{ "id": 5305505, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. EAZED RUDOLPH MEEKINS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Meekins", "decision_date": "1990-06-13", "docket_number": "No. 363A87", "first_page": "689", "last_page": "701", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "326 N.C. 689" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "185 S.E.2d 174", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 663", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571959 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0663-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 S.E.2d 71", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 N.C. 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565099 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/282/0334-01" ] }, { "cite": "295 S.E.2d 416", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 712", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573565 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0712-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 350", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 762", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4714140 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0762-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 430", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 724", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4720164 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0724-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 S.E.2d 442", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2513652 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 S.E.2d 895", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2517737 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 S.E.2d 66", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "74" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 298", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5306390 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0298-01" ] }, { "cite": "298 S.E.2d 631", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "637" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 321", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562282 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0321-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1046, "char_count": 25310, "ocr_confidence": 0.75, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.883968751384299e-07, "percentile": 0.843790699766666 }, "sha256": "a15c9cad78eb2a5782eaf674fc334728d3768e4fd31b6720ad5c620594348637", "simhash": "1:b607d93e37110c83", "word_count": 4251 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:38:26.587833+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. EAZED RUDOLPH MEEKINS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "EXUM, Chief Justice.\nDefendant was properly indicted for first-degree murder, first-degree burglary, first-degree kidnapping, felonious larceny and possession of stolen property. He was found by a jury to be guilty as charged. After a sentencing hearing on the first-degree murder conviction the jury returned a recommendation of life imprisonment, which was imposed. Judgment was arrested on the possession of stolen property conviction, and defendant was sentenced to terms of years on the other convictions.\nDefendant contends his convictions should be vacated and that he is entitled to a new trial because of prejudicial error in the admission of certain evidence. We find no reversible error in defendant\u2019s trial.\nI.\nThe State\u2019s evidence tends to show as follows:\nOn or about 29 April 1986 in the early morning the victim Ethel Owens, a 79-year-old widow, was abducted from her home in her own automobile, murdered in this automobile and her body left in a roadside ditch along a rural highway where it was found on 3 May 1986.\nOn the night of 28 April defendant was at a party in his aunt\u2019s trailer, which was described by a witness as being \u201cthree good rock throws away\u201d from the victim\u2019s home. Defendant, wearing a green Army field jacket, was drinking liquor and wine with several other people. At approximately midnight defendant got upset and broke two glass bottles at the party. He later left, saying he was going jogging. At 4 a.m. on 29 April defendant woke Wanda Jean Lee, who had been at the party, and asked her for some clothes he had left with her earlier. He told Ms. Lee he had hitchhiked to the house, which is forty-five minutes away from where the party took place. The next morning Ms. Lee found a woman\u2019s red and black housecoat in her apartment.\nAt about 5 a.m. on 29 April defendant visited James Overton and asked him for some clothes. Defendant was wearing shorts with bloodstains on them. He explained he had been' in a fight with his brother. Overton recognized the car defendant was driving as the victim\u2019s. Overton asked for money and saw defendant remove eight dollars from a woman\u2019s purse inside the car. He observed that defendant also had some blank checks.\nAt 8:30 a.m. on 29 April the victim\u2019s great-niece, Cindy Williams, drove past the victim\u2019s house and noticed her car was missing. Later that day she entered the victim\u2019s home and noticed a mattress was partially off the bedframe and the sheets were thrown to one side. Beside the bed was a rolled undergarment. Unable to locate her great-aunt at other relatives\u2019 houses, Ms. Williams returned to the victim\u2019s house and called her parents. Her mother, the victim\u2019s niece, came to the victim\u2019s home and noticed it was unusually messy. She observed bloodstains on some sheets and an odor of urine from a recliner chair.\nSheriff Norman Newbern arrived at the crime scene at 7:30 p.m. on 29 April. He observed the door to a storage room of the residence had been broken into and a window screen placed against a wall inside the room. On the ground outside the window the sheriff found a paring knife and a zipper attached to some olive green cloth. Later that night S.B.I. investigators found finger and palm prints throughout the house. Six prints were later identified as defendant\u2019s. His right palm print and left thumbprint were on the screen\u2019s interior, and his right ring fingerprint was on the screen\u2019s exterior. His right and left thumbprints were on the door between the den and kitchen.\nMelvin Burton, Wanda Jean Lee\u2019s boyfriend, testified he had been defendant\u2019s friend for several years. He recalled that defendant broke two bottles together at the 28 April 1986 party and visited Ms. Lee early the next morning. Burton saw defendant later that day and noticed a scratch on his forehead. Defendant explained he had been scratched by his brother during a basketball game. Defendant had some books of checks with him bearing the name of Ethel Owens. Defendant asked Burton to help him get some checks cashed. Burton took defendant to a service station in Elizabeth City, but the station refused to cash the checks. Later defendant and Burton were at a party drinking. While sitting on some back steps defendant began to cry. When Burton asked what was wrong, defendant replied, \u201cI didn\u2019t mean to do it. I didn\u2019t mean to kill her.\u201d On cross-examination Burton testified that defendant said \u201cI didn\u2019t mean to kill Ethel Owens.\u201d\nDefendant was taken into custody for questioning just before midnight on 1 May 1986. He told officers he was with two men who killed Ethel Owens and disposed of her body. Defendant claimed he rode in the back of victim\u2019s car and was never in the front seat. The victim\u2019s car was found in the Albemarle Hospital parking lot on 2 May 1986. There were bloodstains matching the victim\u2019s type at the top of the passenger seat running down to the floor, on the kickboard under the passenger door and on the outside of the car. A knife was found on the floorboard of the car. Defendant\u2019s fingerprints were found on the steering wheel, the rearview mirror and the driver\u2019s armrest.\nOn 3 May Ethel Owens\u2019 badly deteriorated body was found in a roadside ditch. Her body was clad only in a housecoat. She had been stabbed nineteen times. Near the body was found a billfold containing the birth certificate of James Overton, which Overton had previously given defendant; a newspaper article about defendant; and a matchbook from the wedding of defendant\u2019s brother.\nDefendant offered evidence tending to show as follows:\nMelvin Burton, not defendant, had been wearing a green Army jacket at the party on 28 April 1986. Defendant testified that he got into an argument at the party, broke two wine bottles together and cut his hand. He rested on the back porch at the party for an hour, then hitchhiked to Burton\u2019s house. There Burton paid him fifty dollars to get rid of Ethel Owens\u2019 car. Defendant drove to James Overton\u2019s house to change pants. He then parked the victim\u2019s car in the hospital parking lot, where a girlfriend picked him up and drove him home. He later met with Burton and Wanda Jean Lee. Ms. Lee produced some personal checks bearing the victim\u2019s name, and defendant joined her as she unsuccessfully tried to cash the checks.\nDefendant also testified that his mother had been Ethel Owens\u2019 housekeeper and that he had done some heavy lifting and repair work in the victim\u2019s home on two or three occasions, the most recent being some nine months before the murder.\nII.\nDefendant first argues that the trial court erred in admitting certain testimony from the victim\u2019s niece, Elizabeth Sawyer. The trial court conducted a voir dire concerning the admissibility of this testimony. On voir dire Ms. Sawyer testified that the victim told her two weeks before her murder that she feared defendant because defendant had asked for one hundred dollars and she had refused to give it to him. The trial court then determined to admit the testimony under North Carolina Rule of Evidence 803(3), noting that \u201cit relates to an existing mental or emotional state of mind of the declarant concerning her feelings about the defendant, Eazed Rudolph Meekins.\u201d\nMs. Sawyer then testified before the jury over defendant\u2019s objection that she had spoken to the victim two weeks before her death and that the victim told her \u201cthat she was afraid of Zeb Meekins.\u201d After this testimony,' the court instructed the jury as follows:\nLadies and gentlemen of the jury, at this time let me instruct you that you are to consider this witness\u2019 testimony concerning any statement made by Mrs. Ethel Owens only to the extent that you find that it indicates ill will or fear on the part of the victim by the Defendant or of the Defendant. You may consider it for no other reason in this case.\nMs. Sawyer then testified that the victim had previously said several times she was fearful of defendant.\nDefendant contends that admission of this testimony was reversible error because the State failed to demonstrate a meaningful factual basis for the victim\u2019s fears, the testimony was irrelevant to any material issue in the case and any relevancy that did exist was outweighed by the tendency of the evidence unfairly to prejudice defendant.\nIn State v. Alston, 307 N.C. 321, 298 S.E.2d 631 (1983), this Court held that evidence regarding a victim\u2019s fear of the defendant should be accompanied with some factual basis for that fear. We said:\nEvidence of a victim\u2019s fear of the defendant is subject to misuse. Therefore, the naked assertion by a victim prior to his death that he fears the defendant should not be admitted into evidence absent some evidence tending to show a factual basis for such alleged fear.\nId. at 328, 298 S.E.2d at 637. Also, Rule 803 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence establishes the admissibility of state of mind evidence, reading in pertinent part:\nThe following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: ... (3) Then Existing Mental, Emotional or Physical Condition \u2014A statement of the declarant\u2019s then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health). . . .\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 803(3) (1988). Evidence tending to show the state of mind of the victim is admissible as long as the declarant\u2019s state of mind is relevant to the case. State v. Cummings, 326 N.C. 298, 389 S.E.2d 66 (1990). See also State v. Weeks, 322 N.C. 152, 367 S.E.2d 895 (1988). In Cummings the victim\u2019s comments to a paralegal three weeks before she disappeared about her husband\u2019s threats to kill her were admitted because the victim\u2019s state of mind was relevant to the issue of her relationship with her husband. Id. at 313, 389 S.E.2d at 74. Any evidence offered to shed light upon the crime charged should be admitted by the trial court. State v. McElrath, 322 N.C. 1, 13, 366 S.E.2d 442, 449 (1988). Evidence, even if relevant, should not be admitted unless it comports with Rule 403 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence, which states:\nAlthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403 (1988).\nMs. Sawyer\u2019s testimony on voir dire that defendant asked the victim for one hundred dollars and that she refused him provides a plausible reason and factual basis for the victim\u2019s fear of defendant. The victim\u2019s fear of defendant was relevant to the issue of the relationship between the victim and defendant. At trial defendant testified that the victim had \u201calways been a sweet lady\u201d to him who would lend money to him and hire him for jobs around the house. Ms. Sawyer\u2019s testimony tends to show that the victim\u2019s state of mind some two weeks before her murder was not that of a \u201csweet lady\u201d who would lend defendant money but was that of one who was fearful of defendant.\nWhether the probative value of relevant evidence is outweighed by its tendency unfairly to prejudice defendant is a question to be decided initially in the trial court\u2019s discretion. State v. Mason, 315 N.C. 724, 340 S.E.2d 430 (1986). We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court\u2019s determination here that the evidence in question met this test of admissibility. The evidence was relevant, as we have shown, to show a relationship between defendant and the victim which was more favorable to the State and contrary to defendant\u2019s version of this relationship, which was more favorable to defendant. The State was clearly entitled to its benefit. It is not the kind of evidence, either, which would have much tendency unfairly to prejudice defendant or to inflame or cause the jury to convict him on an improper basis in light of all the other rather overwhelming evidence tending to show defendant\u2019s guilt of the crimes charged. See State v. DeLeonardo, 315 N.C. 762, 340 S.E.2d 350 (1986).\nIII.\nDefendant next contends the trial court erred in permitting Sheriff Norman Newbern to testify over objection and motion to strike about certain statements defendant made to him on 1 May 1986. Defendant also contends that he was impermissibly questioned on his own cross-examination regarding these statements.\nThe trial court allowed Sheriff Newbern\u2019s testimony after conducting a voir dire and concluding that admission of the statement would not violate defendant\u2019s constitutional rights because it was given freely, voluntarily and understandingly after defendant freely, knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his rights to remain silent and to be represented by counsel.\nAfter this ruling the following colloquy occurred:\nQ. Sheriff Newbern, on the early morning of May 2, 1986, what did Zeb Meekins tell you with reference to this incident?\nMr. Abbott: Objection.\nCOURT: Overruled.\nA. Uh, you want me to start back over?\nQ. Yes, if you would, please.\nA. Zeb stated . . . that he was jogging after being shut up in the house for two days at Mary Jane Case\u2019s, that Roger, Roger Crutch and Junior Mills, which was Lewis J. Mills, came to him in Miss Ethel\u2019s [the victim\u2019s] car. That Mrs. Ethel Owens was on the passenger side, that Junior was driving. Roger was sitting in the back seat. He stated that he told him, said, \u201cZeb come here we can trust you since you are wanted for raping a white girl . . .\u201d\nMr. Abbott: Objection.\nCOURT: Overruled.\nWITNESS Newbern: Zeb got in the car; they told him to push the screen back in the house so no one would notice. Then Junior began stabbing Mrs. Ethel Owens. That she screamed, \u201cPlease don\u2019t kill me. Don\u2019t kill me.\u201d That he grabbed for his arm to stop him but it was too late. Said he got a scratch on his face below his eye. Zeb stated he knew Mrs. Owens was dead; that she was fifty to eighty miles away. I asked Zeb where the body was, that she still could be alive. He stated that she was no way alive and that he was sure that she was dead. And kept stating: \u201cShe\u2019s dead, man. She\u2019s dead.\u201d That he would tell us where the body was if we would contact his attorney. An attorney was called and uh . . .\nQ. Okay.\nMr. ABBOTT: Motion to strike his testimony.\nCOURT: Motion to strike is denied.\nDuring cross-examination of defendant, the State advised the court out of the hearing of the jury that it would question defendant about his statement to Sheriff Newbern \u201cthat Roger and Junior told him: We can trust you since you\u2019re wanted for raping a white girl.\u201d Defendant, through counsel, then stated, \u201cYour honor, obviously we would object to that information coming in before the jury.\u201d The trial judge heard arguments and overruled defendant\u2019s objection. The jury returned to the courtroom, and during State\u2019s cross-examination of defendant the following colloquy took place:\nQ.: Well, do you remember telling the sheriff that Roger and Junior picked you up?\nA.: No, I don\u2019t.\nQ.: While you were out jogging?\nA.: No, I don\u2019t. No sir.\nQ.: You remember that they told you quote: We can trust you since you are wanted for raping a white girl?\nA.: Who was that?\nQ.: Roger and Junior tell you that?\nA.: No, sir.\nQ.: Mr. Meekins, isn\u2019t it a fact that \u2014 in fact, you were in hiding at that time, weren\u2019t you?\nA.: I wouldn\u2019t call it that. Uh, I had knowed Mrs. Powell for \u2019bout two years and we was dating off and on. And I decided to break up with her and that\u2019s when she uh, said that I raped her. Which I didn\u2019t.\nDefendant contends that part of his statement to Sheriff Newbern that Rogers said, \u201cZeb come here we can trust you since you are wanted for raping a white girl\u201d was irrelevant to any material issue in the case, inadmissible as character evidence, and that its probative value was clearly outweighed by its tendency unfairly to prejudice defendant.\nDefendant characterizes the contested evidence as tending to show he committed another extrinsic crime, i.e., the rape. Actually the evidence shows only that defendant was accused of committing the extrinsic crime, or at least his companions, according to his statement, thought so. Accusations that defendant has committed other extrinsic crimes are generally inadmissible even if evidence that defendant actually committed the crime would have been admissible. State v. Rankin, 306 N.C. 712, 295 S.E.2d 416 (1982); State v. Mack, 282 N.C. 334, 193 S.E.2d 71 (1972); State v. Williams, 279 N.C. 663, 185 S.E.2d 174 (1971).\nThe first question presented here, then, is whether Sheriff Newbern\u2019s testimony that defendant admitted that he saw the victim murdered and her murderers invited him to join in the event because they believed he was wanted for rape and, presumably, would not contact the police, was relevant to some fact or issue in the case. We conclude that it was.\n\u201c \u2018Relevant evidence\u2019 means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 401 (1988). All relevant evidence is admissible unless excluded by some other rule of law. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 402.\nThe statement by defendant that the murderers believed he was a fugitive is relevant for several reasons. It explains why Roger Crutch and Junior Mills wanted defendant to join them. It adds credibility both to Sheriff Newbern\u2019s testimony that the statement as related by the sheriff was made and to the statement itself. The statement conflicts with defendant\u2019s denials at trial that he was involved with the murder of Ethel Owens.\nThe second question is whether it was error to permit the State to cross-examine the defendant about the pending rape charge. We conclude it was not. The State\u2019s cross-examination of defendant about his being wanted on the rape charge was designed to show defendant\u2019s motive for the murder of Ethel Owens and the stealing of her purse and her car. The State was trying to establish defendant\u2019s intent to flee from the pending charges and that he committed the murder and robbery in order to obtain the means whereby he could escape. We conclude therefore that it was relevant under Rules 401 and 402.\nWe must now consider whether the probative value of this evidence regarding the pending rape charge was \u201csubstantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403 (1988). Whether to exclude evidence under this rule is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Mason, 315 N.C. 724, 340 S.E.2d 430 (1986).\nThe trial court here did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence of which defendant complains. While this is the sort of evidence that inclines juries to decide cases on an improper basis and its admission should be carefully scrutinized by our trial judges, we are confident that here the trial court was well within its discretionary ambit in ruling the evidence admissible.\nAs we have shown, the evidence of defendant\u2019s incriminating pretrial statement was relevant and valuable to the State on the question of whether defendant made the statement attributed to him by Sheriff Newbern and whether the statement was true. Cross-examination of defendant about these charges was designed to show a possible motive for the commission of the crimes charged\u2014 an important fact for the State to establish in any criminal case. Other evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt was fairly overwhelming, and there is little chance the jury would have improperly seized on only this evidence as a basis for conviction.\nRegarding cross-examination of defendant on questions relating to his being wanted for rape, this case differs from State v. Williams, 279 N.C. 663, 185 S.E.2d 174. There, we held that a witness\u2019s credibility may not be impeached by cross-examination as to whether he had been accused, however formally, of an unrelated crime. The theory underlying Williams is that a mere unproven accusation that a witness has committed a crime is not sufficiently probative of the witness\u2019s credibility to justify its admission even if, as when Williams was decided, the actual commission or conviction of the crime would have been a proper subject of cross-examination.\nUnlike Williams, the State here did not cross-examine defendant about the rape accusation to show he was unworthy of belief because of this alleged bad act. Rather, the prosecutor inquired about this for the purpose of establishing defendant\u2019s motive for the crime for which he was on trial.\nAccordingly, we overrule all defendant\u2019s assignments of error and conclude that he received a fair trial free from reversible error.\nNo error.\n. In making its recommendation as to punishment, the following aggravating factors were found by the jury: The murder occurred while defendant was fleeing after committing burglary, it occurred during the course of a kidnapping, it was for pecuniary gain and was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. The following mitigating factors were also found: Defendant\u2019s mental age, that defendant committed the murder while under the influence of a mental or emotional disturbance, that his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was impaired, that this impairment was related to his limited intellectual capacity and also his lack of education or the level of education which he was able to perform. The jury found that the mitigating factors were sufficient to outweigh the aggravating factors and recommended life imprisonment.\n. During cross-examination defendant was equivocal regarding when he was last in the victim\u2019s house. He testified that he might have worked in her house only several weeks or a few months before her death.", "type": "majority", "author": "EXUM, Chief Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by Ralf F. Haskell, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.", "Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender, by David W. Dorey, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. EAZED RUDOLPH MEEKINS\nNo. 363A87\n(Filed 13 June 1990)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 73.3 (NCI3d)\u2014 murder \u2014 victim\u2019s fear of defendant \u2014 admissible\nThere was no error in a prosecution for first degree murder, first degree burglary, first degree kidnapping, felonious larceny, and possession of stolen property from the admission of testimony from the victim\u2019s niece that the victim told her she was afraid of defendant. Where the voir dire testimony provided a plausible reason and factual basis for the victim\u2019s fear of defendant, the victim\u2019s fear of defendant was relevant to the issue of the relationship between the victim and the defendant, and there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court\u2019s determination that the probative value of the testimony was not outweighed by its tendency to unfairly prejudice defendant. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 803(3).\nAm Jur 2d, Homicide \u00a7\u00a7 329, 330.\n2. Criminal Law \u00a7 86.5 (NCI3d)\u2014 statement by defendant to sheriff \u2014 other crimes \u2014 admissible\nThe trial court did not err in a prosecution for first degree murder, first degree burglary, first degree kidnapping, felonious larceny, and possession of stolen property by allowing the sheriff to testify over objection that defendant had told him that the murderers had said they would trust defendant because he was wanted for raping a white girl. The statement by defendant that the murderers believed he was a fugitive was relevant to show why the murderers wanted defendant to join them; it added credibility both to the sheriff\u2019s testimony that the statement as related by the sheriff was made and to the statement itself, which conflicts with defendant\u2019s denial at trial that he was involved in the murder; and the trial court was well within its discretionary ambit in ruling the evidence admissible. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rules 401 and 402.\nAm Jur 2d, Evidence \u00a7\u00a7 320-327.\n3. Criminal Law \u00a7 88.4 (NCI3d)\u2014 cross-examination \u2014 other offenses\nThe trial court did not err in a prosecution for first degree murder, first degree burglary, first degree kidnapping, felonious larceny, and possession of stolen property by allowing defendant to be cross-examined about a pending rape charge where defendant had told a sheriff that the murderers had said that they could trust him because he was wanted for raping a white girl. The State\u2019s cross-examination of defendant was designed to show defendant\u2019s motive for the murder and theft of the victim\u2019s purse and car in that the State was trying to establish defendant\u2019s intent to flee from the pending charges. The State did not cross-examine defendant about the rape accusation to show that he was unworthy of belief because of his alleged bad act.\nAm Jur 2d, Evidence \u00a7\u00a7 282, 283, 325, 326.\nAPPEAL by defendant pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a) from a judgment sentencing him to life imprisonment in Case No. 86CRS1655 on a first-degree murder conviction imposed by Williams, J., presiding, at the 16 February 1987 Criminal Session of Superior Court, CHOWAN County. Motion to bypass Court of Appeals on defendant\u2019s convictions for first-degree burglary and felonious larceny in Case No. 86CRS1656 and first-degree kidnapping in Case No. 86CRS1657 allowed 14 April 1988. Heard in the Supreme Court 13 December 1988.\nLacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by Ralf F. Haskell, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.\nMalcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender, by David W. Dorey, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0689-01", "first_page_order": 725, "last_page_order": 737 }