{
  "id": 4725513,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHARLES RAY KIMBRELL",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Kimbrell",
  "decision_date": "1987-10-07",
  "docket_number": "No. 83A87",
  "first_page": "762",
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      "cite": "320 N.C. 762"
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    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
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          "parenthetical": "where issue was witness' competency to testify, jury could be apprised of his belief in Satan"
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          "parenthetical": "pretrial publicity intimating that murders with which defendant was charged were connected with satanic cults inherently prejudicial if insufficient time lapse between publication and trial"
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          "parenthetical": "pretrial publicity intimating that murders with which defendant was charged were connected with satanic cults inherently prejudicial if insufficient time lapse between publication and trial"
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      "cite": "107 Ill. App. 3d, 437",
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      "year": 1982,
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        {
          "parenthetical": "trial court properly refused to allow defendant to raise witchcraft accusation against complainant in indecent liberties with a child case, since not related to crime charged"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHARLES RAY KIMBRELL"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "MEYER, Justice.\nThe issue presented is whether the trial court committed reversible error by permitting the State, over objection, to cross-examine defendant about his knowledge of and participation in \u201cdevil worshipping\u201d activities. The Court of Appeals found the evidence to be inadmissible under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rules 610 and 403, but held that its admission did not constitute reversible error. We agree that the evidence was inadmissible. However, we find that defendant was indeed prejudiced by its admission, and we therefore reverse.\nThe State\u2019s evidence established that on 19 May 1984, Ricky and Pamela Norman were shot to death in their residence. James Clay (\u201cClay\u201d) Hunt was arrested and charged with the murder of the Normans. His sister, Donna Hunt, was subsequently arrested and charged with participation in the crimes. Both Clay and Donna Hunt testified for the State, pursuant to plea agreements.\nClay Hunt testified that from early 1983 through May 1984, he had been selling drugs (Dilaudid tablets), which defendant had supplied. Defendant wanted Ricky Norman killed because he owed defendant a substantial sum of money, and on five or six occasions defendant asked Hunt if he would like to make some more money by killing Norman for him. On 18 May 1984, Clay and Donna Hunt visited defendant\u2019s residence to \u201cshoot dope.\u201d Clay Hunt owed defendant approximately $1,200 at the time. Defendant offered to forgive the debt if Clay Hunt would kill Ricky Norman. Hunt agreed. Defendant instructed Clay Hunt to kill Pamela Norman as well, if she were there, since she would be a witness. Clay and Donna Hunt went to the Normans\u2019 residence to kill them, but they were not at home. On their second visit to the Norman residence, they found Ricky and Pamela at home, and Clay Hunt shot them both to death. The Hunts took approximately $1,500 in cash and some cocaine from the house.\nDefendant took the stand on his own behalf. He testified that he had known the Normans but denied having had any drug-related transactions with them. He stated that the Hunts had come to his home at about midnight on 18 May 1984 and that both appeared to be under the influence of drugs. Clay Hunt told defendant that he thought he and his sister were being followed by a vehicle belonging to the Normans. Both the Hunts and defendant ingested some cocaine. The Hunts left defendant\u2019s home about thirty minutes later in Donna Hunt\u2019s car. Defendant\u2019s wife, Mary Kimbrell, corroborated defendant\u2019s testimony as to the time the Hunts arrived, as to Clay Hunt\u2019s statement that he and his sister were being followed, and as to the approximate time of their departure.\nAfter defendant\u2019s arrest and while he was in custody, he made a statement in which he referred to his knowledge of and participation in \u201cblack magic\u201d activities with a group that included Ricky Norman and others. At trial, the State\u2019s cross-examination of defendant was based, in part, upon defendant\u2019s prior statement. The questions which defendant challenges are as follows:\nQ. Have you done any devil worshipping?\nA. No, sir.\nMr. KLASS: Object.\nThe Court: Overruled. EXCEPTION No. 3\nMr. Zimmerman: Thank you.\nQ. Have you ever been to any ceremonies?\nA. No, sir.\nQ. Have you seen things at night?\nA. No, sir.\nQ. Birds, hawks, dogs, a number of things?\nA. No, sir.\nQ. You don\u2019t recall telling Special Agent Leggett of the SBI that you saw those things?\nA. No, sir.\nQ. \u201cI saw a goat head made out of brass in the vision\u201d?\nMr. LOHR: Objection.\nTHE Court: Overruled. EXCEPTION No. 4\nQ. And you and Luther on Friday the 13th \u2014April, Friday the 13th, you-all were supposed to go to a seance, isn\u2019t that right?\nA. That\u2019s what Bobby Tucker said.\nQ. Huh?\nA. That\u2019s what Curtis Robert Tucker said.\nQ. Well, you were supposed to go, weren\u2019t you?\nMr. LOHR: Objection.\nTHE Court: Overruled. EXCEPTION No. 5\nA. I was inivited [sic].\nThe COURT: You may answer the question.\nA. (continuing) I was invited to it, and when I got up on Main Street to go down toward Luther\u2019s house I seen some police officers going down towards Luther\u2019s, and I kept going straight.\nQ. A police officer?\nA. I seen two carloads going down towards Luther\u2019s.\nQ. And of course that scared you?\nA. Yes, sir.\nQ. Did you tell them you wanted to show them something that Bob and Luther gave you about some little swords \u2014 some little bitty swords, something about they had power?\nA. That\u2019s what they told me.\nMR. LOHR: Objection.\nTHE COURT: Overruled. EXCEPTION NO. 6\nQ. Go ahead. What? Answer the question. You\u2019ve got to answer the question.\nA. I told them about the swords, yes, sir. I wasn\u2019t talking about myself, I was explaining about Luther Flynn at the time, if you\u2019ll remember.\nQ. You had one of these black magic bibles, too, didn\u2019t you? A. No, sir.\nMR. LOHR: Objection.\nTHE COURT: Overruled. EXCEPTION NO. 7 Q. Who had the bible? Who had the bible?\nA. Luther Flynn had the bible.\nQ. Had he ever read any of it to you?\nA. Yes, sir.\nMR. LOHR: Objection. Objection.\nThe Court: Overruled. Exception No. 8\nQ. Were Ricky and Pam Norman involved in this black magic stuff?\nA. I don\u2019t know, sir.\nQ. What did that consist of? Worshipping the devil?\nMR. LOHR: Objection.\nThe Court: Overruled. Exception No. 9 A. I don\u2019t know, sir.\nQ. What did that black bible Luther had have to say about it?\nMR. LOHR: Objection.\nTHE COURT: Overruled. EXCEPTION NO. 10\nQ. You can answser [sic].\nA. It\u2019s just a bunch of words. I don\u2019t know. I didn\u2019t pay any attention to it.\nThe Court of Appeals was unanimous in finding that admission of this evidence was error under North Carolina Rules of Evidence 610 and 403. Kimbrell, 84 N.C. App. at 64-65, 351 S.E. 2d at 804. The panel divided, however, in its assessment of the evidence\u2019s prejudicial effect. The question of the prejudicial effect of the evidence was the only issue addressed in the dissent, and under Rule 16(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure, that issue is the only one before us.\nIn order to show prejudicial effect which rises to the level of reversible error, a defendant must demonstrate that \u201ca reasonable possibility [exists] that, had the error in question not been committed, a different result would have been reached at the trial.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1443(a) (1983). See State v. Scott, 318 N.C. 237, 347 S.E. 2d 414 (1986). Defendant has done so.\nThe outcome of the trial depended on the jury\u2019s perception of the relative veracity of the witnesses. Both the Hunts stood to gain by testifying against defendant because the charges against them were thereby reduced to second-degree murder. The evidence indicated that the Hunts could have had a personal motive to kill and rob Ricky Norman, independent of the proposition made to them by defendant. When they went to his house on 19 May 1984, the Hunts told Norman they wanted to purchase drugs, when in fact they had no money with which to pay for them. Having killed Norman and his wife and having stolen both drugs and cash, the Hunts spent the next two days feeding their drug habits and using the money to purchase more drugs. The evidence further indicated that while in jail, Clay Hunt tried to bribe defendant into paying him $1,000 in return for his not taking the stand against defendant.\nOther than the evidence relating to \u201cdevil worshipping,\u201d the State\u2019s impeachment of defendant showed that he had had an extramarital affair with Donna Hunt; that he had purchased some Dilaudid tablets for her at her request; that he had sold marijuana; and that he had a criminal record consisting of two counts of misdemeanor possession of marijuana, one count of speeding, and one count of littering. However, defendant\u2019s testimony as to the events of the night of 18 May 1984, if believed, exonerated him of involvement in the Norman murders.\nThe State contends that defendant\u2019s denials that he engaged in \u201cdevil worshipping\u201d ceremonies or paid any attention to the \u201cblack magic bible\u201d mitigated any prejudicial effect that the questioning itself may have had. The State describes the questions as a minute portion of the trial upon which the jury would have been most unlikely to have based their verdict because of the substantial evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt supplied by the Hunts. We disagree. The real effect of questions about devil worship, satanic bibles, graveyard seances, and the like, which in this particular case had little or no probative value, can only have been to arouse the passion and prejudice of the jury. We do not believe that this defendant\u2019s simple denials sufficiently mitigated the damage done to his case by these questions. We find support for our conclusion in decisions from other jurisdictions. See, e.g., People v. Brown, 107 Ill. App. 3d, 437 N.E. 2d 1240 (1982) (trial court properly refused to allow defendant to raise witchcraft accusation against complainant in indecent liberties with a child case, since not related to crime charged); Commonwealth v. Atkinson, 364 Pa. Super. 384, 528 A. 2d 210 (1987) (pretrial publicity intimating that murders with which defendant was charged were connected with satanic cults inherently prejudicial if insufficient time lapse between publication and trial). But see State v. Waterhouse, 513 A. 2d 862 (Me. 1986) (evidence of defendant\u2019s belief in satanism admissible to prove killer\u2019s identity and intent); Commonwealth v. Chuck, 227 Pa. Super. 612, 323 A. 2d 123 (1974) (where issue was witness\u2019 competency to testify, jury could be apprised of his belief in Satan).\nIn this case, the relative veracity of the State\u2019s two accomplice witnesses and the defendant was critical. No physical evidence linked defendant to the murders. Both he and his wife, Mary Kimbrell, took the stand and gave testimony which exonerated him from guilt. The State\u2019s case against defendant rested in overwhelming measure on the testimony of Clay and Donna Hunt, who had confessed to murdering and robbing Ricky and Pamela Norman. Both were admitted drug addicts with criminal records. We cannot confidently assume that the Hunts would have been more worthy of belief than defendant had the district attorney not been permitted to ask questions which probably inflamed the jury. Indeed, as the Court of Appeals itself pointed out, \u201caccusations or insinuations of participation in \u2018devil worship\u2019 clearly carry with them a great potential for prejudicial impact on defendant\u2019s credibility.\u201d Kimbrell, 84 N.C. App. at 65, 351 S.E. 2d at 804.\nWe hold that the trial court committed reversible error in permitting the district attorney, over objection, to ask defendant questions about devil worshipping activities. Defendant is entitled to a new trial. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the Court of Appeals with instructions to that court to remand to the Superior Court, Davidson County, for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\n. \u201cEvidence of the beliefs or opinions of a witness on matters of religion is not admissible for the purpose of showing that by reason of their nature his credibility is impaired or enhanced; provided, however, such evidence may be admitted for the purpose of showing interest or bias.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 610 (1986).\n. \u201cAlthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403 (1986).",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "MEYER, Justice."
      },
      {
        "text": "Justice Mitchell\ndissenting.\nFor the reasons given by the majority in the Court of Appeals, 84 N.C. App. 59, 351 S.E. 2d 801 (1987), I am convinced that the trial court\u2019s error in permitting the questioning of the defendant as to whether he had \u201cdone any devil worshipping\u201d \u2014 which he denied in each instance \u2014 was harmless error. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent.",
        "type": "dissent",
        "author": "Justice Mitchell"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by Luden Capone III, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.",
      "Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender, by David W. Dorey, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHARLES RAY KIMBRELL\nNo. 83A87\n(Filed 7 October 1987)\nCriminal Law \u00a7 34\u2014 improper questions concerning devil worship \u2014 prejudicial error\nThe trial court committed prejudicial error in a prosecution for accessory before the fact to murder by permitting the district attorney to ask defendant about devil worshipping activities where the relative veracity of the State\u2019s two accomplice witnesses and the defendant was critical; no physical evidence linked defendant to the murder; both defendant and his wife gave testimony which exonerated defendant; the State\u2019s case against defendant rested in overwhelming measure on the testimony of two admitted drug addicts with criminal records who confessed to murdering and robbing the victims; and the Supreme Court could not confidently assume that the drug addicts would have been more worthy of belief than defendant had the District Attorney not been permitted to ask questions which probably inflamed the jury.\nJustice Mitchell dissenting.\nAppeal by defendant pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals finding no error in his trial before Washington, J., at the 11 November 1985 Criminal Session of Superior Court, DAVIDSON County. State v. Kimbrell, 84 N.C. App. 59, 351 S.E. 2d 801 (1987). Defendant was convicted of two counts of accessory before the fact to second-degree murder and was sentenced to consecutive terms of twenty-five and fifty years imprisonment. Heard in the Supreme Court 8 September 1987.\nLacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by Luden Capone III, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.\nMalcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender, by David W. Dorey, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0762-01",
  "first_page_order": 794,
  "last_page_order": 801
}
