{ "id": 4715465, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RICKY DALE LEDFORD", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Ledford", "decision_date": "1986-02-18", "docket_number": "No. 452A84", "first_page": "599", "last_page": "626", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "315 N.C. 599" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "230 N.C. 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8629214 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/230/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 L.Ed. 2d 299", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 S.E. 2d 197", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4679881 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/311/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 L.Ed. 2d 342", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 L.Ed. 2d 369", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 S.E. 2d 642", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4758280 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 S.E. 2d 689", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "698" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 584", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565300 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0584-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 S.E. 2d 367", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 N.C. 55", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560971 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/295/0055-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 S.E. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "258 N.C. 89", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559589 ], "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/258/0089-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 S.E. 2d 638", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "272 N.C. 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572884 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/272/0327-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 S.E. 2d 833", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4715827 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "12 Wake Forest L. Rev. 833", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Wake Forest L. Rev.", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "847-49" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "223 S.E. 2d 350", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "353" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 N.C. 560", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571164 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "565" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/289/0560-01" ] }, { "cite": "247 S.E. 2d 905", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "912" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 N.C. 559", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566309 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "571" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/295/0559-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 S.E. 2d 827", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "835" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574181 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "198 S.E. 2d 558", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "568", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 N.C. 734", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560265 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/283/0734-01" ] }, { "cite": "21 S.E. 2d 818", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1942, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "222 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8628033 ], "year": 1942, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/222/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 S.E. 2d 201", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "203", "parenthetical": "emphasis in original" }, { "page": "203" }, { "page": "204" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 731", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564808 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "733" }, { "page": "733" }, { "page": "735" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0731-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 S.E. 2d 535", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 158", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4763016 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0158-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 A.L.R. 2d 1046", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "232 S.E. 2d 656", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 N.C. 114", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567549 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/292/0114-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 S.E. 183", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1937, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "188" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "211 N.C. 66", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8623937 ], "year": 1937, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "74" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/211/0066-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 S.E. 2d 833", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 480", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558733 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0480-01" ] }, { "cite": "237 S.E. 2d 728", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "734" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { 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"year": 1949, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "913" }, { "page": "913" }, { "page": "914" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "150 S.E. 2d 428", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "431" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "268 N.C. 258", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561200 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "262" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/268/0258-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 S.E. 2d 724", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "729", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Parker, 268 N.C. 258, 262, 150 S.E. 2d 428, 431 (1966)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4767092 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "139", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Parker, 268 N.C. 258, 262, 150 S.E. 2d 428, 431 (1966)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 A.L.R. 2d 643", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 Utah 310", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Utah", "case_ids": [ 8874732 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1905, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "312, 314" }, { "page": "142, 143" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/utah/29/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "297 S.E. 2d 553", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 169", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561203 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0169-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 S.E. 2d 288", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "295" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 256", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4690513 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "266" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0256-01" ] }, { "cite": "16 S.E. 319", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 2, "year": 1892, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 N.C. 690", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8652126 ], "year": 1892, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/111/0690-01" ] }, { "cite": "200 S.E. 2d 169", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "175" }, { "page": "175" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "284 N.C. 137", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560586 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "145" }, { "page": "145" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/284/0137-01" ] }, { "cite": "299 S.E. 2d 431", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 516", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564041 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "518" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0516-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 S.E. 2d 219", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 787", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4750303 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0787-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 S.E. 2d 114", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573434 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "310 S.E. 2d 20", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "23" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 126", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2399015 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "131" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0126-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 S.E. 2d 765", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 N.C. 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563764 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/277/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "54 L.Ed. 2d 288", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "434 U.S. 928", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6433633, 6433892, 6434117, 6434215, 6433225, 6433418, 6433326, 6433776, 6433043, 6433111, 6433529, 6434333, 6434014 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/434/0928-07", "/us/434/0928-09", "/us/434/0928-11", "/us/434/0928-12", "/us/434/0928-03", "/us/434/0928-05", "/us/434/0928-04", "/us/434/0928-08", "/us/434/0928-01", "/us/434/0928-02", "/us/434/0928-06", "/us/434/0928-13", "/us/434/0928-10" ] }, { "cite": "235 S.E. 2d 178", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 N.C. 644", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572442 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/292/0644-01" ] }, { "cite": "72 L.Ed. 2d 450", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "456 U.S. 932", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6277825, 6278627, 6276296, 6279499, 6277195, 6278351, 6276593, 6276851, 6275989, 6278968, 6278105, 6279802, 6277502 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/456/0932-07", "/us/456/0932-10", "/us/456/0932-02", "/us/456/0932-12", "/us/456/0932-05", "/us/456/0932-09", "/us/456/0932-03", "/us/456/0932-04", "/us/456/0932-01", "/us/456/0932-11", "/us/456/0932-08", "/us/456/0932-13", "/us/456/0932-06" ] }, { "cite": "284 S.E. 2d 437", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 394", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568926 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0394-01" ] }, { "cite": "230 N.C. 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8629214 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "213" }, { "page": "213" }, { "page": "214" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/230/0205-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1850, "char_count": 64256, "ocr_confidence": 0.803, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.689967945576111e-07, "percentile": 0.892428863613284 }, "sha256": "34bc7a5730b04d08d1429186e28e12e5a8befbbe5477f208921fade700202f70", "simhash": "1:6a2ef0a3246cbc52", "word_count": 10856 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:13:08.433452+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RICKY DALE LEDFORD" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MEYER, Justice.\nThe State\u2019s evidence tended to show that on Saturday morning, 23 July 1983, Charlotte Henson drove down Pisgah Drive in Canton past the home of Nora Curtis, her husband\u2019s grandmother, as she did every day on her way to work. On that morning, however, she noticed that the front window of Mrs. Curtis\u2019 home was broken. When she arrived at work, Mrs. Henson telephoned her brother-in-law, Stanley Henson, and asked him to check on his grandmother.\nStanley Henson drove to Mrs. Curtis\u2019 house, and when there was no response to his knock on the front door, he moved to the broken window and called out to his grandmother. He heard her moan and say that she was hurt. He then drove to the Canton Police Department and advised the dispatcher to send a patrol car to Mrs. Curtis\u2019 home immediately. He returned to his grandmother\u2019s home, arriving at the same time as Officer R. G. Stroup. Unable to gain entry through the locked front door, the men walked around to the side screen door which was secured by a hook and eye latch. Officer Stroup was able to force open the screen door, and the two men entered the house. A third door leading to the basement was locked from the inside.\nThe men found 87-year-old Nora Curtis in her nightgown, lying on her side on the bed which was partially broken down at the foot. On the bedroom floor, they found an old aluminum pot and a piece of curtain rod with a jagged end. Both items were stained with a reddish-brown material. There was blood on Mrs. Curtis\u2019 hands, arms, and face and on the pillow, bedcover, and mattress. Mrs. Curtis had bruises on her hands, arms, and face and a large knot on her left shoulder. The bedroom appeared to have been ransacked, and the doors of a wooden wardrobe were hanging open. Mrs. Curtis was taken to the Haywood County Hospital where she remained until her death on 3 August 1983.\nAn investigation of the Curtis home was conducted by the Canton Police Department and the SBI. A small, white cardboard box was found on top of the dresser in Mrs. Curtis\u2019 bedroom. It contained several items, including the butt of a Marlboro Light cigarette. Mrs. Curtis did not smoke. A piece of asphalt was found in the living room. Broken glass was found on the living room floor between the broken window and the couch. The curtain rod on the front window was broken down and one of the curtains was lying on the living room floor. When Sergeant Rhinehart picked up the curtain, he discovered a footprint on a portion of the backside or window side of the curtain that had been folded under before he picked it up. SBI Agent Elliott was able to lift only two fingerprints from the scene, neither of which, when analyzed by the SBI latent print examiner, was found to be of suitable quality for identification purposes.\nMrs. Rochelle Robinson, a daughter of the victim, testified that on the Wednesday prior to the assault, she had driven her mother to the Clyde Savings and Loan to make a $1,500 deposit. Mrs. Robinson further stated that her mother had \u201cat least five hundred dollars left,\u201d which she placed in a large plastic mayonnaise jar in the bedroom wardrobe \u201cwhere she always kept it.\u201d Mrs. Robinson said her mother put \u201ca couple of hundreds and some fifties and some twenties\u201d in the mayonnaise jar. During the crime scene investigation, Officer Stroup found one twenty-dollar bill and some change in a jar inside the wardrobe; neither the plastic mayonnaise jar nor any other money was found in the house during the investigation.\nThe State also presented the testimony of Gene Ledford, the defendant\u2019s cousin. Ledford testified that at approximately 2:00 a.m. on 23 July, he and his stepfather were standing outside the Road Runner, a local store, when they saw the defendant. The defendant came over to them and displayed a roll of paper money. He said the money had been given to him by a man named Bryson so that they would not \u201crat\u201d on him about the \u201cgun deal.\u201d Shortly thereafter, the defendant walked away in the direction of his home.\nLarry Kuykendall, a cab driver, testified that he was driving down Pisgah Drive just before 2:00 a.m. on 23 July. He stated that at that time, he saw the defendant, whom he knew well, stepping onto the sidewalk in front of Mrs. Curtis\u2019 house. Kuykendall stated that he waved at the defendant but that the defendant did not acknowledge him. He also testified that he saw the defendant push something up underneath the plaid flannel shirt he was wearing.\nSergeant Troy Rhinehart of the Canton Police Department testified that on the evening of 23 July 1983, the defendant accompanied him and Lieutenant Scott Ashe to police headquarters where defendant was advised of his constitutional rights and informed that the officers were investigating the break-in and assault at Mrs. Curtis\u2019 home. Defendant stated that he knew nothing about the incident and that he had been at the Game Room that night and had returned to his home at approximately 11:00 p.m. While defendant was being questioned at the police station, the officers asked him to put his feet on the desk so that they could look at the soles of the boots he was wearing. The officers visually compared the tread on defendant\u2019s boots with the footprint on the curtain taken from Mrs. Curtis\u2019 house. Defendant agreed to give the officers his boots and the clothing he was wearing. The officers accompanied defendant back to the mobile home where he was living so that he could change clothes. In the bedroom of the mobile home, the officers noticed an ashtray containing cigarette butts. Defendant agreed to allow the officers to take the cigarette butts.\nRhinehart further testified that on 24 July, he spoke with Gene Ledford and Larry Kuykendall. The police then obtained warrants for defendant\u2019s arrest. They went to defendant\u2019s home very early on Monday morning, 25 July 1983; when two officers knocked on the front door, defendant ran out the back door where he was stopped by Sergeant Rhinehart. The officers searched the defendant and found $422.49 in his pockets. Defendant stated that he had earned the money mowing yards and doing other work.\nMrs. Curtis remained in the hospital following the assault. She had recovered sufficiently by 30 July 1983 that the attending physician, Dr. Bill Owen, left her in the care of Dr. Stuart Harley while Dr. Owen took his vacation. Mrs. Curtis began receiving physical therapy in the hospital, but her condition worsened and she died on 3 August 1983. Dr. Robert Boatright, a pathologist, performed an autopsy on Mrs. Curtis. He testified that Mrs. Curtis\u2019 death was caused by a blood clot that had formed in her leg and, in passing through her body, became lodged in the major artery from her heart to her lungs. In his opinion, the injuries Mrs. Curtis suffered in the assault caused her death because they resulted in a decrease in her usual activities, thereby restricting the movement of the muscles in her legs that would pump the blood out of the veins in her legs.\nThe defendant testified that he lived with his parents in Canton and had known the deceased, Mrs. Curtis, all his life, had been in Mrs. Curtis\u2019 home on a number of occasions, and had done odd jobs for her in the past. He last visited her home approximately three to four weeks prior to the assault. Defendant further testified that he had gone to his girlfriend\u2019s house on the night of 23 July and stayed until 1:30 a.m., although police officer Grant Parrott testified in rebuttal that he had seen the defendant and three others drinking beer behind a feed store on Penland Street at approximately 10:45 p.m. Defendant testified that he went from his girlfriend\u2019s house to the Road Runner by walking down Academy Street and that he was not on Pisgah Drive that night.\nOn the Judgment and Commitment form, it appears that defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment on the consolidated charges of first-degree felony murder and assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury. He was separately sentenced to a consecutive ten-year term on his conviction for felonious larceny.\nDefendant has brought forward four issues for review by this Court. First, he argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support convictions for any of the offenses with which he was charged. Second, he contends that the trial court erroneously admitted testimony of the State\u2019s pathologist that the injuries inflicted on the decedent on 23 July 1983 were the proximate cause of her death because that testimony constituted an opinion as to a question of law and as to the ultimate issue in the case. Third, defendant argues that the trial court erred in sentencing him to a term of imprisonment in excess of the presumptive term for the felonious larceny by failing to make findings in aggravation or mitigation of punishment. Finally, defendant urges this Court to reconsider its ruling in several recent cases and find that the imposition of a sentence based upon a verdict of guilty returned by a jury drawn from a venire from which potential jurors were excluded because of their scruples against capital punishment deprives defendant of his right to due process of law and his right to trial by jury. We find no error in the guilt phase of defendant\u2019s trial, but remand the case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing on defendant\u2019s conviction for felonious larceny. We also vacate the defendant\u2019s conviction for assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury.\nI.\nDefendant was charged in an indictment, proper in form, with the first-degree murder of Mrs. Nora Curtis. The indictment alleges that a burglary and an assault occurred on 23 July 1983 resulting in the death of Mrs. Curtis on 3 August 1983. This indictment, drawn in accordance with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15-144 (1983), is sufficient to sustain a conviction of first-degree murder committed in the perpetration of the felony of first-degree burglary. See State v. Williams, 304 N.C. 394, 284 S.E. 2d 437 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 932, 72 L.Ed. 2d 450 (1982); State v. May, 292 N.C. 644, 235 S.E. 2d 178, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 928, 54 L.Ed. 2d 288 (1977); State v. Lee, 277 N.C. 205, 176 S.E. 2d 765 (1970). The trial judge instructed the jury on a theory of felony murder, naming first-degree burglary as the underlying felony, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty on that theory. If the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support a conviction of first-degree burglary, the judgment of conviction of first-degree felony murder based on that underlying felony cannot be sustained. State v. Forney, 310 N.C. 126, 310 S.E. 2d 20 (1984). Defendant contends that his conviction for first-degree murder must be reversed because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each and every element of the underlying felony, first-degree burglary. For the reasons set forth below, we hold that the State carried its burden of presenting substantial evidence of each essential element of the offense of first-degree burglary and of defendant\u2019s identity as the perpetrator so as to withstand defendant\u2019s motions to dismiss. State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 261 S.E. 2d 114 (1980).\nThe elements of the crime of burglary in the first degree are: (1) the breaking (2) and entering (3) in the nighttime (4) into a dwelling house or a room used as a sleeping apartment (5) of another (6) which is actually occupied at the time of the offense (7) with the intent to commit a felony therein. State v. Harold, 312 N.C. 787, 325 S.E. 2d 219 (1985). Defendant here contends that the State failed to prove that the offense was committed in the nighttime and that, therefore, the offense did not constitute burglary and thus could not support a felony-murder conviction. When the State fails to produce substantial evidence that the offense occurred during the nighttime, a defendant is entitled to have charges of burglary against him dismissed. State v. Forney, 310 N.C. 126, 131, 310 S.E. 2d 20, 23 (1984); State v. Smith, 307 N.C. 516, 518, 299 S.E. 2d 431, 434 (1983). Defendant also argues that the State\u2019s failure to prove the commission of the offense in the nighttime precludes its proving the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of any of the offenses for which he was convicted. We find no merit in these conditions.\nA.\nThere is no statutory definition of \u201cnighttime\u201d for the offense of burglary in North Carolina. State v. Frank, 284 N.C. 137, 145, 200 S.E. 2d 169, 175 (1973). North Carolina courts adhere to the common law definition of \u201cnighttime.\u201d One of our early considerations of this term is found in State v. McKnight, 111 N.C. 690, 16 S.E. 319 (1892). In McKnight, Chief Justice Shepherd wrote:\nSir William Blackston (4 Com., 224) says that \u201canciently the day was accounted to begin only at sunrising, and to end immediately upon sunset; but the better opinion seems to be that if there be daylight or crepusculum enough begun or left to discern a man\u2019s face withal, it is no burglary. But this does not extend to moonlight, for then many midnight burglars would go unpunished.\u201d\nId. at 691, 16 S.E. at 320. More recently, this Court has described \u201cnighttime\u201d as that period of time after sunset and before sunrise \u201cwhen it is so dark that a man\u2019s face cannot be identified except by artificial light or moonlight.\u201d State v. Lyszaj, 314 N.C. 256, 266, 333 S.E. 2d 288, 295 (1985); State v. Frank, 284 N.C. 137, 145, 200 S.E. 2d 169, 175 (1973).\nDefendant contends that the State\u2019s evidence permitted only conjecture and speculation as to whether any breaking or entry was committed in the nighttime. A review of the State\u2019s evidence convinces us that it was sufficiently \u201csubstantial\u201d to withstand defendant\u2019s motions to dismiss and to allow this question of fact to be resolved by the jury. Substantial evidence is the amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. State v. Corbett, 307 N.C. 169, 297 S.E. 2d 553 (1982).\nWe note, first, that the State is not limited to proving solely by direct evidence that the breaking and entering was accomplished in the nighttime; this essential element may be shown by proof of circumstances which convince a reasonable mind of the fact.\nIf this were otherwise, many midnight burglaries would go unpunished, for such offenses are always secretly committed, when no one is, or is supposed to be, present to mark the time, and generally when nothing but circumstances can reveal it ... .\n. . . Such crimes under such conditions are not committed in broad daylight, but under the security from detection and apprehension which the night affords, when sleep has disarmed the owner and rendered his premises defenseless.\nState v. Richards, 29 Utah 310, 312, 314, 81 P. 142, 142, 143 (1905).\nIn the instant case, the State presented sufficient circumstantial evidence that the offense was committed in the \u201cnighttime.\u201d First, the record reveals that the last person to see the victim before the assault was her daughter, Edna Henson. Mrs. Henson testified that when she left her mother\u2019s house at approximately 3:00 p.m. on Friday afternoon, 22 July 1983, the front window of the house was intact and the living room curtains were hanging straight. When Charlotte Henson saw the window the next morning as she drove to work, the window was broken; the curtain and the broken glass were later found lying inside the room.\nSecond, Mr. Larry Kuykendall testified that as he drove his taxicab down Pisgah Drive just before 2:00 a.m. on Saturday morning, 23 July, he recognized defendant, whom he had known all of defendant\u2019s life, stepping onto the sidewalk in front of Mrs. Curtis\u2019 house. Mr. Kuykendall testified that he was driving only five to seven miles per hour and passed within five or six feet of the defendant. He stated that Mrs. Curtis\u2019 house is situated only \u201ca couple of feet\u201d from the sidewalk and \u201cjust a couple of yards\u201d from the street. Mr. Kuykendall testified that, although he and defendant were well acquainted, defendant did not acknowledge him when he blew his horn and waved in greeting; he saw the defendant put \u201csomething up under his shirt\u201d and keep walking. Mr. Kuykendall stated that he noticed that defendant \u201clooked like he was wore out; like he was tired.\u201d Thus, the State presented eyewitness testimony which placed defendant at the scene of the crime at just before 2:00 a.m. on the night in question; Mr. Kuykendall stated that \u201cit was dark\u201d but that there were three streetlights in the vicinity. The jury could reasonably have placed weight on the unrefuted testimony that the defendant refused to acknowledge the friendly greeting of a lifelong acquaintance and, instead, pushed something up under his shirt and kept walking toward town.\nThe third important link in the State\u2019s chain of circumstantial evidence tending to prove that the offense was committed in the nighttime was the testimony of defendant\u2019s cousin, Gene Led-ford, who was waiting at the Road Runner for his paper route newspapers to be delivered in the early morning hours of Saturday, 23 July 1983. Ledford testified that at around 2:00 a.m., he saw the defendant walking toward the Road Runner from the direction of Pisgah Drive. Ledford and defendant\u2019s stepfather both testified that defendant came over to where they were standing with a group of friends and displayed a roll of paper money. Neither man knew how much money was in the roll, but they saw several twenty-dollar bills and some one-dollar bills. The defendant told these men that a man named Bryson gave him the money \u201cin the gun deal\u201d so that they would not \u201crat\u201d on him. This evidence places the defendant on foot \u201ca good mile\u201d from Pisgah Drive sometime around 2:00 a.m. on 23 July 1983, and flashing a substantial sum of paper money.\nThe fourth relevant piece of evidence was the testimony of Stanley Henson, the victim\u2019s grandson who found his grandmother bleeding and bruised in her bloodstained bed shortly after 9:00 a.m. on 23 July. Mr. Henson testified that when he found Mrs. Curtis, she was wearing her pajamas and was lying on her side in her bed which had been broken down at the foot. While, in State v. Forney, 310 N.C. 126, 310 S.E. 2d 20 (1984), we found evidence that the victim had been discovered barefoot and wearing her nightgown outside her home early in the morning was insufficient in and of itself to take the determination of the time of entry into the victim\u2019s home out of the realm of speculation and conjecture, such evidence is certainly probative, especially in light of the other evidence presented. Just as the evidence of the attire of the victim in Forney was not dispositive on these facts, it is not dispositive here, but it may appropriately be considered among other circumstantial evidence on the question of whether the offense occurred during the nighttime.\nFinally, we note that the defendant offered several conflicting accounts of his whereabouts on the night in question. He initially told law enforcement officers that he had gone to the Game Room, played a few games, drunk a few beers, then had gone home around 11:00 p.m. At trial, defendant testified that he had gone to his girlfriend\u2019s house that night at 9:00 and stayed until 1:30 a.m. when he went home. Defendant did not call his girlfriend to testify on his behalf at trial. In rebuttal, Officer Parrott testified that he had seen the defendant with three other men drinking beer behind a feed store at 10:45 p.m. and had spoken with the defendant at that time.\nThe State concedes that any individual link in the chain of its circumstantial evidence on the \u201cnighttime\u201d element, taken alone, is probably insufficient to establish that element. It contends, however, and we agree, that the cumulative effect of this evidence, taken as a whole, is sufficiently substantial to withstand defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the burglary charge and to allow the issue to go to the jury for its determination of the question of fact beyond a reasonable doubt. See generally Annot., \u201cSufficiency of showing that burglary was committed at night,\u201d 82 A.L.R. 2d 643 (1962).\nB.\nDefendant next contends that the State failed to present evidence at trial sufficient to withstand his motion to dismiss on the basis that the State had not proved defendant was the person who committed the offenses. Defendant claims that the State\u2019s evidence as to the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator was comprised of inference based on inference; such method of inferring a defendant\u2019s guilt is not permitted in this State. \u201cA basic requirement of circumstantial evidence is reasonable inference from established facts. Inference may not be based on inference. Every inference must stand upon some clear and direct evidence, and not upon some other inference or presumption.\u201d State v. Byrd, 309 N.C. 132, 139, 305 S.E. 2d 724, 729 (1983) (quoting State v. Parker, 268 N.C. 258, 262, 150 S.E. 2d 428, 431 (1966)).\nThe State presented no direct evidence which placed the defendant inside the victim\u2019s house during the nighttime hours of 23 July 1983. However, the State produced direct evidence that defendant had been inside the victim\u2019s house at some time and that defendant was seen stepping onto the sidewalk one or two feet from the house at 2:00 a.m. on 23 July 1983 and that defendant displayed a large sum of money very shortly thereafter.\nThe State presented four important \u201cestablished facts\u201d which, taken together, lead to the reasonable inference that the defendant committed the offenses for which he was convicted. First, the State tendered the expert testimony of SBI crime laboratory latent evidence expert, Ricky Navarro. Mr. Navarro compared the shoe print found on the window side of the curtain from the victim\u2019s living room with the sole of the left boot defendant admitted he was wearing on the night in question. His comparison of the unique characteristics of the print and the sole of the boot led him to the conclusion that the print was made by defendant\u2019s left boot and by no other shoe. Defendant attacks this evidence on grounds that it does not meet the three-part test for the sufficiency of such circumstantial evidence set forth in State v. Palmer, 230 N.C. 205, 213, 52 S.E. 2d 908, 913 (1949), and clarified in State v. Jackson, 302 N.C. 101, 273 S.E. 2d 666 (1981).\nWhen the sufficiency of shoe print evidence is raised on appeal, the Court must determine whether the Palmer \u201ctriple inference\u201d test has been met by the evidence presented at trial:\nIn the nature of things, evidence of shoeprints has no legitimate or logical tendency to identify an accused as the perpetrator of a crime unless the attendant circumstances support this triple inference: (1) that the shoeprints were found at or near the place of the crime; (2) that the shoe-prints were made at the time of the crime; and (3) that the shoeprints correspond to shoes worn by the accused at the time of the crime.\nPalmer, 230 N.C. at 213, 52 S.E. 2d at 913. Although \u201cit is not necessary that a witness be qualified as an expert to entitle him to testify as to the identity of shoe prints and their correspondence with the shoes worn by a defendant,\u201d State v. Adkinson, 298 N.C. 673, 680, 259 S.E. 2d 858, 863 (1979), Mr. Navarro was qualified as an expert in latent print identification. He testified at great length and in great detail as to the basis of his conclusion that the boot print found on the curtain was made by defendant\u2019s left boot and by no other.\n\u201cNo doubt a witness to identity of footmarks should be required to specify the features on which he bases his judgment of identity; and then the strength of the inference should depend on the degree of accurate details to be ascribed to each feature and of the unique distinctiveness to be predicated of the total combination. . . .\u201d Wigmore on Evidence (3rd Ed.), section 415.\nPalmer, 230 N.C. at 214, 52 S.E. 2d at 914. There is no doubt that the first Palmer inference is sufficiently supported by the evidence at trial; the boot print was discovered on the backside or window side of a curtain lying on the floor of the victim\u2019s living room, \u201cat or near the place of the crime.\u201d Likewise, there is no doubt that the third Palmer inference is supported by the evidence; the expert\u2019s testimony was that the imprint could have been made by no other shoe. Defendant seems to be arguing that, because he testified at trial that he had made the boot print weeks earlier during a visit in the victim\u2019s home, the State failed to provide a sufficient basis for the second Palmer inference, thus causing the State\u2019s identity evidence to fail under Palmer.\nIn State v. Long, 293 N.C. 286, 237 S.E. 2d 728 (1977), as here, investigators were unable to state that a shoe print was made at the time of the crime although they were able to positively state that the print was made by defendant\u2019s shoe. The rationale in Long for finding that the second Palmer inference had been met is applicable here:\nAlthough both Officers Van Isenhour and Mooney admitted on cross-examination that the shoe print could have been made a month prior to the crime, Officer Mooney\u2019s testimony on direct examination that the shoe print corresponded with shoes taken from defendant at the time of his arrest was clearly competent as tending to connect the accused with the crime. The question whether the shoe print could have been impressed only at the time the crime was committed is a question of fact for the jury, not a question of law to be determined by the court prior to the admission of the evidence. State v. Irick, 291 N.C. 480, 231 S.E. 2d 833 (1977).\nLong, 293 N.C. at 296, 237 S.E. 2d at 734. Therefore, because the State presented evidence tending to connect defendant with the scene of the crime at or about the time the offenses were committed, including evidence that defendant was seen directly in front of the victim\u2019s home at 2:00 a.m. on the night in question, and that defendant admitted he was wearing the boots corresponding to the print found on the curtain inside the victim\u2019s home, there is strong evidence that the footprint was made at the time of the burglary. The curtain on which the print was found had been pulled down from over the window which the intruder broke and through which he entered. According to the daughter\u2019s testimony, the curtain was hanging over the window the day before. The location of the print on the back (or window) side of the curtain was consistent with the intruder having stepped on the back of the curtain as he entered through the broken window. The question of whether the print was impressed at the time the crime was committed was a question of fact properly left to the jury. Assuming, arguendo, that the \u201ctriple inference\u201d test of Palmer is required to be met when the shoe print evidence is proved by an expert, that test was met in this case, and defendant\u2019s contention that this evidence was insufficient as a matter of law has no merit.\nThe second important piece of circumstantial evidence connecting defendant with the crimes is the testimony of Mrs. Jona Medlin, SBI forensic serologist. Mrs. Medlin examined cigarette butts taken from defendant\u2019s home and the cigarette butt found in the victim\u2019s bedroom. She compared saliva from those cigarette butts and concluded that the saliva was produced by a person who is a \u201ctype A secretor.\u201d Mrs. Medlin\u2019s analysis of a sample of defendant\u2019s blood revealed that defendant is a type A secretor. She testified that thirty percent of the population of North Carolina falls into the type A secretor category. The State\u2019s evidence also indicated that the cigarettes were of the same brand.\nThe third evidentiary link is the testimony of Mr. Larry Kuykendall, the cab driver, who saw the defendant step onto the sidewalk directly in front of the victim\u2019s home at 2:00 a.m. and stuff something into his shirt. The State introduced into evidence the checked flannel shirt that the defendant admitted that he was wearing on the night in question. Mr. Kuykendall stated that the shirt appeared to be the shirt defendant was wearing when Mr. Kuykendall saw him.\nFinally, the State offered the testimony of defendant\u2019s cousin, Gene Ledford, who stated that he had seen the defendant around 2:00 a.m. on 23 July 1983 and that defendant was displaying a roll of paper money at that time. Ledford spoke with the defendant only minutes after Kuykendall had observed defendant step onto the sidewalk just in front of the victim\u2019s house. When defendant was arrested in the early hours of 25 July 1983, he had in his possession over $400.00, consisting of a one-hundred-dollar bill, four fifty-dollar bills, six twenty-dollar bills, and a one-dollar bill. The victim\u2019s daughter, Mrs. Rochelle Robinson, testified that she saw her mother leave $500.00, consisting of a couple of one-hundred-dollar bills, several fifty-dollar bills, and several twenty-dollar bills in a jar on the Wednesday prior to the assault. We find this evidence concerning defendant\u2019s possession of a large sum of money to be competent on the issue of whether defendant was the perpetrator of the offenses and that the weight and credibility of the evidence were properly before the jury. See, e.g., State v. Puckett, 211 N.C. 66, 74, 189 S.E. 183, 188 (1937); State v. Madden, 292 N.C. 114, 232 S.E. 2d 656 (1977). See generally An-not., \u201cEvidence of acquisition or possession of money; source of which is not traced as admissible against defendant in criminal case,\u201d 91 A.L.R. 2d 1046 (1963).\nIn sum, therefore, we hold that from the four important \u201cestablished facts\u201d offered by the State (the boot print evidence, the blood type evidence, the cab driver\u2019s statements, and the testimony of defendant\u2019s cousin), reasonable inferences could be drawn that the defendant was present inside the victim\u2019s house on the night in question and that he was the perpetrator of the offenses for which he was convicted. The defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charges was correctly denied.\nII.\nDefendant\u2019s next contention is that the trial court erred in allowing the State\u2019s pathologist, Dr. Robert Boatright, to testify that, in his opinion, the injuries suffered by the victim on 23 July 1983 \u201cwere a proximate cause of her death.\u201d Defendant argues that it was error to admit this testimony for two reasons: the statement constituted (1) an opinion as to the ultimate issue for the jury and (2) a legal conclusion. For the reasons stated below, we find no error in the admission of this testimony.\nDr. Boatright was tendered by the State and accepted without objection as an expert in the fields of pathology and medicine. He performed a post-mortem examination of the victim on 3 August 1983. During his direct examination at trial, the following exchange took place:\nQ. Dr. Boatright, do you have an opinion as a medical doctor, satisfactory to yourself, as to whether or not the trauma injuries that Nora Curtis had on the 23rd day of July, 1984 [sic], were a proximate cause of her death?\nMr. COWEN: Objection.\nThe Court.- Overruled.\nQ. And what is that opinion?\nA. My opinion is that they were a proximate cause of her death. May I explain the reasoning\u2014\nDefendant argues, first, that it was error to admit this expert testimony unqualified by the terms \u201ccould\u201d or \u201cmight.\u201d Defendant\u2019s contention is that, because the testimony was not limited by these terms, it amounted to an expression of opinion as to an ultimate issue in the case and invaded the province of the jury. Defendant relies on State v. Keen, 309 N.C. 158, 305 S.E. 2d 535 (1983), and State v. Brown, 300 N.C. 731, 268 S.E. 2d 201 (1980), for the proposition that expert medical testimony is properly admitted when \u201cthe witness testifies only that an event could or might have caused an injury but does not testify to the conclusion that the event did in fact cause the injury, unless his expertise leads him to the unmistakable conclusion . . . .\u201d Keen, 309 N.C. at 163, 305 S.E. 2d at 538; Brown, 300 N.C. at 733, 268 S.E. 2d at 203 (emphasis in original).\nDefendant did not object at trial to Dr. Boatright\u2019s qualification as an expert and does not now explain why Dr. Boatright\u2019s expertise limited him to forming an opinion only as to what could or might have caused the victim\u2019s death. Defendant\u2019s bare contention is that Dr. Boatright\u2019s expertise qualified him only to state what could or might have caused the victim\u2019s death, citing Patrick v. Treadwell, 222 N.C. 1, 21 S.E. 2d 818 (1942). The rule in Patrick has been clarified by modern case law and by statute. In Patrick, the medical expert testified that a second fracture of plaintiffs previously broken arm had, in fact, been caused by a car accident when there was no medical certainty that this was so. In Mann v. Transportation Co. and Tillett v. Transportation Co., 283 N.C. 734, 198 S.E. 2d 558 (1973), this Court said:\n[A]n expert witness should be allowed \u201cto make a positive assertion of causation when that conforms to his true opinion, reserving \u2018could\u2019 and \u2018might\u2019 for occasions when he feels less certainty\u201d; ... if the expert witness, \u201cthough holding a more positive opinion, is forced to adopt the \u2018could\u2019 or \u2018might\u2019 formula, then the result is patently unjust, unless the more positive opinion may be said to be inherently incredible.\u201d\nId. at 748, 198 S.E. 2d at 568 (citations omitted). The Court went on to explain that \u201c[w]hen a jury\u2019s inquiry relates to cause and effect in a field where special knowledge is required to answer the question, the purpose of expert testimony is likely to be thwarted or perverted unless the expert witness is allowed to express a positive opinion (if he has one) on the subject.\u201d Id. See also State v. Morgan, 299 N.C. 191, 205, 261 S.E. 2d 827, 835 (1980); State v. Wilkerson, 295 N.C. 559, 571, 247 S.E. 2d 905, 912 (1978); Taylor v. Boger, 289 N.C. 560, 565, 223 S.E. 2d 350, 353 (1976); Comment, Expert Medical Testimony: Differences Between the North Carolina Rules and Federal Rules of Evidence, 12 Wake Forest L. Rev. 833, 847-49 (1976).\nThe shift in emphasis away from the question of whether expert testimony \u201cinvades the province of the jury\u201d or expresses an opinion as to \u201can ultimate issue\u201d is further evidenced by the General Assembly\u2019s enactment in 1981 of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8-58.12 and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8-58.13 (repealed by 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 1037, \u00a7 9). Those statutes discard the formerly required use of the hypothetical question and permit an expert witness to testify in the form of an opinion if his or her scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.\nHere, the trial court properly allowed Dr. Boatright to express his positive opinion as to the cause of the victim\u2019s death, unqualified by the terms \u201ccould\u201d or \u201cmight.\u201d The trial judge, after accepting Dr. Boatright as an expert in pathology, properly con-eluded, pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8-58.13, then in effect, that Dr. Boatright\u2019s testimony would assist the jury in understanding his testimony and in determining a fact in issue. Defendant offered no evidence to the effect that Dr. Boatright\u2019s expertise could not lead him to the conclusion he expressed or that his testimony was \u201cinherently incredible.\u201d The cases relied upon by defendant state that \u201ccould\u201d or \u201cmight\u201d must be used only when the witness\u2019 expertise cannot lead him to an \u201cunmistakable conclusion.\u201d Keen, 309 N.C. at 163, 305 S.E. 2d at 538; Brown, 300 N.C. at 733, 268 S.E. 2d at 203. We also note that Dr. Boatright did not offer an opinion as to defendant\u2019s guilt or innocence. Brown, 300 N.C. at 735, 268 S.E. 2d at 204. Therefore, defendant\u2019s contention that Dr. Boatright\u2019s testimony as to the cause of Mrs. Curtis\u2019 death was improperly admitted as an expression of opinion as to an ultimate issue and thus invaded the province of the jury is without merit. See also N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 704 (effective 1 July 1984).\nDefendant\u2019s second basis for challenging admission of this testimony is that it constituted a legal conclusion. Defendant also seems to argue that Dr. Boatright\u2019s use of the term \u201cproximate cause\u201d in his answer to the prosecutor\u2019s question was improper because it constituted testimony that a legal standard had been met. Defendant seems to base this argument on a statement in 1 Brandis on North Carolina Evidence \u00a7 126, n.55 (2d rev. ed. 1982) to the effect that the principle excluding opinions on matters of law \u201cclearly bars opinion that a criminal defendant is \u2018guilty\u2019 or that a civil defendant was \u2018negligent\u2019 or that conduct was a \u2018proximate cause \u2019 of injury.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nWe have very recently stated that even under the new rules of evidence, an expert may not testify that a particular legal conclusion or standard has or has not been met, at least where the standard is a legal term of art which carries a specific legal meaning not readily apparent to the witness. State v. Smith, 315 N.C. 76, 337 S.E. 2d 833 (1985).\nDr. Boatright was the pathologist who examined the body of the deceased on autopsy. He testified that he found, inter alia, an embolus, or blood clot, blocking the major arteries from the heart to the lungs, resulting in her death. Then followed the portion of his testimony which is the subject of defendant\u2019s argument:\nQ. Do you have an opinion, Dr. Boatright, satisfactory to yourself as to what caused the death of Mrs. Curtis?\nA. Yes sir, a clot of blood moved from her vessels, the veins in her legs, through her heart and to the artery to the lungs and blocked it.\nQ. What does that do, sir?\nA. This dams up the flow of blood. And does not let the blood go around it. Almost as if you would drive a cork into the artery.\nQ. Dr. Boatright, you heard the testimony here a few minutes ago of Dr. Bill Owen, is that correct?\nA. Yes sir, I did.\nQ. Did you hear his description of the trauma, the injury, that Mrs. Curtis \u2014that he observed on Mrs. Curtis on July 23rd?\nA. Yes sir, I did.\nQ. Did you hear his testimony as to her condition in the hospital and the course of her stay in the hospital?\nA. Yes sir, I did.\nQ. Dr. Boatright, do you have an opinion as a medical doctor, satisfactory to yourself, as to whether or not the trauma injuries that Nora Curtis had on the 23rd day of July, 1984 [sic], were a proximate cause of her death?\nMr. CoweN: Objection.\nThe Court: Overruled.\nQ. And what is that opinion?\nA. My opinion is that they were a proximate cause of her death. May I explain the reasoning\u2014\nQ. Yes sir, I would ask you the basis for that opinion?\nA. The blood circulates in the body with no intrinsic pump or no pressure behind it, different from the arteries. The legs are the fartherest [sic] from the heart. The blood in these vessels in the legs is lying there. And the movement of muscles surrounding these vessels propels this blood to the heart normally \u2014 comes under very low pressure, but the muscles and activity keep the blood flowing. When a person, particularly an old person, is put into bed this blood does not move because the muscles are not moving. It begins to stagnate, particularly in areas where the valves are partial\u2014 valves to aid in the flow of blood to permit it to go only one way towards the heart. Due to this settling of blood, a clot forms. This clot will set there in this vessel. It will grow because it has blocked the blood near the heart. The smaller veins distal to it become clogged up. In some instances, as it did in this case, the clot breaks loose. When it breaks loose, it flows through the body. The veins become larger as it goes from the legs to the heart; so there is no obstruction. However, once you go through the heart and back out to the lungs, the vessel is much smaller leaving the heart than the vessel entering the heart. Therefore, the \u2014 if we may say, it\u2019s like a cork or log in a river; when it gets to the narrow part, it plugs up the flow. This plugs up the flow and for all practical purposes stops the circulation of blood, resulting in death.\nQ. How did the trauma injuries contribute to that?\nA. They stopped her having her usual activity \u2014 being up and around. They put her in the hospital in pain,'unable to move or painful for her to move; very much restricted the use of her legs; therefore the use of the muscle pumping the veins to get the blood out of her legs.\nQ. Thank you, sir. That would be all.\nIn addition to his objection, the defendant moved to strike this testimony as \u201cnot being based on any opinion based on medical expertise.\u201d The trial judge denied the motion.\nWe first address defendant\u2019s argument that Dr. Boatright\u2019s testimony constituted a legal conclusion. The well-established rule is that opinion testimony to the effect that a defendant\u2019s conduct caused injury or death is clearly inadmissible as a legal conclusion. However, Dr. Boatright did not attempt to state an opinion as to any conduct which caused Mrs. Curtis\u2019 death; he merely gave his expert medical opinion that the injuries he observed were the proximate cause of Mrs. Curtis\u2019 death. This testimony relates to a medical conclusion which Dr. Boatright was fully qualified to make. It clearly did not address a legal conclusion or standard. Dr. Boatright could not and did not testify that, in his opinion, defendant\u2019s alleged conduct on 23 July caused Mrs. Curtis\u2019 subsequent death on 3 August. That question was properly left to the jury.\nNext, we address defendant\u2019s argument that Dr. Boatright\u2019s use of the term \u201cproximate cause\u201d constituted testimony that a legal standard had been met. We observe that the question related to whether the trauma injuries of 23 July were a \u201cproximate cause\u201d of death. In effect, the question asks, \u201cWas the blood clot, which you conclude was the cause of death, caused by the trauma injuries, and therefore were the trauma injuries a proximate cause of death?\u201d Dr. Boatright responded directly to the question in the affirmative and even employed the term \u201cproximate cause.\u201d The prosecutor\u2019s question incorporated the term \u201cproximate cause,\u201d a legal standard familiar to lawyers. In Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1103 (5th ed. 1979), we find \u201cproximate cause\u201d defined as \u201cthat which, in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.\u201d The \u201cpopular\u201d meaning of the term \u201cproximate cause\u201d is approximately the same as the legal meaning. Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 1828 (1966) defines \u201cproximate cause\u201d as \u201ca cause which directly or with no mediate agency produces an effect;\nWe conclude that this portion of Dr. Boatright\u2019s testimony did purport to state that a legal standard had been met and its admission was therefore error. We also conclude, however, that this error was not so prejudicial as to warrant a new trial. After answering the prosecutor\u2019s question in the affirmative, Dr. Boat-right asked, and was permitted, to explain his reasoning. He explained, in considerable detail, that Mrs. Curtis\u2019 being bedridden caused a clot to form which traveled to the lung and lodged there, stopping the circulation of blood and resulting in death.\nThis explanation does not address the relationship between the conduct of the defendant and the death, but relates only to the relationship among the deceased\u2019s bedridden condition, the blood clot, and her death. Dr. Boatright had previously been permitted to give testimony without objection, that the cause of death was the pulmonary embolus or blood clot. We conclude that though the admission of the prosecutor\u2019s question and Dr. Boat-right\u2019s brief affirmative answer was error, there is no reasonable possibility that, had the error not been committed, a different result would have been reached at the trial. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1443 (1983).\nIII.\nThe defendant\u2019s next argument concerns the ten-year sentence he received on the felonious larceny conviction.\nThe defendant was convicted of first-degree murder under the felony-murder rule with the underlying felony being the first-degree burglary. He was also convicted of first-degree burglary, assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury, and felonious larceny. After the jury recommended life imprisonment for the first-degree murder, the defendant was sentenced on the various charges.\nThe murder, burglary, and assault convictions were listed on one Judgment and Commitment form; the felonious larceny conviction was placed on another form. The trial judge went on to state that the burglary and assault convictions merged with the first-degree murder conviction as a matter of law. On a Findings form which listed the file number of the murder charge, 83CRS4979, the trial court found three aggravating circumstances: that the offense was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; that the victim was very old; and that the defendant has a prior conviction or convictions for criminal offenses punishable by more than sixty days confinement. The trial court found no mitigating circumstances. The defendant was then sentenced to the mandatory term of life imprisonment for the first-degree murder conviction.\nOn the felonious larceny charge, the trial judge stated that he found the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances, and he imposed the maximum ten-year sentence, which was ordered to run consecutive to the life sentence. However, the trial judge failed to list the findings in aggravation and mitigation on the Judgment and Commitment form which contained the felonious larceny charge.\nInitially, we note that although the Judgment and Commitment form might tend to give the impression that the burglary conviction was consolidated for sentencing with the first-degree murder conviction, this is not what actually occurred. The sentencing hearing transcript reveals that the trial judge stated, \u201cThe first degree burglary and the assault, of course, by law merge into the murder charge.\u201d This statement clearly indicates that the trial judge recognized that the burglary, being the underlying felony, merged with the first-degree murder conviction. The trial judge, however, was incorrect in stating that the assault \u201cmerged\u201d into the murder charge. We conclude that under the facts of this case, the defendant could not be convicted of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury.\nPrior to 1969, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-32 (1953) provided:\nAssault with deadly weapon with intent to kill resulting in injury. \u2014 Any person who assaults another with a deadly weapon with intent to kill, and inflicts serious injury not resulting in death, shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment in the State prison or be worked under the supervision of the State Highway and Public Works Commission for a period not less than four months nor more than ten years.\nIn order to obtain a conviction under this statute, the State was required to prove the following elements: (1) an assault, (2) with a deadly weapon, (3) with intent to kill, (4) resulting in the infliction of serious injury, (5) which falls short of causing death. State v. Meadows, 272 N.C. 327, 158 S.E. 2d 638 (1968); State v. Jones, 258 N.C. 89, 128 S.E. 2d 1 (1962). It was therefore clear that if the assault resulted in the death of the victim, the defendant could not be convicted of this offense, as one of the essential elements of the crime would be lacking.\nIn 1969, the statute was amended to provide:\nAssault with a firearm or other deadly weapon with intent to kill or inflicting serious injury; punishments. \u2014 (a) Any person who assaults another person with a firearm or other deadly weapon of any kind with intent to kill and inflict serious injury is guilty of a felony punishable under G.S. 14-2.\n(b) Any person who assaults another person with a firearm or other deadly weapon per se and inflicts serious injury is guilty of a felony punishable by a fine or imprisonment for not more than five years, or both such fine and imprisonment.\n(c) Any person who assaults another person with a firearm with intent to kill is guilty of a felony punishable by a fine or imprisonment for not more than five years, or both such fine and imprisonment.\nSubsequent amendments deleted the word \u201cfirearm\u201d and altered the degree of punishment which could be imposed. 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 765, \u00a7 1; 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 229, \u00a7\u00a7 1-3; 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 760, \u00a7 5. Present N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-32(b) (under which defendant was convicted) provides: \u201cAny person who assaults another person with a deadly weapon and inflicts serious injury shall be punished as a Class H felon.\u201d\nIn a case arising after the 1969 amendment, we said that under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-32(b), the term \u201cinflicts serious injury\u201d means a physical or bodily injury resulting from an assault with a deadly weapon which, though serious, falls short of causing death. State v. Joyner, 295 N.C. 55, 243 S.E. 2d 367 (1978). Therefore, while the statute no longer expressly articulates the requirement that the assault not result in death, Joyner makes it clear that if the State proves to the satisfaction of the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the assaultive conduct resulted in death, it has disproven the \u201cserious injury\u201d element because \u201cserious injury\u201d necessarily must be injury that falls short of death. If a victim dies as the result of an assault, a defendant cannot be convicted of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury for that particular assaultive conduct.\nHere, the evidence clearly shows that the assaultive conduct which formed the basis of the assault charge resulted in the victim\u2019s death. No other assault independent of the one causing death took place. Since the State failed to introduce evidence of an assault which did not result in the victim\u2019s death, we vacate the defendant\u2019s conviction for assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury.\nThe defendant also contends that an examination of the record clearly shows that the trial judge violated the Fair Sentencing Act, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.4 (1985), in sentencing him to a term in excess of the presumptive for the felonious larceny conviction. Defendant contends that there are two ways of reading this record. First, he suggests that the record could be interpreted as indicating that the trial judge made no findings in aggravation or mitigation as to the felonious larceny conviction, yet sentenced defendant to the maximum punishment provided by law for that offense. If that were the case, a failure to make these findings would require that the sentence for felonious larceny be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing. Defendant suggests that another interpretation of the record would infer that the trial judge made findings in aggravation and mitigation for all of the offenses together, without separating them as to each offense. If that were the case, the same result would be reached because this Court has held that separate findings must be made for each offense, even if the cases are consolidated for hearing. State v. Ahearn, 307 N.C. 584, 300 S.E. 2d 689 (1983):\nWe therefore hold that in every case in which the sentencing judge is required to make findings in aggravation and mitigation to' support a sentence which varies from the presumptive term, each offense, whether consolidated for hearing or not, must be treated separately, and separately supported by findings tailored to the individual offense and applicable only to that offense.\nId. at 598, 300 S.E. 2d at 698.\nDefendant notes that while some or all of the aggravating factors found by the trial judge could possibly be found to be proper in aggravation of the burglary charge, this charge merged by law with the first-degree murder charge. Defendant contends that only one of the aggravating factors \u2014 prior convictions punishable by more than sixty days imprisonment \u2014 could properly aggravate the felonious larceny conviction; and the other two aggravating factors \u2014 that the victim was very old and that the offense was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel \u2014 are unrelated to the felonious larceny charge and are unsupported by the evidence. For these reasons, defendant argues that these factors cannot properly be used to aggravate the offense of felonious larceny.\nThe State contends that a mere clerical error resulted in the file number of the first-degree murder offense being placed on the Findings form and that the trial judge intended his findings to relate only to the felonious larceny conviction, thus properly escalating the punishment to the ten-year maximum. The State notes that the Judgment and Commitment form for the first-degree murder is marked to indicate that no written findings were made because the prison term imposed is one required by law, i.e., life imprisonment, and that the Judgment and Commitment form for the felonious larceny is marked to indicate that written findings were, in fact, found though they appear on the other sheet. The State contends that those findings are contained in the Findings form which was erroneously marked with the first-degree murder file number. The State also argues that mere clerical error must be responsible for the confusion because the murder conviction is not subject to the Fair Sentencing Act or the presumptive terms set out in that act. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.1 (1983). The State suggests that there was no Ahearn violation and that this Court should remand the matter to the trial court for an order correcting the clerical error to show the felonious larceny file number on the Findings form.\nAfter a careful examination of the record, we conclude that the defendant is entitled to a new sentencing hearing on the felonious larceny conviction. If there was no clerical error, the trial judge clearly erred by sentencing the defendant to a term in excess of the presumptive sentence without making written findings in aggravation and mitigation. If there was a clerical error, the trial judge still erred by finding two aggravating circumstances \u2014 that the victim was very old and- that the offense was especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel \u2014 which are, under the facts of this case, totally unrelated to the crime of felonious larceny. We therefore vacate the ten-year sentence for the felonious larceny conviction and remand for a new sentencing hearing.\nIV.\nFinally, defendant contends that the practice of \u201cdeath-qualifying\u201d the jury before the guilt-innocence phase of his trial resulted in a jury biased in favor of the prosecution on the issue of guilt and deprived him of a fair trial. We have consistently rejected such arguments. E.g., State v. Noland, 312 N.C. 1, 320 S.E. 2d 642 (1984), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 84 L.Ed. 2d 369, reh\u2019g denied, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 85 L.Ed. 2d 342 (1985); State v. Maynard, 311 N.C. 1, 316 S.E. 2d 197, cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 83 L.Ed. 2d 299 (1984). This assignment of error is without merit.\nIn summary, then, we hold that the trial court committed no error in the guilt-innocence phase of defendant\u2019s trial. We vacate the defendant\u2019s conviction for assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury in file number 83CRS4981. We also vacate the ten-year sentence for felonious larceny in file number 83CRS4982 and remand the matter to the Superior Court, Haywood County, for a new sentencing hearing on the felonious larceny conviction.\nNo. 83CRS4979 \u2014First-degree murder \u2014 no error.\nNo. 83CRS4981 \u2014Assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury \u2014 conviction vacated.\nNo. 83CRS4982 \u2014 Felonious larceny \u2014 sentence vacated and remanded for resentencing.", "type": "majority", "author": "MEYER, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by Tiare B. Smiley, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "Ann B. Petersen for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RICKY DALE LEDFORD\nNo. 452A84\n(Filed 18 February 1986)\n1. Burglary and Unlawful Breakings \u00a7 5.2; Homicide \u00a7 21.6\u2014 first degree murder \u2014 felony murder \u2014 first degree burglary \u2014 time of offense \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThere was no merit to defendant\u2019s contention that his conviction for first degree murder must be reversed because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each and every element of the underlying felony, first degree burglary, particularly that the offense was committed during the nighttime, where the evidence tended to show that the last person to see the victim was her daughter; when the daughter left the victim\u2019s house at 3:00 p.m. on a Friday afternoon, the front window of the house was intact and the living room curtains were hanging straight; another of the victim\u2019s relatives saw the window on the following Saturday morning as she drove to work, and the window was broken; the curtain and broken glass were later found lying inside the room; a cab driver testified that, as he drove his taxi down the victim\u2019s street just before 2:00 a.m. on Saturday morning, he recognized defendant, whom he had known all of defendant\u2019s life, stepping onto the sidewalk in front of the victim\u2019s house; though it was dark, there were three streetlights in the vicinity; defendant did not acknowledge the cab driver\u2019s greeting but instead pushed something up under his shirt and kept walking; defendant\u2019s cousin testified that, while waiting for his paper route newspapers to be delivered around 2:00 a.m. on Saturday morning, he saw defendant walking toward a store from the direction of the victim\u2019s house; defendant displayed a roll of paper money, stating that he had been given the money in a gun deal; the victim\u2019s grandson found his grandmother bleeding and bruised in her bloodstained bed, wearing her pajamas, shortly after 9:00 a.m. on Saturday morning; and defendant offered several conflicting accounts as to his whereabouts on the night in question.\n2. Homicide \u00a7 21.4; Criminal Law \u00a7 61.2\u2014 first degree murder \u2014 identity of perpetrator \u2014 boot print \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe State\u2019s evidence with regard to defendant as the perpetrator of the crime was sufficient to be submitted to the jury where it tended to show that a boot print on the window side of a curtain in the victim\u2019s living room was made by the left boot which defendant was wearing on the night of the crime; cigarette butts taken from defendant\u2019s home and the cigarette butt taken from the nonsmoking victim\u2019s bedroom were the same brand; saliva on those cigarette butts was produced by a \u201ctype A secretor\u201d; defendant was a type A secretor, as was 30% of the North Carolina population; a cab driver saw defendant step onto the sidewalk directly in front of the victim\u2019s home at 2:00 a.m. and stuff something into his shirt; the State introduced the checked flannel shirt which defendant admitted he was wearing on the night in question, and the cab driver stated that the shirt appeared to be the one defendant was wearing when the cab driver saw him; defendant\u2019s cousin testified that he saw defendant at 2:00 a.m. on the day in question and defendant was displaying a roll of paper money at that time; the cousin saw defendant only minutes after the cab driver had seen him in front of the victim\u2019s house; and when defendant was arrested in the early hours two days later, he had in his possession over $400 consisting of bills similar in denomination to those which the victim had placed in a jar in her home two days before the assault.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 61.2\u2014 boot print \u2014 admissibility of evidence\nThere was no merit to defendant\u2019s contention that shoe print evidence was inadmissible because it did not meet the three-part test for sufficiency of such circumstantial evidence set forth in State v. Palmer, 230 N.C. 205, since the boot print in question was discovered on the backside or window side of a curtain lying on the floor of the victim\u2019s living room \u201cat or near the place of the crime\u201d; the expert testified that the print could have been made only by defendant\u2019s left boot and by no other shoe; and there was evidence tending to connect defendant with the scene of the crime at or about the time the offenses were committed, including evidence that defendant was seen directly in front of the victim\u2019s home at 2:00 a.m. on the night in question and that defendant admitted he was wearing the boots corresponding to the print found on the curtain inside the victim\u2019s home.\n4. Homicide \u00a7 15.5\u2014 expert opinion testimony \u2014 proximate cause of death \u2014 failure to use \u201ccould\u201d or \u201cmight\u201d\nThere was no merit to defendant\u2019s contention that, because a pathologist\u2019s testimony that injuries suffered by the victim on the date of the crime \u201cwere a proximate cause of her death\u201d was not limited by the terms \u201ccould\u201d or \u201cmight,\u201d it amounted to an expression of opinion as to an ultimate issue in the case and invaded the province of the jury, since the trial court accepted the witness as an expert in pathology; defendant did not object; the court properly concluded that the witness\u2019s testimony would assist the jury in understanding his testimony and in determining a fact in issue; defendant offered no evidence to the effect that the witness\u2019s expertise could not lead him to the conclusion he expressed or that his testimony was inherently incredible; and the witness did not offer an opinion as to defendant\u2019s guilt or innocence. N.C.G.S. 8-58.13.\n5. Homicide \u00a7 15.5\u2014 expert opinion testimony \u2014 proximate cause of death \u2014 admission erroneous \u2014 no prejudice\nTestimony by a pathologist in a murder prosecution that injuries sustained by the victim during the assault \u201cwere a proximate cause of her death\u201d did not constitute a legal conclusion but did constitute testimony that a legal standard had been met, and its admission was therefore error; however, there was no reasonable possibility that, had the error not been committed, a different result would have been reached at trial.\n6. Assault and Battery \u00a7 4\u2014 death resulting from assault \u2014 conviction for assault improper\nIf a victim dies as the result of an assault, a defendant cannot be convicted of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury for that particular assaultive conduct; therefore, defendant\u2019s conviction for assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury is vacated since the State failed to introduce evidence of an assault which did not result in the victim\u2019s death.\n7. Criminal Law \u00a7 138; Larceny \u00a7 10\u2014 sentence \u2014clerical error \u2014 improper aggravating factors\nDefendant is entitled to a new sentencing hearing on his felonious larceny conviction where the State contended that a mere clerical error resulted in the file number of the first degree murder offense being placed on the Findings form and that the trial judge intended his findings to relate only to the felonious larceny conviction, thus properly escalating the punishment to the ten year maximum, but if there was a clerical error, the trial judge erred by finding two aggravating circumstances \u2014that the victim was very old and that the offense was especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel \u2014 which were, under the facts of this case, totally unrelated to the crime of felonious larceny, and if there was no clerical error, the trial judge clearly erred by sentencing defendant to a term in excess of the presumptive sentence without making written findings in aggravation and mitigation.\nBEFORE Burroughs, J., at the 16 April 1984 Criminal Session of Superior Court, HAYWOOD County. Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, first-degree burglary, felony larceny, and assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury. The death-qualified jury recommended life imprisonment for the conviction of first-degree murder committed during the perpetration of first-degree burglary. On the Judgment and Commitment form, it appears that the assault conviction was consolidated for sentencing with the first-degree murder, and the judge sentenced defendant to life imprisonment upon the jury\u2019s recommendation. Defendant was separately sentenced to a consecutive term of ten years for the larceny conviction. Defendant appeals his life sentence as a matter of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a). His motion to bypass the Court of Appeals on his appeal of the ten-year sentence was allowed by this Court on 14 March 1985. Heard in the Supreme Court 17 October 1985.\nLacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by Tiare B. Smiley, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nAnn B. Petersen for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0599-01", "first_page_order": 627, "last_page_order": 654 }