{ "id": 2562449, "name": "LEA COMPANY v. NORTH CAROLINA BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION", "name_abbreviation": "Lea Co. v. North Carolina Board of Transportation", "decision_date": "1989-01-04", "docket_number": "No. 427PA88", "first_page": "691", "last_page": "697", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "323 N.C. 691" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "361 S.E. 2d 568", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 78", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2572852 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0078-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 S.E. 2d 605", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 596", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4719396, 4721386, 4721131, 4718827, 4724383 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0596-02", "/nc/313/0596-05", "/nc/313/0596-04", "/nc/313/0596-03", "/nc/313/0596-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 S.E. 2d 17", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 N.C. App. 604", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527288 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/72/0604-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 S.E. 2d 25", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "28-29" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 N.C. App. 724", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523758 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "728" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/60/0724-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 S.E. 2d 866", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "867-68" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 697", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2561441 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "699" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0697-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 500, "char_count": 12922, "ocr_confidence": 0.805, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.209694413231495e-08, "percentile": 0.43085600743518254 }, "sha256": "92bd188261855bb5c90ce6c8cb1a1201c49eb75ecca1020839ae68b3e5c163ab", "simhash": "1:9e50f72ead3486da", "word_count": 2172 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:25:25.148086+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "LEA COMPANY v. NORTH CAROLINA BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MEYER, Justice.\nThis is a companion case to No. 111PA88, which was jointly argued with this case. Our decision in the companion case is rendered this date and is reported as Lea Co. v. N. C. Board of Transportation, 323 N.C. 697, 374 S.E. 2d 866 (1989). For the factual background of this case, see our opinion in the companion case.\nUpon the denial by Judge Ross of plaintiffs motion filed pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure to reopen the judgment disposing of the case on the merits for the purpose of offering evidence of and recovering compound interest on the amount of damages, plaintiff filed an amended affidavit and application for attorneys\u2019 fees. The plaintiff, in its amended affidavit and application, sought to recover attorneys\u2019 fees for the Rule 60(b) motion in addition to attorneys\u2019 fees for the main case. By order dated 21 July 1988 Judge Ross allowed plaintiffs application for attorneys\u2019 fees and expenses in full for all the time claimed and at the rate claimed except for services for the Rule 60(b) proceeding. The order denied all fees relating to services of paralegals and secretaries acting as paralegals both as to the main case and the Rule 60(b) motion.\nTwo questions are presented by this appeal: (1) did the trial court err in denying that portion of plaintiffs application for fees relating to its Rule 60(b) motion, and (2) did the trial court err in denying that portion of plaintiffs application for fees attributable to the services of paralegals and secretaries acting as paralegals in the case in general. We hold that the trial court did not err in either respect. We address the issues seriatim.\nI.\nAs we noted in the companion case:\n[Subsequent to certification of our mandate in the second appeal, plaintiff moved pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 60(b)(6) \u201cthat the [trial] court reopen its prior judgment . . . for the purpose of making additional findings and conclusions as to whether [plaintiff] should be awarded compound interest as an element of just compensation.\u201d The trial court noted that \u201cwith respect to this case, the Supreme Court in its mandate did not remand . . . for consideration of the award of compound interest, but simply affirmed the judgment of the trial court.\u201d ... It then denied the motion \u201con the ground that this [c]ourt is bound by the mandate of the Supreme Court which affirmed the earlier judgment of the trial court and did not remand for further proceedings . . . .\u201d\n323 N.C. at 699, 374 S.E. 2d at 867-68.\nWe held in the companion case that our mandate did not include a remand for consideration of an award of compound interest; rather, it affirmed a judgment awarding simple interest, which was all the plaintiff had sought. We further held that the trial court had no authority to modify or change in any material respect the decree affirmed.\nThe statutory authorization for the award of the property owner\u2019s expenses, including attorneys\u2019 fees, in inverse condemnation actions is contained in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 136-119, which in relevant part provides as follows:\nThe judge rendering a judgment for the plaintiff in a proceeding brought under G.S. 136-111 awarding compensation for the taking of property, shall determine and award or allow to such plaintiff, as a part of such judgment, such sum as will in the opinion of the judge reimburse such plaintiff for his reasonable cost, disbursements and expenses, including reasonable attorney, appraisal, and engineering fees, actually incurred because of such proceeding.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 136-119 (1986) (emphasis added).\nLea Company contends that the statute is mandatory and that an examination of the facts of the case discloses that each condition of the statute has been satisfied, that is, that a judgment awarding compensation has been rendered in its favor for the taking of property, that it acted reasonably in expending attorneys\u2019 fees in seeking compound interest under Rule 60(b), and that those fees were incurred in the course of the inverse condemnation action. We disagree.\nWhile this Court has not previously addressed the award of attorneys\u2019 fees under N.C.G.S., \u00a7 136-119, we conclude that the language of the statute is itself determinative of the issues before us. Though the statute provides that the judge \u201cshall determine and award or allow\u201d particular types of fees, it also provides that the amount awarded is to be \u201csuch sum as will in the opinion of the judge reimburse such plaintiff for his . . . reasonable attorney[s\u2019] . . . fees.\u201d Our Court of Appeals has held and we now hold that the award of attorneys\u2019 fees under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 136-119 is within the sound discretion of the trial judge and that his exercise of that discretion is not reviewable except for abuse of discretion. See Cody v. Dept. of Transportation, 60 N.C. App. 724, 728, 300 S.E. 2d 25, 28-29 (1983). Both the question of whether to award fees for a particular activity and, if so, the question of the amount of such fees are within the discretion of the trial judge, and his decision will not be reversed absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion.\nThe amount of attorneys\u2019 fees a trial judge awards is not controlled by the contractual arrangement between the property owner and his attorney or by the attorney\u2019s assessment of the value of his services but, as the General Assembly has provided, is an amount to be determined by the trial judge in his discretion based upon the \u201creasonable\u201d value of the services rendered. See Bandy v. City of Charlotte, 72 N.C. App. 604, 325 S.E. 2d 17, disc. rev. denied, 313 N.C. 596, 330 S.E. 2d 605 (1985). Two of the numerous factors for consideration in fixing reasonable attorneys\u2019 fees are the kind of case or motion for which the fees are sought and the result obtained. Here, Lea Company sought attorneys\u2019 fees for the motion to reopen a judgment which the trial court recognized, and which we held in the companion case, it could not reopen as to interest on the award of damages because it was bound by the mandate of this Court. The result was that the motion was denied. The trial judge ordered that \u201c[t]he application for fees and expenses in the Rule 60(b) proceeding is denied because the Rule 60(b) motion was denied and the fees were not reasonably incurred.\u201d Whether the fees incurred in the pursuit of the failed Rule 60(b) motion were \u201creasonably incurred\u201d was within the discretion of the trial judge, and we are unable to say that he abused that discretion.\nII.\nWhile this Court is sensitive to the fact that work performed by paralegals and legal secretaries is both valuable and can result in a reduction from the fees charged by attorneys for performing the same services, we are here faced with the question of whether the trial judge abused his discretion in denying fees for such services. The decision of whether to incur the expense of such services on a particular activity and the extent of those services is ordinarily made by the attorney or attorneys in charge of the litigation after consultation with the client. A trial judge, acting within his discretion, may consider and include in the sum he awards as attorneys\u2019 fees the services expended by paralegals and secretaries acting as paralegals if, in his opinion, it is reasonable to do so. While, here, some of the paralegal and secretarial time was spent in research, obtaining copies of cases, organizing exhibits, preparing for hearings, and keeping files in order, the plaintiff concedes in its brief that \u201cmuch of the secretarial and paralegal time was charged for preparing the fee affidavits\u201d and that \u201c[m]ost of the amounts sought for secretarial time were incurred in preparing the fee statement.\u201d\nWe reject plaintiffs contention that the statute mandates that the services performed by the paralegals and secretaries acting as paralegals be paid as \u201ccost, disbursements and expenses\u201d separate and apart from \u201cattorney[s\u2019] fees.\u201d Based upon the record before us, it is quite clear that Judge Ross could reasonably have concluded that these services of the paralegals and secretaries acting as paralegals were largely clerical in nature or, even if not, were part of the ordinary office overhead and ought to be subsumed in the hourly rate of the attorneys. Here, as we previously noted, the attorneys\u2019 hourly rate was allowed in full, as was the total hours of attorneys\u2019 time claimed. We hold that Judge Ross did not abuse his discretion in concluding that such services on the appeal of the interest issue and other work (other than the Rule 60(b) motion to reopen the judgment for the award of compound interest) were not reasonably incurred separate and apart from the attorneys\u2019 fees.\nWe find no merit in plaintiffs contention that the doctrine of the law of the case entitles it to recover the fees for paralegals and secretaries acting as paralegals. Simply because the trial judge seemingly allowed expenses for paralegals and legal secretaries to be recovered as a part of the attorneys\u2019 fee in previous orders relating to other stages of the action does not mandate that they be allowed as a part of the attorneys\u2019 fees in subsequent. stages.\nJudge Ross did not make written findings of fact or conclusions of law relating to the services of paralegals and secretaries acting as paralegals, and no party requested that he do so. N.C.R. Civ. P. 52(a)(2). Therefore, it is presumed that the court on proper evidence found facts to support its order. Watkins v. Hellings, 321 N.C. 78, 361 S.E. 2d 568 (1987).\nIn summary, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial judge in denying Lea Company\u2019s application for attorneys\u2019 fees for services rendered in regard to the Rule 60(b) motion or in denying the application for fees for time expended by paralegals and secretaries acting as paralegals. The order of Judge Ross allowing in part and denying in part plaintiffs application for fees is affirmed.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "MEYER, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Patton, Boggs & Blow, by C. Allen Foster, Eric C. Rowe, and Julie A. Davis, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by James B. Richmond, Special Deputy Attorney General, for defendantappellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LEA COMPANY v. NORTH CAROLINA BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION\nNo. 427PA88\n(Filed 4 January 1989)\n1. Attorneys at Law \u00a7 7.3\u2014 condemnation action \u2014 attorney fees \u2014 discretion of court\nAn award of attorney fees under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 136-119 in an inverse condemnation action and the amount of such fees are within the discretion of the trial judge, and his decision will not be reversed absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion.\n2. Attorneys at Law \u00a7 7.3\u2014 failed motion \u2014 attorney fees not reasonably incurred\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that attorney fees incurred in the pursuit of a failed Rule 60(b) motion to reopen an inverse condemnation judgment for an award of compound interest were not \u201creasonably incurred\u201d and in denying plaintiffs application for such attorney fees.\n3. Attorneys at Law \u00a7 7.3\u2014 condemnation action \u2014 attorney fees \u2014 services of paralegals and legal secretaries\nA trial judge, acting within his discretion, may consider and include in the sum he awards as attorney fees the services expended by paralegals and secretaries acting as paralegals if, in his opinion, it is reasonable to do so.\n4. Attorneys at Law \u00a7 7.3\u2014 condemnation \u2014 services by paralegals and legal secretaries \u2014 recovery separate from attorney fees not mandated\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 136-119 does not mandate that services performed by paralegals and secretaries acting as paralegals be paid as \u201ccosts, disbursements and expenses\u201d separate and apart from attorney fees. In this case, the trial judge could reasonably have concluded that services of paralegals and secretaries acting as paralegals were largely clerical in nature or, even if not, were part of the ordinary office overhead and ought to be subsumed in the hourly rate of the attorneys, and that such services were not reasonably incurred separate and apart from the attorney fees.\n5. Attorneys at Law \u00a7 7.3\u2014 expenses for paralegals and legal secretaries \u2014 allowance as attorney fees in part of action \u2014 subsequent allowance not mandated\nThe trial judge\u2019s allowance of expenses for paralegals and legal secretaries to be recovered as a part of the attorney fees in previous orders relating to other stages of the action does not mandate that they be allowed as a part of the attorney fees in subsequent stages.\nON appeal by plaintiff from an order entered by Ross, J., in Superior Court, Guilford County, on 21 July 1988, allowing in part and denying in part plaintiffs application for fees. On 18 October 1988, we allowed the parties\u2019 joint petition for discretionary review prior to determination of the Court of Appeals. The case was consolidated for purpose of oral argument with case No. 111PA88, bearing the same caption, by order of this Court entered on 25 October 1988. Heard in the Supreme Court 14 December 1988.\nPatton, Boggs & Blow, by C. Allen Foster, Eric C. Rowe, and Julie A. Davis, for plaintiff-appellant.\nLacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by James B. Richmond, Special Deputy Attorney General, for defendantappellee." }, "file_name": "0691-01", "first_page_order": 723, "last_page_order": 729 }