{ "id": 2542694, "name": "IN RE: INQUIRY CONCERNING A JUDGE, NO. 121 GEORGE R. GREENE, Respondent", "name_abbreviation": "In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, No. 121 Greene", "decision_date": "1991-05-02", "docket_number": "No. 289A89", "first_page": "639", "last_page": "651", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "328 N.C. 639" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "191 S.E.2d 664", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 N.C. 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562829 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/282/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 S.E.2d 562", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8557304 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 S.E.2d 716", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "717-18", "parenthetical": "judgment in custody action vacated when presiding judge determined facts in part on the basis of unrevealed evidence gathered \"in secret from undisclosed sources\" without party's knowledge or that of his counsel" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "238 N.C. 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8606972 ], "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "304", "parenthetical": "judgment in custody action vacated when presiding judge determined facts in part on the basis of unrevealed evidence gathered \"in secret from undisclosed sources\" without party's knowledge or that of his counsel" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/238/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "257 La. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "La.", "case_ids": [ 5602987, 9741316 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/la/257/0001-01", "/so2d/241/0469-01" ] }, { "cite": "532 P.2d 303", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10466726 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "305" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/532/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "237 S.E.2d 246", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "251" }, { "page": "251" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "293 N.C. 235", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562567 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "241" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/293/0235-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 S.E.2d 822", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "825" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 N.C. 597", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571409 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "602" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/289/0597-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 955, "char_count": 25944, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.927895885924944e-08, "percentile": 0.37013934017002537 }, "sha256": "1c069621d7544e2f0a49628bd79e9bd54bfd55c9c5518c8ea6c40f2f0c271aea", "simhash": "1:e447d0ab39c85860", "word_count": 4186 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:58:40.693084+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Justices MITCHELL and Frye did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case." ], "parties": [ "IN RE: INQUIRY CONCERNING A JUDGE, NO. 121 GEORGE R. GREENE, Respondent" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PER CURIAM.\nRespondent urges this Court to reject the Judicial Standards Commission\u2019s (Commission) recommendation. He argues (1) the proceedings against him should be dismissed because they denied him procedural due process; (2) the Commission\u2019s factual findings are not supported by clear and convincing evidence, and (3) the findings do not support the Commission\u2019s conclusions.\nThe proceedings against respondent occurred as follows:\nAfter advising respondent by confidential notice dated 4 January 1988 that it had ordered a preliminary investigation to determine whether formal proceedings should be instituted against him, the Commission, on 7 October 1988, concluded that formal proceedings should be instituted and served Notice of Complaint and a verified complaint upon respondent on 16 October 1988.\nThe complaint alleged that respondent, while presiding over a criminal session of Wake County District Court on 16 October 1987, heard a case which involved a charge of assault on a female. The complaint alleged:\nThe respondent criticized the victim\u2019s decision not to reconcile with the defendant and implied that the assault was justified and deserved. The respondent also made derogatory remarks about Interact, the battered women\u2019s assistance group whose representative was present in court in support of the victim, including the comment that they were \u201ca one-sided man-hating bunch of females.\u201d Following the trial, the respondent approached where the victim and the Interact representative were standing in the hall. The respondent grinned at . . . the victim in the case, and asked if she forgave him. He then told [the victim] in the presence of the Interact representative that once his wife had slapped him and that he had \u201claid her on the floor and did not have any more problems from her.\u201d\nRespondent answered these allegations by denying his conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice because:\nA. The attempted counseling to the prosecuting witness was given after hearing the evidence and finding the defendant \u201cguilty.\u201d That his opinion remains that in light of the evidence, the two children of the parties and the obvious pregnancy of the prosecuting witness, a joint working out of their difficulties was the best course for all of the involved parties.\nB. The remarks about \u201cInteract\u201d persons were made outside Court and as a result of and in response to their previous disruption in the Courtroom and the proceedings before Respondent by representatives of that group. Further, to the attempts by those same representatives to influence Respondent\u2019s decision and invade his impartiality by improper pressure tactics. Finally, to the interference, after Court, in his attempt to mitigate any personally perceived prejudice by the prosecuting witness.\nC. Respondent made a good faith and sincere attempt to ameliorate any hostility with the prosecuting witness Myra Sheffield by asking her if she forgave him for any misunderstanding which may have occurred in the Courtroom.\nThe complaint also alleged:\n(c) While presiding over a criminal session of Wake County District Court on 24 February 1988, the respondent engaged in a conversation with a defendant who was charged with speeding on Rock Quarry Road in Wake County. The respondent admitted during the conversation in open court that a defendant who was charged with speeding on Rock Quarry Road that the respondent drives the same route at 52 miles per hour, which is in excess of the posted speed limit of 45 miles per hour.\nRespondent answered this allegation by admitting having made the statement attributed to him but denying it was conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice because:\nA. Respondent was merely attempting to make the point to the particular Defendant that reality is that police policy allows drivers some leeway with regard to speed limits on certain roads. Respondent routinely tells this to defendants who appear in his Courtroom charged with speeding. Respondent knows that the police also give defendants who are speeding a few miles over the limit a warning. Respondent attempts to impress upon Defendants that speeding in excess of the leeway allowed by the police becomes a serious offense.\nB. Respondent did not mean to imply by his statement that he approved of driving in substantial excess of the posted speed limit.\nBy letter dated 23 November 1988 respondent\u2019s counsel requested Special Counsel for the Commission, Mr. James Coman, to furnish the following items:\n1. A list of witnesses you expect to call to testify before the Commission against Judge Greene and a summary of what you expect their testimony to be;\n2. Copies of any written statements or complaints made to the Commission or its investigators as a part of this inquiry;\n3. Copies of any transcription of oral statements made to the Commission or its investigators as part of this inquiry;\n4. Any letters, statements, or complaints filed by any individual with the Commission concerning Judge Greene which might have lead [sic] to the initiation of this inquiry; and\n5. Copies of any investigative reports submitted by any person utilized by the Commission to conduct this inquiry.\nMr. Coman replied on 3 January 1989. Mr. Coman\u2019s letter advised respondent\u2019s counsel of the names of witnesses expected to be called against respondent and gave a detailed summary of the testimony each witness was expected to give. The letter advised that \u201cinvestigative reports . . . are considered confidential and are not made available unless such information is presented at the hearing.\u201d The letter noted that exculpatory material known by Special Counsel had been made available by advising respondent\u2019s counsel regarding certain people \u201cthey may want to speak with or people who do not support the contentions of the witnesses to be presented ... in furtherance of the complaint.\u201d\nBy letter dated 10 January 1989 to Judge Gerald Arnold, Commission Chairman, respondent\u2019s counsel expressed dissatisfaction with the discovery procedures of the Commission and requested that the Chairman \u201corder the Special Counsel to adopt an \u2018open file\u2019 policy on discovery.\u201d Respondent complained that Commission\u2019s Special Counsel, Mr. Coman, had asserted the \u201cconfidentiality\u201d of the proceedings as grounds for denying access to all of the Commission\u2019s investigative files.\nAfter a meeting of respondent\u2019s counsel, Commission Special Counsel, and Judge Arnold in Judge Arnold\u2019s office on 15 February 1989, Judge Arnold advised respondent\u2019s counsel by letter dated 17 February 1989 that he had personally reviewed the report and the letter response of Special Counsel. He concluded the response was reasonable. He denied respondent\u2019s counsel\u2019s request that he order Special Counsel to disclose all material in the investigative file.\nOn 16 March 1989 respondent\u2019s counsel moved to dismiss the complaint \u201cfor failure of the Special Counsel to comply with reasonable requests for discovery.\u201d\nFormal hearing after notice before the Commission was conducted on 2 June 1989. Evidence for the Commission tended to show as follows:\nOn 16 October 1987 respondent presided over a trial involving a charge of assault on a female against the husband of the prosecuting witness. A representative of Interact, a counseling service for persons in violent marriages or domestic situations, was present in court with the victim. Respondent made certain remarks concerning Interact. One witness recalled these remarks as accusing In-\" teract of being \u201canti-man or man-hater or something like that . . . .\u201d Another witness, the representative from Interact, testified that respondent \u201clectured the victim.\u201d This witness made contemporaneous handwritten notes of respondent\u2019s remarks made, she said, in the courtroom. She later used these contemporaneous notes to draft a letter of complaint to the Judicial Standards Commission after which she destroyed the handwritten notes.\nUsing her letter to the Commission to refresh her recollection, this witness testified that respondent told the prosecuting witness that she shouldn\u2019t have anything to do with Interact and \u201cInteract was a one-sided, man-hating bunch of females, a pack of she-dogs.\u201d The witness said respondent told the prosecuting witness that \u201cshe was being selfish not to go back [to her husband] and that she would ruin her children\u2019s lives.\u201d Respondent said, \u201cYou really haven\u2019t been hit that much. You deserve to be hit. How is a man supposed to react?\u201d\nThere was other testimony that respondent polled the persons in the courtroom to see how many had \u201chad little spats in their marriages.\u201d\nAfter the proceeding in court was completed, the Interact witness and the prosecuting witness came into contact with respondent outside the courtroom. According to these witnesses respondent told them that his wife had once slapped him and \u201che had laid her on the floor and had never had any problems from her since.\u201d Respondent then asked the assault victim to forgive him, and she replied negatively.\nOn 24 February 1988, while hearing an alleged speeding violation, which had occurred on Rock Quarry Road, respondent remarked, \u201cNow, you know everybody speeds .... Everybody drives fifty-five miles an hour on Rock Quarry Road. And do you know how I know that everybody drives fifty-five miles an hour on Rock Quarry Road? Because I drive fifty-five miles an hour on Rock Quarry Road.\u201d\nRespondent testified in his own behalf and offered corroborative witnesses. His testimony tended to show as follows:\nIn the assault case respondent was concerned because he thought there were persons in the courtroom supporting the prosecuting witness who were trying to influence his decision and judgment in the matter. Respondent \u201cgot mad.\u201d He admitted making the remark about having slapped his wife down, but said that this was an exaggerated version of what actually happened. Respondent said, \u201cAnd if I lost it, I lost it. But I did the best that I could under the circumstances sitting as judge and jury.\u201d Respondent recalled that he was not directing his \u201cshe-dogs\u201d remark to Interact or any other particular group. He had no knowledge of Interact at the time and did not know there were Interact representatives in the courtroom. He said, \u201cMy recollection is that I said if men got into an argument they would argue, might even sometimes fight, but sooner or later they would forget about it, go on and be friends. Women are just the opposite. They get in an argument, they act like a bunch of she-dogs, something of that effect. I never referred to any particular group as being she-dogs. I said women in general. It was a general comment. It might not have been in good taste, but that\u2019s what I recall saying.\u201d\nRegarding his comments concerning speed limit violations, respondent testified his experience had been that officers in traffic cases ordinarily do not issue citations unless the motorist is speeding ten miles or more over the posted speed limit and \u201cthat\u2019s common knowledge all over Wake County.\u201d Respondent said, \u201cIn my effort to educate the public on how not to get speeding tickets, I have consistently said I\u2019ve locked my cruise control on fifty-two miles an hour in a forty-five zone. I speed \u2014 I drive thirty-five in a thirty-five and twenty-five in a twenty-five. On the open highway where the speed limit is fifty-five I never exceed sixty-two. I have done it repeatedly, repeatedly, repeatedly; and I won\u2019t deny it. But I have never said that I sped fifty-five on Rock Quarry Road. That is that lady\u2019s version, the way she wanted to give it to you. I did not say that, I categorically deny it.\u201d\nAfter the hearing the Commission notified respondent that it had determined to file a recommendation with the Supreme Court of North Carolina. On 28 June 1989 the Commission served its formal recommendation on respondent.\nThe Commission recommends to the Court that respondent be censured. In support of this recommendation the Commission advised the Court that it found the following facts on clear and convincing evidence:\n(a) The respondent demeaned the dignity and integrity of the proceedings before him and his judicial office when during proceedings in open court in an assault on a female case, State v. Sheffield, Wake County file number 87CR50908, over which he presided on 16 October 1987, he embarassed [sic] and humiliated the seven-months\u2019 pregnant victim of the assault by telling her she would ruin her children\u2019s lives if she did not reconcile with her estranged husband, she deserved to be hit, and she had not been hit that much; he referred in a derogatory manner to the representative of the support group who was with the victim and the support group itself, which he later came to know was Interact, as a one-sided, man-hating bunch of females and a pack of she-dogs; and he polled the courtroom spectators as to how many of them had little spats during their marriages.\n(b) While presiding over the 24 February 1988 criminal session of Wake County District Court, the respondent admitted in open court during a conversation with a defendant charged with speeding on Rock Quarry Road in Wake County that he also speeds on the same road by driving 52 miles per hour in a 45 miles per hour zone. Furthermore, the respondent routinely admitted in open court while presiding over other district court criminal sessions that he broke the law by driving 52 miles per hour in 45 miles per hour zones and 62 miles per hour in 55 miles per hour zones and routinely counselled defendants appearing before him charged with speeding and others present in the courtroom that they should restrict their speeding violations to these limits in order to avoid apprehension and conviction.\nThe Commission concluded respondent\u2019s actions constitute conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-376 and which violates Canons 2A, 3A(2), and 3A(3) of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct.\nRespondent continues to press his claim here that the proceedings before the Commission denied him due process of law. He makes two arguments: First, the Commission failed to provide respondent adequate prehearing discovery because it denied respondent open and full access to the Commission\u2019s investigative files. Second, the Commission itself was not a fair and impartial tribunal.\nWe conclude respondent was afforded due process in these proceedings. We make this conclusion in light of the nature of a judicial disciplinary proceeding begun before the Commission. Such proceeding \u201cis neither criminal nor civil in nature. It is an inquiry into the conduct of a judicial officer, the purpose of which is not primarily to punish any individual but to maintain due and proper administration of justice in our State\u2019s courts, public confidence in its judicial system, and the honor and integrity of judges.\u201d In re Crutchfield, 289 N.C. 597, 602, 223 S.E.2d 822, 825 (1975). \u201cAlbeit serious, censure and removal are not to be regarded as punishment but as the legal consequences attached to adjudged judicial misconduct or unfitness.\u201d In re Nowell, 293 N.C. 235, 241, 237 S.E.2d 246, 251 (1977).\nWe agree with respondent, nevertheless, that in judicial disciplinary proceedings begun before the Judicial Standards Commission a judge is entitled\nto a hearing which meets the basic requirements of due process. [Citation omitted.] \u201cThe Commission\u2019s procedures are required to meet constitutional due process standards since a judge\u2019s interest in continuing in public office is an individual interest of sufficient importance to warrant constitutional protection against deprivation.\u201d In re Hanson, 532 P.2d 303, 305 (Alas. 1975); In re Haggerty, 257 La. 1, 241 So.2d 469 (1970).\nId. at 241-42, 237 S.E.2d at 251. The Law of the Land Clause in the North Carolina Constitution \u201cguarantees to the litigant in every kind of judicial proceeding the right to an adequate and fair hearing .... Where the claim or defense turns upon a factual adjudication, the constitutional right of the litigant to an adequate and fair hearing requires that he be apprised of all the evidence received by the court and given an opportunity to test, explain, or rebut it.\u201d In re Custody of Gupton, 238 N.C. 303, 304, 77 S.E.2d 716, 717-18 (1953) (judgment in custody action vacated when presiding judge determined facts in part on the basis of unrevealed evidence gathered \u201cin secret from undisclosed sources\u201d without party\u2019s knowledge or that of his counsel) (citations omitted).\nHere respondent was accorded an adequate and fair hearing, was apprised of all material evidence received and relied on by the Commission and given opportunity to test, explain and rebut it. Respondent has referred us to no authority, and we know of none, for the proposition that due process requires a respondent judge in a judicial disciplinary proceeding to have open access to the Commission\u2019s investigative files. Respondent concedes that neither the Administrative Procedure Act, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 150B-1, et seq., nor the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, apply to proceedings before the Judicial Standards Commission. Indeed, due process does not mandate open access to the prosecution\u2019s files even in criminal cases. State v. Tatum, 291 N.C. 73, 229 S.E.2d 562 (1976); cf. State v. Davis, 282 N.C. 107, 191 S.E.2d 664 (1972).\nRespondent\u2019s contention that the Commission itself was not a fair and impartial tribunal is based on his assertion that the Commission was aware of, and either biased by or used against him, certain evidence in its files which was not revealed to respondent. In support of this contention respondent relies on the following colloquy between respondent and Special Counsel:\nQ. When you talked with the investigators for the Commission, did you make any analogy or reference as to what you thought this was all about?\nA. Uh-huh (yes), I did.\nQ. And do you think that that analogy is a valid assessment of what this is all about, Judge Greene?\nA. There is room for me to think so, but I would not categorically say yes.\nMr. Coman: No further questions.\nRespondent argues that whatever analogy was referred to by Special Counsel must have been known to the Commission yet not revealed to respondent. We reject this argument. It is based on speculation and is not supported by the record. Responding to this argument, the Commission moved the Court to be permitted to amend the record on appeal so as to include its entire investigative report for in camera inspection by the Court. Respondent resists this motion and prays that it be denied. The Court has elected to deny the motion.\nWe cannot sustain this argument of respondent for two reasons: First, we do not know what the mysterious analogy was, whether the Commission knew of it, and if it knew of it, whether the analogy affected its decision. So far as the record reveals the Commission\u2019s recommendation was based solely on its findings contained in its order and its conclusions drawn from those findings. Second, it is not the Commission but this Court which decides whether respondent\u2019s conduct is deserving of censure. The only conduct with which we are concerned and of which we have knowledge is that revealed by the evidence before the Commission which formed the basis of its recommendation.\nRespondent next contends the findings of the Commission are not supported by clear and convincing evidence and that its findings do not support its conclusions or its recommendation.\nWhile there is some evidence to support all the Commission\u2019s findings, we conclude the finding that respondent told the prosecuting witness in the assault case that she deserved to be hit and had not been hit that much is not supported by clear and convincing evidence. We reject this finding. We conclude the other findings of the Commission are supported by clear and convincing evidence, and we adopt them as our own. See In re Nowell, 293 N.C. 235, 237 S.E.2d 246. Respondent\u2019s answer to the complaint does not deny that he made the remarks the complaint attributed to him, and the thrust of his testimony before the Commission is not to deny many of the remarks attributed to him by the complaining witnesses and found by the Commission to have been made. His testimony seems to be directed primarily toward making his remarks seem less egregious in light of respondent\u2019s version of his motives and the context in which the remarks were made. That respondent\u2019s motives might have been pure does not necessarily detract from the egregious effect of his remarks on others. \u201cWhether the conduct of a judge may be characterized as prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute depends not so much on the judge\u2019s motives but more on the conduct itself, the results thereof, and the impact such conduct might reasonably have upon knowledgeable observers.\u201d In re Crutchfield, 289 N.C. 597, 223 S.E.2d 822.\nCanon 2A of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct provides \u201c[a] judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct himself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.\u201d Canon 3A(3) provides in part: \u201cA judge should be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom he deals in his official capacity.\u201d\nWe agree with the conclusion of the Commission that respondent\u2019s conduct which we have concluded has been proved by clear and convincing evidence violated both of these canons and that it was conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-376.\nNow, therefore, it is ordered by the Supreme Court of North Carolina, in conference, that respondent, Judge George R. Greene, be, and he is hereby, censured by this Court for the conduct determined by the Court to be conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute.\nJustices MITCHELL and Frye did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.\n. No action on this motion by the Commission appears of record. By implication at least the motion was denied.", "type": "majority", "author": "PER CURIAM." } ], "attorneys": [ "Bailey & Dixon, by Wright T. Dixon, Jr., and Alan J. Miles, for respondent-appellant.", "Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by James J. Coman, Senior Deputy Attorney General, Special Counsel to the Judicial Standards Commission." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN RE: INQUIRY CONCERNING A JUDGE, NO. 121 GEORGE R. GREENE, Respondent\nNo. 289A89\n(Filed 2 May 1991)\n1. Judges \u00a7 7 (NCI3d)\u2014 judicial disciplinary proceeding \u2014 due process \u2014 access to investigative files\nDue process did not require that the respondent in a judicial disciplinary proceeding have open access to the Judicial Standards Commission\u2019s investigative files.\nAm Jur 2d, Judges \u00a7\u00a7 18-20, 50.\n2. Judges \u00a7 7 (NCI3d)\u2014 judicial disciplinary proceeding-consideration of evidence in files \u2014 failure of record to support contention\nDefendant\u2019s contention that the Judicial Standards Commission considered evidence in its files not revealed to respondent and was thus not a fair and impartial tribunal was not supported by the record since (1) the record shows only that the Commission\u2019s recommendation was based solely on its findings contained in its order and its conclusions drawn from those findings, and (2) the Supreme Court rather than the Commission decides whether respondent\u2019s conduct is deserving of censure, and the only conduct of which the Supreme Court has knowledge is that revealed by the evidence before the Commission which formed the basis of its recommendation.\nAm Jur 2d, Judges \u00a7\u00a7 18-20, 50.\n3. Judges \u00a7 7 (NCI3d)\u2014 censure of judge \u2014 conduct prejudicial to administration of justice\nA superior court judge is censured by the Supreme Court for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute for the following conduct which occurred while he was a district court judge: (1) while presiding over a prosecution for assault on a female, respondent told the victim that she would ruin her children\u2019s lives if she did not reconcile with defendant, referred to a battered women\u2019s assistance group whose representative was present in court in support of the victim as a one-sided, man-hating bunch of females and pack of she-dogs, and polled the courtroom spectators as to how many of them had little spats during their marriages; and (2) while presiding over the trial of a defendant charged with speeding on Rock Quarry Road in Wake County, respondent stated that he also speeds on the same road by driving fifty-two miles per hour in a forty-five miles per hour zone, and while presiding over other speeding trials respondent routinely admitted that he drove fifty-two miles per hour in forty-five miles per hour zones and sixty-five miles per hour in fifty-five miles per hour zones and counseled defendants charged with speeding that they should restrict their speeding violations to those limits in order to avoid apprehension and conviction.\nAm Jur 2d, Judges \u00a7\u00a7 18-20, 50.\nTHIS matter is before the Court upon a recommendation of the Judicial Standards Commission that respondent, George R. Greene, a judge of the General Court of Justice, Superior Court Division, be censured for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-376 and which violates Canons 2A, 3A(2) and 3A(3) of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct. Heard in the Supreme Court 15 November 1989.\nBailey & Dixon, by Wright T. Dixon, Jr., and Alan J. Miles, for respondent-appellant.\nLacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by James J. Coman, Senior Deputy Attorney General, Special Counsel to the Judicial Standards Commission.\n. At all times material to the proceedings in this matter, Judge Greene was a judge in the District Court Division, Tenth Judicial District. Judge Greene was elected judge in the Superior Court Division in the 1988 General Election and began serving in that capacity on 1 January 1989." }, "file_name": "0639-01", "first_page_order": 673, "last_page_order": 685 }