{ "id": 2568550, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM KELLY STRICKLAND", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Strickland", "decision_date": "1987-11-05", "docket_number": "No. 569A86", "first_page": "31", "last_page": "42", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "321 N.C. 31" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "112 S.E. 2d 734", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "252 N.C. 60", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8617792 ], "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/252/0060-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 S.E. 2d 679", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 N.C. 379", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564082 ], "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/271/0379-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 S.E. 2d 661", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569459 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 S.E. 2d 289", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 573", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571231 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0573-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E. 2d 84", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "90" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 626", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4714364 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "635" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0626-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 S.E. 2d 551", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "564" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 N.C. 644", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572613 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "663" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/289/0644-01" ] }, { "cite": "150 S.E. 2d 47", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "49" }, { "page": "49" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "268 N.C. 124", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560389 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "127" }, { "page": "127" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/268/0124-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 S.E. 2d 527", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1947, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "529" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "228 N.C. 85", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8623395 ], "year": 1947, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "88" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/228/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 S.E. 2d 724", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 52", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2571664 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 S.E. 2d 354", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "357" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 561", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567881 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0561-01" ] }, { "cite": "50 S.E. 2d 723", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "724" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "229 N.C. 596", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12167101 ], "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "598" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/229/0596-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 S.E. 2d 793", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "800", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Jones, 229 N.C. 596, 598, 50 S.E. 2d 723, 724 (1948)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 641", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563176 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "652", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Jones, 229 N.C. 596, 598, 50 S.E. 2d 723, 724 (1948)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0641-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 S.E. 2d 828", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 666", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4694299 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0666-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 L.Ed. 2d 137", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 12835 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/476/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "257 S.E. 2d 569", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "578-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568313 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "12-14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 S.E. 2d 711", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "718-19" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 445", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575234 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "456" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0445-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 S.E. 2d 708", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "718", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Hardy, 299 N.C. 445, 456, 263 S.E. 2d 711, 718-19 (1980)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 337", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4695126 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "351", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Hardy, 299 N.C. 445, 456, 263 S.E. 2d 711, 718-19 (1980)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0337-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 S.E. 2d 374", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "377" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 N.C. 75", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561038 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/295/0075-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 S.E. 2d 238", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 N.C. 597", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569931 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/286/0597-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 S.E. 883", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1913, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "164 N.C. 513", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8658968 ], "year": 1913, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/164/0513-01" ] }, { "cite": "238 S.E. 2d 482", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "490" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "293 N.C. 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565105 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "425" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/293/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E. 2d 599", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "603" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567497 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "94" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 S.E. 2d 540", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "548", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Vickers, 306 N.C. 90, 94, 291 S.E. 2d 599, 603 (1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2401728 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "53", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Vickers, 306 N.C. 90, 94, 291 S.E. 2d 599, 603 (1982)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "165 S.E. 2d 328", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 N.C. 108", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8557876 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/275/0108-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 S.E. 2d 114", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "117" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573434 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98-99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 S.E. 2d 885", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "890-91", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 98-99, 261 S.E. 2d 114, 117 (1980)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4777958 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "96", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 98-99, 261 S.E. 2d 114, 117 (1980)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0087-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 S.E. 2d 578", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 113", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565031 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "250 S.E. 2d 204", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565526 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0236-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 977, "char_count": 25819, "ocr_confidence": 0.827, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.566319508537193e-07, "percentile": 0.8158334713722692 }, "sha256": "6b79a888603fe04cc18aa4b5b7988e664e0513e253eb019eed7e98ee932c7b97", "simhash": "1:a37dc622542f0dfe", "word_count": 4345 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:04:28.747837+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM KELLY STRICKLAND" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WHICHARD, Justice.\nDefendant was convicted of first degree murder, kidnapping, and discharging a firearm into an occupied motor vehicle. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder, forty years (consecutive) for the kidnapping, and ten years (consecutive) for firing into the motor vehicle. We find no error.\nThe State\u2019s evidence, in pertinent summary, showed the following:\nDefendant and his wife, Myra Strickland, were separated. On 9 July 1985, Bishop Edith H. Dickerson, Ms. Strickland\u2019s minister, picked her up from her mother\u2019s house in Wilson and drove her to church in Rocky Mount for the evening service. After the service, at about 10:00 p.m., Bishop Dickerson and Ms. Strickland left the church. They saw defendant\u2019s car parked across the street with defendant sitting inside. Robert Bayman, defendant\u2019s friend, was walking down the street. The women drove behind defendant\u2019s car, then went back to the church. While Ms. Strickland called the police, defendant walked up to the church and Bishop Dickerson met him at the door. Defendant told her that he had heard that she was a lesbian and that he would \u201cget [her].\u201d He left when she refused to let him in the church. The two women then left and drove to Wilson. On their way, defendant\u2019s car passed them. Bayman was driving and defendant was in the passenger seat. Bishop Dickerson dropped Ms. Strickland off at her mother\u2019s home between 10:30 and 10:45 p.m.\nDefendant had asked Bayman to drive him to Rocky Mount that evening to see a girlfriend. They met at a bootlegger\u2019s house, where they each had one drink. Bayman testified that defendant was not drunk at that time. Bayman and defendant then drove to another house, where they had a second drink. While there, defendant shot a pistol several times between his legs and over his shoulder. They left at about 8:30 p.m.\nWhen they arrived in Rocky Mount, they stopped at a place where defendant said he was going to visit a woman. Defendant walked off. After a few minutes he rushed back to Bayman, telling him to run. They drove to a gas station, where defendant asked Bayman to hide the car and wait. Defendant pointed a gun at Bayman, telling him to get out of the car because he was going to kill someone. When Bayman refused to get out, defendant ordered him to follow a car that had passed. He followed this car, which was Bishop Dickerson\u2019s, to Ms. Strickland\u2019s mother\u2019s house. Ms. Strickland got out and Bishop Dickerson drove away. Bayman continued to follow her car. After several miles, defendant asked Bayman to pull up beside her car. Defendant aimed a gun out of his window, telling Bishop Dickerson to stop. The cars jostled for position on the road, during which time defendant fired several shots at Bishop Dickerson\u2019s car and threatened Bayman with the gun.\nWhen Bishop Dickerson stopped her car, defendant got inside and slapped her twice. Her car then pulled down a dirt road. Bay-man followed in defendant\u2019s car. When Bayman drove around a curve in the road, he saw Bishop Dickerson\u2019s car in some trees. He saw defendant get out of the car and empty shells from his gun into his hand. Defendant stated, \u201cShe is dead now.\u201d Bayman said, \u201c[M]an, you didn\u2019t kill that lady.\u201d Defendant answered, \u201c[Y]es, I did.\u201d Bayman saw Bishop Dickerson in the car with a wound in her chest. She appeared to be dead. Bayman and defendant drove to a convenience store in Wilson. When police cars pulled up, defendant ran away.\nAn assistant medical examiner who performed an autopsy on Bishop Dickerson testified that a \u201cbullet wound track\u201d perforated the upper part of her heart and aorta, causing her to die from massive internal bleeding.\nAlthough defendant did not call any witnesses at trial, he attempted to show, through cross-examination of the State\u2019s witnesses, that he was insane at the time of the offenses.\nDefendant first assigns as error the trial court\u2019s denial of his pretrial motion to prohibit the prosecutor from \u201cdeath qualifying\u201d the jury. Defendant contends that the court\u2019s \u201cblanket\u201d denial of this motion violated his right to trial by a jury composed of a representative cross-section of the community. He argues that the court should not have ruled on this motion until the State attempted to excuse particular prospective jurors because they were opposed to capital punishment, and that the court should have made an individual evaluation of each person to see if he or she would impose the death penalty.\nDefendant\u2019s argument has no merit. The United States Supreme Court recently held that the federal constitution does not prohibit states from \u201cdeath qualifying\u201d juries in capital cases. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. ---,90 L.Ed. 2d 137 (1986). We have held that the practice of \u201cdeath qualifying\u201d juries in capital cases violates neither the United States Constitution nor the North Carolina Constitution. State v. Barts, 316 N.C. 666, 343 S.E. 2d 828 (1986).\nDefendant further contends that the court erred by allowing the State to ask Myra Strickland whether defendant knew the difference between right and wrong during June 1985 and by allowing Ms. Strickland to answer. Defendant argues that the question and answer have no probative value because, first, the terms \u201cright and wrong\u201d are relative, and, second, when a defendant raises the insanity defense, the proper question is not whether the defendant knew right from wrong generally, but whether he or she had the mental capacity \u201cto distinguish between right and wrong at the time and in respect of the matter under investigation.\u201d State v. Benton, 276 N.C. 641, 652, 174 S.E. 2d 793, 800 (1970) (quoting State v. Jones, 229 N.C. 596, 598, 50 S.E. 2d 723, 724 (1948)) (prosecutor not permitted to ask psychiatrist on cross-examination whether defendant knew the difference between right and wrong on the day of the killing).\nWe conclude that our decision in State v. Boone, 302 N.C. 561, 276 S.E. 2d 354 (1981), governs this case. In Boone, the district attorney asked the defendant\u2019s father on cross-examination whether defendant knew right from wrong. The father answered that \u201cat times he knew the difference between right and wrong.\u201d We held that the trial court did not err in admitting the question and answer because lay opinion concerning the mental capacity of a defendant in a criminal case is admissible. Id. at 565, 276 S.E. 2d at 357. Similarly, the trial court in the present case did not err when it allowed the State to ask Ms. Strickland whether defendant knew the difference between right and wrong in June 1985 and when it allowed Ms. Strickland\u2019s affirmative response.\nWe note that the adoption of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 701, did not effect a substantive change in the law regarding the admissibility of lay opinions of sanity. The witness here had firsthand knowledge regarding defendant\u2019s sanity and her opinion could have been helpful to the jury. See State v. Davis, 321 N.C. 52, 361 S.E. 2d 724 (1987).\nAssuming, arguendo, that the trial court erred, the error was harmless. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Ms. Strickland whether she had told defendant\u2019s sisters that defendant had run around his yard naked and urinated on trees like a dog, whether defendant had been in a mental hospital, whether he waked his family up at night to go \u201cbird blinding,\u201d whether he drove his truck down the road at excessive speeds with the doors open and his family inside, and whether he had injured his head during a motorcycle accident. Further, defense counsel asked Robert Bayman whether defendant was in \u201chis right state of mind\u201d at some point prior to the killing and whether he had a reputation in the community for being crazy. Some of the incidents about which defense counsel asked Bayman and Ms. Strickland allegedly occurred prior to June 1985, even months and years earlier. In light of these questions and the evidence elicited thereby, the question to Ms. Strickland of whether defendant knew right from wrong in June 1985, and her affirmative response, could not have prejudiced defendant. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1443(a).\nSeveral of defendant\u2019s assignments of error address the direct and cross-examination of State\u2019s witness Robert Bayman.\nDefendant first complains that the court erred by allowing the State to ask Bayman whether, in his opinion, defendant was intoxicated on 9 July 1985. Defendant contends that the State did not lay a proper foundation for the admission of Bayman\u2019s opinion because the evidence at trial had not shown that Bayman had had an adequate opportunity to observe defendant before they left the bootlegger\u2019s house. In State v. Dawson, 228 N.C. 85, 88, 44 S.E. 2d 527, 529 (1947), we held that:\nA lay witness is competent to testify whether or not in his opinion a person was drunk or sober on a given occasion on which he observed him. The conditions under which the witness observed the person, and the opportunity to observe him, go to the weight, not the admissibility, of the testimony.\nBayman testified that he was with defendant at the bootlegger\u2019s house and saw defendant take a drink. Since Bayman had the opportunity to observe defendant, he was competent to give his opinion as to whether defendant was intoxicated at that time.\nDuring direct examination, Bayman testified that when he and defendant left the crime scene, defendant said, \u201c[I]f you tell anybody ... I am going to gets [sic] you next.\u201d When the prosecutor asked Bayman whether he believed defendant, Bayman replied, \u201cI said, yes, I believe him because I felt like if he knocked a lady off he would knock a man off.\u201d Defendant contends that Bay-man\u2019s statement was inadmissible under Rule 602 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence because Bayman had no personal knowledge that defendant \u201cknocked off\u2019 Bishop Dickerson; he had not actually seen defendant kill her. He contends that the statement was also inadmissible under Rule 701 because Bayman\u2019s opinion was not \u201chelpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 701 (1986).\nAssuming, without deciding, that the admission of this evidence was error, we hold that the error was harmless. In the context of Bayman\u2019s prior testimony detailing defendant\u2019s offenses, his statement that defendant \u201cknocked off\u2019 Bishop Dickerson could not have been prejudicial. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1443(a).\nDefendant further contends that the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to ask Bayman whether in his opinion, based upon what he saw defendant do from the time they pulled behind Bishop Dickerson\u2019s car until defendant ran from the convenience store, defendant was in his right mind and knew the difference between right and wrong. Defendant also contends that the court erred by allowing Bayman\u2019s replies that defendant was in his right mind \u201c[bjecause ever since I been knowing him, he was the same as he were then\u201d and \u201cbecause at the time that he aimed the gun at me, he would have shot me if he had been out of his head.\u201d Defendant argues that since Bayman applied the incorrect standard in forming an opinion as to whether defendant was \u201cin his right mind,\u201d his testimony could not have been helpful to the determination of defendant\u2019s mental capacity, and that it thus should have been excluded under Rules 701(b), 402 (relevance) and 403 (probative value outweighed by danger of prejudice).\nWe hold that the court did not err. A lay witness may testify in the form of an opinion if the opinion is \u201c(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 701 (1986). \u201cA lay witness, from observation, may form an opinion as to one\u2019s mental condition and testify thereto before the jury.\u201d State v. Moore, 268 N.C. 124, 127, 150 S.E. 2d 47, 49 (1966); see also State v. Brower, 289 N.C. 644, 663, 224 S.E. 2d 551, 564 (1976). Bayman testified at trial that he had known defendant three to five years, and that he was with him several hours on 9 July 1985., Clearly, Bayman had the opportunity to form an opinion as to defendant\u2019s mental capacity. In State v. Moore, we held that the trial court erred by refusing to allow a witness to answer defense counsel\u2019s question as to whether the defendant was acting like a man \u201cnot in his right mind.\u201d 268 N.C. at 127, 150 S.E. 2d at 49. Likewise, it would have been error not to allow Bayman to testify similarly here.\nNeither do we find error in the trial court\u2019s refusal to allow defense counsel to cross-examine Bayman about certain assaults Bayman allegedly committed. Rule 608(b) states in part that:\n(b) Specific instances of conduct. \u2014 Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 608(b) (1986). In State v. Morgan, 315 N.C. 626, 635, 340 S.E. 2d 84, 90 (1986), we held that \u201cextrinsic instances of assaultive behavior, standing alone, are not in any way probative of the witness\u2019 character for truthfulness or untruthfulness,\u201d and therefore are inadmissible under Rule 608(b).\nDefendant\u2019s contention that the trial court should have dismissed the kidnapping charge at the close of all evidence is also without merit. The standard of review of a trial court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss at the close of the State\u2019s evidence is:\nwhether there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense included therein, and (2) of defendant\u2019s being the perpetrator of such offense. If so, the motion is properly denied. State v. Roseman, 279 N.C. 573, 184 S.E. 2d 289 (1971); State v. Mason, 279 N.C. 435, 183 S.E. 2d 661 (1971).\nIf the evidence is sufficient only to raise a suspicion or conjecture as to either the commission of the offense or the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of it, the motion should be allowed. State v. Cutler, 271 N.C. 379, 156 S.E. 2d 679 (1967); State v. Guffey, 252 N.C. 60, 112 S.E. 2d 734 (1960).\nThe evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the State; the State is entitled to every reasonable intendment and every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom; contradictions and discrepancies are for the jury to resolve and do not warrant dismissal; and all of the evidence actually admitted, whether competent or incompetent, which is favorable to the State is to be considered by the court in ruling on the motion. State v. Thomas, 296 N.C. 236, 250 S.E. 2d 204 (1978); State v. McKinney, 288 N.C. 113, 215 S.E. 2d 578 (1975).\nState v. Mercer, 317 N.C. 87, 96, 343 S.E. 2d 885, 890-91 (1986) (quoting State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 98-99, 261 S.E. 2d 114, 117 (1980)).\nUnlawful confinement or restraint is an element of the crime of kidnapping. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-39 (1986). Defendant contends that since the evidence is insufficient to show that he unlawfully confined or restrained Bishop Dickerson, the trial court should have dismissed the kidnapping charge. The evidence shows that after defendant had shot at Bishop Dickerson\u2019s car several times, he got into the car and slapped her twice, then the car pulled down a dirt road. We conclude that, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, there is evidence which permits a reasonable inference that defendant unlawfully confined the victim in her car.\nDefendant further contends that the trial court erred by not charging the jury on the defense of insanity. Where a defendant\u2019s evidence discloses facts which are legally sufficient to constitute a defense to the crime with which he or she has been charged, the court is required to instruct the jury as to the legal principles applicable to that defense. State v. Mercer, 275 N.C. 108, 116, 165 S.E. 2d 328, 334 (1968). We hold that the evidence presented at trial does not present facts legally sufficient to establish a defense of insanity. The legal test for insanity is\nwhether defendant, at the time of the alleged act, was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease or deficiency of the mind, as to be incapable of knowing the nature and quality of his act, or if he does know this, was by reason of such a defect of reason incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong in relation to such act.\nState v. Corley, 310 N.C. 40, 53, 311 S.E. 2d 540, 548 (1984) (quoting State v. Vickers, 306 N.C. 90, 94, 291 S.E. 2d 599, 603 (1982)); see also State v. Jones, 293 N.C. 413, 425, 238 S.E. 2d 482, 490 (1977). Defendant claims that evidence elicited on cross-examination of Ms. Strickland and Robert Bayman was sufficient to make out a defense of insanity. That evidence included testimony that defendant drove down the highway recklessly, that he woke his family up during the night to go \u201cbird blinding,\u201d that he shot into the floor beside his wife a few times, that he beat his wife and children, and that he had a reputation in the community for being crazy. Although this evidence tends to show that defendant\u2019s behavior was often antisocial and unacceptable, it does not support defendant\u2019s argument that at the time he killed Bishop Dickerson he was incapable of knowing the nature and quality of his actions or of distinguishing between right and wrong in relation to these actions.\nFinally, defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication as a defense to the first degree murder charge and in refusing to submit the possible verdict of second degree murder to the jury on the basis that voluntary intoxication negates the specific intent necessary for first degree murder. First, to support an instruction of voluntary intoxication,\n[t]he evidence must show that at the time of the killing the defendant\u2019s mind and reason were so completely intoxicated and overthrown as to render him utterly incapable of forming a deliberate and premeditated purpose to kill. State v. Shelton, 164 N.C. 513, 79 S.E. 883 (1913). In the absence of some evidence of intoxication to such degree, the court is not required to charge the jury thereon. State v. McLaughlin, 286 N.C. 597, 213 S.E. 2d 238 (1975).\nState v. Medley, 295 N.C. 75, 79, 243 S.E. 2d 374, 377 (1978). The evidence here showed only that defendant had had two drinks earlier in the evening. This evidence was insufficient to show that defendant was so intoxicated at the time of the crime that he was incapable of forming the intent necessary for first degree murder. This Court has held that \u201cwhen the State\u2019s evidence is clear and positive with respect to each element of the offense charged and there is no evidence showing the commission of a lesser included offense, it is not error for the trial judge to refuse to instruct on the lesser offense.\u201d State v. Williams, 314 N.C. 337, 351, 333 S.E. 2d 708, 718 (1985) (quoting State v. Hardy, 299 N.C. 445, 456, 263 S.E. 2d 711, 718-19 (1980)). Since the State\u2019s evidence clearly showed every element of first degree murder, and since defendant has not shown voluntary intoxication sufficient to negate specific intent, it follows that the trial court was not required to submit the possible verdict of second degree murder to the jury. The trial court thus did not err in refusing to instruct on voluntary intoxication and to submit the possible verdict of second degree murder to the jury. See State v. Goodman, 298 N.C. 1, 12-14, 257 S.E. 2d 569, 578-79 (1979).\nFor the reasons set forth, we find that the defendant received a fair trial, free from prejudicial error.\nNo error.", "type": "majority", "author": "WHICHARD, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by Dennis P. Myers, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "R. Gene Braswell, S. Reed Warren, and Glenn Alton Barfield for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM KELLY STRICKLAND\nNo. 569A86\n(Filed 5 November 1987)\n1. Constitutional Law \u00a7 63\u2014 death qualified jury \u2014 constitutional\nThe trial court did not err in a prosecution for murder, kidnapping, and discharging a firearm into an occupied motor vehicle by death qualifying the jury.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 63.1\u2014 mental capacity of defendant \u2014 lay opinion admissible\nThe trial court did not err in a prosecution for murder, kidnapping, and discharging a firearm into an occupied vehicle by allowing the State to ask defendant\u2019s estranged wife whether defendant knew the difference between right and wrong on the date of the killing. Lay opinion concerning the mental capacity of a defendant in a criminal case is admissible; however, assuming error, there was no prejudice because defense counsel asked on cross-examination whether the witness had told defendant\u2019s sisters that defendant had run around his yard naked and urinated on trees like a dog, whether defendant had been in a mental hospital, whether he awakened his family at night to go \u201cbird blinding,\u201d whether he drove his truck down the road at excessive speeds with the doors open and his family inside, and whether he had injured his head during a motorcycle accident. Defense counsel also asked another witness whether defendant was in his right state of mind at some point prior to the killing and whether he had a reputation in the community for being crazy. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 701.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 64\u2014 lay opinion that defendant intoxicated \u2014 no error\nThe trial court did not err in a prosecution for murder, kidnapping and discharging a firearm into an occupied vehicle by allowing the State to ask defendant\u2019s companion whether defendant was intoxicated on the night of the murder where the companion had had an opportunity to observe defendant.\n4. Criminal Law \u00a7 65\u2014 testimony that companion believed defendant's threat\u2014 admissible\nIn a prosecution for murder, kidnapping, and discharging a firearm into an occupied vehicle, testimony by defendant\u2019s companion on the night of the murder that he believed defendant\u2019s statement that defendant would get him next if he told anybody because the companion felt that if defendant \u201cknocked off\u2019 a lady, he would knock off a man was not prejudicial in the context of the witness\u2019s prior testimony detailing defendant\u2019s offenses. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 602, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 701, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1443(a).\n5. Criminal Law \u00a7 63\u2014 defendant\u2019s sanity \u2014 opinion of companion\nThe trial court did not err in a prosecution for murder, kidnapping and discharging a firearm into an occupied vehicle by allowing the prosecutor to ask defendant\u2019s companion on the night of the shooting whether defendant was in his right mind and knew the difference between right and wrong or in allowing the witness\u2019s answers that defendant had been the same since he had known him and that defendant would have shot him if he had been out of his mind. The witness clearly had an opportunity to form an opinion as to defendant\u2019s mental capacity. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 701.\n6. Criminal Law \u00a7 89.10\u2014 impeachment of witness \u2014 prior assaults\nThe trial court in a prosecution for kidnapping, murder, and discharging a firearm into an occupied vehicle did not err by refusing to allow defendant to cross-examine his companion on the night of the murder about certain assaults the companion had allegedly committed. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 608(b).\n7. Kidnapping \u00a7 1.2\u2014 unlawful confinement \u2014 evidence sufficient\nThe trial court did not err by not dismissing a kidnapping charge at the close of all the evidence where the evidence showed that defendant shot at the victim\u2019s car several times, got into the car and slapped her twice, and the car then pulled down a dirt road. Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, there was evidence which permitted a reasonable inference that defendant unlawfully confined the victim in the car. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-39 (1986).\n8. Criminal Law \u00a7 63\u2014 failure to instruct on insanity \u2014 no error\nThe trial court did not err in a prosecution for murder, kidnapping, and discharging a weapon into an occupied vehicle by not charging the jury on the defense of insanity where the evidence showed that defendant\u2019s behavior was often antisocial and unacceptable, but did not support defendant\u2019s contention that he was incapable of knowing the nature and quality of his actions or of distinguishing right from wrong in relation to those actions.\n9. Homicide \u00a7 28.6\u2014 murder \u2014 defense of intoxication \u2014 refusal to instruct \u2014 no error\nThe trial court did not err in a first degree murder prosecution by refusing to instruct on voluntary intoxication and to submit the possible verdict of second degree murder on the basis that voluntary intoxication negated the specific intent necessary for first degree murder where the evidence showed only that defendant had had two drinks earlier in the evening and was insufficient to show that he was incapable of forming the intent necessary for first degree murder.\nAppeal by defendant pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a) (1986) from the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment upon his conviction of first degree murder before Small, J., at the 27 May 1986 Criminal Session of Superior Court, WAYNE County. On 24 February 1987 we allowed defendant\u2019s petition to bypass the Court of Appeals in appeals from convictions of kidnapping, for which the trial court sentenced defendant to forty years imprisonment, and discharging a firearm into an occupied motor vehicle, for which the trial court sentenced defendant to ten years imprisonment. Heard in the Supreme Court 12 October 1987.\nLacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by Dennis P. Myers, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nR. Gene Braswell, S. Reed Warren, and Glenn Alton Barfield for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0031-01", "first_page_order": 59, "last_page_order": 70 }