{ "id": 2490911, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WINFRED ED BRIDGES", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Bridges", "decision_date": "1989-11-09", "docket_number": "No. 96A88", "first_page": "529", "last_page": "535", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "325 N.C. 529" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "364 S.E.2d 648", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "657" }, { "page": "657" }, { "page": "657-58" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2570670 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "345" }, { "page": "346" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0327-01" ] }, { "cite": "86 L. Ed. 2d 231", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "472 U.S. 320", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 S.E.2d 783", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "796" }, { "page": "796" }, { "page": "796", "parenthetical": "funds requested for additional pathologist although pulmonary specialist testified for defense" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 30", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4738200 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "52" }, { "page": "52" }, { "page": "52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0030-01" ] }, { "cite": "342 S.E.2d 847", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "850-51" }, { "page": "851" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 507", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4701571 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "512-13" }, { "page": "512-13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0507-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 S.E.2d 775", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "779" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 193", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4774343 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0193-01" ] }, { "cite": "470 U.S. 68", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11298833 ], "weight": 13, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "74" }, { "page": "60" }, { "page": "77" }, { "page": "62" }, { "page": "83" }, { "page": "66" }, { "page": "79" }, { "page": "63" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/470/0068-01" ] }, { "cite": "297 S.E.2d 553", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 169", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561203 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0169-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 S.E.2d 648", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "659", "parenthetical": "Mitchell, J., concurring in result, joined by Meyer, J." } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2570670 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348-49", "parenthetical": "Mitchell, J., concurring in result, joined by Meyer, J." } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0327-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 718, "char_count": 14168, "ocr_confidence": 0.772, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.678305454142545e-08, "percentile": 0.4922572705976294 }, "sha256": "23acddd4362558748ea12aa3dc5df1a229d07981482427e43b97e9df389a4158", "simhash": "1:534e5463a1382d5b", "word_count": 2333 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:51:09.974518+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WINFRED ED BRIDGES" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WHICHARD, Justice.\nDefendant was convicted of robbery with a firearm and of murder in the first degree in the perpetration of a felony. He was sentenced to death for the murder conviction. We conclude that the trial court erred in denying defendant\u2019s pretrial motion for funds to hire an independent fingerprint expert. For this reason, we order a new trial.\nAt approximately 2:00 p.m. on 17 May 1987, a customer entered the Lake Side Grocery on Highway 15 in Granville County and discovered the body of its proprietor lying on the floor behind the counter. A forensic pathologist later determined that the victim had died from small-caliber gunshot wounds to the head and chest. The cash register was open and the floor was littered with debris, including a wallet belonging to the victim and what appeared to be its scattered contents. An unplugged wall clock was stopped at approximately 1:43 p.m. An electrically operated alarm system, which evidently had been pulled off the wall near the clock, was found in a sink in an adjacent room. A sign on the entry door was hung so as to indicate the store was \u201cClosed.\u201d\nEvidence that the victim had been robbed consisted of the testimony of the victim\u2019s grandson that his grandfather customarily kept large amounts of cash in his billfold, rather than in the cash register, and the testimony of a customer who had purchased a box of salt with a twenty-dollar bill around 1:30 p.m. that day. Neither the cash register nor the billfold found on the floor of the grocery contained a twenty-dollar bill or any other cash.\nThe bulk of the evidence linking defendant to the murder was circumstantial. An acquaintance testified that on 17 May, on her way to visit a resident of the trailer park across the highway from the store, she had seen defendant walking down the highway toward the store between 1:15 and 1:30 p.m. She saw defendant again, still in the general vicinity of the store, after she left the park fifteen or twenty minutes later. Defendant later introduced contradictory alibi testimony of his uncle and cousin.\nThe only direct evidence of defendant\u2019s involvement in the victim\u2019s death was three thumbprints which the State\u2019s expert witnesses identified at trial as defendant\u2019s. One print was lifted from the \u201cOpen/Closed\u201d sign on the entry door; the other two were lifted from the back of a medical insurance card found lying near the victim\u2019s wallet. Prior to trial defendant had filed two motions regarding any fingerprint impressions taken from the crime scene. The first, based on N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-903(e) (1988), requested scientific examination of the prints by defendant\u2019s own expert; the second, under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-454 (1986), requested funds to hire an expert for such an examination. At a pretrial hearing Judge James R. Strickland expressly denied the second motion and in effect denied the first. The motions were reiterated midtrial, albeit somewhat obliquely, along with a motion to suppress the fingerprint evidence, and again were overruled. We hold that under the particular facts of this case it was error to refuse funds for the expert examination of this evidence.\nIn Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 84 L. Ed. 2d 53 (1985), the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant is constitutionally entitled to the assistance of a court-appointed psychiatrist in the preparation of a defense when he has made \u201ca preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor\u201d in his defense. Id. at 74, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 60. In State v. Johnson, 317 N.C. 193, 199, 344 S.E.2d 775, 779 (1986), this Court considered synonymous \u201ca showing\u201d that the issue is \u201ca significant factor,\u201d and \u201ca threshold showing of specific necessity\u201d or of \u201cparticularized need,\u201d the last of which has figured frequently in the jurisprudence of this State as a measure of the appropriateness of providing the assistance of an expert. See, e.g., State v. Artis, 316 N.C. 507, 512-13, 342 S.E.2d 847, 850-51 (1986).\nThis Court\u2019s post-A/ce cases have held further that, in addition to making such a threshold showing, the defendant must demonstrate either that without expert assistance he will be deprived of a fair trial, or that there is a reasonable likelihood that it will materially assist him in the preparation of his case. E.g., State v. Penley, 318 N.C. 30, 52, 347 S.E.2d 783, 796 (1986). This additional requisite accords with the United States Supreme Court\u2019s subsequent refinement of Ake that there is no deprivation of due process when the trial court exercises its discretion to find that defendant\u2019s showing consists of \u201clittle more than undeveloped assertions that the requested assistance would be beneficial.\u201d Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323-24 n.1, 86 L. Ed. 2d 231, 236 n.1 (1985). See Artis, 316 N.C. at 512-13, 342 S.E.2d at 851.\nIn State v. Moore, 321 N.C. 327, 364 S.E.2d 648 (1988), this Court recognized that the showing demanded under Ake and its North Carolina progeny was \u201ca flexible one[,] . . . designed to ensure that the indigent defendant \u2018has access to the raw materials integral to the building of an effective defense.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 344, 364 S.E.2d at 657 (quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 77, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 62). Accordingly, this Court examined that defendant\u2019s motion for funds for a fingerprint expert and identified three circumstances that together met the requisite threshold showing of specific necessity. First, \u201c[defendant showed that absent a fingerprint expert he would be unable to assess adequately the State\u2019s expert\u2019s conclusion that defendant\u2019s palmprint was found at the scene of the attack.\u201d Id. Second, he \u201cdemonstrated that . . . this testimony by the State\u2019s expert was crucial to the State\u2019s ability to identify defendant as the perpetrator of the crimes charged against him.\u201d Id. Third, the defendant in Moore showed that his ability to communicate and reason was impaired by mental retardation, thus impeding his ability to assist his counsel in making a defense. Id. This last finding clearly satisfied the second-tier criterion of Ake and Caldwell, demonstrating that the expert assistance shown to be necessary by the first two circumstances would be of material value in preparing a defense.\nThe first two circumstances stated in Moore also underlie defendant\u2019s showing of specific necessity in this case. Additionally, together they \u201cdemonstrate that defendant would have been \u2018materially assisted in the preparation of his defense\u2019 had the trial court granted his motion.\u201d Moore, 321 N.C. at 345, 364 S.E.2d at 657 (quoting Penley, 318 N.C. at 52, 347 S.E.2d at 796). First, the experts who testified as to the preparation and identification of the latent prints found at the crime scene were witnesses for the State, not independent parties. See Moore, 321 N.C. at 346, 364 S.E.2d at 657-58; cf. Penley, 318 N.C. at 52, 347 S.E.2d at 796 (funds requested for additional pathologist although pulmonary specialist testified for defense). Without his own expert to examine the items found at the crime scene and to compare any latent prints to his own impressions, defendant was unable to assess adequately the conclusion of the State\u2019s experts that the latent prints from the crime scene correlated to his own fingerprints. Second, fingerprint evidence was the only direct evidence linking defendant to the offense. This evidence was thus critical to the State\u2019s ability to identify defendant as the perpetrator of the crimes with which he was charged. The importance of this circumstance to a demonstration that an expert would have \u201cmaterially assisted in . . . [a] defense\u201d cannot be overstated: \u201c[W]hen, because of lack of funds, a defendant is unable to rebut expert testimony with expert assistance of his own, the defendant\u2019s chances of persuading the jury to reject the expert\u2019s conclusions are \u2018devastated.\u2019 \u201d Moore, 321 N.C. at 346 n.4, 364 S.E.2d at 658 n.4 (quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 83, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 66).\nWhile it is within the trial court\u2019s discretion to \u201capprove a fee\u201d for the appointment of an expert witness to testify for an indigent defendant, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-454 (1986), it is error of constitutional magnitude to refuse such funds when the defendant has made a \u201cthreshold showing of specific need\u201d and when expert assistance is of material importance to his defense or its absence would deprive him of a fair trial. These requisites are met when it is apparent that the fingerprint evidence is crucial to the State\u2019s proof that defendant is the perpetrator of the charged offense and when denial of a motion for funds precludes an indigent defendant from seeking the assistance of an independent expert in assessing that evidence.\nDefendant made timely motions for the assistance of a fingerprint expert. For the reasons stated herein, we conclude that he made a threshold showing of specific need for such expertise and demonstrated that such testimony would be of material assistance in preparing his defense. Because the trial court erred in denying those motions, and because we cannot say that error in precluding defendant from expert examination of critical inculpatory evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1443(b) (1988), defendant is entitled to a new trial. \u201c[A] State may not legitimately assert an interest in maintenance of a strategic advantage over the defense, if the result of that advantage- is to cast a pall on the accuracy of the verdict obtained.\u201d Ake, 470 U.S. at 79, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 63.\nIn view of this disposition and of the improbability that the numerous other errors assigned will recur upon retrial, we find it unnecessary to address defendant\u2019s remaining arguments.\nNew trial.", "type": "majority", "author": "WHICHARD, Justice." }, { "text": "Justice Mitchell\ndissenting.\nThe majority holds that the defendant demonstrated at trial that a fingerprint expert appointed at public expense would be of material assistance to him in preparing his defense, and that the trial court, therefore, erred in failing to appoint one. Although many types of experts will be of material assistance to an indigent defendant in preparing his case and should be appointed by the trial court in proper situations, I have previously explained to the best of my ability:\nThe taking and analysis of fingerprints is largely a mechanical function, although admittedly one which requires some training and experience. Basically, the analysis of fingerprints involves comparing the latent print taken from the scene of the crime with a known print of the defendant to determine whether there are points of similarity. Once a given number of points of similarity are observed, the expert draws the conclusion that the two prints were made by the same person.\nIt has been my experience that all of the steps involved in fingerprint analysis can be readily demonstrated to a jury in such a manner that the jurors are able to determine for themselves whether the points of similarity are in fact similar. Likewise, the jurors are as capable as the expert of counting the number of points of similarity. There simply is nothing so mysterious or difficult about fingerprint analysis and comparison as to prevent the ordinary lay juror from determining whether the procedure has been performed correctly and the expert has reached the right conclusion, once the technique is explained and pointed out to the juror. For this reason, a defendant can properly defend himself against such evidence\u2014 if in fact he will ever be able to defend himself \u2014 by the simple expedient of thorough cross-examination of the State\u2019s fingerprint witness. See State v. Corbett, 307 N.C. 169, 297 S.E.2d 553.\nState v. Moore, 321 N.C. 327, 348-49, 364 S.E.2d 648, 659 (1988) (Mitchell, J., concurring in result, joined by Meyer, J.).\nThe lesson for our trial judges from the majority\u2019s holdings in this case and the Moore case is that they must appoint fingerprint experts at public expense to assist indigent defendants in all cases in which the State relies upon fingerprint evidence and there were no eyewitnesses to the crime for which the defendant is charged. Perhaps this would be a desirable result in an ideal world. Given the limited financial resources available to our courts, however, the appointment of experts to aid criminal defendants in preparing a defense should be reserved for those cases in which it is reasonably likely to be necessary to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial. In my view, this clearly is not such a case.\nI dissent from the majority\u2019s holding that the trial court erred in failing to appoint a fingerprint expert and that the defendant must have a new trial as a result.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Justice Mitchell" } ], "attorneys": [ "Lacy F. Thornburg, Attorney General, by Steven F. Bryant, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "Floyd B. McKissick, Sr., and Stephen D. Kaylor for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WINFRED ED BRIDGES\nNo. 96A88\n(Filed 9 November 1989)\nConstitutional Law \u00a7 31 (NCI3d)\u2014 indigent defendant \u2014funds for fingerprint expert\nThe trial court erred in denying an indigent defendant\u2019s pretrial motion for funds to hire an independent fingerprint expert in a first degree murder case where defendant made a threshold showing of specific need for such expertise and demonstrated that such testimony would be of material assistance in preparing his defense by showing that fingerprint evidence was the only direct evidence linking defendant to the offense; the experts who testified as to the preparation and identification of the latent prints found at the crime scene were witnesses for the State, not independent parties; and, without the assistance of a fingerprint expert, defendant would be unable to assess adequately the conclusion of the State\u2019s experts that the latent prints from the crime scene correlated to his own fingerprints.\nAm Jur 2d, Criminal Law \u00a7 1006.\nJustice Mitchell dissenting.\nAppeal by defendant pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a) from a judgment sentencing him to death, entered by Fight, J\u201e at the 19 January 1988 Criminal Session of Superior Court, GRANVILLE County, upon defendant\u2019s conviction of murder in the first degree in the perpetration of a felony. Heard in the Supreme Court 12 October 1989.\nLacy F. Thornburg, Attorney General, by Steven F. Bryant, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nFloyd B. McKissick, Sr., and Stephen D. Kaylor for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0529-01", "first_page_order": 555, "last_page_order": 561 }