{
  "id": 2569559,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MILDRED WATKINS VANDIVER",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Vandiver",
  "decision_date": "1988-02-03",
  "docket_number": "No. 91A87",
  "first_page": "570",
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    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
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      "year": 1984,
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      "cite": "310 N.C. 209",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:04:28.747837+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MILDRED WATKINS VANDIVER"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "MARTIN, Justice.\nThe victim, Robert Eugene Scott, bled to death from a single stab wound to the neck on 28 December 1985. On that date, the victim had been visiting his mother and stepfather, Shirley and Joseph Haselden, in their apartment on the second floor of a Fayetteville rooming house. At about 6:45 p.m., the victim became embroiled in an argument with defendant\u2019s boyfriend, Paul Hair, outside defendant\u2019s first-floor apartment. Shortly thereafter the victim suffered a stab wound which severed his carotid artery. At trial the state theorized that defendant stabbed the victim, while defendant maintained that Paul Hair was solely responsible for the crime.\nThe state\u2019s evidence tended to show that the Haseldens, the victim, and Gregory Davis, another second-floor resident, agreed to confront defendant and complain about loud music coming from her apartment below. The group went downstairs and knocked on defendant\u2019s door. Paul Hair came to the door yelling and cursing, and an argument ensued between him and the victim. Defendant warned the victim not to bother Hair and disappeared back into her apartment. Recognizing the futility of the dispute, Davis and Mr. Haselden went back to their own apartments. The victim remained at defendant\u2019s door and Mrs. Haselden lingered on the stairs.\nMrs. Haselden, the only purported eyewitness to the crime, testified that she was standing at the bottom of the stairs across from defendant\u2019s door when she heard Paul Hair say \u201cGo ahead and do it if you\u2019re going to.\u201d Defendant then came out of her apartment, exclaimed \u201cNo son of a bitch tells me I\u2019m not allowed to play my [expletive] music,\u201d and stabbed the victim with a butcher knife.\nDefendant testified on her own behalf, denying any participation in the crime. She testified that the victim continued arguing with Hair after the others had gone upstairs. At one point during the dispute the victim came inside the apartment and slapped defendant\u2019s face. Hair then followed the victim into the hallway outside the apartment with a steak knife in his hand. Defendant did not see the actual stabbing but did notice that the victim was bleeding. Later, Hair told defendant that police would not prosecute a woman and encouraged her to take the blame for the stabbing.\nThe jury convicted defendant of murder in the second degree. The trial judge found one factor in mitigation, that defendant\u2019s criminal record consisted solely of misdemeanors punishable by not more than sixty days\u2019 imprisonment, and one factor in aggravation, that defendant\u2019s testimony was perjured. Having determined that the aggravating factor outweighed the mitigating factor, the trial judge sentenced defendant to life imprisonment.\nDefendant first argues that she is entitled to a new trial because the trial judge refused to order disclosure of a police memorandum purportedly containing a prior inconsistent statement by witness Shirley Haselden. Following Mrs. Haselden\u2019s direct testimony that she had observed the stabbing from the bottom of the stairs, defense counsel requested that the report in question, filed by Officer J. D. Bronson of the Fayetteville Police Department on the night of the killing, be admitted for purposes of cross-examination. This request was denied. Counsel renewed the motion during cross-examination of Detective David Pulliam of the Fayetteville Police Department and it was again denied. The trial court made written findings of fact and conclusions of law, then sealed the report for appellate review.\nDefendant argues that the trial court\u2019s ruling was a clear violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-903(f)(2), which provides:\nAfter a witness called by the State has testified on direct examination, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the State to produce any statement of the witness in the possession of the State that relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified. If the entire contents of that statement relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the witness, the court shall order it to be delivered directly to the defendant for his examination and use.\n(Emphasis added.)\nWe have opened the sealed envelope and examined the document in question. Our own impressions of the report are accurately reflected by the voir dire testimony of Detective Pulliam:\n[Mr. VanStory]: The report that you just looked at, that was a field report made by a uniformed officer?\n[Detective Pulliam]: Yes, sir, it is.\nQ. What are the purposes of those field reports?\nA. He writes down his investigative notes on the incident as any physical observation that he makes or any information that may have been transferred to him from any outside source. And he does a summation or a narrative of the information given to him, and then he places that information in a summary report or an original report.\nQ. Is it meant to be a detailed account of what occurred?\nA. No, sir, it\u2019s not.\nQ. In this particular report that you just looked at, he doesn\u2019t specify from whence this information came or from whom it came; is that correct?\nA. That\u2019s correct.\nQ. As a matter of fact, three different people is [sic] listed as possible sources of the information?\nA. That is correct.\nQ. And he doesn\u2019t indicate who told him what?\nA. That is correct.\nThe term \u201cstatement\u201d as used in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-903(f)(2) includes statements signed or otherwise adopted by the witness and \u201csubstantially verbatim\u201d recitals or oral statements which are contemporaneously recorded. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-903(f)(5) (1983). Because the report in question contains only a narrative of the offense and does not attribute oral statements to any of the three witnesses mentioned therein, we conclude that it does not contain Mrs. Haselden\u2019s prior \u201cstatement\u201d for purposes of section 903. Defendant\u2019s assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant next challenges the validity of the life sentence imposed. She contends that the trial judge erroneously found as a nonstatutory aggravating factor that defendant\u2019s testimony was perjured.\nWe first approved the use of perjury as an aggravating factor in State v. Thompson, 310 N.C. 209, 311 S.E. 2d 866 (1984). Recognizing that our decision was \u201cfraught with potential dangers,\u201d however, we strongly cautioned that \u201ca trial judge should exercise extreme caution in this area and should refrain from finding perjury as an aggravating factor except in the most extreme case.\u201d Id. at 226-27, 311 S.E. 2d at 876. We have been careful to reiterate this admonishment on each occasion on which the issue has arisen. See State v. Rogers, 316 N.C. 203, 341 S.E. 2d 713 (1986); State v. Brown, 315 N.C. 40, 337 S.E. 2d 808 (1985), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 90 L.Ed. 2d 733 (1986).\nExperience has demonstrated that the concerns expressed in Thompson were well-founded. The \u201cextreme case\u201d standard has proved unworkable and our words of caution insufficient bulwarks against misuse of the aggravating factor. This is amply demonstrated by the facts of this case. Here, the only evidence of perjury was the fact that defendant\u2019s testimony was contradicted by Shirley Haselden. The trial judge noted that the jury \u201cby its verdict obviously found that the defendant\u2019s testimony was false.\u201d That the trial judge\u2019s finding of perjury was conjectural is certain.\nBecause a trial judge\u2019s determination of the factor is basically dependent upon his subjective evaluation of the defendant\u2019s demeanor, we find it impossible to formulate adequately concrete guidelines to prevent future erroneous findings. In the interests of justice, we therefore hold that perjury may no longer constitute a nonstatutory aggravating factor in North Carolina. If the facts of the particular case warrant it, a defendant who commits perjury may be prosecuted under a separate indictment for that offense. In so ruling, we intend no criticism of the trial judges who have wrestled unsuccessfully with this problematic sentencing issue.\nThe rule herein announced shall be effective in all sentencing hearings commencing on or after the certification date of this opinion, including the resentencing of this defendant. Prior case law is overruled to the extent that it conflicts with this decision. This cause is remanded to the Superior Court, Cumberland County, for a new sentencing hearing.\nRemanded for new sentencing hearing.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "MARTIN, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by Edmond W. Caldwell, Jr., Special Deputy Attorney General, for the state.",
      "Robin E. Hudson for defendant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MILDRED WATKINS VANDIVER\nNo. 91A87\n(Filed 3 February 1988)\n1. Constitutional Law g 30; Bills of Discovery g 6\u2014 police memorandum \u2014 refusal to order discovery\nThe trial court did not err in refusing to order disclosure pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-903(f)(2) of a police memorandum purportedly containing a prior inconsistent statement by a State\u2019s witness where the memorandum contained only a narrative of the offense and did not attribute oral statements to any of the three witnesses mentioned therein, and it thus did not contain a witness\u2019s prior \u201cstatement\u201d within the meaning of section 903.\n2. Criminal Law g 138.29\u2014 perjury not proper aggravating factor\nPerjury may no longer constitute a nonstatutory aggravating factor in North Carolina. Prior case law conflicting with this decision is overruled.\nAppeal by defendant from judgment sentencing her to life imprisonment for conviction of murder in the second degree, said judgment imposed by Hight, J., at the 1 December 1986 session of Superior Court, Cumberland County. Heard in the Supreme Court 11 November 1987.\nLacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by Edmond W. Caldwell, Jr., Special Deputy Attorney General, for the state.\nRobin E. Hudson for defendant."
  },
  "file_name": "0570-01",
  "first_page_order": 598,
  "last_page_order": 602
}
