{ "id": 2561441, "name": "LEA COMPANY v. NORTH CAROLINA BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION", "name_abbreviation": "Lea Co. v. North Carolina Board of Transportation", "decision_date": "1989-01-04", "docket_number": "No. 111PA88", "first_page": "697", "last_page": "700", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "323 N.C. 697" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "90 N.C. 120", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8687103 ], "year": 1884, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "122" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/90/0120-01" ] }, { "cite": "125 S.E. 2d 298", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "303" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "257 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565312 ], "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/257/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 S.E. 2d 199", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "202" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "268 N.C. 720", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565339 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "722" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/268/0720-01" ] }, { "cite": "210 S.E. 2d 181", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "183" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 N.C. 235", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565054 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/286/0235-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 S.E. 2d 355", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360" }, { "page": "361" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 254", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4773795 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0254-01" ] }, { "cite": "304 S.E. 2d 164", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 603", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4710350 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0603-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 360, "char_count": 7262, "ocr_confidence": 0.792, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.5953294527938745e-07, "percentile": 0.8190012236234622 }, "sha256": "517785809703b54e97bd8cf8c8d199ba9912cacafed9d977da44d359ad871d0e", "simhash": "1:8dcb7462277d2659", "word_count": 1189 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:25:25.148086+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "LEA COMPANY v. NORTH CAROLINA BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WHICHARD, Justice.\nThe issue is whether the trial court properly denied plaintiff\u2019s motion, pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 60(b)(6), to reopen a prior judgment for the purpose of making additional findings and conclusions as to whether plaintiff should be awarded compound interest as an element of just compensation for defendant\u2019s taking of an interest in plaintiffs property by inverse condemnation. We hold that it did.\nThis case is before us for the third time. On the first appeal, we affirmed a judgment that defendant was liable to plaintiff for the taking of a compensable interest in plaintiffs property as a result of intermittent and recurring flooding caused by inadequately sized culverts installed by defendant in its highway structures downstream from plaintiffs property. Lea Company v. N.C. Board of Transportation, 308 N.C. 603, 304 S.E. 2d 164 (1983). Upon remand for a trial on the issue of damages, the trial court determined, inter alia, that the statutory rate of interest, as applied to the facts of this case, was unconstitutional. It thereupon awarded interest on plaintiffs award of damages at the rate of 11% per annum for the period between the time of the taking and the entry of the judgment awarding compensation. On defendant\u2019s appeal from that award, we adopted the \u201cprudent investor\u201d standard for determining the appropriate interest rate for calculation of additional compensation for delay, concluded that the trial court had applied this standard correctly, and affirmed. Lea Company v. N.C. Bd. of Transportation, 317 N.C. 254, 345 S.E. 2d 355 (1986).\nIn the second appeal, we also exercised our \u201crarely used general supervisory powers\u201d to address a collateral issue not raised by the parties, viz, \u201cwhether compound interest rather than simple interest should be used in measuring the amount by which the award should be adjusted due to delayed payment.\u201d Id. at 263, 345 S.E. 2d at 360. We concluded:\nSince this Court has now adopted the \u201cprudent investor\u201d standard, compound interest should be allowed for delayed payment in condemnation cases if the evidence shows that during the pertinent period the \u201cprudent investor\u201d could have obtained compound interest in the market place. The use of compound interest as a measure in calculating additional compensation for delay is a matter which will turn upon the evidence in each case and must be decided on a case-by-case basis.\nId. at 264, 345 S.E. 2d at 361.\nOn 4 September 1986, subsequent to certification of our mandate in the second appeal, plaintiff moved pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 60(b)(6) \u201cthat the [trial] court reopen its prior judgment ... for the purpose of making additional findings and conclusions as to whether [plaintiff] should be awarded compound interest as an element of just compensation.\u201d The trial court noted that \u201cwith respect to this case, the Supreme Court in its mandate did not remand ... for consideration of the award of compound interest, but simply affirmed the judgment of the trial court.\" It also noted that \u201c[a]t the trial, the plaintiff made no offer of evidence of compound interest rates obtainable in the marketplace during the pertinent period; nor did it assign as error on appeal, the trial court\u2019s failure to award compound interest.\u201d It then denied the motion \u201con the ground that this [c]ourt is bound by the mandate of the Supreme Court which affirmed the earlier judgment of the trial court and did not remand for further proceedings [and on the further] ground that no evidence was presented at trial to support the award of compound interest.\u201d\nPlaintiff gave notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals. On 19 April 1988 we allowed defendant\u2019s petition for discretionary review prior to determination by the Court of Appeals. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31(b) (1986). We now affirm.\nA decision of this Court on a prior appeal constitutes the law of the case, both in subsequent proceedings in the trial court and on a subsequent appeal. Transportation, Inc. v. Strick Corp., 286 N.C. 235, 239, 210 S.E. 2d 181, 183 (1974). \u201c[0]ur mandate is binding upon [the trial court] and must be strictly followed without variation or departure. No judgment other than that directed or permitted by the appellate court may be entered.\u201d D & W, Inc. v. Charlotte, 268 N.C. 720, 722, 152 S.E. 2d 199, 202 (1966). \u201cWe have held judgments of Superior [C]ourt which were inconsistent and at variance with, contrary to, and modified, corrected, altered or reversed prior mandates of the Supreme Court ... to be unauthorized and void.\" Collins v. Simms, 257 N.C. 1, 8, 125 S.E. 2d 298, 303 (1962).\nThe mandate of this Court in the second appeal of this case affirmed a judgment of the trial court granting plaintiff simple interest on its award at the rate of 11% per annum for the time between defendant\u2019s taking of plaintiffs property and entry of the judgment awarding compensation. Lea Company, 317 N.C. 254, 345 S.E. 2d 355. As the trial court noted, our mandate did not include a remand for consideration of an award of compound interest; rather, it affirmed a judgment awarding simple interest, which was all the plaintiff had sought. The trial court \u201chad no authority to modify or change in any material respect the decree affirmed.\u201d Murrill v. Murrill, 90 N.C. 120, 122 (1884).\nAccordingly, the order denying plaintiffs motion to \u201creopen [the] judgment\u201d for consideration of an award of compound interest is\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "WHICHARD, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Patton, Boggs and Blow, by Eric C. Rowe and C. Allen Foster, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by James B. Richmond, Special Deputy Attorney General, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LEA COMPANY v. NORTH CAROLINA BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION\nNo. 111PA88\n(Filed 4 January 1989)\nAppeal and Error \u00a768\u2014 affirmation of judgment \u2014 consideration of collateral issue \u2014motion to reopen judgment denied\nThe trial court properly denied plaintiffs motion to reopen a prior judgment for the purpose of making additional findings and conclusions as to whether plaintiff should be awarded compound interest as an element of just compensation for defendant\u2019s taking of an interest in plaintiffs property by inverse condemnation where the trial court had determined that the statutory rate of interest was unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this case and awarded interest at 11% per annum; the Supreme Court affirmed, adopting the prudent investor standard for determining the appropriate interest rate; the Supreme Court also addressed the collateral issue, not raised by the parties, of whether compound interest should have been used; and plaintiff moved to reopen the prior judgment subsequent to certification of the mandate in the appeal. The mandate did not include a remand for consideration of an award of compound interest; rather, it affirmed a judgment awarding simple interest, which was all the plaintiff had sought, and the trial court had no authority to modify or change in any material respect the decree affirmed.\nOn appeal by plaintiff from an order entered by Ross, J., in Superior Court, GUILFORD County, on 22 October 1987. On 19 April 1988 we allowed defendant\u2019s petition for discretionary review prior to determination by the Court of Appeals. Heard in the Supreme Court 14 December 1988.\nPatton, Boggs and Blow, by Eric C. Rowe and C. Allen Foster, for plaintiff-appellant.\nLacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by James B. Richmond, Special Deputy Attorney General, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0697-01", "first_page_order": 729, "last_page_order": 732 }