{
  "id": 5304621,
  "name": "C. WILLIAM BARKER, Plaintiff v. EDWARD C. AGEE, JAMES R. MABE, BRADFORD K. ROOT, FRANK E. WALL, VELPO D. WARD, JR., and WARD & COMPANY, P.A., Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs v. CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK, Third-Party Defendant",
  "name_abbreviation": "Barker v. Agee",
  "decision_date": "1990-04-05",
  "docket_number": "No. 224PA89",
  "first_page": "470",
  "last_page": "473",
  "citations": [
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      "cite": "326 N.C. 470"
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
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  "jurisdiction": {
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    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
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      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1986,
      "pin_cites": [
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          "page": "797"
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    {
      "cite": "79 N.C. App. 103",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        8519505
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      "year": 1986,
      "pin_cites": [
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          "page": "107"
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        "/nc-app/79/0103-01"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:38:26.587833+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "C. WILLIAM BARKER, Plaintiff v. EDWARD C. AGEE, JAMES R. MABE, BRADFORD K. ROOT, FRANK E. WALL, VELPO D. WARD, JR., and WARD & COMPANY, P.A., Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs v. CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK, Third-Party Defendant"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "PER CURIAM.\nOn this appeal: (1) defendants seek reversal of summary judgment entered by th\u00e9 trial judge entitling plaintiff to enforce an acceleration clause and to recover against defendants amounts due under the terms of a promissory note; and (2) third-party defendant, Citizens National Bank (Bank), seeks a determination of its standing to appeal the judgment entered in the trial court against defendants. The Court of Appeals held that the Bank did not have standing to appeal from the judgment because the judgment did not affect the Bank\u2019s rights, and that therefore the Bank was not an aggrieved party. The Court of Appeals otherwise affirmed the trial court\u2019s order granting plaintiff\u2019s motion for summary judgment and awarding attorney\u2019s fees to plaintiff. We disagree with the Court of Appeals\u2019 determination that the Bank lacked standing; however, we agree with the remainder of the Court of Appeals\u2019 decision.\nPlaintiff and defendants owned an accounting firm. Defendants purchased plaintiff\u2019s stock in the firm for $850,000. A down payment was made and the balance, $750,000, was to be paid in monthly installments of $6,862, due the first of each month pursuant to an interest-free promissory note executed by defendants. Upon default in the payment of an installment for fifteen or more days, the holder had the right to declare the entire unpaid balance due and, upon doing so, was entitled to interest in addition to reasonable attorney\u2019s fees. In an effort to avoid disputes and to avoid personal contact between the parties regarding whether payments were timely made and also to give the parties independent records of when the payments were made, counsel for both parties agreed that the monthly payments would be made by wire transfer. Plaintiff\u2019s counsel provided defendants\u2019 counsel with an account number in order that the wire transfers could be made to plaintiff\u2019s Merrill Lynch account. Defendants arranged to have the transfers made from an account with third-party defendant, the Bank, by automatically transferring the funds each month.\nUpon failure by the Bank to transfer the 1 March 1987 payment within the fifteen-day grace period, plaintiff notified defendants of his intention to accelerate the note and declared the unpaid balance of $514,726 immediately due. Defendants refused to pay and plaintiff commenced this action against defendants. Defendants filed a third-party complaint against the Bank. The Bank answered and thereafter all parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of plaintiff against defendants/third-party plaintiffs. Defendants and the Bank appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the Bank\u2019s appeal. The Court of Appeals concluded that the order granting summary judgment against defendants did not determine the Bank\u2019s liability and did not affect the Bank\u2019s rights; therefore, the Bank was not an aggrieved party under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-271 and thus lacked standing to appeal. We disagree.\nThe Bank\u2019s right to appeal in this case is controlled by Rule 14 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. \u201cRule 14 provides that \u2018the third-party defendant may assert against the plaintiff any defenses which the third-party plaintiff has to the plaintiff\u2019s claim.\u2019 \u201d City of Winston-Salem v. Ferrell, 79 N.C. App. 103, 107, 338 S.E.2d 794, 797 (1986). \u201cWhen a third-party defendant has an opportunity to participate fully in the determination of third-party plaintiff\u2019s liability, it is bound by a judgment in favor of the original plaintiff.\u201d Id. Here the Bank not only had an opportunity to participate, but in fact did fully participate in the determination of third-party plaintiff\u2019s liability and is bound by the judgment in favor of plaintiff entered against defendants as third-party plaintiffs. Since the Bank is bound by the judgment which affects its substantial rights, it is clearly an aggrieved party within the meaning of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-271. The Court of Appeals thus erred in dismissing the Bank\u2019s appeal.\nThe Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment entered in favor of plaintiff against defendants/third-party plaintiffs on the promissory note. On appeal to this Court, defendants and the Bank contend that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that summary judgment for plaintiff was properly entered by the trial court. We agree with the Court of Appeals\u2019 conclusion on this issue. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals\u2019 decision affirming summary judgment for plaintiff against defendants. On dismissal of the Bank\u2019s appeal, we reverse.\nAffirmed in part; reversed in part.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "PER CURIAM."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Smith Helms Mull\u00eds & Moore, by Robert A. Wicker and Linda S. Bellows, for plaintiff-appellee.",
      "Hendrick, Zotian, Cocklereece & Robinson, by T. Paul Hendrick and William A. Blancato, for defendants/third-party plaintiff-appellants.",
      "Poyner & Spruill, by J. Phil Carlton and Mary Beth Johnson, for third-party defendant-appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "C. WILLIAM BARKER, Plaintiff v. EDWARD C. AGEE, JAMES R. MABE, BRADFORD K. ROOT, FRANK E. WALL, VELPO D. WARD, JR., and WARD & COMPANY, P.A., Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs v. CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK, Third-Party Defendant\nNo. 224PA89\n(Filed 5 April 1990)\nAppeal and Error \u00a7 7 (NCI3d); Rules of Civil Procedure \u00a7 14 (NCI3d)\u2014 judgment for plaintiff against third party plaintiffs \u2014 right of third party defendants to appeal\nThird party defendant bank was an aggrieved party within the meaning of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-271 which could appeal summary judgment entered in favor of plaintiff against defendants-third party plaintiffs where the bank fully participated in the determination of third party plaintiff\u2019s liability and is bound by the judgment in favor of plaintiff entered against defendants as third party plaintiffs. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 14.\nAm Jur 2d, Appeal and Error \u00a7\u00a7 92, 173, 174, 182; Parties \u00a7\u00a7 192, 194, 196.\nOn discretionary review upon petitions filed by defendants/third-party plaintiffs and third-party defendant pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31 from a decision of the Court of Appeals, 93 N.C. App. 537, 378 S.E.2d 794 (1989), affirming the judgment of Walker, J., entered 23 March 1988 in the Superior Court, GUILFORD County. Heard in the Supreme Court 15 March 1990.\nSmith Helms Mull\u00eds & Moore, by Robert A. Wicker and Linda S. Bellows, for plaintiff-appellee.\nHendrick, Zotian, Cocklereece & Robinson, by T. Paul Hendrick and William A. Blancato, for defendants/third-party plaintiff-appellants.\nPoyner & Spruill, by J. Phil Carlton and Mary Beth Johnson, for third-party defendant-appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0470-01",
  "first_page_order": 506,
  "last_page_order": 509
}