{ "id": 2541708, "name": "M. A. BHATTI v. CARL D. BUCKLAND", "name_abbreviation": "Bhatti v. Buckland", "decision_date": "1991-02-07", "docket_number": "No. 431A90", "first_page": "240", "last_page": "247", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "328 N.C. 240" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "394 S.E.2d 192", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "99 N.C. App. 750", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524944 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/99/0750-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 N.C. App. 310", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8528022 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/93/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "383 S.E.2d 670", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 N.C. App. 637", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522531 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/95/0637-01" ] }, { "cite": "377 S.E.2d 814", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "817-18" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "485 F. Supp. 1041", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 1462122 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1046", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/485/1041-01" ] }, { "cite": "339 S.E.2d 90", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "93", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 N.C. App. 315", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520555 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/79/0315-01" ] }, { "cite": "761 F.2d 162", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 29505 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "165", "parenthetical": "\"The apparent purpose behind the enactment of \u00a7 75-1.1 was the protection of the consuming public.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/761/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 S.E.2d 397", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "400" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 539", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567785 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "543" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0539-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 S.E.2d 887", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 397", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4717354, 4715229 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0397-01", "/nc/315/0397-02" ] }, { "cite": "333 S.E.2d 772", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "773" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 N.C. App. 521", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527590 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "522" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/76/0521-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 S.E.2d 578", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 N.C. 534", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4749057 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/319/0534-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 S.E.2d 82", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "94" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521216 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/81/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 S.E.2d 895", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "897" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 N.C. 311", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569627 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "314" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/292/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 S.E.2d 796", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "800" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 N.C. App. 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8357774 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "68" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/88/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 L. Ed. 2d 143", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "464 U.S. 848", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6365858, 6364260, 6365669, 6365094, 6364100, 6364727, 6363978, 6366221, 6363789, 6365421, 6365267, 6366006, 6364471, 6364892 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/464/0848-12", "/us/464/0848-04", "/us/464/0848-11", "/us/464/0848-08", "/us/464/0848-03", "/us/464/0848-06", "/us/464/0848-02", "/us/464/0848-14", "/us/464/0848-01", "/us/464/0848-10", "/us/464/0848-09", "/us/464/0848-13", "/us/464/0848-05", "/us/464/0848-07" ] }, { "cite": "705 F.2d 712", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1858591 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "715" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/705/0712-01" ] }, { "cite": "342 S.E.2d 896", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4694693, 4700070, 4693586, 4700021, 4698716 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0378-02", "/nc/316/0378-03", "/nc/316/0378-01", "/nc/316/0378-04", "/nc/316/0378-05" ] }, { "cite": "338 S.E.2d 918", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "924" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 N.C. App. 51", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519376 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "61" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/79/0051-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 S.E.2d 342", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "346" }, { "page": "346" }, { "page": "346" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568140 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309" }, { "page": "309" }, { "page": "309" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "363 S.E.2d 672", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "676", "parenthetical": "\"private parties engaged in the sale of a residence [are] not involved in trade or commerce and cannot be held liable under [Chapter 75].\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 N.C. App. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358398 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "443" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/88/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "257 S.E.2d 63", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "67" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 N.C. App. 449", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554712 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "454" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/42/0449-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 S.E.2d 192", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "193" }, { "page": "194", "parenthetical": "Greene, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 N.C. App. 750", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8524944 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "752" }, { "page": "752" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/99/0750-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 N.C. App. 310", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8528022 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "314" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/93/0310-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 876, "char_count": 17195, "ocr_confidence": 0.779, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.7601977999336995e-07, "percentile": 0.9302470916258052 }, "sha256": "5cb87cd07cb813d197afc01138f9fd4195577f3a84e518c834ef00f388a596fe", "simhash": "1:2bbc54663c3f2852", "word_count": 2791 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:58:40.693084+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "M. A. BHATTI v. CARL D. BUCKLAND" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WHICHARD, Justice.\nDefendant owned two lots in a tract of land known as the Whitesell Home Place in Alamance County. In June 1987 defendant, through his agent Teague Auction and Realty, Inc. (Teague), advertised the property for sale at a public auction scheduled for 27 June 1987. His ad stated:\nTract #1 Consists of 1.56 Acres with 302.06 ft. Fronting on Williamson Ave. 278.99 ft. Deep [and including a house and several outbuildings]. . . . Tract #2 Consists of 1.13+ Acres . . . w/ 299.61 ft. Fronting Whitesell Drive. 201.84 ft. Deep .... Investors, Speculators, Homeseekers, This Is Some Choice Property That You Will Want To Have A Look At. (Emphasis added.)\nThe ad listed defendant as the property owner and stated that Teague, third party defendant at trial, would conduct the sale.\nAt the auction on 27 June 1987, plaintiff purchased Tract #1 for $66,000 and Tract #2 for $39,000. Pursuant to the advertised terms of the sale, plaintiff deposited ten percent of the $105,000 purchase price, i.e., $10,500, with Teague. The terms required that the balance be paid \u201cupon delivery of deed.\u201d Subsequently, plaintiff discovered that the advertised frontage on Tract #1 was incorrect and that the deed plat in the Alamance County Register of Deeds office showed that the frontage was only 268.4 feet, substantially less than the 302.06 feet represented in the ad.\nOn 12 August 1987, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant, alleging that defendant had misrepresented Tract #l\u2019s frontage and claiming that \u201cother descriptions set forth in said advertisement, circulars, and flyers, were misleading and substantially different from the actual size and dimensions of said property.\u201d Plaintiff further alleged that defendant had refused to refund plaintiff\u2019s payment of $10,500, and that plaintiff had relied on defendant\u2019s intentionally or recklessly misleading statements to his detriment. Plaintiff concluded by alleging that defendant\u2019s actions constituted \u201cunfair or deceptive acts or practices\u201d in violation of N.C.G.S. Chapter 75. Plaintiff prayed for: (1) recovery of the $10,500 plus interest from 27 June 1987; (2) treble damages and reasonable attorney fees; and (3) payment of the court costs by defendant.\nDefendant answered, denying that the descriptions were intentionally misrepresented and denying that plaintiff reasonably relied on the descriptions. Defendant also contended that \u201cpublication of the plat description, including accurate meets [sic] and bounds and distances, together with the announcement prior to the auction sale, correcting the error in advertising . . . constitutes estoppel against the plaintiff\u2019s action.\u201d Defendant counterclaimed for a sum of $150,000, attorney fees, and court costs, stating:\nthe reason defendant was auctioning said property was that he had certain financial obligations, including obligations to the Internal Revenue Service, which required immediate payment, that as a result of the Plaintiff\u2019s breach of the Sales Contract and his failure to tender[ ] the agreed upon Purchase Price, the Defendant was required to sell his home and incur moving and storage expenses, disrupt his family, suffer interest payments and suffer other ancillary and other consequential damages.\nFurther, defendant filed a third party complaint against Teague, alleging that Teague was responsible for advertising and conducting the sale, and seeking indemnification and contribution from Teague. Teague answered, alleging that: (1) there was no mistake in the description of Tract #2, and (2) defects in the description of Tract #1 were \u201ccorrected by stopping the sale and passing around plats of the property giving the correct front footage . . . [and] after inspection had been made by all of those who wished to see said plat, the sale was resumed.\u201d\nAt trial, the jury found that the sale was procured by defendant\u2019s \u201cfraudulent representation\u201d and that it was not the result of a mutual mistake. It found that plaintiff was entitled to recover from defendant $10,500 with interest from the date the suit was commenced, plus costs. The trial court entered judgment accordingly, but denied plaintiff\u2019s motion to treble the damages pursuant to N.C.G.S. Chapter 75.\nOn plaintiff\u2019s appeal, the majority in the Court of Appeals \u2014 relying on Rosenthal v. Perkins, 42 N.C. App. 449, 257 S.E.2d 63 (1979), and Robertson v. Boyd, 88 N.C. App. 437, 363 S.E.2d 672 (1988) \u2014 concluded that Chapter 75 did not apply because defendant \u201cwas a private individual who engaged a realtor to auction a residence on his behalf.\u201d Bhatti v. Buckland, 99 N.C. App. 750, 752, 394 S.E.2d 192, 193 (1990). Judge Greene dissented, reasoning that unlike in both Rosenthal and Robertson, \u201cno record evidence supports a finding that defendant was a homeowner selling his own home,\u201d so the sale in question was \u201cin or affecting commerce\u201d within the meaning and intent of that phrase as used in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1. Bhatti, 99 N.C. App. at 752, 394 S.E.2d at 194 (Greene, J., dissenting).\nBecause this case is before us pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-30(2), our review is limited to the issue raised in Judge Greene\u2019s dissent: whether defendant\u2019s sale of the two lots was \u201cin or affecting commerce\u201d within the meaning and intent of that phrase as used in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1. N.C.R. App. P. 16(b). For the reasons stated below, we hold that defendant\u2019s actions were \u201cin or affecting commerce.\u201d We accordingly reverse.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1 declares unlawful \u201c[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-l.Ha) (1988). The case law applying Chapter 75 holds that a plaintiff who proves fraud thereby establishes that unfair or deceptive acts have occurred. \u201cProof of fraud would necessarily constitute a violation of the prohibition against unfair and deceptive acts . . . .\u201d Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 309, 218 S.E.2d 342, 346 (1975). If a violation of Chapter 75 is found, treble damages must be awarded. Pinehurst, Inc. v. O\u2019Leary Bros. Realty, 79 N.C. App. 51, 61, 338 S.E.2d 918, 924 (\u201cdamages assessed pursuant to G.S. Sec. 75-1.1 are trebled automatically\u201d), cert. denied, 316 N.C. 378, 342 S.E.2d 896 (1986); see also Atlantic Purchasers, Inc. v. Aircraft Sales, Inc., 705 F.2d 712, 715 (4th Cir.) (\u201caward of treble damages is a right of the successful plaintiff\u201d), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 848, 78 L. Ed. 2d 143 (1983). Once the plaintiff has proven fraud, thereby establishing prima facie a violation of Chapter 75, see Powell v. Wold, 88 N.C. App. 61, 68, 362 S.E.2d 796, 800 (1987), the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that he is exempt from the provisions of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1(d) (1988); see Edmisten, Attorney General v. Penney Co., 292 N.C. 311, 314, 233 S.E.2d 895, 897 (1977); Olivetti Corp. v. Ames Business Systems, Inc., 81 N.C. App. 1, 22, 344 S.E.2d 82, 94 (1986), aff\u2019d in part and rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 319 N.C. 534, 356 S.E.2d 578 (1987).\nApplication of Chapter 75 is not unfettered, however. The statute itself exempts both \u201cprofessional services rendered by a member of a learned profession,\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-l.Kb), and acts by an advertising medium unaware of their \u201cfalse, misleading or deceptive character.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 754.1(c) (1988). Our Court of Appeals has engrafted a further exemption. In two cases \u2014 Rosenthal, 42 N.C. App. 449, 257 S.E.2d 63, and Robertson, 88 N.C. App. 437, 363 S.E.2d 672 \u2014 that court has held that private homeowners selling a residence are not subject to the Act. In Rosenthal, the court stated:\nThe defendants . . . were not engaged in trade or commerce. They did not by the sale of their residence on this one occasion become realtors. It is clear from the cases involving violation of the Unfair Trade Practices Act that the alleged violators must be engaged in a business, a commercial or industrial establishment or enterprise.\nRosenthal, 42 N.C. App. at 454, 257 S.E.2d at 67; see also Robertson, 88 N.C. App. at 443, 363 S.E.2d at 676 (\u201cprivate parties engaged in the sale of a residence [are] not involved in trade or commerce and cannot be held liable under [Chapter 75].\u201d).\nDefendant did not appeal from the jury\u2019s finding that the sale here was procured by his \u201cfraudulent representation,\u201d so that finding is undisputed. Because the presence of fraud is undisputed, defendant\u2019s acts were \u201cunfair or deceptive.\u201d Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. at 309, 218 S.E.2d at 346. The focus of our inquiry, then, is upon whether defendant has met his burden of proving that the sale nevertheless was not \u201cin or affecting commerce\u201d within the meaning and intent of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 754.1(a), (d).\nIt is clear beyond argument that the sale in this case does not fall within either of the two statutory exemptions. It remains, then, to determine whether it falls within the \u201chomeowner\u2019s exception\u201d created by the Court of Appeals, or is otherwise exempt. Apart from the \u201chomeowner\u2019s exception,\u201d no basis for exempting the sale is either argued by the parties or suggested by the record. While this Court has not passed upon the \u201chomeowner\u2019s exception,\u201d for purposes of deciding this case we assume, arguendo, that it exists, and that the sale by a private party of his or her residence is not within the scope of Chapter 75.\nIn determining whether defendant has met his burden of proving himself within the scope of the \u201chomeowner\u2019s exception,\u201d we consider the facts he has proved in the context of the purposes underlying the protections provided by Chapter 75. The General Assembly initially stated the purpose of section 75-1.1 as follows:\nThe purpose of this section is to declare, and to provide civil legal means to maintain, ethical standards of dealings between persons engaged in business and between persons engaged in business and the consuming public within this State to the end that good faith and fair dealings between buyers and sellers at all level[s] of commerce be had in this State.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1 (1975) (quoted in Threatt v. Hiers, 76 N.C. App. 521, 522, 333 S.E.2d 772, 773 (1985), disc. rev. denied, 315 N.C. 397, 338 S.E.2d 887 (1986)). The law was enacted \u201cto establish an effective private cause of action for aggrieved consumers in this State,\u201d and it \u201cwas needed because common law remedies had proved often ineffective.\u201d Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 543, 276 S.E.2d 397, 400 (1981); see also Lindner v. Durham Hosiery Mills, Inc., 761 F.2d 162, 165 (4th Cir. 1985) (\u201cThe apparent purpose behind the enactment of \u00a7 75-1.1 was the protection of the consuming public.\u201d).\nThe General Assembly subsequently amended section 75-l.l(b) to define \u201ccommerce\u201d inclusively as \u201cbusiness activity, however denominated,\" limited only by the express exemptions set forth above. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-l.Kb) (1988) (emphasis added). The term \u201cbusiness\u201d generally imports a broad definition. See, e.g., Webster\u2019s New Collegiate Dictionary 113 (G. & C. Merriam Co., Springfield, Mass., 1953) (\u201cBusiness, often an inclusive term, specifically names the combined activities of those engaged in the purchase and sale of commodities or in related financial transactions\u201d) (emphasis added). Other courts have emphasized the inclusive nature of the statute in light of the foregoing considerations. Our Court of Appeals has stated: \u201cThe purpose of G.S. 75-1.1 is to provide a civil means to maintain ethical standards of dealings between persons engaged in business and the consuming public in this State[,] and [it] applies to dealings between buyers and sellers at all levels of commerce.\u201d United Virginia Bank v. Air-Lift Associates, 79 N.C. App. 315, 320, 339 S.E.2d 90, 93 (1986) (emphasis added). A federal court sitting in North Carolina has stated, similarly: \u201c[T]he Act is directed toward maintaining ethical standards in dealings between persons engaged in business and to promote good faith at all levels of commerce.\u201d United Roasters, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 485 F. Supp. 1041, 1046 (E.D.N.C. 1979) (emphasis added).\nSo far as the record here reveals, the transaction at issue was indisputably a commercial land transaction that affected commerce in the broad sense. Defendant\u2019s advertising of this property explicitly appealed to \u201cInvestors [and] Speculators\u201d as well as \u201cHomeseekers.\u201d The more probable inference from this evidence is that the sale was not of residential property. This probability is further advanced by defendant\u2019s assertion in his counterclaim that plaintiff\u2019s failure to pay \u201cthe agreed upon Purchase Price\u201d required defendant \u201cto sell his home.\u201d This pleading does nothing to advance the proposition that defendant was selling residential property, but suggests instead that his residence and the property sold here were discrete entities. Assuming that a \u201chomeowner\u2019s exception\u201d exists, its application is limited to an individual involved in the sale of his or her own residence. The only evidence in this record tending in any way to prove that the property at issue was residential was that the advertisement noted that the lots to be sold included a house and several outbuildings. This evidence is insufficient to carry defendant\u2019s burden of proving that he was a \u201cprivate party engaged in the sale of a residence.\u201d\nOn the contrary, to the limited extent that the transaction is depicted by the sparse facts in this record, it involved a buyer and seller in a commercial context to which the protections afforded by section 75-1.1, whether viewed literally or purposively, apply. The defendant did not prove that the transaction was anything other than a business activity well within the banks of the stream of commerce as broadly defined by the General Assembly in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1. As such, plaintiff is entitled to the protection of the statute.\nWe thus conclude that the sale fell within the ambit of the inclusive phrase \u201cbusiness activities, however denominated,\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-l.l(b), and was therefore \u201cin or affecting commerce\u201d within the meaning and intent of that phrase as used in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-l.l(a). Because the jury found that the sale was procured by defendant\u2019s \u201cfraudulent representation,\u201d plaintiff was entitled to treble damages. Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. at 309, 218 S.E.2d at 346.\nDefendant relies in part on Blackwell v. Dorosko, 93 N.C. App. 310, 377 S.E.2d 814, opinion withdrawn in part on other grounds upon rehearing, 95 N.C. App. 637, 383 S.E.2d 670 (1989), which held that the owner of a resort condominium unit at Kure Beach, \u201cas a private vendor of realty,\u201d could not be subject to liability under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1 in its sale. Blackwell, 93 N.C. App. at 314, 377 S.E.2d at 817-18. It is impossible to determine from the opinion in Blackwell whether the condominium unit there was the seller\u2019s residence. To the extent that Blackwell may be read as exempting from the Act the sale of property not used as a residence and not otherwise shown to be outside the commercial context to which the protection afforded by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1 is applicable, it is disapproved.\nFor the reasons stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The cause is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further remand to the Superior Court, Alamance County, for entry of a judgment for treble the amount of damages fixed by the verdict. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-16 (1988). The superior court shall also determine, in its discretion, whether to award plaintiff an attorney fee. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-16.1 (1988).\nReversed and remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "WHICHARD, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Latham, Wood & Hawkins, by B.F. Wood, and Stem, Graham & Klepfer, by William A. Eagles, for plaintiff appellant.", "Douglas R. Hoy for defendant appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "M. A. BHATTI v. CARL D. BUCKLAND\nNo. 431A90\n(Filed 7 February 1991)\nUnfair Competition \u00a7 1 (NCI3d)\u2014 sale of land at auction \u2014inaccurate description \u2014not covered by homeowner\u2019s exemption\nThe Court of Appeals\u2019 decision that the sale of two lots at auction with a faulty description was not \u201cin or affecting commerce\u201d within the meaning of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1 was reversed where the presence of fraud was undisputed, the sale did not fall within either of the two statutory exemptions, and the transaction at issue was indisputably a commercial land transaction that affected commerce in the broad sense. Assuming that a homeowner\u2019s exemption exists, its application is limited to an individual involved in the sale of his or her own residence; the evidence in this record was insufficient to carry defendant\u2019s burden of proving that he was a \u201cprivate party engaged in the sale of a residence.\u201d Blackwell v. Dorosko, 93 N.C. App. 310, is disapproved to the extent that it may be read as exempting from the Act the sale of property not used as a residence and not otherwise shown to be outside the commercial context to which the protection afforded by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1 is applicable.\nAm Jur 2d, Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade Practices \u00a7 735.\nAPPEAL by plaintiff pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 99 N.C. App. 750, 394 S.E.2d 192 (1990), affirming an order denying plaintiff\u2019s motion for treble damages and attorney fees entered by Fountain, J., on 23 August 1989 in Superior Court, ALAMANCE County. Heard in the Supreme Court 10 December 1990.\nLatham, Wood & Hawkins, by B.F. Wood, and Stem, Graham & Klepfer, by William A. Eagles, for plaintiff appellant.\nDouglas R. Hoy for defendant appellee." }, "file_name": "0240-01", "first_page_order": 274, "last_page_order": 281 }