{ "id": 2484550, "name": "CAROL CLARK, Personal Representative of the Estate of Wayne Scott Jordan, and ARLIN CLARK and wife, CAROL CLARK, as Individuals v. INN WEST, a North Carolina Partnership, d/b/a Ramada Inn; RAMADA INN, a Delaware Corporation; JAMES E. BRANDIS and wife, ANN BRANDIS; DEBRA ARA; WALLACE HYDE; CLIFTON E. SILER and wife, DOROTHY E. SILER; BETTY S. HINTZ and husband, WILLARD A. HINTZ; and MARY THRASH BOYD and husband, ALBERT L. BOYD", "name_abbreviation": "Clark v. Inn West", "decision_date": "1989-05-04", "docket_number": "No. 180PA88", "first_page": "415", "last_page": "420", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "324 N.C. 415" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "365 S.E.' 2d 682", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "89 N.C. App. 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521435 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/89/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 N.E. 2d 550", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553", "parenthetical": "\"[T]here is no support in precedent in dram shop cases for damages based on a future potentiality of support not presently provable.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "11 Ill. App. 2d 177", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5160199 ], "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "181", "parenthetical": "\"[T]here is no support in precedent in dram shop cases for damages based on a future potentiality of support not presently provable.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/11/0177-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 S.E. 2d 682", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "685" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "162 N.W. 2d 182", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10786796 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186", "parenthetical": "construing Iowa dram shop statute to deny claim on behalf of estate of fatally injured intoxicated person against liquor licensees who served him" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/162/0182-01" ] }, { "cite": "314 S.E. 2d 739", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "742" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 669", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2392835 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "673" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0669-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 S.E.' 2d 682", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "685" }, { "page": "685", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 N.C. App. 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521435 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "279" }, { "page": "279" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/89/0275-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 568, "char_count": 11382, "ocr_confidence": 0.818, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2338599545090467e-07, "percentile": 0.6063036879756311 }, "sha256": "f8ddd0b011ed77df7cc29f707cc96d895c334a2488e9e60b6b7dcd0df81e6015", "simhash": "1:0fcabfe2146684dc", "word_count": 1845 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:39:53.264050+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "CAROL CLARK, Personal Representative of the Estate of Wayne Scott Jordan, and ARLIN CLARK and wife, CAROL CLARK, as Individuals v. INN WEST, a North Carolina Partnership, d/b/a Ramada Inn; RAMADA INN, a Delaware Corporation; JAMES E. BRANDIS and wife, ANN BRANDIS; DEBRA ARA; WALLACE HYDE; CLIFTON E. SILER and wife, DOROTHY E. SILER; BETTY S. HINTZ and husband, WILLARD A. HINTZ; and MARY THRASH BOYD and husband, ALBERT L. BOYD" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WHICHARD, Justice.\nDefendants seek reversal of a decision of the Court of Appeals that reversed the trial court\u2019s order dismissing plaintiffs\u2019 complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The issue is whether the personal representative of the estate of a nineteen-year-old who consumes alcoholic beverages and dies from injuries sustained in a single-car accident may recover damages under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 18B-121 from the seller of the beverages. We answer in the negative, and we thus reverse the Court of Appeals.\nPlaintiffs alleged the following: On 5 December 1985 Wayne Scott Jordan (decedent), age nineteen, bought and consumed four \u201cdouble shots\u201d of tequila and four bottles of beer in the lounge located on the premises of defendant motel Inn West, which is owned or leased by the individual defendants other than defendant Debra Ara. Defendant Debra Ara, Inn West\u2019s employee, served the alcoholic beverages to decedent. Decedent became visibly intoxicated and left the lounge. While driving toward his home, decedent crashed his car near the Haywood-Buncombe county line. He died at 4:37 a.m. on 6 December 1985 from injuries sustained in the crash. Decedent\u2019s injuries were proximately caused by his negligent operation of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.\nPlaintiffs asserted claims under the Wrongful Death Act, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 28A-18-2, and under the Dram Shop Act, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 18B-121. Defendant answered asserting various defenses, including contributory negligence. By order of 16 April 1987, the trial court granted defendants\u2019 motion pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss on the ground that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under either statute.\nOn appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the wrongful death claim and decedent\u2019s parents\u2019 individual claims under the Dram Shop Act, but it reversed the dismissal of the Dram Shop Act claim by the personal representative. Plaintiffs did not seek discretionary review; thus, the propriety of the dismissal of the wrongful death claim, and of the parents\u2019 individual claims under the Dram Shop Act, is not before us. Defendants petitioned for discretionary review of the reinstatement of the Dram Shop Act claim by the personal representative. On 7 September 1988 we allowed the petition.\nArticle 1A of Chapter 18B of the North Carolina General Statutes authorizes a claim for damages for injury caused by the negligent selling or furnishing of alcoholic beverages to underage persons. \u201c \u2018Underage person\u2019 means a person who is less than the age legally required for purchase of the alcoholic beverage in question.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 18B-120(3) (1983). The age legally required for purchase of \u201cspirituous liquor,\u201d such as the tequila here, is twenty-one. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 18B-302 (1983). An \u201caggrieved party has a claim for relief for damages against a permittee or local Alcohol Beverage Control Board\u201d if the permittee or Board negligently sold or furnished an alcoholic beverage to an underage person and consumption of the beverage caused or contributed to impairment of the underage person and injury was proximately caused by the underage person\u2019s negligent operation of a vehicle while so impaired. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 18B-121 (1983). The term \u201caggrieved party\u201d includes \u201ca person who sustains an injury as a consequence of the actions of the underage person, but does not include the underage person . . . .\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 18B-120(1) (1983). Thus, had decedent lived, he could not have recovered for his injuries.\nThe Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the personal representative of decedent\u2019s estate was an aggrieved party and therefore could recover under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 18B-121. Clark, 89 N.C. App. at 279, 365 S.E. 2d at 685. The court stated:\nTo determine who is the aggrieved party entitled to bring an action for damages under G.S. 18B-121, we must look not only to the definition of \u201caggrieved party\u201d in G.S. 18B-120(1) but also to the wrongful death statute. \u201cAll statutes dealing with the same subject matter are to be construed in pari materia \u2014 i.e., in such a way as to give effect, if possible, to all provisions.\u201d . . . Under the wrongful death statute, the personal representative of the deceased is the proper plaintiff. . . . Construing the statutes together, as we must, the personal representative is the aggrieved party. Dismissal of the personal representative\u2019s claim under G.S. 18B-120 et seq. was error.\nId. at 278-79, 365 S.E. 2d at 685 (citations omitted).\nWe disagree with this conclusion. The plain language of the statute precludes the underage person from recovering for his own injuries. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 18B-120 (1983). The wrongful death statute provides for survivorship only of claims that could have been brought by the decedent had he lived. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 28A-18-2 (1984); Carver v. Carver, 310 N.C. 669, 673, 314 S.E. 2d 739, 742 (1984). Here, the decedent could not have maintained an action for his own injuries because the underage person is excluded from the definition of an aggrieved party in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 18B-120(1). Therefore, no claim survives his death, and his personal representative may not maintain an action under the Dram Shop Act.\nThis decision comports with the modern view that the intoxicated person may not recover against a seller or server of intoxicating beverages for self-inflicted damage. 1 J. Mosher, Liquor Liability Law \u00a7 3.03 (1988). Even absent express statutory preclusion such as that present here, \u201cmost courts interpret these statutes to preclude such causes of action.\u201d Id. at 3-7. \u201cIf relief is denied to a drinker, neither the intoxicated person nor his estate may sue.\u201d Id. at 3-9 (emphasis added). We agree with the Iowa Supreme Court that \u201cthe . . . Dram Shop Act was passed to aid in the protection of the public from damages inflicted on it by intoxicated persons, but this does not mean the Act . . . was intended to allow a person who overindulges to recoup his losses incurred as a result of his intoxication.\u201d Evans v. Kennedy, 162 N.W. 2d 182, 186 (Iowa 1968) (construing Iowa dram shop statute to deny claim on behalf of estate of fatally injured intoxicated person against liquor licensees who served him). Our General Assembly expressly has denied a right of recovery under the Dram Shop Act to the intoxicated decedent himself. We believe it is equally clear that it did not intend to allow the intoxicated decedent\u2019s personal representative, who merely stands in his stead, to recover damages caused by the decedent\u2019s own indiscretions.\nAccordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals with instructions to remand to the Superior Court, Haywood County, for reinstatement of the order dismissing the claims.\nReversed.\n. This statute provides:\nAn aggrieved party has a claim for relief for damages against a permittee or local Alcoholic Beverage Control Board if:\n(1) The permittee or his agent or employee or the local board or its agent or employee negligently sold or furnished an alcoholic beverage to an underage person; and\n(2) The consumption of the alcoholic beverage that was sold or furnished to an underage person caused or contributed to, in whole or in part, an underage driver\u2019s being subject to an impairing substance within the meaning of G.S. 20-138.1 at the time of the injury; and\n(3) The injury that resulted was proximately caused by the underage driver\u2019s negligent operation of a vehicle while so impaired.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 18B-121 (1983).\n. In dismissing the parents\u2019 claims as individuals under the Dram Shop Act, the Court of Appeals stated: \u201cDismissal of the personal representative\u2019s claim under G.S. 18B-120 et seq. was error. However, dismissal of the claims of [the parents] as individuals was proper. A parent cannot maintain an action in his individual capacity for the wrongful death of his child.\u201d Clark v. Inn West, 89 N.C. App. 275, 279, 365 S.E. 2d 682, 685 (1988). As stated above, plaintiffs did not seek discretionary review; thus, their standing, as individuals, to sue under the Dram Shop Act is not before us.\nWe note, however, that parents are not expressly excluded from the definition of \u201caggrieved party\u201d under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 18B-120G). \u201cInjury\u201d is defined by subsection (2) to include \u201closs of means of support\u201d; subsection (2) further provides that \u201c[n]othing in G.S. 28-18-2(a) or subdivision (1) of this section shall be interpreted to preclude recovery under this Article for loss of support ... on account of . . . death of the underage person . . . .\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 18B-120(2) (1983). Thus, the statute does not preclude recovery by the parents for loss of support by their underage child, if the underage child in fact supported the parents.\nHere, however, the complaint alleges only that the decedent would have provided income and support for his parents in the future. Support cannot be lost until it is in fact provided. Thus, the complaint does not allege sufficient facts to establish the parents\u2019 actual dependence on the decedent for income and support. See Robertson v. White, 11 Ill. App. 2d 177, 181, 136 N.E. 2d 550, 553 (1956) (\u201c[T]here is no support in precedent in dram shop cases for damages based on a future potentiality of support not presently provable.\u201d). The trial court therefore properly dismissed the parents\u2019 individual claims brought under the Dram Shop Act.\n.See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 28A-18-1 (1984); 2 N. Wiggins, Wills and Administration of Estates in North Carolina \u00a7 241 (1964).", "type": "majority", "author": "WHICHARD, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Coward, Cabler, Sossomon & Hicks, P.A., by J. K. Coward, Jr., for plaintiff-appellees.", "Roberts Stevens & Cogburn, P.A., by Steven D. Cogburn, Glenn S. Gentry, and Landon Roberts, for defendant-appellants.", "Hafer, Day & Wilson, P.A., by F. Eugene Hafer and Betty S. Waller, for North Carolina Hotel & Motel Association, amicus curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CAROL CLARK, Personal Representative of the Estate of Wayne Scott Jordan, and ARLIN CLARK and wife, CAROL CLARK, as Individuals v. INN WEST, a North Carolina Partnership, d/b/a Ramada Inn; RAMADA INN, a Delaware Corporation; JAMES E. BRANDIS and wife, ANN BRANDIS; DEBRA ARA; WALLACE HYDE; CLIFTON E. SILER and wife, DOROTHY E. SILER; BETTY S. HINTZ and husband, WILLARD A. HINTZ; and MARY THRASH BOYD and husband, ALBERT L. BOYD\nNo. 180PA88\n(Filed 4 May 1989)\nIntoxicating Liquor \u00a7 24\u2014 dram shop law \u2014sale to underage person \u2014 single-car accident \u2014 no right of action hy personal representative\nThe personal representative of the estate of an underage person who consumes alcoholic beverages and dies from injuries in a single-car accident may not recover damages under the Dram Shop Act, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 18B-121, from the seller of the beverages. The decedent could not have maintained an action for his own injuries because the underage person is excluded from the definition of aggrieved party in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 18B-120G), and the General Assembly did not intend to allow the intoxicated decedent\u2019s personal representative, who merely stands in his stead, to recover damages caused by the decedent\u2019s own indiscretions.\nON discretionary review of a decision of the Court of Appeals, reported at 89 N.C. App. 275, 365 S.E.' 2d 682 (1988), affirming in part and reversing in part an order entered by Kirby, J., at the 13 April 1987 Civil Session of Superior Court, HAYWOOD County. Heard in the Supreme Court 15 March 1989.\nCoward, Cabler, Sossomon & Hicks, P.A., by J. K. Coward, Jr., for plaintiff-appellees.\nRoberts Stevens & Cogburn, P.A., by Steven D. Cogburn, Glenn S. Gentry, and Landon Roberts, for defendant-appellants.\nHafer, Day & Wilson, P.A., by F. Eugene Hafer and Betty S. Waller, for North Carolina Hotel & Motel Association, amicus curiae." }, "file_name": "0415-01", "first_page_order": 453, "last_page_order": 458 }