{ "id": 4732592, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. EVELYN GRACE HENSLEY VAUGHT", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Vaught", "decision_date": "1986-11-04", "docket_number": "No. 351PA86", "first_page": "480", "last_page": "487", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "318 N.C. 480" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "342 S.E. 2d 536", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "80 N.C. App. 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524474 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/80/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 S.E. 2d 437", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 418", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2393317 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0418-01" ] }, { "cite": "335 S.E. 2d 6", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "8", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 522", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4691739 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0522-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 S.E. 2d 828", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "very old, targeted victim" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 666", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4694299 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "very old, targeted victim" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0666-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 S.E. 2d 483", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 N.C. App. 251", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521622 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/62/0251-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 S.E. 2d 689", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "voluntary manslaughter: where the two-year-old child victim was struck against bedpost with such force that it shattered a cast covering his lower abdomen and leg and fractured his skull" }, { "page": "701", "parenthetical": "very old, targeted victim" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 584", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565300 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "voluntary manslaughter: where the two-year-old child victim was struck against bedpost with such force that it shattered a cast covering his lower abdomen and leg and fractured his skull" }, { "page": "603", "parenthetical": "very old, targeted victim" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0584-01" ] }, { "cite": "336 S.E. 2d 388", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "second-degree murder: where the victim, who was tied to a bedpost and had a towel forced down his throat, suffered emotional distress before dying of asphyxiation" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 588", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4691780 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "second-degree murder: where the victim, who was tied to a bedpost and had a towel forced down his throat, suffered emotional distress before dying of asphyxiation" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0588-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 S.E. 2d 783", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "786", "parenthetical": "emphasis in original" }, { "page": "787" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4761533 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "414", "parenthetical": "emphasis in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "342 S.E. 2d 536", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "538" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "80 N.C. App. 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524474 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "490" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/80/0486-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 624, "char_count": 16290, "ocr_confidence": 0.759, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4640755996375976e-07, "percentile": 0.657914805071647 }, "sha256": "0716dfd23ecb4d866a3ed44000cb288d3f223cc8d600f9a3b1d6d22fb54faba3", "simhash": "1:732dcaaf06339b74", "word_count": 2706 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:03:08.889643+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. EVELYN GRACE HENSLEY VAUGHT" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MEYER, Justice.\nThis appeal presents questions concerning whether the trial court, in sentencing a defendant under the guidelines of the Fair Sentencing Act, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.4 (1983 & Cum. Supp. 1985), properly considered certain aggravating factors in imposing a prison sentence in excess of the presumptive term prescribed for the assault of which defendant was convicted.\nThe defendant was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury and of felonious breaking or entering. The trial court imposed the maximum active sentence of twenty years imprisonment for the assault and imposed a ten-year suspended sentence for the breaking or entering conviction. The Court of Appeals held that the defendant received a fair trial but that the trial court erred in the sentencing phase as to the assault conviction by considering as aggravating factors that (1) the offense was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; (2) the victim was physically infirm; and (3) the defendant poses a dangerous threat to others. No factors in aggravation or mitigation were found as to the breaking or entering conviction. We reverse the Court of Appeals holding that the sentencing judge erred in finding that (1) the offense was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and (2) the victim was physically infirm. We affirm that portion of the Court of Appeals opinion holding that the sentencing judge erred in finding that the defendant poses a dangerous threat to others.\nUnder the Fair Sentencing Act, the trial judge is to consider certain statutory aggravating and mitigating factors in determining whether to sentence the defendant for a prison term in excess of the presumptive term. In addition to the statutory factors that the judge must consider, the judge may consider other aggravating and mitigating factors that are proved by a preponderance of the evidence and that are reasonably related to the purpose of sentencing. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.4(a) (1983 & Cum. Supp. 1985). If the judge imposes a prison term that differs from the presumptive term, he or she must list in the record each factor in aggravation or mitigation that is proved by a preponderance of the evidence. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.4(b) (1983 & Cum. Supp. 1985).\nThe State\u2019s evidence tended to show that on 5 December 1984 at approximately 7:30 a.m., defendant Evelyn Vaught went to Shirley Slater\u2019s home and knocked on the back door. Because the defendant was carrying a potted poinsettia, Ms. Slater assumed she was receiving a flower delivery and opened the door. The defendant handed Ms. Slater the plant and then shot Ms. Slater in the chest. Although the first shot disabled Ms. Slater, the defendant continued firing at Ms. Slater, who ultimately sustained gunshot injuries to the heart, neck, and arm as a result of this incident.\nThe State\u2019s evidence further showed that Ms. Slater had been dating a man with whom the defendant had been romantically involved. The evidence tended to show that the defendant persistently sought the man\u2019s affections and was disappointed when he would not return her phone calls. Additionally, the defendant had seen Ms. Slater with the man on several occasions.\nIn late October 1984, the victim, Ms. Slater, sustained an injury to her left foot which required that she wear a cast that went from her toes to her knee. Ms. Slater testified that while wearing the cast, she had seen the defendant at a cafeteria in Winston-Salem and that the defendant had the opportunity to observe that she was wearing a cast. Ms. Slater was using crutches and wearing the cast on the day of the shooting.\nThe defendant contended that she was visiting her mother and sister on the date of the shooting.\nThe jury convicted the defendant of felonious breaking or entering and of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury. At the sentencing stage, the trial judge considered the factors in aggravation and mitigation and sentenced the defendant to the maximum term of twenty years for the assault conviction.\nI.\nThe first issue we address is whether the trial court erred in finding as an aggravating factor that the offense was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.4(a)(l)(f) (1983 & Cum. Supp. 1985).\nIn determining whether a crime is \u201cespecially heinous, atrocious, or cruel\u201d under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.4(a)(1)(f), the focus is on whether \u201cthe facts of the case disclose excessive brutality, or physical pain, psychological suffering, or dehumanizing aspects not normally present in that offense.\u201d State v. Blackwelder, 309 N.C. 410, 414, 306 S.E. 2d 783, 786 (1983) (emphasis in original). The extent of physical mutilation of the body of the deceased or surviving victim may also be appropriate in measuring the brutality of the crime. Id. at 415, 306 S.E. 2d at 787. Furthermore, that the victim suffered both psychological and physical pain not normally present in the offense will support a finding of heinous, atrocious, or cruel. State v. Brown, 314 N.C. 588, 336 S.E. 2d 388 (1985) (second-degree murder: where the victim, who was tied to a bedpost and had a towel forced down his throat, suffered emotional distress before dying of asphyxiation); State v. Ahearn, 307 N.C. 584, 300 S.E. 2d 689 (1983) (voluntary manslaughter: where the two-year-old child victim was struck against bedpost with such force that it shattered a cast covering his lower abdomen and leg and fractured his skull).\nRelying on its decision in State v. Medlin, 62 N.C. App. 251, 302 S.E. 2d 483 (1983), the Court of Appeals ruled that the facts in the present case do not support a finding of heinous, atrocious, or cruel under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.4(a)(l)(f). In Medlin, the Court of Appeals held that evidence that the defendant shot the victim five times with a .22-caliber pistol and fled without rendering assistance was insufficient to support a finding of heinous, atrocious, or cruel because the evidence did not reflect excessive brutality beyond that present in any assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury.\nIn State v Blackwelder, 309 N.C. 410, 306 S.E. 2d 783, we discussed Medlin and noted:\nWhile the Court of Appeals in Medlin applied the correct standard, i.e. whether the offense was excessively brutal beyond that normally present in any assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury, the court ignored, to defendant\u2019s favor, that the victim was shot five times. Where proof of one act constituting an offense is sufficient to sustain a defendant\u2019s conviction, multiple acts of the same offense are relevant to the question of sentencing, including whether the offense charged was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.\nId. at 413 n. 1, 306 S.E. 2d at 786 n. 1 (emphasis added).\nApplying the law to the facts of the present case, it is clear from the record that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court\u2019s finding that the offense was heinous, atrocious, or cruel. The initial shot resulted in a wound to Ms. Slater\u2019s heart and was sufficient to support a conviction of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury. The second, third, and fourth shots were not necessary to the conviction and resulted in a severed jugular vein and permanent nerve injury to Ms. Slater\u2019s arm.\nThe record also discloses ample evidence of physical pain and psychological suffering sufficient to support the trial judge\u2019s finding that the offense was heinous, atrocious, or cruel. The victim pled with the defendant to stop firing. After all shots were fired, the victim was on the ground, drifting in and out of consciousness. She felt pain and trauma, yet was unable to get help because she could not move.\nWe reverse the Court of Appeals holding that the trial court erroneously found that the offense was heinous, atrocious, or cruel.\nII.\nThe second issue we address is whether the trial court erred in finding as an aggravating factor that the victim was physically infirm. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.4(a)(l)(j) (1983 & Cum. Supp. 1985).\nWe have held that the victim\u2019s \u201cvulnerability is clearly the concern addressed by this factor.\u201d State v. Ahearn, 307 N.C. 584, 603, 300 S.E. 2d 689, 701. In most of the cases in which we have reviewed this factor, our focus has been on the victim\u2019s age, e.g., State v. Barts, 316 N.C. 666, 343 S.E. 2d 828 (1986) (very old, targeted victim); State v. Ahearn, 307 N.C. 584, 300 S.E. 2d 689 (victim very young).\nIn State v. Hines, 314 N.C. 522, 335 S.E. 2d 6 (1985), we held that a victim\u2019s age does not make a defendant more blameworthy unless age \u201cimpedes a victim from fleeing, fending off attack, recovering from, its effects, or otherwise avoid being victimized.\u201d Id. at 525, 335 S.E. 2d at 8 (emphasis added). This test applies with equal force where the victim\u2019s physical infirmity, rather than her age, impedes her ability to flee, fend off attack, or recover from the effects of an attack.\nIn the present case, the Court of Appeals held that because the victim \u201chad no opportunity, with or without the cast, to escape,\u201d 80 N.C. App. at 490, 342 S.E. 2d at 538, the trial court improperly found as an aggravating factor the victim\u2019s physical infirmity. Although the cast may have had no effect on the victim\u2019s ability to escape a rapid-fire succession of gunshots, the first of which disabled her, it may have impeded her ability to recover from the effects of the attack and thus to summon help.\nThe record discloses that at the time of the offense, Ms. Slater was wearing a leg cast and, as a result, her mobility was greatly impaired. After being shot, she went down; once down, she had difficulty getting up. Two hours later, she finally managed to get back to her bedroom to call for assistance. This evidence leaves little doubt that the victim\u2019s physical infirmity impeded her ability to recover from the effects of the attack and to call for assistance. Thus, the trial court did not err in finding the victim\u2019s physical infirmity as an aggravating factor.\nWe reverse the Court of Appeals holding that there was not sufficient evidence from which the trial judge could find as an aggravating factor that the victim was physically infirm. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.4(a)(l)(j) (1983 & Cum. Supp. 1985).\nIII.\nFinally, we must determine whether the trial court erred in finding as a nonstatutory aggravating factor of the assault conviction that the defendant poses a dangerous threat to others. A nonstatutory aggravating factor must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence and must be reasonably related to the purposes of sentencing. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.4(a) (1983 & Cum. Supp. 1985).\nWe agree with the Court of Appeals holding that the trial court erred in finding this nonstatutory aggravating factor. The evidence presented was not sufficient to support a finding that the defendant posed any greater threat or danger to others than any member of the public convicted of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury.\nThe State argues that because the defendant harbors deep resentment against her former lover who testified against her, the defendant poses a danger to others. If we accept this proposition, it would follow that whenever a witness testifies against a defendant who is ultimately convicted of a crime of violence, a trial judge could aggravate the sentence because the defendant poses a threat to others. Presumably, the General Assembly considered the threat of violence in determining the presumptive sentences for crimes against the person. State v. Higson, 310 N.C. 418, 312 S.E. 2d 437 (1985).\nIn conclusion, we reverse the Court of Appeals opinion insofar as it holds that the trial court erred in finding, as to the assault conviction, that (1) the offense was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and (2) the victim was physically infirm. We affirm that portion of the Court of Appeals opinion holding that the trial court erroneously found as a nonstatutory aggravating factor that the defendant poses a threat to others. The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further remand to the Superior Court, Stokes County, for resentencing.\nAffirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "MEYER, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by K. D. Sturgis, Associate Attorney General, for the State-appellant.", "Greeson and Page, by Michael R. Greeson, Jr., for defendantappellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. EVELYN GRACE HENSLEY VAUGHT\nNo. 351PA86\n(Filed 4 November 1986)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 138.21\u2014 assault with deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury \u2014 especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel offense \u2014sufficiency of evidence\nIn a prosecution for assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury, evidence was sufficient to support the trial court\u2019s finding that the offense was heinous, atrocious, or cruel, where it tended to show that defendant approached the victim\u2019s back door with a plant in her hand; when the victim opened the door and took the plant, defendant shot her in the chest; the victim suffered a wound to her heart, and this injury was sufficient to support a conviction for the crime charged; the second, third, and fourth shots were not necessary to the conviction and resulted in a severed jugular vein and permanent nerve injury to the victim\u2019s arm; there was ample evidence of physical pain and psychological suffering sufficient to support the judge\u2019s finding that the offense was heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that the victim pled with defendant to stop firing; after all shots were fired, the victim was on the ground, drifting in and out of consciousness; and the victim felt pain and trauma, yet was unable to get help because she could not move. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.4(a)(l)(f).\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 138.24\u2014 severity of sentence \u2014 physical infirmity of victim as aggravating factor \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nIn a prosecution for assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury, the trial court did not err in finding as an aggravating factor that the victim was physically infirm where the evidence tended to show that the victim was wearing a leg cast and, as a result, her mobility was greatly impaired; after being shot, the victim went down; once down, she had difficulty getting up; two hours later she finally managed to get back to her bedroom to call for assistance; and this evidence left little doubt that the victim\u2019s physical infirmity impeded her ability to recover from the effects of the attack and to call for assistance. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.4(a)(l)(j).\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 138.29\u2014 severity of sentence \u2014aggravating factor \u2014 insufficiency of evidence\nIn a prosecution for assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury, the trial court erred in finding as a nonstatutory aggravating factor that defendant posed a dangerous threat to others, since there was no evidence that defendant posed any greater threat or danger to others than any member of the public convicted of the crime charged; furthermore, there was no merit to the State\u2019s argument that defendant posed a danger to others because she harbored deep resentment against her former lover who testified against her.\nOn discretionary review of a decision of the Court of Appeals, 80 N.C. App. 486, 342 S.E. 2d 536 (1986), finding error in a judgment entered by Hight, J., at the 10 June 1985 Criminal Session of Superior Court, STOKES County, upon defendant\u2019s conviction by a jury of breaking or entering and of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury. The trial court imposed an active sentence of twenty years imprisonment for the assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury conviction and a ten-year suspended sentence for the breaking or entering. The Court of Appeals held that the defendant received an error-free trial but that the trial court erred in finding aggravating factors under the Fair Sentencing Act, N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 15A-1340.1 through -1340.7 (1983 & Cum. Supp. 1985). Pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31, the State filed a petition for discretionary review, which this Court granted on 7 July 1986. Heard in the Supreme Court 13 October 1986.\nLacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by K. D. Sturgis, Associate Attorney General, for the State-appellant.\nGreeson and Page, by Michael R. Greeson, Jr., for defendantappellee." }, "file_name": "0480-01", "first_page_order": 504, "last_page_order": 511 }