{ "id": 4747067, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. FREDERICK DONALD CLARK", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Clark", "decision_date": "1987-03-04", "docket_number": "No. 127A85", "first_page": "215", "last_page": "222", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "319 N.C. 215" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "373 U.S. 83", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11716714 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/us/373/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 L.Ed. 2d 137", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 12835 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/476/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 S.E. 2d 164", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 272", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4707923 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0272-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 S.E. 2d 231", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "20 N.C. App. 267", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551680 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/20/0267-01" ] }, { "cite": "244 S.E. 2d 263", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 N.C. 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561223, 8561192, 8561261, 8561243, 8561212 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/295/0090-03", "/nc/295/0090-01", "/nc/295/0090-05", "/nc/295/0090-04", "/nc/295/0090-02" ] }, { "cite": "241 S.E. 2d 343", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "35 N.C. App. 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8548912 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/35/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "246 S.E. 2d 159", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 N.C. App. 315", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8552523 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/37/0315-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 S.E. 2d 297", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 699", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573944, 8573889, 8573908, 8573927 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0699-04", "/nc/297/0699-01", "/nc/297/0699-02", "/nc/297/0699-03" ] }, { "cite": "254 S.E. 2d 649", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 N.C. App. 287", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8548979 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/41/0287-01" ] }, { "cite": "310 S.E. 2d 920", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 N.C. App. 390", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525146 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/66/0390-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 L.Ed. 2d 757", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "414 U.S. 1132", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11847458, 11847011, 11847720, 11847817, 11847176, 11847082, 11847372, 11847341, 11847631, 11847257, 11846938, 11847546 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/414/1132-08", "/us/414/1132-02", "/us/414/1132-11", "/us/414/1132-12", "/us/414/1132-04", "/us/414/1132-03", "/us/414/1132-07", "/us/414/1132-06", "/us/414/1132-10", "/us/414/1132-05", "/us/414/1132-01", "/us/414/1132-09" ] }, { "cite": "195 S.E. 2d 534", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 N.C. 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558286 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/283/0175-01" ] }, { "cite": "200 S.E. 2d 626", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "284 N.C. 321", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561787 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/284/0321-01" ] }, { "cite": "49 L.Ed. 2d 1206", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "428 U.S. 902", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6180680, 6180844, 6180492, 6180302, 6181071, 6180146 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/428/0902-04", "/us/428/0902-05", "/us/428/0902-03", "/us/428/0902-02", "/us/428/0902-06", "/us/428/0902-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 S.E. 2d 60", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "287 N.C. 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562667 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/287/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "240 S.E. 2d 437", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 294", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572653 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0294-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 S.E. 2d 452", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 678", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564413 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0678-01" ] }, { "cite": "277 S.E. 2d 390", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571552 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "310 S.E. 2d 587", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2393544 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "273 S.E. 2d 716", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 137", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564083 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0137-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E. 2d 84", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 626", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4714364 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0626-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 U.S. 83", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11716714 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/373/0083-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 721, "char_count": 15228, "ocr_confidence": 0.782, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.65227693854873e-08, "percentile": 0.45180626360841886 }, "sha256": "4f18dc49ab4817dc113ab4b76b86b04b96d0380a9cb8fe73b2818c57ab7a5398", "simhash": "1:c23df0f34e6fb5fb", "word_count": 2557 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:18:01.553874+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. FREDERICK DONALD CLARK" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WEBB, Justice.\nBy his first assignment of error the defendant argues that he was \u201cdenied his right to cross-examine the State\u2019s key witnesses in complete accordance with the rules of evidence.\u201d He first contends that the trial court erred in denying him an opportunity to cross-examine Darrell Givens concerning the details of a larceny for which Mr. Givens was convicted.\nThe defendant propounded questions on cross-examination to Darrell Givens which, if he had been allowed to answer, would have shown that after Mr. Givens had left his employment with a fire extinguisher company he went to customers of the company and represented to them that he was there to inspect the fire extinguishers. When left alone he would steal money if any was in the room.\nIt appears that this testimony should have been admitted under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 608(b) as probative of Givens\u2019 character for untruthfulness. See State v. Morgan, 315 N.C. 626, 340 S.E. 2d 84 (1986). Nevertheless, we do not believe that its exclusion was prejudicial error. Givens testified that he was currently in the custody of the North Carolina Department of Corrections pursuant to a larceny conviction, that at the time of the 3 January murder he was a cocaine addict and was so intoxicated by cocaine use that he had to drink vodka to sleep, that he refused to assist Lester Norman after the shooting because he was running from the police, that he had pleaded guilty to three larceny charges since 1976, and that he supported his $70 to $100 per day cocaine habit by playing cards, shooting dice and playing pool. The defendant was able to impeach the witness with such effectiveness through this testimony that we hold there is not \u201ca reasonable possibility that, had the error in question not been committed, a different result would have been reached at the trial,\u201d as required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1443(a). See State v. Milby, 302 N.C. 137, 273 S.E. 2d 716 (1981).\nThe defendant also argues that the trial court erred in denying him an opportunity to bring out the biases and interests of Gary Crawford and James Porter on cross-examination. The trial court sustained the State\u2019s objections to the defendant\u2019s attempts to establish that Crawford was testifying in exchange for concessions in a pending trial in another county. Crawford testified that he and Ronnie Williams, who had at one time been a suspect in this case, were very close friends and that they had committed a break-in together, that he had lived at times with James Porter, a confessed drug dealer and purchaser of stolen property, and that he had stolen Lester Norman\u2019s wedding ring from the defendant. Crawford also testified that he had been convicted but not yet sentenced for a cocaine charge and for the break-in committed with Ronnie Williams. He stated that the two cases had been consolidated for sentencing, reducing the total possible sentence he might be required to serve, and that a prayer for judgment had been entered in the cases to allow sentencing to occur after his testimony in the present case. The plea bargain in his cases also included an agreement by the State to dismiss three misdemeanor charges. Following Crawford\u2019s testimony his attorney in the breaking or entering case testified that although there was no agreement in that case involving Crawford\u2019s testimony in this case, both he and Crawford expected a lighter sentence to be imposed in return for his truthful testimony. In light of the extensive testimony as to concessions to Crawford in that case we hold that this testimony would have been merely cumulative. Its exclusion was not error.\nThe defendant also argues that it was error not to allow him to ask James Porter on cross-examination whether he had disposed of stolen goods for Gary Crawford. He contends that this was relevant to show that Porter was biased in favor of Crawford. We agree with defendant that this testimony was relevant to Porter\u2019s credibility and should have been allowed. The defendant was allowed to explore Porter\u2019s drug sales, his prior convictions and the terms of his current probation. He also established Porter\u2019s motive to receive the reward money offered in the Lester Norman case and the fact that Crawford often socialized at Porter\u2019s house, at which he once resided. In light of this evidence about Porter\u2019s credibility we hold that there is not a reasonable possibility that the excluded testimony would have led to a different result. The defendant\u2019s first assignment of error is overruled.\nThe appellant next assigns error to the denial of his motion to compel disclosure of exculpatory evidence in the State\u2019s possession. Prior to trial H. D. Jones, the officer in charge of investigating the case, was examined by the defendant\u2019s counsel as to whether there had been compliance with the defendant\u2019s request for disclosure. Mr. Jones testified that he had interviewed Sylvester McClure in regard to the case and that McClure had made a statement. The court examined in camera Mr. Jones\u2019 notes of McClure\u2019s statement and sustained the State\u2019s objection to revealing this evidence. The court sealed McClure\u2019s statement, which was sent to this Court to determine whether it was error under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L.Ed. 2d 215 (1963), to withhold this statement from the defendant. The Court in Brady held that it is a violation of a defendant\u2019s due process rights for the prosecution to withhold evidence favorable to the defendant after he has requested it.\nWe have examined McClure\u2019s statement as taken by Mr. Jones and it does not contain anything favorable to the defendant. This assignment of error is overruled.\nIn his third assignment of error the defendant argues that the court erred in allowing the State to propound to several jurors a question substantially as follows:\nThe State will be relying in this case on what\u2019s been called circumstantial evidence. That is a type of evidence accepted by the law. There are no witnesses who can say I saw the defendant Frederick Clark shoot Lester Norman. Circumstantial evidence is proof of a chain of events or chain of facts, and that\u2019s what we will be relying on in this case. Does the fact that there are no eyewitnesses cause you any problems?\nOn two occasions, the court sustained the defendant\u2019s objection to this question and instructed the jury on how to consider circumstantial evidence. On several occasions no objection was made to the question. We note that not all the State\u2019s evidence was circumstantial. Darrell Givens testified that he heard the defendant say he shot and robbed Lester Norman.\nThe defendant argues that the question (1) is improperly argumentative, asserting to the jury that none of the State\u2019s witnesses saw the crime, (2) is improperly hypothetical, asking the jurors to assume a state of the evidence and then proffer a guess as to his or her likely reaction, (3) improperly preconditions the jurors to believe, as a matter of fact, that there are no eyewitnesses, and (4) improperly \u201cstakes the jurors out\u201d and provides the prosecutor an unfair insight as to how they might vote.\nThere have been many cases dealing with this question raised by the appellant. See State v. Adcock, 310 N.C. 1, 310 S.E. 2d 587 (1983); State v. Bracey, 303 N.C. 112, 277 S.E. 2d 390 (1981); State v. Phillips, 300 N.C. 678, 268 S.E. 2d 452 (1980); State v. Denny, 294 N.C. 294, 240 S.E. 2d 437 (1978); State v. Vinson, 287 N.C. 326, 215 S.E. 2d 60 (1975), vacated in part, Vinson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 902, 49 L.Ed. 2d 1206 (1976); State v. Jackson, 284 N.C. 321, 200 S.E. 2d 626 (1973); State v. Washington, 283 N.C. 175, 195 S.E. 2d 534 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1132, 38 L.Ed. 2d 757 (1974); State v. Hedgepeth, 66 N.C. App. 390, 310 S.E. 2d 920 (1984); State v. Williams, 41 N.C. App. 287, 254 S.E. 2d 649, cert. denied, 297 N.C. 699, 259 S.E. 2d 297 (1979); State v. Hunt, 37 N.C. App. 315, 246 S.E. 2d 159 (1978); Re Will of Worrell, 35 N.C. App. 278, 241 S.E. 2d 343, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 90, 244 S.E. 2d 263 (1978); and State v. Wood, 20 N.C. App. 267, 201 S.E. 2d 231 (1973). The rules regarding proper questions to ask prospective jurors as stated in the above cases were summarized in Phillips as follows:\nCounsel should not fish for answers to legal questions before the judge has instructed the juror on applicable legal principles by which the juror should be guided. Counsel should not argue the case in any way while questioning the jurors. Counsel should not engage in efforts to indoctrinate, visit with or establish \u201crapport\u201d with jurors. Jurors should not be asked what kind of verdict they would render under certain named circumstances.\n300 N.C. at 682, 268 S.E. 2d at 455.\nWe hold that the question by the prosecuting attorney does not violate any of the rules enunciated in Phillips. It does not fish for answers to legal questions before the judge has instructed the jury. It merely informs the jurors that the State will rely on circumstantial evidence and asks them whether a lack of eyewitnesses could cause them problems. The prosecuting attorney was not arguing with the jury or attempting to establish \u201crapport\u201d with them. The question was certainly not designed to ask what kind of verdict the jury would render under certain named circumstances. The question is not, as contended by the defendant, improperly argumentative. It does not incorporate within the question assumed facts. The question is not hypothetical. The State did rely to a great degree on circumstantial evidence. It does not improperly \u201cprecondition\u201d the jurors to believe there were no eyewitnesses. No eyewitness testified. This assignment of error is overruled.\nFinally, the defendant argues that his constitutional rights were violated when the trial court allowed a \u201cdeath qualified\u201d jury to pass on his guilt in the guilt or innocence phase of the trial. We considered and rejected this argument in State v. Ladd, 308 N.C. 272, 302 S.E. 2d 164 (1983). The United States Supreme Court recently reached the same conclusion in Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. \u2014, 90 L.Ed. 2d 137 (1986). We decline to reconsider the issue here.\nIn the trial we find\nNo error.", "type": "majority", "author": "WEBB, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by Tiare B. Smiley, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender, by Louis D. Bilionis, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. FREDERICK DONALD CLARK\nNo. 127A85\n(Filed 4 March 1987)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 86.8\u2014 impeachment of witness \u2014details of larceny \u2014 exclusion as harmless error\nDefendant should have been permitted to cross-examine a State\u2019s witness concerning the details of a larceny for which he had been convicted to show the witness\u2019s character for untruthfulness, N.C.G.S. 8C-1, Rule 608(b). However, the exclusion of such evidence was not prejudicial error where defendant was able effectively to impeach the witness through other testimony that he was a cocaine addict at the time of the murder in question and was so intoxicated by cocaine that he had to drink vodka to sleep, that he refused to help the victim after the shooting because he was running from the police, that he pleaded guilty to three larceny charges in 1976, and that he supported his $70 to $100 per day cocaine habit by playing cards, shooting dice and playing pool.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 89.8\u2014 concessions for testimony \u2014 exclusion not error\nThe trial court did not err in sustaining the State\u2019s objections to defendant\u2019s attempts to establish that a State\u2019s witness was testifying in exchange for concessions in a pending trial in another county where there was other extensive testimony as to the concessions to defendant in the pending cases and the excluded testimony would have been merely cumulative.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 86.8\u2014 impeachment of witness \u2014 disposing of stolen goods \u2014 exclusion as harmless error\nThe trial court erred in refusing to permit defendant to ask a State\u2019s witness on cross-examination whether he had disposed of stolen goods for a second State\u2019s witness since such testimony was relevant to the first witness\u2019s credibility. However, the exclusion of such testimony was not prejudicial error in light of other evidence about the witness\u2019s credibility, including his drug sales, his prior convictions, the terms of his current probation, and his motive to receive reward money in the present case.\n4. Constitutional Law \u00a7 30\u2014 third person\u2019s statement \u2014 denial of motion to compel disclosure\nThe trial court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion to compel disclosure of a third person\u2019s statement to a police officer was not error under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, where the statement did not contain anything favorable to defendant.\n5. Jury \u00a7 6.3\u2014 question to prospective juror \u2014 reliance on circumstantial evidence \u2014 absence of eyewitnesses\nThe trial court did not err in allowing the prosecutor to propound to prospective jurors a question which informed the jurors that the State would rely on circumstantial evidence and asked them whether a lack of eyewitnesses would cause them problems.\n6. Constitutional Law \u00a7 63\u2014 \u201cdeath qualified\u201d jury \u2014 constitutionality\nDefendant\u2019s constitutional rights were not violated when the trial court allowed a \u201cdeath qualified\u201d jury to pass on his guilt at the guilt-innocence phase of his first degree murder trial.\nAPPEAL by defendant from Saunders, Judge. Judgment entered 14 December 1984 in Superior Court, MECKLENBURG County. Heard in the Supreme Court 11 December 1986.\nThe defendant was tried for the first degree murder of Lester Norman, whose body was found in a vacant lot in Charlotte on 4 January 1984. The State presented the following evidence: Gary Crawford and James Porter testified that they saw the defendant twice on the night of 2 and 3 January at Porter\u2019s home. On the first occasion the defendant stated that he had robbed two white men at gunpoint. He showed Porter and Crawford a wallet, a watch and other jewelry he had taken from the two men. The defendant returned later that night and stated that he had committed another armed robbery against a lone male. He said he had shot at the victim but did not think he had hit him. He showed Crawford and Porter a wallet, gold chains and a wedding ring he had taken from the second victim. Inside the wallet Porter saw Lester Norman\u2019s driver\u2019s license.\nDuring a search of the residence shared by Crawford and Ronnie Williams police discovered a chrome-colored .357 magnum, a watch and several gold chains which Crawford said he had obtained from the defendant. A gold wedding ring, identified by his sister as belonging to Lester Norman, was also traced to Crawford, who stated that he had gotten the ring from the defendant.\nDarrell Givens testified that he was in the Wishbone liquor house in the early morning of 3 January 1984 when the defendant said that he had robbed and shot Lester Norman. Dr. Hobart Wood testified that Lester Norman died as a result of a gunshot wound. He testified the death could have occurred between 3:00 and 4:00 a.m. on 3 January 1984.\nThe defendant was convicted of first degree murder under the felony murder rule, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-17, and sentenced to life imprisonment. He appealed.\nLacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by Tiare B. Smiley, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nMalcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender, by Louis D. Bilionis, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0215-01", "first_page_order": 247, "last_page_order": 254 }