{ "id": 4718276, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM THOMAS RIDDICK", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Riddick", "decision_date": "1986-02-18", "docket_number": "No. 113A85", "first_page": "749", "last_page": "761", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "315 N.C. 749" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "144 S.E. 2d 865", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "265 N.C. 703", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8576849 ], "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/265/0703-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 S.E. 2d 915", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "920" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "244 N.C. 701", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2219506 ], "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "707" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/244/0701-01" ] }, { "cite": "239 S.E. 2d 406", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "293 N.C. 633", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566760 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/293/0633-01" ] }, { "cite": "294 S.E. 2d 314", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "318", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 526", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571481 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "532", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0526-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 S.E. 2d 118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "261 S.E. 2d 114", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573434 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 S.E. 2d 649", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "651-52" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560587 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "65-66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "287 S.E. 2d 818", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "821" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 238", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567356 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0238-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 S.E. 2d 829", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "833" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 770", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4755941 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "777" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0770-01" ] }, { "cite": "334 S.E. 2d 741", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 460", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4685694 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0460-01" ] }, { "cite": "50 L.Ed. 2d 301", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "429 U.S. 932", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 7686, 5955, 6294, 7343 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/429/0932-03", "/us/429/0932-04", "/us/429/0932-01", "/us/429/0932-02" ] }, { "cite": "226 S.E. 2d 10", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "18" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "290 N.C. 148", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560710 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "160" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/290/0148-01" ] }, { "cite": "206 S.E. 2d 229", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "236" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 N.C. 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565214 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "492" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/285/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 S.E. 2d 644", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "652" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 528", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558765 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "539" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0528-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 997, "char_count": 28521, "ocr_confidence": 0.803, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.583165425028393e-07, "percentile": 0.9812689851802171 }, "sha256": "114164a361f128867ba5f46b5a40f3ecf6e0e977dd2567ac8afa3440e5ec2f30", "simhash": "1:a7e5622e76309478", "word_count": 4972 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:13:08.433452+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM THOMAS RIDDICK" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MITCHELL, Justice.\nBy his assignments, the defendant contends that the trial court made several errors. He contends the trial court erred by allowing witnesses to respond to leading questions, to questions for which a proper foundation had not been laid, and to a question that assumed facts not yet in evidence. The defendant also contends the trial court erred by admitting irrelevant testimony and by allowing a witness not qualified as an expert to give opinion testimony. Finally, he contends that the trial court erred by denying his motions to dismiss the charges against him. We find no error.\nThe State\u2019s evidence tended to show that on the night of 12 January 1984, the Elizabeth City Fire Department responded to an alarm for a fire at 208 Oak Grove Avenue. The house which burned was the dwelling place of Ruth Cowell and her four children: Don Earl Davis, Michele Cowell, Latoyia Cowell and Lateyia Cowell. The defendant, William Thomas Riddick, was living with them at the time of the fire. Lateyia Cowell was killed as a result of the fire, and Latoyia and Don were burned.\nAround 10:00 p.m. on 12 January 1984, Marie Brooks looked out of her window and across the street and saw smoke coming from 208 Oak Grove. She told her daughter to call the fire department. Her daughter called the fire department and reported the fire. By that time Ruth Cowell\u2019s house at 208 Oak Grove was \u201cin blazes.\u201d\nMichele Cowell, eleven years old, testified that she lived at 208 Oak Grove with her mother Ruth Cowell, the defendant William Riddick, and her three siblings. Approximately four days before the fire, Vernon Brooks, Ruth\u2019s friend and Lateyia\u2019s father, picked up Ruth and the children. They stayed at various places and went to Godley Temple\u2019s house on the day of the fire. Ruth sent Michele to the defendant\u2019s shop to ask him to send her food stamps and a television. The defendant told Michele that Ruth would have to come and get them. The defendant later came to Godley Temple\u2019s house. Upon his assurances that he would not beat Ruth anymore, Ruth told her daughters to get into the defendant\u2019s car. The defendant took the girls to his shop where they were later joined by Ruth and Don.\nAt nightfall Ruth and her four children left the shop and went to 208 Oak Grove with the defendant. It was cold in the house, so the defendant lit a fire in the wood heater located in the living room by putting wood, paper, and kerosene in the heater. He got the kerosene from a can located on the back porch and returned the can to the porch. Michele testified that this was the first time that she had seen the defendant put kerosene in the wood heater. No other heater was lit in the house that night.\nMichele got a quilt, and she and Lateyia covered up on a chair located about one foot from the heater and fell asleep. Ruth and Latoyia went to sleep on a couch in the bedroom. The defendant was in the kitchen.\nMichele testified that she was awakened when she felt something warm on her back. She turned and saw fire in the kitchen and going into the dining room. The room she was in was also on fire with fire coming from the wood heater and spreading. Michele smelled a strong odor of kerosene. She felt for Lateyia but could not find her. She moved a table that was in her way and went out the front door. She then heard Lateyia and Latoyia crying in the house.\nMichele went to the house of a neighbor, Mr. Lamb, and then to the house of Miss Spellman, another neighbor. While at Miss Spellman\u2019s she heard the defendant say: \u201cUmm that house caught on fire like that.\u201d He also said: \u201cThat was a lot of money riding on this fire.\u201d and \u201cI messed up.\u201d The defendant was smiling when he came to Miss Spellman\u2019s from the fire.\nMichele testified that the defendant treated Lateyia \u201ckind of mean.\u201d He forced a hotdog down her throat once because she ate slowly. He would make her stand on one leg on a chair if she did something wrong, and if she put the other leg down he \u201cwould beat her.\u201d Michele also testified that she had seen the defendant throw Lateyia down and \u201c[t]ake her by the back of the neck and pick her up.\u201d\nRuth Davis Cowell testified that she and her children left the house at 208 Oak Grove for four days because she and the defendant had been arguing. While they were running errands before returning home on the night of the fire, the defendant purchased kerosene which he put in a five gallon can and placed in the back of the truck. After the defendant started the fire in the wood heater, he carried a kerosene heater into the bedroom. Ruth then fell asleep. She was awakened by the defendant who pulled her and said: \u201cGet out. The house is on fire.\u201d He pulled her from the house. Then he ran around the house calling Don and breaking out windows. When Ruth was awakened she detected a strong odor of kerosene.\nRuth testified that she had a $5,000 life insurance policy on each of her four children. She is the beneficiary of each policy and received payment under the policy on Lateyia. She had attempted to make the defendant a beneficiary but was unsuccessful because he was not a relative.\nRuth\u2019s son Don testified that when he came home the night of the fire, he went to the kitchen and warmed food for everyone. He ate some cake, and went to the back bedroom where he fell asleep. Next, he heard the defendant calling him, so he went to the back door but could not get it open. When Don first came out of the bedroom he \u201csmelled something like gas . . . .\u201d The house was full of smoke and fire. He finally got the back door open and escaped. His ears and nose were burned. Don also testified that this was the first time he had seen the defendant use kerosene to light the wood heater. He corroborated Michele\u2019s accounts of the defendant\u2019s treatment of Lateyia.\nLouise A. Spellman lived next door to 208 Oak Grove Avenue. The defendant came to her house the day following the fire. Her testimony concerning the conversation she had with the defendant on that occasion included the following:\nQ. And did you \u2014what, if anything, did he \u2014 did he say about money?\nA. Well, we were talking about the children and he said to me \u201cThere is a lot of money riding on those children.\u201d So I said, \u201cHow do you know?\u201d He said \u201cI ought to know. I helped pay it sometime.\u201d\nQ. Pay what?\nA. The insurance.\nShe also testified that the defendant brought up the subject of insurance on the children\u2019s lives, and that she had never mentioned the subject to him because it was none of her business.\nJames Michael Meads testified he was one of the firemen who responded to the alarm for the fire at 208 Oak Grove Avenue. He entered the flaming house and rescued Latoyia. He also found Lateyia dead in the living room and described her as \u201c[a] mass of burnt tissue.\u201d\nLieutenant James Stanley, an eleven-year veteran with the fire department, also responded to the alarm. He stated that: \u201c[In] my opinion, a flammable liquid was used or was burning at this residence.\u201d Specifically, he testified that in his opinion a flammable liquid was burning \u201c[i]n the living room trailing backwards to the kitchen.\u201d\nCecil Richardson, Jr. and Floyd Douglas Allen were found by the trial court to be experts on the origin and causes of the fire. Both witnesses corroborated Stanley\u2019s testimony regarding the presence of a flammable liquid. Allen testified that in his opinion two and one-half to five gallons of a flammable liquid were poured onto the floor at the time of the fire. Richardson examined the kerosene heater located in the bedroom shared by Ruth Cowell and the defendant. He testified that it showed no signs of having been used and contained no fuel. Allen testified that the kerosene heater in the bedroom was not associated with the fire\u2019s origin.\nThe defendant testified in his own behalf and offered several character witnesses. He testified that on the night of the fire he refueled the kerosene heater in the bedroom and the woodburning heater in the living room and started fires in both. He then went to get some water. When he returned and opened the bedroom door, fire rushed out at him. The defendant testified that he did not pour kerosene on the floor nor did he set fire to the house or have any intention to harm the children or Ruth. He said that he considered Ruth and her children his family and would not hurt them.\nBy his first assignment of error, the defendant contends that the trial court committed prejudicial error by allowing Michele Cowell and Don Davis to respond to leading questions asked by the prosecutor. \u201cA leading question is generally defined as one which suggests the desired response and may frequently be answered yes or no.\u201d State v. Britt, 291 N.C. 528, 539, 231 S.E. 2d 644, 652 (1977). The general rule is that leading questions should be asked only on cross-examination. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 611(c) (Cum. Supp. 1985). However, a trial judge must \u201cexercise reasonable control over the mode ... of interrogating witnesses . . . .\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 611(a) (Cum. Supp. 1985). Leading questions should be permitted on direct examination when necessary to develop the witness\u2019s testimony. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 611(c) (Cum. Supp. 1985). Among other things, this means that it is within the discretionary power of the trial judge to allow leading questions on direct examination. Counsel may be allowed to lead a witness on direct examination when the witness has difficulty in understanding the question because of immaturity or advanced age. See State v. Greene, 285 N.C. 482, 492, 206 S.E. 2d 229, 236 (1974). Rulings by the trial judge on the use of leading questions are discretionary and reversible only for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Smith, 290 N.C. 148, 160, 226 S.E. 2d 10, 18, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 932, 50 L.Ed. 2d 301 (1976).\nWe assume arguendo that all of the questions directed to these two witnesses and assigned as error were leading. Michele Cowell was eleven years old and Don Davis was fifteen years old at the time of trial. Both had trouble in understanding certain questions asked of them. A trial court may be reversed for abuse of discretion only upon a showing that its ruling was manifestly unsupported by reason and could not have been the result of a reasoned decision. State v. Hayes, 314 N.C. 460, 334 S.E. 2d 741 (1985); White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E. 2d 829, 833 (1985). We find no such abuse of discretion by the trial court in allowing the questions to be asked and answered.\nBy his next assignment the defendant contends that the trial court erred by overruling his objection to a question asked Michele Cowell regarding statements allegedly made by the defendant. Michele\u2019s testimony was that she heard the defendant say: \u201cThat was a lot of money riding on this fire.\u201d and \u201cI messed up.\u201d The defendant argues that the prosecutor did not establish a proper foundation for the question because he did not show the proximity of the witness to the defendant and, thus, there was no evidence that the witness could hear the defendant.\nThe North Carolina Rules of Evidence state that: \u201cA witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that he has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but need not, consist of the testimony of the witness himself.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 602 (Cum. Supp. 1985). Michele\u2019s testimony that she in fact heard the defendant make the statements in question ipso facto amounted to testimony that she had the ability to hear him make those statements. No more was required to establish her personal knowledge under Rule 602, but the defendant was, of course, free to cross-examine her as to such matters. In the present case, however, Michele\u2019s testimony also established that she was near the defendant when she heard him make the statements. The testimony of Michele was sufficient to show her ability to perceive and hear the defendant\u2019s statements and thus, to support a finding that she had personal knowledge of the matters in question. This assignment of error is meritless.\nBy his next assignment of error the defendant contends that the trial court erred by overruling his objections to questions asked of Michele Cowell and Don Davis as to what they could smell while in the house. The defendant argues that these questions assumed facts not yet in evidence because they assumed there was something present to be smelled, i.e., a flammable liquid.\nAssuming arguendo that the trial court erred by overruling the defendant\u2019s objections to such questions, we perceive no resulting prejudice to the defendant. The record is replete with evidence that kerosene was in the home at all times in question and had been used by the defendant to start the fire in the wood heater. Therefore, there would have been nothing remarkable about an odor of kerosene in the house. For these reasons there was no reasonable possibility that a different result would have been reached at trial had the errors in question not been committed. The defendant has shown no prejudice resulting from such errors. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1443 (1983).\nThe defendant next assigns as error the admission of testimony tending to show that he physically mistreated Ruth Cowell when she returned home after spending time elsewhere. This assignment is without merit. The North Carolina Rules of Evidence provide that: \u201c \u2018Relevant evidence\u2019 means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 401 (Cum. Supp. 1985). Generally, all relevant evidence is admissible. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 402 (Cum. Supp. 1985). We conclude that the evidence complained of was admissible as it tended to show the defendant\u2019s motives and state of mind at the time the crimes occurred. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b) (Cum. Supp. 1985). Although motive is not an element of any of the crimes for which the defendant stands convicted, his motives and state of mind at the time of the fire certainly were facts \u201cof consequence to the determination of the action. . . .\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 401 (Cum. Supp. 1985). The trial court did not err by admitting such evidence.\nThe defendant also assigns as error the trial court\u2019s ruling allowing Lieutenant James Stanley, an eleven-year veteran of the Elizabeth City Fire Department, to opine that a flammable liquid was burning on the living room floor and \u201ctrailing\u201d towards the kitchen. The defendant argues that Stanley was never qualified as an expert witness, and that opinions such as the one given here may not be introduced through lay witnesses.\nJustice Copeland, writing for this Court in State v. Hunt, 305 N.C. 238, 243, 287 S.E. 2d 818, 821 (1982), said:\nAn objection to a witness\u2019s qualifications as an expert in a given field or upon a particular subject is waived if it is not made in apt time upon this special ground, and a mere general objection to the content of the witness\u2019s testimony will not ordinarily suffice to preserve the matter for subsequent review.\nThe defendant merely made a general objection to the testimony which is the subject of this assignment. Therefore, any objection to the witness testifying as an expert was waived, and the assignment is overruled.\nThe defendant\u2019s contention that Stanley\u2019s testimony invaded the province of the jury because his opinion embraced an ultimate issue of fact is also without merit. That Stanley\u2019s opinion testimony as an expert embraced an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact did not make it objectionable. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 704 (Cum. Supp. 1985).\nBy his next assignment the defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss all charges at the close of all of the evidence. The defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to permit the submission to the jury of the charges against him. This assignment is without merit.\nAt the close of the State\u2019s evidence and at the close of all evidence, the defendant moved to dismiss the charges against him for first degree murder, first degree arson and felonious assault with a deadly weapon \u2014 fire \u2014with intent to kill and inflicting serious injuries. When a defendant moves under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1227(a)(2) for dismissal at the close of all the evidence, \u201cthe trial court is to determine whether there is substantial evidence (\u0430) of each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense included therein, and (b) of defendant\u2019s being the perpetrator of the offense. If so, the motion to dismiss is properly denied.\u201d State v. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62, 65-66, 296 S.E. 2d 649, 651-52 (1982). The trial court is to view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and give it all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence supporting the charges against the defendant. State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 261 S.E. 2d 114 (1980). \u201cThe trial court is not required to determine that the evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence prior to denying a defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss.\u201d Id. at 101, 261 S.E. 2d 118. The trial court must determine as a matter of law whether the State has offered \u201csubstantial evidence of all elements of the offense charged so any rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the offense.\u201d State v. Thompson, 306 N.C. 526, 532, 294 S.E. 2d 314, 318 (1982) (emphasis added).\nThe defendant was charged among other things with assault with a deadly weapon with the intent to kill inflicting serious injury. He was convicted of the lesser included offense of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury. The defendant contends that the trial court erred in submitting either the original charge or the lesser included offense to the jury. Citing State v. Palmer, 293 N.C. 633, 239 S.E. 2d 406 (1967), he argues that a \u201cdeadly weapon\u201d is an \u201cinstrument\u201d which is likely to produce death or great bodily harm under the circumstances of its use. The defendant argues that fire is not an \u201cinstrument\u201d and, therefore, cannot in and of itself ever be a deadly weapon within the meaning of the law. We do not agree.\nJustice Parker, later Chief Justice, writing for this Court in State v. Cauley, 244 N.C. 701, 707, 94 S.E. 2d 915, 920 (1956) stated:\nA deadly weapon is not one that must kill. It is an instrument which is likely to produce death or great bodily harm, under the circumstances of its use. Some weapons are per se deadly, e.g., a rifle or pistol: others, owing to the great and furious violence and manner of use, become deadly. \u2018The deadly character of the weapon depends sometimes more upon the manner of its use and the condition of the person assaulted than upon the intrinsic character of the weapon itself.\u2019 Where the deadly character of the weapon is to be determined by the facts and circumstances, the relative size and condition of the parties and the manner in which it is used, it becomes a question for the jury under proper instructions from the court.\n(Citations omitted.)\nIt is unnecessary for this Court to decide in the context of this case whether fire is a deadly weapon per se. Cauley clearly suggests that, at the very least, fire can be a deadly weapon according to its manner of use. See State v. Price, 265 N.C. 703, 144 S.E. 2d 865 (1965). In the present case, the State\u2019s evidence tended to show that the victim of the assault, Lateyia Cowell, was five years old and asleep at the time the defendant set fire to the house. This evidence was sufficient to justify the trial court in permitting the jury to find that the fire in the present case was used as a deadly weapon. The defendant\u2019s argument to the contrary is without merit.\nThe defendant next argues that there was no eyewitness testimony tending to show that he set the fire in the home or did any other criminal act. He also points out that he made no specific admission of wrongdoing to anyone and that there has been no showing that he in fact gained financially due to the fire and resulting death and injuries. The defendant therefore contends that all of the charges against him should have been dismissed. We do not agree.\nWhen considered in the light most favorable to the State, as it must be for purposes of considering the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, the evidence tends to show that the defendant thought that Ruth Cowell had been staying with other men at times when she absented herself from him. He had beaten her on more than one occasion \u2014 most recently a day or two before the fire \u2014 for this reason. He had also treated her children by other men in a \u201cmean\u201d fashion. For example, he once forced a hot dog down five-year-old Lateyia\u2019s throat because she ate slowly. He often made her stand on one leg on a chair and beat her if she put the other leg down.\nOn the night of the fire in question, the defendant bought kerosene in a five gallon can and took it home with him. The evidence tended to show that, excluding the defendant, all occupants of the home went to sleep. Sometime thereafter the occupants who survived were awakened by a large fire which was burning in the living room and \u201ctrailing backwards\u201d to the kitchen. The defendant\u2019s own evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the State, tended to show that he was the only person awake in the house at the time the fire broke out. Although the defendant testified that he did not pour any kerosene on the floor, expert testimony was introduced tending to show that the \u201cpour pattern\u201d established that from two and one-half to five gallons of flammable liquid had burned on the living room and kitchen floors. All evidence tended to show that the defendant was the only person in the house to use a flammable liquid on the night of the fire. Although the defendant consistently stated at trial that Ruth Cowell and her children were like his children and he considered them his children, the defendant was smiling when he stated a short time after the fire: \u201cThat was a lot of money riding on this fire.\u201d and \u201cI messed up.\u201d\nThe foregoing evidence was sufficient to permit but not compel a rational trier of fact to find among other things that the defendant intentionally and maliciously lit a fire in and burned the Cowell dwelling house with the intent to kill the entire family, and that his actions actually caused death and other serious bodily injury within. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charges against him. This assignment of error is without merit and is overruled.\nThe defendant received a fair trial free from prejudicial error.\nNo error.", "type": "majority", "author": "MITCHELL, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by Reginald L. Watkins, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.", "William T. Davis for the defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM THOMAS RIDDICK\nNo. 113A85\n(Filed 18 February 1986)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 87.1\u2014 children as witnesses \u2014 leading questions proper\nThe trial court in a murder and arson case did not err in allowing the prosecutor to ask leading questions of an 11-year-old and a 15-year-old who were in the house when it was burned where the witnesses had trouble in understanding certain questions asked of them. N.C.G.S. 8C-1, Rule 611(a) and (c).\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 33.2\u2014 admissibility of defendant\u2019s statements \u2014 personal knowledge of witness\nIn a prosecution for murder, arson and assault there was no merit to defendant\u2019s contention that a witness who was in the house at the time of the fire could not properly testify as to statements allegedly made by defendant, since the witness\u2019s testimony that she in fact heard defendant make the statements in question ipso facto amounted to testimony that she had the ability to hear him make those statements; no more was required to establish her personal knowledge of the matter pursuant to N.C.G.S. 8C-1, Rule 602; and the witness\u2019s testimony also established that she was near defendant when she heard him make the statements.\n3. Arson \u00a7 3\u2014 kerosene odor in house \u2014 questions assuming facts not in evidence \u2014 no prejudice\nEven if the trial court in an arson case erred in allowing two witnesses to answer questions as to what they could smell while in the house because the questions assumed facts not yet in evidence, such error was not prejudicial since the record was replete with evidence that kerosene was in the house at all times in question and had been used by defendant to start a fire in a wood heater so that there would have been nothing remarkable about an odor of kerosene in the house.\n4. Arson \u00a7 3\u2014 arson victim \u2014evidence of defendant\u2019s physical mistreatment\u2014 admissibility to show motive\nIn a prosecution of defendant for arson of a house he shared with a woman and her four children, evidence that defendant physically mistreated the woman when she returned home after spending time elsewhere was admissible as it tended to show the defendant\u2019s motives and state of mind at the time the crimes occurred, though motive was not an element of the crimes for which defendant was on trial, since motives and state of mind at the time of the fire certainly were facts of consequence to the determination of the action. N.C.G.S. 8C-1, Rule 401.\n5. Criminal Law \u00a7 51\u2014 qualification of expert \u2014 necessity for specific objection\nDefendant could not complain that testimony of an eleven-year veteran of the city fire department opining that a flammable liquid was burning on the living room floor and \u201ctrailing\" towards the kitchen was inadmissible because the fireman was never qualified as an expert witness, since defendant merely made a general objection to the testimony and did not object specifically to the witness\u2019s qualifications as an expert.\n6. Assault and Battery \u00a7 5.2\u2014 burning of occupied house \u2014 fire as deadly weapon\nIn a prosecution for assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury, evidence tending to show that the victim of the assault was five years old and asleep at the time defendant set fire to the house was sufficient to justify the trial court in permitting the jury to find that the fire in the present case was used as a deadly weapon.\n7. Arson \u00a7 4.1; Assault and Battery \u00a7 14.1; Homicide \u00a7 21.5\u2014 arson \u2014 first degree murder \u2014 assault with deadly weapon \u2014sufficiency of evidence\nIn a prosecution for first degree murder, first degree arson, and assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury, evidence was sufficient to be submitted to the jury where it tended to show that defendant lived in a house with a woman and her four children; defendant thought the woman had been staying with other men at times when she absented herself from him; he had beaten her on more than one occasion for this reason, most recently a day or two before the fire; he had also treated her children in a \u201cmean\u201d fashion; on the night of the fire defendant bought kerosene in a five-gallon can and took it home with him; excluding defendant, all the occupants of the home went to sleep; sometime thereafter, the occupants who survived were awakened by a large fire which was burning in the living room and \u201ctrailing backwards\u201d to the kitchen; defendant was the only person awake in the house at the time the fire broke out; expert testimony tended to show that the \u201cpour pattern\u201d established that from 2lh to 5 gallons of flammable liquid had burned on the living room and kitchen floors; defendant was the only person in the house to use a flammable liquid on the night of the fire; and defendant was smiling when he stated a short time after the fire, \u201cThat was a lot of money riding on this fire,\u201d and \u201cI messed up.\u201d\nAppeal by the defendant from judgments entered on 4 October 1984 by Small, J., in Superior Court, PASQUOTANK County.\nThe defendant was convicted upon proper indictments for first degree murder, first degree arson, and assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury. He was sentenced to separate terms of life imprisonment for murder and arson and to imprisonment for ten years for the assault. All three prison terms were ordered to run consecutively.\nThe defendant appealed the murder and arson convictions and resulting life sentences to the Supreme Court as a matter of right. His motion to bypass the Court of Appeals on his appeal of the assault conviction was allowed by the Supreme Court on 15 March 1985. Heard in the Supreme Court 17 October 1985.\nLacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by Reginald L. Watkins, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.\nWilliam T. Davis for the defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0749-01", "first_page_order": 777, "last_page_order": 789 }