{ "id": 2561304, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. EZZARD CHARLES QUICK", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Quick", "decision_date": "1989-01-04", "docket_number": "No. 106A88", "first_page": "675", "last_page": "683", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "323 N.C. 675" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "128 S.E. 2d 889", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "258 N.C. 453", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561130 ], "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/258/0453-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 S.E. 2d 263", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "266" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 226", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2566310 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0226-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E. 2d 622", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "625" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 747", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573188 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "751" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0747-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 S.E. 2d 370", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4750010 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 S.E. 2d 430", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 447", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2561633 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0447-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 S.E. 2d 729", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 54", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4732922 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0054-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 S.E. 2d 558", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2571279 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 U.S. 400", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1525264 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "406" }, { "page": "928" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/380/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "399 U.S. 149", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6168934 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/399/0149-01" ] }, { "cite": "238 S.E. 2d 456", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "293 N.C. 447", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565179 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/293/0447-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 S.E. 2d 652", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "290 N.C. 383", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561569 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/290/0383-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 S.E. 2d 577", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 N.C. 667", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4684566 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/311/0667-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 759, "char_count": 19155, "ocr_confidence": 0.829, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.6680660843552687e-07, "percentile": 0.6954849491225165 }, "sha256": "dc5891e9780eaf35502c5f97296634e273d9bfd4dd7dc697f15ef51994596497", "simhash": "1:d227ca32712712fa", "word_count": 3176 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:25:25.148086+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. EZZARD CHARLES QUICK" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "FRYE, Justice.\nDefendant appeals from a sentence of life imprisonment upon his conviction of first degree murder. The case was tried as a non-capital case after the trial judge determined that there were no statutory aggravating circumstances. On appeal to this Court, defendant contends that the trial court erred by admitting allegedly hearsay statements of the deceased victim into evidence, by admitting evidence for the State during the presentation of defendant\u2019s case, and by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence. We find no error.\nDefendant and the victim, Bridgette Richmond, had been lovers for about a year prior to the victim\u2019s death on 18 July 1987. On the previous day, the victim had placed in defendant\u2019s automobile a letter in which she stated that she no longer wished to continue a relationship with defendant. Defendant admitted at trial that he found the letter around 6:30 p.m. on the evening of 17 July 1987. Later that same evening, defendant and the victim got into an argument as the victim and her brother were leaving a party. Defendant attempted to get into the automobile with the victim and her brother but was restrained by the victim\u2019s brother. Defendant threatened to get a gun and told the victim and her brother that they were \u201cboth dead meat.\u201d\nDuring this time, Bridgette Richmond lived with her grandmother, Lillian McCormick. She did not return to her grandmother\u2019s house on the night of 17 July 1987 but returned at approximately 10:15 on the morning of 18 July 1987. About fifteen minutes after the victim returned home, defendant arrived at the house, walked in and sat down to watch television. Shortly thereafter, defendant and the victim began arguing.\nDuring the course of the argument, Mrs. McCormick entered the room and said to defendant, \u201cWhy don\u2019t you let her alone. She said she was breaking up with you. And get out.\u201d Defendant walked out of the house onto the front porch. After several minutes, defendant reached under a couch on the porch and pulled out a shotgun. Defendant reentered the house carrying the gun in both hands with the barrel pointed forward.\nUpon seeing defendant with the shotgun, Mrs. McCormick fled through the front door and circled around the house to the back door. Defendant and the victim started fighting and Mrs. McCormick heard a shot before she reached the back door. She entered the house and saw defendant \u201cbreaking his gun down.\u201d The victim was lying on the floor in the next room with \u201cblood every which way.\u201d Defendant left through the back door carrying the shotgun. He was arrested nine hours later, approximately six miles from the crime scene.\nDefendant testified that the victim\u2019s death was an accident, that while he had read the letter from the victim, he did not consider it to be a \u201cDear John\u201d letter. Defendant testified that after the party he drove to the \u201clover\u2019s lane,\u201d parked his automobile and waited for the victim until the early hours of the morning on 18 July 1987. Defendant then walked to the victim\u2019s grandmother\u2019s house where he sat on the porch and waited for the victim but later went to sleep in a nearby abandoned automobile.\nUpon awakening defendant returned to the house, walked in and approached the victim. Defendant left the house after what he characterized as a \u201cdisagreement\u201d but denied that Mrs. McCormick had asked him to leave. Defendant testified that as he left the house, he remembered that he had left an old shotgun with the victim. He testified that he and the victim had previously placed the shotgun under the couch on the porch in order to provide the victim with some protection when she returned home from work late at night.\nAfter retrieving the gun from beneath the couch, defendant testified that he entered the house with the shotgun in order to ask the victim to give him the shell which he had also given her when they placed the gun under the couch. He further testified that when he entered the house with the gun, the victim grabbed the gun and tried to wrestle it from him. Defendant stated that at this point, he realized the gun must be loaded and struggled with the victim to retain control of the gun for his own safety. Defendant testified that in the course of the struggle, both he and the victim fell in the kitchen. The victim regained a standing position before defendant and began to leave the kitchen toward the front door. Defendant testified that as he attempted to stand, the shotgun fell from his hand, struck the table and discharged.\nInvestigators arrived at the scene shortly after the shooting and found defendant\u2019s automobile parked on a side road two or three hundred yards from the victim\u2019s house. The shotgun was never found; defendant stated that he dropped it in a field. The detective investigating the scene found \u201ca forearm to what appeared to be a single barrel shotgun\u201d on the backseat of the automobile. A subsequent search of the automobile produced the victim\u2019s letter to defendant.\nThe victim was alive when detectives arrived at the scene. She died later at the hospital. The examining physician testified that the victim died as a result of complications of a shotgun wound to the back. He further testified that the shot had been fired from a distance of six to eight feet and the upward path of the bullets indicated either that the victim was bending forward when she was shot or that the gun had been fired from slightly beneath her at an upward angle.\nDefendant first contends that the trial court erred by admitting certain statements of the deceased victim into evidence. The statements were introduced in the form of; 1) a letter from the victim to defendant, 2) testimony of the victim\u2019s grandmother, and 3) defendant\u2019s testimony on cross-examination. The letter stated in part:\nThis is just a letter to let you know that this is the end of our relationship. ... I can\u2019t take you any longer. ... You and I can be friends and not lovers. . . . Ezzard (I) stopped caring about you around the last of October of 1986 when I found out that you wasn\u2019t a real man. ... I get sick just looking at you all the time. . . .\nThe victim\u2019s grandmother testified to statements made by her to defendant during an argument between the victim and defendant the day of the homicide. Defendant\u2019s testimony on cross-examination confirmed his knowledge of the letter and its contents.\nDefendant contends that the admission of the statements violated N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 802. Rule 802 provides that \u201c[hearsay is not admissible except as provided by statute or by these rules.\u201d\nDefendant\u2019s contention that these statements are inadmissible under Rule 802 as hearsay is without merit. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 801(c), defines hearsay as \u201ca statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.\u201d Statements offered for the purpose of showing that the statement was made and that the defendant was aware of the statement are admissible for those purposes and are not considered hearsay. State v. Walden, 311 N.C. 667, 319 S.E. 2d 577 (1984); State v. Swift, 290 N.C. 383, 226 S.E. 2d 652 (1976). Statements offered, not to prove the correctness of the statement, but to show the motive of defendant in committing the homicide, are not hearsay and are admissible. State v. Kirkman, 293 N.C. 447, 238 S.E. 2d 456 (1977).\nThe letter and the testimony of the victim\u2019s grandmother were offered for the purpose of showing that defendant\u2019s motive for killing the victim was because she wished to discontinue their relationship. The cross-examination of defendant regarding the contents of the letter was designed to show that he knew its contents prior to the homicide. The statements were relevant for the purposes for which they were admitted and their admission into evidence did not violate Rule 802.\nDefendant also contends that the admission of these statements violated his constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses. Defendant\u2019s right to confront and cross-examine those witnesses who testify against him is guaranteed by the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 26 L.Ed. 2d 489 (1970). The confrontation guarantee of the sixth amendment applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406, 13 L.Ed. 2d 923, 928 (1965). A similar right of the accused to confront the accusers and witnesses against him is guaranteed by the North Carolina Constitution. N.C. Const. Art. I, \u00a7\u00a7 19 and 23 (1984 & Cum. Supp. 1988). Nevertheless, the confrontation clause is not violated by the admission of a declarant\u2019s out-of-court statements as long as the declarant testifies as a witness and is subject to full and effective cross-examination. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 26 L.Ed. 2d 489 (1970).\nThe confrontation clause was not violated in this case. As to the grandmother\u2019s testimony concerning what she told the defendant, defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine the grandmother. As to the letter written from the victim to the defendant, it was authenticated by two witnesses. Defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine both witnesses. It is not necessary that he be allowed to confront the writer of the letter because the truth of the matter stated in the letter was not at issue. The fact that the victim wrote the \u201cDear John\u201d letter is what the State wanted to prove. This depended on the credibility of the two witnesses who authenticated her signature. Since defendant was able to confront the two witnesses, the confrontation clause was not violated.\nDefendant next contends that the trial court erred by admitting evidence for the State during the presentation of defendant\u2019s case contrary to the order of proceedings established by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1221. Defendant assigns error to the timing of the court\u2019s admission of State\u2019s Exhibit 16, the letter from the deceased victim to defendant.\nThe order of proceedings is regulated by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1221, as defendant notes; however, the issue of admission of evidence during the presentation of an opponent\u2019s case is regulated by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1226. This statute provides in pertinent part:\n(a) Each party has the right to introduce rebuttal evidence concerning matters elicited in the evidence in chief of another party. The judge may permit a party to offer new evidence during rebuttal which could have been offered in the party\u2019s case in chief or during a previous rebuttal, but if new evidence is allowed, the other party must be permitted further rebuttal.\n(b) The judge in his discretion may permit any party to introduce additional evidence at any time prior to verdict.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1226 (1988).\nThe statute is clear authorization for a trial judge, within his discretion, to permit a party to introduce additional evidence at any time prior to the verdict. State v. Riggins, 321 N.C. 107, 361 S.E. 2d 558 (1987). The judge may also permit a party to offer new evidence which could have been offered in the party\u2019s case in chief or during a previous rebuttal as long as the opposing party is permitted further rebuttal. State v. Lowery, 318 N.C. 54, 347 S.E. 2d 729 (1986).\nA review of the record reveals that State\u2019s Exhibit 16 was admitted sua sponte by the trial court at the end of the state\u2019s cross-examination of defendant for the limited purpose of showing his knowledge of the letter. The letter was reintroduced over defendant\u2019s objection during the State\u2019s presentation of rebuttal evidence after the close of defendant\u2019s case. There is nothing in the record which suggests that defendant was prevented from presenting further rebuttal evidence. In fact, the trial judge asked if there was anything else to be presented by either side and both parties responded in the negative. It thus appears that the trial court followed the statute in admitting the exhibit during rebuttal and we find no abuse of discretion in admitting the exhibit for a limited purpose following cross-examination of defendant.\nFinally, defendant contends that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to dismiss made at the close of all the evidence. Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction of first degree murder because the State failed to present substantial evidence of each element of the offense charged.\nA motion to dismiss is properly denied if substantial evidence of each essential element of the offense charged is presented at trial. State v. Stone, 323 N.C. 447, 373 S.E. 2d 430 (1988). The evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the State and the State is entitled to every reasonable inference to be drawn from that evidence. State v. Bullard, 312 N.C. 129, 322 S.E. 2d 370 (1984). Murder in the first degree is defined as the \u201cunlawful killing of a human being with malice and with premeditation and deliberation.\u201d State v. Calloway, 305 N.C. 747, 751, 291 S.E. 2d 622, 625 (1982). The essential elements of murder may be established by circumstantial evidence. State v. Childress, 321 N.C. 226, 362 S.E. 2d 263 (1987).\nDefendant essentially asserts that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he committed the homicide with malice and with premeditation and deliberation because the State\u2019s evidence was circumstantial while his testimony showed that the shooting was accidental. He relies on State v. Foust, 258 N.C. 453, 128 S.E. 2d 889 (1963), where this Court held the evidence insufficient to show malice in order to support a charge of second degree murder. The Court examined the ostensibly threatening remarks made by the sixteen-year-old defendant and concluded that, under the circumstances, they were \u201cjust sort of sweetheart talk\u201d and did not permit a legitimate inference that defendant killed the victim with malice. The facts in Foust should be contrasted with State v. Childress, 321 N.C. 226, 362 S.E. 2d 263, where this Court distinguished Foust and upheld the submission of first degree murder to the jury notwithstanding defendant\u2019s evidence of accident and the reliance by the State on inferences to be drawn from circumstantial evidence. Without belaboring the point, we find that the evidence in the instant case more closely resembles the\u00ae evidence in Childress than that in Foust.\nIn the instant case, the State\u2019s evidence shows that defendant threatened the victim immediately after arguing with her and after being restrained from getting into the automobile with her; that defendant reentered the house carrying a shotgun after having been ordered out of the house by the victim\u2019s grandmother; that the grandmother fled when she saw defendant with the shotgun but heard a shot before she reached the back door of the house; that when she reentered the house, she saw defendant dismantling the gun; that defendant left the house without staying to render aid to the victim and was found six miles away nine hours later. This evidence, when considered together with the expert opinion that the victim was shot in the back from a distance of six to eight feet and with the disappearance of the shotgun, is inconsistent with an accident theory and supports an inference that the shooting was intentional and with premeditation and deliberation. See State v. Childress, 321 N.C. 226, 362 S.E. 2d 263. Malice may be presumed from the intentional use of the shotgun, clearly a deadly weapon. Id. at 230, 362 S.E. 2d at 266.\nWhen all the evidence in the record is considered in the light most favorable to the State, it is clear that there was sufficient evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt to survive his motion to dismiss and to sustain the jury verdict finding defendant guilty of murder in the first degree.\nNo error.", "type": "majority", "author": "FRYE, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by Thomas J. Ziko, Assistant Attorney General, and Joan H Byers, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.", "G. Hugh Moore for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. EZZARD CHARLES QUICK\nNo. 106A88\n(Filed 4 January 1989)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 73.2\u2014 statements in letter and by witness \u2014 no hearsay \u2014 admissibility to show motive\nStatements in a \u201cDear John\u201d letter written by a homicide victim to defendant, testimony elicited on cross-examination of defendant concerning the contents of the letter, and statements made by the victim\u2019s grandmother to defendant during an argument between defendant and the victim the day of the shooting were not hearsay and were properly admitted to show defendant\u2019s motive for killing the victim. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 802.\n2. Constitutional Law \u00a7 65\u2014 right of confrontation \u2014 statements to defendant-letter from victim \u2014 cross-examination of witnesses\nDefendant\u2019s constitutional right of confrontation was not violated by the admission of a \u201cDear John\u201d letter written by the victim to defendant where the fact that the victim wrote the letter and not the truth of the matters stated therein was at issue, the letter was authenticated by two witnesses, and defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine both witnesses. Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; Art. I, \u00a7\u00a7 19 and 23 of the N.C. Constitution.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 93\u2014 time of admission of exhibit for the State\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting an exhibit for the State, a letter from a homicide victim to defendant, at the end of the State\u2019s cross-examination of defendant for the limited purpose of showing his knowledge of the letter. Nor did the trial court err in permitting the State to reintroduce the letter over defendant\u2019s objection during the State\u2019s presentation of rebuttal evidence where defendant was given the opportunity to present further rebuttal evidence. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1221; N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1226.\n4. Homicide \u00a7 21.5\u2014 malice, premeditation and deliberation \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe State presented sufficient evidence of malice, premeditation and deliberation to sustain defendant\u2019s conviction of first degree murder where the State\u2019s evidence tended to show that defendant threatened the victim immediately after arguing with her and after being restrained from getting into an automobile with her; defendant reentered the victim\u2019s house carrying a shotgun after having been ordered out of the house by the victim\u2019s grandmother; the grandmother fled out the front door when she saw defendant with the shotgun but heard a shot before she reached the back door of the house; the grandmother reentered the house and saw defendant dismantling the gun; defendant left the house without staying to render aid to the victim and was found six miles away nine hours later; the shotgun was never found; the victim died as a result of complications of a shotgun wound to the back; and the shot had been fired from a distance of only six to eight feet from the victim.\nDEFENDANT appeals, pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a), from a judgment imposing life imprisonment entered by Hobgood (Robert HJ, J., at the 2 November 1987 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Lee County, upon a jury verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree. Heard in the Supreme Court 13 October 1988.\nLacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by Thomas J. Ziko, Assistant Attorney General, and Joan H Byers, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.\nG. Hugh Moore for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0675-01", "first_page_order": 707, "last_page_order": 715 }