others.\u2019 This is culpable negligence.\u201d State v. Johnson, 72 N.C. App. 512, 514, 325 S.E. 2d 253, 255 (1985). \u201cA wilful violation of any one of these statutes [N.C.G.S. 20-165.1, 20-138, -139] would constitute culpable negligence if that violation was the proximate cause of [the victim\u2019s] death.\" State v. Atkins, 58 N.C. App. 146, 148, 292 S.E. 2d 744, 746, cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 306 N.C. 744 (1982).\n. Although it is difficult to visualize a situation where an intoxicated driver could cause another\u2019s injury or death by an act that could not be characterized as \u201cmisconduct,\u201d Lowery, 223 N.C. 598, 27 S.E. 2d 638, does not and should not foreclose that possibility.\n. As the facts in this case occurred prior to the effective date of N.C.G.S. 20-138.1, it is controlled by former N.C.G.S. 20-138. However, the law stated herein is equally applicable to prosecutions for manslaughter based upon N.C.G.S. 20-138.1.", "type": "majority", "author": "MARTIN, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by Charles J. Murray, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State of North Carolina, appellant.", "Robert D. Jacobson for defendant appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KIM RILEY McGILL\nNo. 163A85\n(Filed 5 November 1985)\nAutomobiles and Other Vehicles \u00a7 113\u2014 driving under the influence \u2014 proof required for involuntary manslaughter\nWhen a death is caused by one who was driving under the influence of alcohol, only two elements must exist for the successful prosecution of involuntary manslaughter: a willful violation of G.S. 20-138 and the causal link between that violation and the death. The State is not required to prove further that defendant\u2019s intoxication caused him to violate some other rule of the road and that such violation was a proximate cause of the victims\u2019 death.\nAPPEAL by the State of North Carolina pursuant to N.C.G.S. 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 73 N.C. App. 206, 326 S.E. 2d 345 (1985), granting a new trial to defendant on convictions of manslaughter before Lane, J., at the 31 October 1983 session of Superior Court, ROBESON County. Heard in the Supreme Court 11 September 1985.\nLacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by Charles J. Murray, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State of North Carolina, appellant.\nRobert D. Jacobson for defendant appellee." }, "file_name": "0633-01", "first_page_order": 677, "last_page_order": 682 }