{ "id": 2566622, "name": "ABDULATI BOLKHIR, GAL, OF AHMED BOLKHIR, MINOR v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY", "name_abbreviation": "Bolkhir v. North Carolina State University", "decision_date": "1988-03-09", "docket_number": "No. 329PA87", "first_page": "706", "last_page": "713", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "321 N.C. 706" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "355 S.E. 2d 786", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "85 N.C. App. 521", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12170105 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/85/0521-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E. 2d 889", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "891" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 N.C. App. 556", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525223 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "559" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/57/0556-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 S.E. 2d 286", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "241 N.C. 37", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8600439 ], "year": 1954, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/241/0037-01" ] }, { "cite": "50 S.E. 2d 534", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "538-39" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "229 N.C. 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12166417 ], "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441-42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/229/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "125 S.E. 2d 899", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "903" }, { "page": "903" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "257 N.C. 404", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568113 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "410" }, { "page": "410" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/257/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 S.E. 339", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1926, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "341" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "192 N.C. 475", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8623768 ], "year": 1926, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/192/0475-01" ] }, { "cite": "270 S.E. 2d 482", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "490" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 108", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564338 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "120" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0108-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 S.E. 2d 703", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "704" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "9 N.C. App. 243", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549376 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "245" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/9/0243-01" ] }, { "cite": "53 S.E. 513", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1906, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 N.C. 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11252733 ], "year": 1906, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/141/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 F. 979", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.", "case_ids": [ 6738202, 6738167 ], "year": 1897, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f/82/0979-02", "/f/82/0979-01" ] }, { "cite": "332 S.E. 2d 744", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "745" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 N.C. App. 342", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527251 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "343" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/76/0342-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 S.E. 2d 308", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "312" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "270 N.C. 187", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566478 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "193" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/270/0187-01" ] }, { "cite": "209 S.E. 2d 522", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "524" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "23 N.C. App. 699", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8553767 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "701" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/23/0699-01" ] }, { "cite": "14 S.E. 2d 489", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1941, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "492" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "219 N.C. 416", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624452 ], "year": 1941, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422-23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/219/0416-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 S.E. 2d 559", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "564" }, { "page": "565", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "565" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2402972 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "232" }, { "page": "233" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 S.E. 2d 557", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "559" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "244 N.C. 385", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2219546 ], "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/244/0385-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 S.E. 2d 685", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 N.C. 405", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564236 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "408" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/271/0405-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 S.E. 2d 273", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 N.C. 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564321 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "283-84" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/282/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "355 S.E. 2d 786", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "787" }, { "page": "787" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 N.C. App. 521", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12170105 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "524" }, { "page": "523" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/85/0521-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 776, "char_count": 16298, "ocr_confidence": 0.822, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.612105610045385e-07, "percentile": 0.9481516103834625 }, "sha256": "c03a5c42a87f1b02598d1ad58813798229469f1437bfeac68a1abffff5407aab", "simhash": "1:1c9428e0d4e7041e", "word_count": 2702 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:04:28.747837+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ABDULATI BOLKHIR, GAL, OF AHMED BOLKHIR, MINOR v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WHICHARD, Justice.\nPlaintiffs son, Ahmed Bolkhir, was injured when he pushed out a glass panel in a storm door while attempting to enter an apartment rented from defendant, an institution of the State of North Carolina. The Industrial Commission concluded that defendant\u2019s employee was negligent in creating an unsafe condition by switching the door\u2019s screen panel with its glass panel when he knew or should have known that children might push on the glass when opening the door. It thus awarded damages pursuant to the Tort Claims Act.\nOn appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no evidence of negligence. It accordingly reversed. Bolkhir v. N.C. State Univ., 85 N.C. App. 521, 355 S.E. 2d 786 (1987). We now hold that it erred in doing so.\nIn August 1982, plaintiff and his family resided in an apartment in the married student housing complex operated by defendant, North Carolina State University. Plaintiffs apartment had one entrance which was equipped with an exterior storm door consisting of three horizontal panels. The immovable lower panel was constructed of aluminum. At the beginning of plaintiffs tenancy, the door had a middle panel made of wire mesh screen and an upper panel made of glass. During the year and a half prior to the accident, plaintiffs children had frequently pushed on the screen when opening the door, and thus defendant\u2019s maintenance staff had to repair the screen three or four times. The maintenance staff considered these repeated repairs to be a problem, so one of defendant\u2019s employees switched the middle screen panel with the upper glass panel.\nOn 28 August 1982, three year old Ahmed was playing hide- and-seek with his four year old brother Wesam and a neighbor. Wesam and the neighbor entered plaintiffs apartment and locked Ahmed out. Ahmed knocked on the door and yelled for someone to open it. As his mother approached the door, she saw Ahmed \u201ccome through the glass.\u201d The glass panel shattered, and Ahmed fell through the door. As a result of the fall, Ahmed suffered cuts on both wrists and his left foot. After two operations, Ahmed\u2019s left foot has a ten percent permanent partial disability.\nPlaintiff brought this action as guardian ad litem for his injured son. Since the defendant is a state institution, plaintiff brought the action before the Industrial Commission pursuant to the Tort Claims Act, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 143-291 et seq. The Commission concluded that defendant\u2019s employee negligently created an unsafe condition by switching the screen panel with the glass panel. The Commission further concluded that defendant\u2019s employee\u2019s actions were the proximate cause of Ahmed\u2019s injuries. After adding the parents as \u201cnecessary and proper\u201d parties, the Commission awarded the parents $4,741.38 for Ahmed\u2019s medical expenses, and it awarded Ahmed $35,000.00 for pain and suffering, scarring, and permanent disability.\nDefendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the Commission\u2019s decision and order. The Court of Appeals held that \u201cthe mere \u2018switching\u2019 of the panels in the door did not create an unsafe condition, and the findings made by the Commission do not support the ultimate finding and conclusion that defendant was negligent in maintaining the leased premises.\u201d Bolkhir v. N.C. State Univ., 85 N.C. App. 521, 524, 355 S.E. 2d 786, 787. We granted plaintiffs petition for discretionary review.\nA finding of fact by the Industrial Commission in a proceeding under the Tort Claims Act is binding if there is any competent evidence to support it. Barney v. Highway Comm., 282 N.C. 278, 283-84, 192 S.E. 2d 273, 277 (1972). Negligence is a mixed question of law and fact, and the reviewing court must determine whether the Commission\u2019s findings support its conclusions. Id.\nTo recover under the Tort Claims Act, plaintiff must show that the injuries sustained by his son were the proximate result of a negligent act of a state employee acting within the course and scope of his employment. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 143-291 (1979 & Supp. 1981); Davis v. Highway Commission, 271 N.C. 405, 408, 156 S.E. 2d 685, 687 (1967). The parties stipulated that the maintenance persons who repaired the door were state employees acting within the course and scope of their employment. Thus, the alleged negligence is the only disputed issue. Under the Act, negligence is determined by the same rules as those applicable to private parties. MacFarlane v. Wildlife Resources Com., 244 N.C. 385, 387, 93 S.E. 2d 557, 559 (1956).\nThe essence of negligence is behavior creating an unreasonable danger to others. W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts \u00a7 31 (5th ed. 1984). To establish actionable negligence, plaintiff must show that: (1) defendant failed to exercise due care in the performance of some legal duty owed to plaintiff under the circumstances; and (2) the negligent breach of such duty was the proximate cause of the injury. Hairston v. Alexander Tank & Equipment Co., 310 N.C. 227, 232, 311 S.E. 2d 559, 564 (1984).\nWith regard to the first element, a landlord has a duty to exercise due care in making repairs to leased premises. Livingston v. Investment Co., 219 N.C. 416, 422-23, 14 S.E. 2d 489, 492 (1941); Carson v. Cloninger, 23 N.C. App. 699, 701, 209 S.E. 2d 522, 524 (1974). The standard of due care is always the conduct of a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances. Watson v. Stallings, 270 N.C. 187, 193, 154 S.E. 2d 308, 312 (1967). Although the standard remains constant, the proper degree of care varies with the circumstances. Id.\nWith regard to the second element, this Court has defined proximate cause as\na cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new and independent cause, produced the plaintiffs injuries, and without which the injuries would not have occurred, and one from which a person of ordinary prudence could have reasonably foreseen that such a result, or consequences of a generally injurious nature, was probable under all the facts as they existed.\nHairston v. Alexander Tank & Equipment Co., 310 N.C. at 233, 311 S.E. 2d at 565 (citations omitted). Foreseeability is thus a requisite of proximate cause. Id. To establish foreseeability, the plaintiff must prove that defendant, in the exercise of reasonable care, might have foreseen that its actions would cause some injury. Id. at 234, 311 S.E. 2d at 565. The defendant must exercise \u201creasonable prevision\u201d in order to avoid liability. Id. The law does not require a defendant to anticipate events which are merely possible but only those which are reasonably foreseeable. Id.\nUnder the foregoing principles, as plaintiffs landlord, defendant had a duty to exercise due care in making repairs to the leased premises. The question thus becomes whether defendant, through its employees, acted as a reasonably prudent person would have under the circumstances. The pertinent circumstances, as found by the Commission based on competent evidence, were as follows:\nThe apartments in question were leased only to families with children. Plaintiffs children had repeatedly pushed out the screen in the middle panel of the door to his apartment. Defendant\u2019s employee replaced the screen in the middle panel with glass in an attempt to prevent further repetition of such acts.\nThe Commission made further \u201cfindings\u201d as follows:\n3. ... It was foreseeable that many young children would be ... in and out of the storm doors and around the middle panel of the storm door where they would look out and in and push against the door to open it if it did not fasten properly.\n5. Defendant-landlord in the exercise of reasonable care had a duty to recognize that children have less discretion than adults and may be unmindful of dangers that adults would recognize.\n12. Defendant\u2019s employee created an unsafe condition by switching the panels in the storm door. He knew or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known that a glass panel in the middle of the door would be unsafe for the same small children that had been pushing the screen panel out. Defendant\u2019s employees negligently created an unsafe condition, and such negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiffs minor child\u2019s injury.\nThe Commission concluded that \u201cdefendant\u2019s employee . . . negligently failed to exercise due care in repairing the storm door . . . in switching the glass and screen panels . . . when he knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known that a glass panel in the middle of the door would be dangerous for the same small children that had been pushing out the previous screen panel.\u201d\nWe hold that the Commission could find and conclude that the replacement of the screen panel with glass by defendant\u2019s employee was not reasonably prudent conduct under the circumstances presented. The findings establish that defendant\u2019s employee had actual knowledge that plaintiffs children habitually opened the door in question by pushing forcefully on the middle panel. We cannot say as a matter of law that a reasonable person under these circumstances could not have foreseen that these children would continue to engage in their habitual behavior once the screen was replaced with glass, and that a glass panel where the children customarily applied force would create a potentially dangerous situation for them. A person exercising \u201creasonable prevision\u201d might well have foreseen that a child of tender years would not alter a long-standing habit merely because a screen panel was replaced with glass, and that force applied by the child to glass could shatter the glass and cause serious injury to the child.\nThe application of particular facts to the reasonableness standard is almost always a question of fact, not of law. Hulcher Bros. v. N.C. Dept. of Transportation, 76 N.C. App. 342, 343, 332 S.E. 2d 744, 745 (1985). \u201cOnly when the facts are such that reasonable minds can reach but one conclusion does the question become one of law.\u201d Id. (citing Patton v. Southern Railway Co., 82 F. 979 (4th Cir. 1897) and Brown v. Durham, 141 N.C. 249, 53 S.E. 513 (1906)). On the facts here, reasonable minds could differ. The question of whether defendant, through its employee, acted as a reasonably prudent person would act under the circumstances thus was properly for the factfinder, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the factfinder\u2019s resolution of the question in favor of the plaintiff.\nThe Court of Appeals based its holding denying compensation on Cagle v. Robert Hall Clothes and Beaty v. Robert Hall Clothes, 9 N.C. App. 243, 175 S.E. 2d 703 (1970), which it found \u201cindistinguishable\u201d from the present case. Bolkhir v. N.C. State Univ., 85 N.C. App. at 523, 355 S.E. 2d at 787. In Cagle, a five year old child was injured when he fell through a glass door while attempting to leave defendant\u2019s store. The court there upheld a directed verdict for defendant on the ground that there was no evidence that defendant failed to exercise due care. Cagle, 9 N.C. App. at 245, 175 S.E. 2d at 704. The crucial distinction between the present case and Cagle is that in Cagle there was no evidence of prior incidents of children pushing on the door with such force as to cause breakage. The evidence here, by contrast, fully supported the findings regarding such prior incidents, and the fact-finder could conclude from this evidence that the incident in question, and the resulting injury, were foreseeable.\nPlaintiff also contends that the Commission erred by awarding the medical expenses to him and his wife rather than to his injured son. Plaintiff brought this action as guardian ad litem for his son. It was in that capacity that he sought recovery of his son\u2019s medical expenses. He did not request that these expenses be paid to himself or to himself and his wife. Nevertheless, acting on her own motion, the Deputy Commissioner added the parents as \u201cnecessary and proper\u201d parties and awarded them $4,741.38 for the son\u2019s medical expenses. The full Commission adopted her order without modification. Since the Court of Appeals held that defendant was not negligent, it did not address this issue.\nWhen an unemancipated minor is injured by the negligence of another, two claims may arise. The minor has a claim for his or her losses, and the parent has a claim for the loss of the child\u2019s services during minority and the medical expenses reasonably necessary for treatment of the minor\u2019s injuries. Flippin v. Jarrell, 301 N.C. 108, 120, 270 S.E. 2d 482, 490 (1980); Shipp v. Stage Lines, 192 N.C. 475, 479, 135 S.E. 339, 341 (1926). Thus, prior to commencing this action, plaintiff had a separate cause of action for his son\u2019s medical expenses. However, a father waives this right by participating as guardian ad litem in a trial in which the minor is awarded medical expenses. See Doss v. Sewell, 257 N.C. 404, 410, 125 S.E. 2d 899, 903 (1962); Pascal v. Transit Co. and Lambert v. Transit Co., 229 N.C. 435, 441-42, 50 S.E. 2d 534, 538-39 (1948). By this waiver, the father treats the minor as emancipated for the purpose of recovering the medical expenses, and the minor may recover all the damages flowing from the injury. Shields v. McKay, 241 N.C. 37, 84 S.E. 2d 286 (1954).\nDefendant does not respond to this contention, and \u201c[i]t is immaterial to [it] whether the infant or the parent asserts the claim.\u201d Doss v. Sewell, 257 N.C. at 410, 125 S.E. 2d at 903. Pursuant to the foregoing authorities, we hold that the parents have waived their claim for medical expenses in favor of their son. Accordingly, the Commission erred by awarding the medical expenses to the parents. On remand the Commission is instructed to modify its order to award the $4,741.38 in medical expenses to plaintiffs injured son.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The cause is remanded to that court for further remand to the Industrial Commission for reinstatement of its decision and order, subject to the modification set forth above.\nReversed and remanded.\n. Under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 42-42(a)(2), a landlord has a duty to \u201c[m]ake all repairs and do whatever is necessary to put and keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 4242(a)(2) (1984). The Commission cited this statute after its conclusion that defendant was negligent. This statute, however, does not alter the common law standard of ordinary and reasonable care. Brooks v. Francis, 57 N.C. App. 556, 559, 291 S.E. 2d 889, 891 (1982).", "type": "majority", "author": "WHICHARD, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael E. Mauney for plaintiff, appellant.", "Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by Randy Meares, Assistant Attorney General, and Meg Scott Phipps, Associate Attorney General, for the State, appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ABDULATI BOLKHIR, GAL, OF AHMED BOLKHIR, MINOR v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY\nNo. 329PA87\n(Filed 9 March 1988)\n1. Negligence \u00a7 57.1\u2014 repair oi screen door \u2014 use of glass panel \u2014 injury to child\nThe Court of Appeals erred by reversing the Industrial Commission\u2019s award of damages to plaintiffs where defendant\u2019s employee replaced a screen panel in a storm door with a glass panel because children kept pushing out the screen panel. The Commission\u2019s findings established that defendant\u2019s employee had actual knowledge that plaintiffs children habitually opened the door in question by pushing forcefully on the middle panel, and it cannot be said as a matter of law that a reasonable person under these circumstances could not have foreseen that these children would continue to engage in their habitual behavior once the screen was replaced with glass.\n2. Parent and Child \u00a7 5.1\u2014 medical expenses of child \u2014 father as guardian ad litem \u2014 parents\u2019 claim for medical expenses waived in favor of child\nThe Industrial Commission erred in an action under the State Tort Claims Act by awarding medical expenses to the parents of an injured child where the father had participated in the action as a guardian ad litem. By that participation, the father had waived his separate cause of action for his son\u2019s medical expenses in favor of the son.\nON discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31 of a decision of the Court of Appeals reported at 85 N.C. App. 521, 355 S.E. 2d 786 (1987), which reversed a decision and order of the North Carolina Industrial Commission that awarded plaintiffs son damages under the Tort Claims Act. Heard in the Supreme Court 8 February 1988.\nMichael E. Mauney for plaintiff, appellant.\nLacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by Randy Meares, Assistant Attorney General, and Meg Scott Phipps, Associate Attorney General, for the State, appellee." }, "file_name": "0706-01", "first_page_order": 734, "last_page_order": 741 }