{ "id": 2490196, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM EARL CLARK", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Clark", "decision_date": "1989-12-07", "docket_number": "No. 341A88", "first_page": "677", "last_page": "685", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "325 N.C. 677" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "286 S.E.2d 68", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 609", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570230 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0609-01" ] }, { "cite": "287 S.E.2d 824", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 285", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567606 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0285-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 71", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 78", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4704658 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0078-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 S.E.2d 129", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "involuntary manslaughter" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 676", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571995 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "involuntary manslaughter" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0676-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 S.E.2d 711", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "breaking or entering" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 445", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575234 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "breaking or entering" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0445-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 S.E.2d 10", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "voluntary manslaughter" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2517737 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "voluntary manslaughter" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "257 S.E.2d 569", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568313 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "298 S.E.2d 645", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 274", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562214 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "50 L. Ed. 2d 69", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "429 U.S. 809", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6085, 7371, 6739, 5782, 5823 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/429/0809-04", "/us/429/0809-01", "/us/429/0809-03", "/us/429/0809-05", "/us/429/0809-02" ] }, { "cite": "221 S.E.2d 333", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 N.C. 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567445 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/289/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 S.E.2d 409", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "284 N.C. 67", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559900 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/284/0067-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 S.E.2d 114", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "117" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573434 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "308 S.E.2d 264", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 594", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4764258 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0594-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 S.E.2d 377", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "383" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2515495 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "358" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 S.E.2d 555", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 583", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2491770 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0583-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 753, "char_count": 18621, "ocr_confidence": 0.743, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.3119408169995195e-07, "percentile": 0.7885670168415224 }, "sha256": "b48c93c35ea41aa59bb7f8c9074b3a21dc0d93624b1c847f2c09e1753e790085", "simhash": "1:b76bd0a3f53a975a", "word_count": 3144 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:51:09.974518+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Justice WEBB joins in this concurring opinion." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM EARL CLARK" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "FRYE, Justice.\nDefendant was charged in a proper bill of indictment containing two counts. Count I charged defendant with feloniously discharging a firearm into an occupied dwelling. Count II charged defendant with murder. Defendant was tried in a noncapital trial on the charge of murder and entered a plea of not guilty. At the conclusion of all the evidence at trial, the trial court instructed the jury concerning the law as to murder in the first degree by reason of a killing during the perpetration of a felony. The trial court further instructed the jury that it would find defendant guilty of first degree murder on the basis of this theory or find him not guilty. Acting pursuant to these instructions, the jury returned a verdict finding defendant guilty of first degree murder. The trial court entered judgment sentencing defendant to life imprisonment, and defendant appealed to this Court.\nOn appeal, defendant brings forth three assignments of error pertaining to the following: (1) whether the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the first degree murder charge under the felony murder rule because there was insufficient evidence to convict defendant of the underlying felony; (2) whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that it should consider a possible verdict finding defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter; and (3) whether this Court should reject the felony murder rule for cases in which the underlying felony is the offense of discharging a firearm into occupied property. We find no error in defendant\u2019s trial.\nEvidence for the State tended to show in pertinent part that on the night of Sunday, 22 March 1987, Johnny Bryant was shot and killed while visiting at the home of Jacquelyn Foulks. Foulks and defendant William Earl Clark had been \u201cgoing together\u201d for five years prior to the shooting.\nFoulks, a witness for the State, testified that on the afternoon of 22 March 1987, she and defendant had gone out together. They had been together from about mid-day until that night when they went with friends to a club. They had been drinking beer that day and fighting and arguing all evening. Outside the club, the victim Johnny Bryant observed defendant twisting Foulks\u2019 arm until she went down on her knees. Bryant and defendant argued over the incident, but Foulks saw no weapons during this confrontation. Bryant, Foulks, and defendant went back into the club. At about 11:00 p.m., the three of them came back outside the club. After knocking a beer out of Foulks\u2019 hand, defendant took some of her clothes out of the trunk of his automobile, put them on the ground, and drove off.\nFoulks testified that Bryant gave her a ride home. Bryant accompanied Foulks inside her house. After she put her child to bed, Foulks went to her room to change clothes and heard an automobile drive up. Defendant was the driver of the automobile. She let him inside the house, and he sat on the couch. He was \u201cstill upset and high\u201d and asked, \u201cWhat is this, a new boyfriend?\u201d Foulks replied that she and Bryant were just friends. After some further conversation, during which she told defendant that they \u201cwere through, it was over with \u2014 through,\u201d defendant got up and left. Foulks followed defendant to the door and closed and locked it as he left the house.\nBryant stood up as Foulks accompanied defendant to the door. Foulks never heard defendant\u2019s automobile pull off or the motor start. She heard a slam, then a gunshot. She saw Bryant stagger toward her kitchen where he grabbed the kitchen table and fell. He had \u201ca big hole in his chest\u201d and blood was everywhere. Foulks testified that the gunshot came through her closed front door. She ran out the front door of her house to get help and saw defendant driving slowly away from her house. She ran into the road, threw up her hands and told defendant to stop. She asked him if he realized that he had shot Bryant. Defendant did not answer, but he jumped out of his automobile and looked at Foulks. Then he got back into the automobile and drove off. Foulks ran to her neighbor\u2019s house for help.\nRaymond Becton Fields, a neighbor of Foulks, testified that he was awakened about midnight on the date of the shooting incident by Foulks, who was hysterical. She told him that a friend of hers had been shot and that \u201cBro shot him.\u201d He testified that he went with Foulks to her house and saw the victim. He checked the victim Bryant for a pulse and, finding none, told Foulks that Bryant was dead. Fields also testified that he noticed a hole about the size of a finger in the front door.\nCaptain Lester Gosnell of the Lenoir County Sheriff\u2019s Department arrived at Foulks\u2019 house shortly after the shooting. He examined the front door of Foulks\u2019 residence and observed a hole approximately one inch in diameter with visible black markings around the hole. After taking a statement from Foulks, Gosnell obtained a warrant for defendant\u2019s arrest. He then went to defendant\u2019s house and placed him under arrest.\nGosnell also testified that he advised defendant of his Miranda rights after defendant was taken into custody. Defendant told Gosnell that he did not want to answer any questions without a lawyer. During a thirty:five to forty-minute wait for the magistrate, the defendant said to Gosnell, \u201cIt don\u2019t take much to get in trouble but it takes a long time to get out, don\u2019t it?\u201d Gosnell replied, \u201cThat\u2019s true.\u201d Later, defendant asked Gosnell, \u201c[T]o be charged with first-degree murder, don\u2019t you have to aim at your target?\u201d Gosnell responded, \u201cI think so.\u201d Defendant then said, \u201cI just don\u2019t know why I did what I did.\u201d Gosnell made no further reply but wrote down each of these comments.\nDefendant testified at trial in his own behalf. He admitted that he and Foulks had an argument on 22 March 1987, but he denied having words with Bryant. He testified that he went to Foulks\u2019 house to make up with her, but he never went inside the house. He testified that he fell asleep in the automobile while he was parked in Foulks\u2019 driveway. He awoke hearing Foulks calling him, saying, \u201cBro, Bro, Bro, come help me. Johnny have been shot.\u201d Defendant then backed out of the driveway and went home. He denied shooting a gun at any time that night. He further testified that Foulks later told him that she had gotten the victim\u2019s gold necklace and his coat. Defendant testified that the only statements he made to Captain Gosnell were the following: \u201cIt don\u2019t take you long to get in trouble but it takes you a long time to get out\u201d; and \u201c[A]ny time they get you for murder you\u2019re in a world of trouble even though you don\u2019t know how you got in it.\u201d\nDefendant first contends that the trial court erred in denying his motions to dismiss the charge of first degree murder under the felony murder rule because there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the underlying felony of discharging a firearm into an occupied dwelling. In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence. State v. Locklear, 322 N.C. 349, 368 S.E.2d 377 (1988). The trial court should not grant a dismissal simply because there are contradictions and discrepancies in the evidence; the jury must resolve these conflicts. State v. Workman, 309 N.C. 594, 308 S.E.2d 264 (1983). The test that the trial court must apply is whether there is substantial evidence\u2014 either direct, circumstantial, or both \u2014 to support a finding that the crime charged has been committed and that defendant was the perpetrator. State v. Locklear, 322 N.C. at 358, 368 S.E.2d at 383. The term \u201csubstantial evidence\u201d simply means \u201cthat the evidence must be existing and real, not just seeming or imaginary.\u201d State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 99, 261 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1980). If there is substantial evidence of each essential element of the offense charged and that defendant was the perpetrator, then a motion to dismiss should be denied. We conclude that there was substantial evidence that defendant committed the offense of discharging a firearm into an occupied dwelling and, therefore, sufficient evidence of the felony required to sustain defendant\u2019s conviction of first degree murder under the felony murder rule.\nThe offense of discharging a firearm into an occupied dwelling is defined by statute, which provides in pertinent part that:\nAny person who willfully or wantonly discharges or attempts to discharge:\n... (2) a firearm into any building . . . while it is occupied is guilty of a Class H Felony.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-34.1 (1986). The evidence must show that defendant intentionally shot into the occupied building. State v. Williams, 284 N.C. 67, 199 S.E.2d 409 (1973). Defendant\u2019s specific argument here is that the State failed to submit substantial evidence that he intended to shoot into the house. We disagree.\nThe evidence in the present case was sufficient, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, to support a finding that defendant intentionally shot into a residence that he knew was occupied. Jacquelyn Foulks testified that defendant came to her home while Johnny Bryant was visiting her. Defendant and Foulks argued and he left the house in an angry manner. As Foulks was locking the door behind defendant, Johnny Bryant stood up. Foulks then heard what she thought was an automobile door slam followed by a gunshot. The shot came through the front door and hit Bryant in the chest. After trying to help the victim, Foulks ran out of the house and saw defendant driving slowly away. She stopped him and asked him if he knew that he had shot Bryant. Defendant did not answer but drove away. Furthermore, the State presented evidence through Captain Gosnell that defendant volunteered incriminating statements after he was arrested. We conclude that this was substantial evidence from which the jury could find that defendant did intend to shoot into the residence. See id. Therefore, defendant\u2019s argument is without merit.\nDefendant next assigns as error the trial court\u2019s failure to instruct the jury with regard to a \u2022 possible verdict finding him guilty of involuntary manslaughter. The second count in the bill of indictment was in the form prescribed by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15-144 and charged defendant with the murder of Johnny Bryant. A murder indictment in the form prescribed by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15-144 will support a verdict finding the defendant guilty of first degree murder upon any of the theories set forth in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-17. State v. Bush, 289 N.C. 159, 221 S.E.2d 333, death sentence vacated, 429 U.S. 809, 50 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1976).\nThe State is not required at any time to elect a theory upon which it will proceed against the defendant on the charge of first degree murder, and it is proper for the trial court to submit the issue of the defendant\u2019s guilt of that charge to the jury on each of the theories of first degree murder supported by substantial evidence presented at trial. State v. Strickland, 307 N.C. 274, 298 S.E.2d 645 (1983). Further, rather than have the jury render a general verdict if it finds the defendant guilty of first degree murder, the better practice is for the trial court to have the jury specify the theory or theories upon which it finds first degree murder to have been established beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Goodman, 298 N.C. 1, 257 S.E.2d 569 (1979).\nIn the present case, the trial court submitted the murder charge for the jury\u2019s consideration only upon the theory of first degree murder under the felony murder rule. Both the trial court\u2019s instructions and the written verdict form given the jury required that the jury find defendant guilty of first degree murder under that theory or find him not guilty. The jury returned its verdict specifying that it found defendant guilty of first degree murder in the perpetration of a felony.\nDefendant contends that the jury should have been instructed with regard to a possible verdict finding him guilty of involuntary manslaughter. However, defendant presented no evidence to establish involuntary manslaughter. The State\u2019s evidence tended to show that defendant intentionally shot into an occupied dwelling causing the death of the victim. If the State\u2019s evidence is believed, then defendant is guilty of felony murder. Defendant\u2019s evidence was that he did not fire a gun at any time on the night in question. If defendant\u2019s evidence is believed, then he is not guilty of any degree of homicide. Since there was no evidence of involuntary manslaughter, the trial judge did not err in failing to submit involuntary manslaughter as a possible verdict. It is well settled that a jury should only be instructed with regard to a possible verdict if there is evidence to support it. State v. Weeks, 322 N.C. 152, 367 S.E.2d 10 (1988) (voluntary manslaughter); State v. Hardy, 299 N.C. 445, 263 S.E.2d 711 (1980) (breaking or entering); see also State v. Wrenn, 279 N.C. 676, 185 S.E.2d 129 (1971) (involuntary manslaughter).\nFinally, defendant contends that this Court should reconsider established law and apply the \u201cmerger doctrine\u201d to bar application of the felony murder rule to homicides committed in the perpetration of the felony of discharging a firearm into occupied property. We have rejected this application of the \u201cmerger doctrine\u201d on several recent occasions. See State v. King, 316 N.C. 78, 340 S.E.2d 71 (1986); State v. Mash, 305 N.C. 285, 287 S.E.2d 824 (1982); State v. Wall, 304 N.C. 609, 286 S.E.2d 68 (1982). The defendant has offered no argument that persuades us to alter this well-settled law.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we hold that the defendant received a fair trial, free of prejudicial error.\nNo error.", "type": "majority", "author": "FRYE, Justice." }, { "text": "Justice MITCHELL\nconcurring in result.\nThe majority holds that the trial court properly refused to instruct on the lesser offense of involuntary manslaughter, because there was no evidence of involuntary manslaughter. For reasons which I have fully discussed in my dissenting opinion in State v. Thomas, 325 N.C. 583, 386 S.E.2d 555 (1989), involuntary manslaughter is not a lesser included offense of first-degree murder, when, as here, first-degree murder is submitted to the jury based solely upon the felony murder theory; this is true without regard to what the evidence may tend to show. Because the trial court \u2014 for whatever reason \u2014 permitted this case to go to the jury for its determination of whether the defendant was guilty of first-degree murder only under the felony murder theory, no instruction on lesser homicide offenses would have been proper. I concur only in the result reached by the majority.\nJustice WEBB joins in this concurring opinion.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "Justice MITCHELL" } ], "attorneys": [ "Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by Jane P. Gray, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.", "Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender, by M. Patricia Devine, Assistant Appellate Defender, for the defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM EARL CLARK\nNo. 341A88\n(Filed 7 December 1989)\n1. Homicide \u00a7 21.6 (NCI3d); Weapons and Firearms \u00a7 3 (NCI3d) \u2014 felony murder \u2014 discharging firearm into occupied dwelling\u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThere was sufficient evidence that defendant intentionally discharged a firearm into a residence that he knew was occupied to support his conviction of first degree murder under the felony murder rule where the State\u2019s evidence tended to show that defendant came to the home of his former girlfriend while the victim was visiting her; defendant and the girlfriend argued and defendant left the house in an angry manner; the girlfriend heard an automobile door slam followed by a gunshot; the shot came through the front door and struck the victim in the chest; the girlfriend ran from the house and saw defendant driving slowly away; she stopped defendant and asked him if he knew he had shot the victim, and defendant did not answer but drove away; and defendant volunteered incriminating statements after his arrest, including a statement that \u201cI just don\u2019t know why I did what I did.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-34.1.\nAm Jur 2d, Homicide \u00a7 94.\n2. Homicide \u00a7 12 (NCI3d)\u2014 murder indictment \u2014 theories of prosecution\nA murder indictment in the form prescribed by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15-144 will support a verdict finding defendant guilty of first degree murder upon any of the theories set forth in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-17.\nAm Jur 2d, Homicide \u00a7 211.\n3. Homicide \u00a7 25 (NCI3d)\u2014 first degree murder \u2014 election of theories not required\nThe State is not required at any time to elect a theory upon which it will proceed against the defendant on the charge of first degree murder, and it is proper for the trial court to submit the issue of defendant\u2019s guilt of that charge to the jury on each of the theories of first degree murder supported by substantial evidence presented at trial.\nAm Jur 2d, Homicide \u00a7 211.\n4. Homicide \u00a7 31 (NCI3d)\u2014 first degree murder \u2014 specification of theory in verdict\nRather than have the jury render a general verdict if it finds the defendant guilty of first degree murder when more than one theory is submitted, the better practice is for the trial court to have the jury specify the theory or theories upon which it finds first degree murder to have been established beyond a reasonable doubt.\nAm Jur 2d, Homicide \u00a7 542.\n5. Homicide \u00a7 30.3 (NCI3d)\u2014 murder prosecution \u2014 instruction on involuntary manslaughter not required\nThe trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury with regard to a possible verdict of involuntary manslaughter in a murder prosecution in which the trial court\u2019s instructions required the jury to find defendant guilty of first degree murder under the felony murder rule or to find him not guilty where the State\u2019s evidence tended to show that defendant intentionally shot into an occupied dwelling and caused the death of the victim, and defendant\u2019s evidence was that he did not fire a gun at any time on the night in question.\nAm Jur 2d, Homicide \u00a7 531.\n6. Homicide \u00a7 4.2 (NCI3d)\u2014 felony murder \u2014 discharging firearm into occupied property as underlying felony\nThe \u201cmerger doctrine\u201d will not be applied to bar application of the felony murder rule to homicides committed in the perpetration of the felony of discharging a firearm into occupied property.\nAm Jur 2d, Homicide \u00a7 73.\nJustice MITCHELL concurring in result.\nJustice WEBB joins in the concurring opinion.\nAPPEAL of right by the defendant from judgment entered by Reid, J., on 3 March 1988, in Superior Court, LENOIR County, sentencing the defendant to life imprisonment for murder in the first degree. Heard in the Supreme Court 11 April 1989.\nLacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by Jane P. Gray, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.\nMalcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender, by M. Patricia Devine, Assistant Appellate Defender, for the defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0677-01", "first_page_order": 703, "last_page_order": 711 }