{ "id": 4736424, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES CURTIS SOWELL and LONNIE ALONYA SAMUEL", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Sowell", "decision_date": "1986-11-18", "docket_number": "No. 330A86", "first_page": "640", "last_page": "643", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "318 N.C. 640" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "342 S.E. 2d 541", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "80 N.C. App. 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524332 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/80/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 S.E. 2d 580", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 487", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4737583 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0487-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 S.E. 2d 583", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 480", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4732592 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0480-01" ] }, { "cite": "298 S.E. 2d 673", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 370", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562412 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0370-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 S.E. 2d 358", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "80 N.C. App. 63", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521833 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/80/0063-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 374, "char_count": 8038, "ocr_confidence": 0.779, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.8648112720239546e-08, "percentile": 0.36802377281455406 }, "sha256": "e363623c1c580f8716db50a289a2a77de32b9da724dbbbdcd6e34f628fa2269c", "simhash": "1:832f8206666fd964", "word_count": 1312 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:03:08.889643+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Justices Mitchell and Browning join in this dissenting opinion." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES CURTIS SOWELL and LONNIE ALONYA SAMUEL" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PARKER, Justice.\nIn imposing sentences in excess of the presumptive terms, the trial court found as an aggravating factor for each defendant that \u201cThe offense involved damage causing great monetary loss,\u201d which is listed as Factor 23 on the sentencing form supplied by the Administrative Office of the Courts and derived from N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.4(a)(l)m (1983). This aggravating factor was based upon the victim\u2019s testimony at the sentencing hearing when, in response to the question of what was his best recollection as to the total amount of his hospital and medical expenses, he answered that he had \u201cseen somewhere in the area of thirty to forty thousand dollars\u201d and had been told by his employer that \u201cit was between seventy-five and a hundred thousand.\u201d Both defendants appealed the trial court\u2019s consideration of this aggravating factor in sentencing to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the sentences. For the reasons stated in Judge Eagle\u2019s dissent, on the same issue, in State v. Bryant, 80 N.C. App. 63, 341 S.E. 2d 358 (1986), Judge Becton dissented from that portion of the majority opinion that affirmed the trial court\u2019s interpretation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.4(a)(l)m as including monetary loss resulting from personal injury.\nBased on Judge Becton\u2019s dissent, defendants contend that the trial court\u2019s consideration of the victim\u2019s medical and hospital expenses, in aggravation of the sentences under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.4(a)(l)m, was erroneous for two reasons. First, defendants argue, this factor applies only to damage to property causing great monetary loss and not to great monetary loss incurred because of a personal injury. We agree with defendants and for the reasons stated in this Court\u2019s recent decision in State v. Bryant, Case No. 856SC386 (filed 18 November 1986), we reverse the Court of Appeals and find that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.4(a)(l)m does not include monetary loss resulting from personal injury.\nNext, defendant Sowell contends that consideration of the medical expenses incurred by the victim also is prohibited by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.4(a)(l) (1983), which provides that \u201cEvidence necessary to prove an element of the offense may not be used to prove any factor in aggravation, and the same item of evidence may not be used to prove more than one factor in aggravation.\u201d Defendant Sowell argues that the monetary loss suffered by the victim was simply additional evidence of the seriousness of the injury inflicted in the assault, and that introduction of this evidence at the sentencing hearing was impermissible because it was not a separate factor to be considered by the trial court for any other purpose.\nWhen considering defendant Sowell\u2019s argument, this Court must focus on whether it was essential for the State to use this evidence in establishing the element of serious injury for conviction of this crime. State v. Melton, 307 N.C. 370, 298 S.E. 2d 673 (1983). Although evidence of large medical and hospital expenses is both properly and frequently used to establish the element of serious injury, such expenses are not inherent in every instance of a serious injury, nor are such expenses a necessary method for proving the element of serious injury. The loss of an eye or a limb may not generate large medical expenses, yet undeniably the injury would still be serious. In addition, the State did not rely on such expenses to establish the element of serious injury, and instead presented evidence of the permanent disabilities suffered by the victim as a result of the assault to prove serious injury. Consequently, this Court finds that defendant Sowell's argument is without merit.\nWe have recognized that when a victim suffers multiple injuries, one of which would be sufficient to establish the element of serious injury, the additional injuries may be considered when sentencing a defendant without violating the prohibition in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.4(a)(l) against use of the same evidence to prove both an element of an offense and an aggravating factor. State v. Vaught, 318 N.C. 480, 349 S.E. 2d 583 (1986); State v. Carter, 318 N.C. 487, 349 S.E. 2d 580 (1986). In these cases, however, the aggravating factor considered by the trial court was N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.4(a)(l)f (1983), \u201cThe offense was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel.\u201d\nThe monetary loss incurred by the victim as a result of the assault was found as a statutory aggravating factor by the trial court. Whether or not the monetary loss could have been found as a non-statutory aggravating factor is not before this Court.\nFor the reasons stated above, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case remanded to that court for further remand to the Superior Court of Robeson County for resentencing in the convictions of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury.\nReversed and remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "PARKER, Justice." }, { "text": "Justice MARTIN\ndissenting in part.\nFor the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in State v. Bryant (No. 290A86, filed 18 November 1986), I dissent from that part of the majority opinion holding that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.4 (aXlXm) applies only to damage to property causing great monetary loss and not to monetary loss resulting from personal injuries caused by a defendant during the commission of his offense.\nJustices Mitchell and Browning join in this dissenting opinion.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Justice MARTIN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by J. Charles Waldrup, Associate Attorney General, for the State.", "Bruce F. Jobe, for defendant appellant Sowell", "Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender, for defendant appellant Samuel" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES CURTIS SOWELL and LONNIE ALONYA SAMUEL\nNo. 330A86\n(Filed 18 November 1986)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 138.26\u2014 sentence \u2014 great monetary loss as aggravating factor \u2014factor applicable only to personal property\nIn a prosecution of defendants for assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury, the trial court erred in finding as an aggravating factor that the offense involved damage causing great monetary loss based on the victim\u2019s hospital and medical expenses, since this factor applies only to damage to property causing great monetary loss and not to great monetary loss incurred because of a personal injury. N.C.G.S. 15A-1340.4(a) (l)m.\n2. Assault and Battery \u00a713\u2014 assault with deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury \u2014 medical expenses incurred by victim \u2014same evidence not used to prove element of offense and aggravating factor\nThere was no merit to defendant\u2019s contention that consideration of the medical expenses incurred by the assault victim was prohibited by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.4(a)(l), which provides that evidence necessary to prove an element of the offense may not be used to prove any factor in aggravation, since evidence of large medical and hospital expenses may be used to establish the element of serious injury but such expenses are not inherent in every instance of a serious injury, nor are such expenses a necessary method for proving the element of serious injury; moreover, the State did not rely on such expenses to establish the element of serious injury, but instead presented evidence of the permanent disabilities suffered by the victim as a result of the assault to prove serious injury.\nJustice Martin dissenting in part.\nJustices Mitchell and Browning join in this dissenting opinion.\nAPPEAL by defendants of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-30 (2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 80 N.C. App. 465, 342 S.E. 2d 541 (1986), affirming sentences imposed by the trial court following defendants\u2019 convictions at the 27 May 1985 Criminal Session of Robeson County Superior Court, McLelland,