{ "id": 2541546, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DANIEL McKINNON", "name_abbreviation": "State v. McKinnon", "decision_date": "1991-05-02", "docket_number": "No. 327A90", "first_page": "668", "last_page": "678", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "328 N.C. 668" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "234 S.E.2d 574", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "625" }, { "page": "579" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 N.C. 617", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571639 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/292/0617-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 S.E.2d 752", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "758", "parenthetical": "defendant has no right to greater than the statutory number of peremptories" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 355", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572408 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "363", "parenthetical": "defendant has no right to greater than the statutory number of peremptories" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0355-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 L. Ed. 2d 1456", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "463 U.S. 1249", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6267545 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/463/1249-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 L. Ed. 2d 1398", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "463 U.S. 1213", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6237890, 6236868, 6238726, 6237546, 6236523, 6238317, 6235632, 6237202, 6236246, 6235963, 6235325 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/463/1213-09", "/us/463/1213-06", "/us/463/1213-11", "/us/463/1213-08", "/us/463/1213-05", "/us/463/1213-10", "/us/463/1213-02", "/us/463/1213-07", "/us/463/1213-04", "/us/463/1213-03", "/us/463/1213-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 S.E.2d 761", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "773" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567447 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "267" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 S.E.2d 359", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "363" }, { "page": "364", "parenthetical": "potential juror excused after admitting that experience in Korea could affect ability to be fair or impartial" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 20", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4729914 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "26" }, { "page": "27-28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0020-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 430", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "435" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 724", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4720164 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "731" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0724-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 S.E.2d 84", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86", "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "261 N.C. 727", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575389 ], "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "730", "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/261/0727-01" ] }, { "cite": "72 L. Ed. 2d 155", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "455 U.S. 1038", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11385393, 11385354 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/455/1038-02", "/us/455/1038-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 S.E.2d 461", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "464" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "254 N.C. 475", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626914 ], "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/254/0475-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 S.E.2d 732", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "748", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Carter, 254 N.C. 475, 479, 119 S.E.2d 461, 464 (1961)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567383 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "227-28", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Carter, 254 N.C. 475, 479, 119 S.E.2d 461, 464 (1961)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "273 S.E.2d 264", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "267" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 683", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570075 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "686-87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0683-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 S.E.2d 233", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239-40" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 567", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4756069 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "578" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0567-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1007, "char_count": 22094, "ocr_confidence": 0.77, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.6262214112348512e-07, "percentile": 0.6881316246622873 }, "sha256": "fedafaea76485bb0af207f8f6471016f8cf41c7ec3510fe02f8085736b9175e4", "simhash": "1:fb6fd486762e8c98", "word_count": 3667 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:58:40.693084+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DANIEL McKINNON" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WHICHARD, Justice.\nDefendant was tried capitally and convicted of first-degree felony murder on the theory that the killing was committed during the course of second-degree rape and second-degree sex offense. Following defendant\u2019s sentencing proceeding pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000, the jury recommended life imprisonment and the trial court entered judgment accordingly. Defendant appeals his conviction of first-degree murder as a matter of right. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a) (1989). We hold that defendant\u2019s trial was free of prejudicial error.\nThe State\u2019s evidence tended to show that on the evening of 18 August 1987, eighteen-year-old Tammie Michelle Martin left her grandmother\u2019s house to go to the store for a snack. Martin\u2019s grandmother, Lillie McKenneth, testified that Martin called around 10:00 p.m. to say she was on her way home, but she never arrived. Reginald McDougald testified that between 9:30 and 10:00 p.m. that evening he was riding his bicycle on Martin Luther King (MLK) Drive and he saw Martin walking south towards Lumbee Homes. McDougald testified that Martin told him she was going to Shannon McDuffie\u2019s house in Lumbee Homes. McDuffie testified that Martin arrived at her house around 9:45 p.m., visited briefly, called her grandmother to say she was on her way home, unsuccessfully tried to call her boyfriend, and then left at approximately 10:30 p.m.\nAt approximately 11:12 or 11:13 p.m. on 18 August, Vincent McCall was driving to pick up his brother, Phillip White, from work at the Pizza Hut. On the way McCall saw defendant at the corner of Oregon Street and MLK Drive. Defendant asked McCall for a ride and McCall agreed. McCall testified that defendant was sweating and seemed to be in a \u201chysterical\u201d state. According to McCall, defendant got into the car and said: \u201cVince, I beat this girl. I beat her bad. I beat her bad. I don\u2019t know what got into me. I beat her bad, Vince. I\u2019m going to have an assault charge on me tomorrow.\u201d When they arrived at the Pizza Hut, Phillip White brought some water out for defendant to drink. On the way back home, McCall began to admonish his brother that alcohol and drugs would lead to trouble. In a joking manner defendant agreed, telling White that drinking could cause a person not to know what he was doing. Then defendant stated: \u201cI did something tonight. I shocked myself.\u201d\nOn 19 August 1987, Lillie McKenneth and Tommy Moody, Tammie Martin\u2019s boyfriend, reported her disappearance to the police. At approximately 2:00 p.m. that day Tommy McNeil, one of McKenneth\u2019s neighbors, discovered Tammie\u2019s body among overgrown weeds and high grass on a vacant lot about one block from McKenneth\u2019s home. The victim was clothed only in tennis shoes and socks. The police found a \u201clock blade\u201d knife with a four-inch blade and assorted articles of clothing scattered in the grass on the lot. An autopsy of the victim showed that the cause of death was acute subdural hemorrhage on the surface of the brain caused by trauma to the head. The victim suffered, in addition, five fractured ribs on the left side, fractures of both sides of the lower jaw, bruising of the scalp, multiple superficial scratches and bruises on the face, neck, chest, and around the eyes. There was evidence of vaginal intercourse and indications of forcible anal intercourse.\nOn 21 August 1987, police questioned defendant regarding both an alleged assault on his girlfriend, Patricia Lewis, and the death of Tammie Martin. During that interview, defendant indicated that he had spent the morning of 18 August at the public library and then had lunch at the soup kitchen. From there, defendant went to Weaver\u2019s Court Apartments and eventually started arguing with his girlfriend. According to defendant, the argument culminated with Lewis slapping defendant and striking him with a wine bottle. Defendant said he struck Lewis during the argument in self-defense. Afterwards, defendant played basketball at the recreation center until about 4:30 p.m., visited with a cousin at Lumbee Homes until around 2:00 a.m., and then walked home.\nAlso during the interview, defendant told SBI agent James Bowman that he knew the victim and that they had had sexual relations approximately three times during the summer. Defendant said the victim had a boyfriend and she did not want him to know that she and defendant had been seeing each other.\nDuring a subsequent interview on 22 August 1987, defendant said he had been drinking beer and wine on and off on the day of the victim\u2019s death. At about 9:30 p.m., defendant saw the victim near MLK Drive talking with some friends. Defendant said \u201c[h]ello\u201d and the victim was friendly, saying she wanted to see him later. Defendant said that about ten or fifteen minutes later he and the victim were walking together discussing the problems they had with her boyfriend and his girlfriend. They then walked out into the garden on the vacant lot owned by Tommy McNeil and began playing and wrestling. According to defendant, they undressed and had sex. Subsequently, they resumed their conversation but began to argue. The victim slapped defendant in the face, he grabbed her, and they wrestled for five or six minutes. Defendant said he did not hit the victim. Eventually they stopped wrestling; the victim said she had to go home and began to get dressed. Defendant dressed and left, walking back towards MLK Drive where he met Vince McCall a few minutes later.\nFor the defendant, Aldo McRae testified that he saw the victim between 10:30 and 11:00 p.m. on the evening of 18 August. McRae testified that the victim said she was on her way home. McRae also testified that after seeing the victim, he encountered Dwight Bowden in the vicinity of Fred\u2019s Supermarket. Bowden was \u201ctalking crazy,\u201d saying \u201cyou can kill somebody\u201d and that he knew a place no one could find. Later that night McRae was jogging in the vicinity of the vacant lot where McKenneth\u2019s neighbor found the victim\u2019s body. On three separate occasions that evening McRae saw a blue Oldsmobile circling the area. McRae had previously seen Barry Robinson driving that car. The next day McRae saw both Robinson and Bowden at the recreation center shooting basketball. Robinson had what appeared to be fresh scratches or scars on his face, and he moved to stand behind McRae each time police drove by the area.\nThree other witnesses testified on defendant\u2019s behalf. Defendant did not testify.\nDefendant first assigns as error the introduction by the State of testimony from Patricia Lewis regarding the incident on 18 August 1987, in which defendant allegedly assaulted Lewis. The police first took defendant into custody on 21 August 1987 for questioning on the alleged assault on Lewis. Following this interrogation, they arrested defendant and charged him with this assault.\nPrior to defendant\u2019s trial for the murder of Tammie Martin, defendant made a motion in limine to prohibit the State from introducing evidence of the assault charge or the circumstances surrounding it. The trial court denied defendant\u2019s pretrial motion without prejudice to defendant\u2019s right to raise the issue at trial. When Lewis was called to testify regarding the details of defendant\u2019s alleged assault on 18 August, the trial court overruled defendant\u2019s objection and denied his motion to strike the testimony. Defendant argues that evidence of the prior alleged assault was not relevant and that any probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rules 402, 403, 404(b) (1988).\nThe challenged testimony was essentially as follows: At about 11:00 or 11:30 a.m. on 18 August 1987, Lewis walked with defendant and Dorothy Page from her apartment to the store to buy some wine. On the way to the store, defendant told Lewis he did not want her to be afraid of him and he would not do anything to her. On the way back, defendant jumped at Lewis to see if she was scared of him. Defendant again told her he would not hurt her, but then he hit Lewis and she fell in the street. Defendant then picked up Lewis by the neck and began hitting her in the head with the wine bottle. Lewis eventually ran away and called an ambulance. When the ambulance arrived to assist Lewis, she saw defendant walking down the sidewalk and noticed he had changed clothes. Later that day, Lewis saw defendant at the hospital. Defendant approached Lewis, but left when Lewis reported defendant\u2019s presence to hospital personnel.\nDefendant challenges the relevancy of Lewis\u2019s testimony, arguing that it tends to prove only that defendant has a violent propensity towards women. If so, the evidence would violate North Carolina Rule of Evidence 404, which states:\n(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. \u2014 Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, entrapment or accident.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b) (1988).\nThe evidence at issue here, however, was \u201cadmissible for other purposes\u201d in that Lewis\u2019s testimony served to clarify the ambiguity in defendant\u2019s statement to Vince McCall that he \u201cbeat this girl.\u201d On at least two occasions during defendant\u2019s trial the jury could have inferred that when defendant told McCall he \u201cbeat this girl,\u201d he was referring to the altercation between defendant and Patricia Lewis, not to the rape and murder of the victim here.\nFirst, during defense counsel\u2019s cross-examination of McCall the following exchange took place:\nQ. Now, when Danny was talking about the girl, he was talking about his girlfriend, Patricia Lewis; is that correct?\nA. I have no idea who he was talking about, because he never stated a name.\nQ. Didn\u2019t he mention his girlfriend?\nA. No, he did not.\nAlthough the questions by defense counsel did not constitute evidence, they did suggest to the jury that defendant\u2019s incriminating statement referred to the incident with Lewis, not to the killing of Tammie Martin. A defendant\u2019s cross-examination of a State\u2019s witness can open the door for the State to introduce evidence in rebuttal. State v. Albert, 312 N.C. 567, 578, 324 S.E.2d 233, 239-40 (1985); State v. Pruitt, 301 N.C. 683, 686-87, 273 S.E.2d 264, 267 (1981).\nSecond, on direct examination by the State, SBI agent Bowman testified from the notes of his interview with defendant as follows: \u201cHe [defendant] said that about ten or fifteen minutes after he left the garden he met up with Vince McCall and they rode around. He said that he told Vince about hitting his girlfriend, Patricia, earlier in the day . . . .\u201d The State, having introduced a statement by defendant containing exculpatory material, is bound by that material unless it is contradicted or rebutted. State v. Rook, 304 N.C. 201, 227-28, 283 S.E.2d 732, 748 (1981) (quoting State v. Carter, 254 N.C. 475, 479, 119 S.E.2d 461, 464 (1961)), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1038, 72 L. Ed. 2d 155 (1982); State v. Johnson, 261 N.C. 727, 730, 136 S.E.2d 84, 86 (1964) (per curiam). The details of Lewis\u2019s testimony were relevant to rebut or contradict the inference that defendant was referring to Lewis when he said \u201cI beat this girl.\u201d Lewis\u2019s testimony highlighted the differences between the two incidents, showing especially that defendant allegedly assaulted her in the morning, that defendant\u2019s demeanor was relatively calm thereafter, and that the assault was nonsexual in nature. In light of Lewis\u2019s testimony, the jury reasonably could infer that defendant, in a \u201chysterical state\u201d shortly after an aggressive sexual encounter with Tammie Martin, was referring to Martin rather than Lewis when he confided to Vince McCall that he \u201cbeat this girl.\u201d Thus, the challenged testimony was relevant and properly was admitted \u201cfor other purposes\u201d under Rule 404(b).\nDefendant argues that even if Lewis\u2019s testimony was relevant, its \u201cprobative value [was] substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . .\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403 (1988). Application of Rule 403 to exclude relevant evidence is within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Mason, 315 N.C. 724, 731, 340 S.E.2d 430, 435 (1986). The transcript of Lewis\u2019s testimony reveals that the trial court carefully limited the proffered testimony to serve the purpose of rebuttal. When the State\u2019s questions exceeded the scope of rebuttal, the court repeatedly sustained defense counsel\u2019s objections. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and that defendant is not entitled to relief on this assignment of error.\nDefendant next assigns as error the trial court\u2019s refusal to dismiss potential jurors John Oliver and Carmen Hayes for cause. The trial court denied defendant\u2019s pretrial motion to increase the number of peremptory challenges available to defendant. During jury selection defendant sought to challenge for cause potential juror Oliver on the basis that his responses to questioning indicated he might assign more credibility to law enforcement officers than to other witnesses. The trial court denied the challenge for cause and defendant exercised a peremptory challenge to remove Oliver. After exhausting his remaining peremptories, defendant sought to challenge for cause potential juror Hayes on the basis of conflicting responses regarding her ability to presume the innocence of defendant and to hold the State to its burden of proof that defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court denied the challenge for cause and denied defendant\u2019s subsequent motion for additional peremptories. Hayes ultimately sat on defendant\u2019s jury.\nThe trial court\u2019s rulings on challenges for cause are discretionary and will not ordinarily be disturbed on appeal. See State v. Kennedy, 320 N.C. 20, 26, 357 S.E.2d 359, 363 (1987); State v. Taylor, 304 N.C. 249, 267, 283 S.E.2d 761, 773 (1981), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1213, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1398, reh\u2019g denied, 463 U.S. 1249, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1456 (1983). Defendant exercised the peremptory challenges he was entitled to by statute. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1217(a)(l) (1988); see also State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 355, 363, 259 S.E.2d 752, 758 (1979) (defendant has no right to greater than the statutory number of peremptories).\nCounsel for defendant sought to challenge for cause potential juror Oliver after the following exchange:\n[Q.] In this case you\u2019re going to have testimony from people who are involved in law enforcement and people who are not, such as every day people who work and don\u2019t have any experience in the courtroom. My question to you is: Do you think that you would give more weight or tend to believe the testimony of a police officer more so than you would the testimony of Mr. Daniel McKinnon or any other witness who is not involved in law enforcement?\n[A.] To be honest with you, that would be hard to answer right now. There is always the possibility you might would.\n[Q.] So it is not an automatic thing that you would just believe a person because he\u2019s in law enforcement? Is that what you\u2019re saying?\n[A.] Not really.\n[Q.] Well, would you think that you would tend to believe a police officer more so than any other type of witness?\n[A.] Possibly, to be honest with you. I\u2019m saying due to the fact that he\u2019s supposed to be trained.\n[Q.] You\u2019re saying just because you think a police officer, by their profession or training in investigation and law enforcement\u2014\n[A.] I\u2019m saying possibly in that relation. I\u2019m trying to be honest with you.\nLater, counsel for defendant returned to this subject:\n[Q.] Earlier, Mr. Oliver, you indicated that you might tend to favor the testimony of law enforcement officers. Is that still your position?\n[A.] Maybe we misunderstood each other. I say I might.\n[Q.] You might?\n[A.] But I \u2014 I believe a man can spot the truth if you look for it. That\u2019s what I\u2019m saying. I don\u2019t think anything is an automatic.\n[Q.] Yes, sir.\n[A.] That\u2019s what I\u2019m trying to say.\n[Q.] You think because of their training they are more believable than other witnesses, because of their training and experience?\n[A.] Not necessarily so. What I am saying is that perhaps so.\nOliver\u2019s responses during voir dire indicated that he would not automatically give enhanced credence to testimony by any particular class of witness. Rather, certain factors in the witness\u2019s background, such as training or experience, would affect the credibility of that witness. This case is therefore not controlled by State v. Lee, 292 N.C. 617, 234 S.E.2d 574 (1977). In Lee this Court ordered a new trial where the trial court declined to excuse for cause a potential juror who admitted there was a possibility she would give more credence to the testimony of law enforcement officials. The Court stated: \u201cUnder the particular circumstances of this case, we do not believe that juror Norvell could qualify as a disinterested and impartial juror.\u201d Id. at 625, 234 S.E.2d at 579. The circumstances that gave the Court concern in Lee were the witness\u2019s close relationship with several local police officers who might be testifying in the case, and the fact that her husband was a member of the local police department. In this case, there was no such significant relationship between potential juror Oliver and the testifying officers. The Court in Lee also took special notice of the fact that the only time Norvell said she could be fair and impartial was in response to direct questioning by the trial court. Id. Nothing in Oliver\u2019s responses indicated that he was partial or biased. Cf. State v. Kennedy, 320 N.C. at 27-28, 357 S.E.2d at 364 (potential juror excused after admitting that experience in Korea could affect ability to be fair or impartial). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to excuse potential juror Oliver for cause.\nNext, defendant argues that the trial court should have allowed his challenge for cause of juror Hayes after she gave conflicting and ambiguous responses to questions about whether she would hold the State to its burden of proof. The transcript of Hayes\u2019 voir dire indicates some confusion on her part during questioning, including agreement with a statement that she would require defendant to present evidence in his defense. Immediately following that response, however, she asked that the question be repeated. Hayes ultimately agreed three times that if the State did not meet its burden of proof she could find defendant not guilty even though he presented no witnesses in his behalf. The final exchange between Hayes and defense counsel was as follows:\n[Q.] You wouldn\u2019t have that in the back of your mind the fact that he didn\u2019t testify or call any witnesses?\n[A.] No, sir.\n[Q.] That wouldn\u2019t be of any concern? If it would, just tell us.\n[A.] No, sir, not if the State couldn\u2019t prove it.\n[Q.] Okay. And that\u2019s irregardless [sic] of whether he testifies or puts on any evidence?\n[A.] Yes, sir.\nThe responses of juror Hayes indicated that she would be able to hold the State to its burden of proof without requiring defendant to present evidence; therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to excuse her for cause. Defendant is not entitled to relief on this assignment of error.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we conclude that defendant received a fair trial free from prejudicial error.\nNo error.", "type": "majority", "author": "WHICHARD, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by Debra C. Graves, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender, by Constance H. Everhart, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DANIEL McKINNON\nNo. 327A90\n(Filed 2 May 1991)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 34.4 (NCI3d)\u2014 evidence of another offense \u2014 relevancy for rebuttal \u2014 admissible for \u201cother purposes\u201d\nTestimony by defendant\u2019s girlfriend giving details of defendant\u2019s assault on her on the morning of 18 August was relevant in a prosecution of defendant for a rape and murder on the night of 18 August to rebut or contradict the inference that defendant was referring to the altercation with his girlfriend rather than to the rape and murder of the victim when he told a witness the night of 18 August that he had \u201cbeat this girl.\u201d Therefore, the testimony did not show only that defendant had a violent propensity toward women but was properly admitted for \u201cother purposes\u201d under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b).\nAm Jur 2d, Evidence \u00a7 298.\n2. Jury \u00a7 7.9 (NCI3d)\u2014 potential juror \u2014 bias in favor of law officers \u2014 challenge for cause\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant\u2019s challenge for cause of a potential juror on the basis that he might assign more credibility to law enforcement officers than to other witnesses where the juror\u2019s responses during voir dire indicated that he would not automatically give enhanced credence to testimony by any particular class of witnesses but that certain factors in a witness\u2019s background, such as training or experience, would affect the credibility of that witness.\nAm Jur 2d, Jury \u00a7 285.\n3. Jury \u00a7 7.9 (NCI3d)\u2014 potential juror \u2014 challenge for cause\u2014 requirement that defendant present evidence\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to excuse for cause a potential juror who agreed with a statement during voir dire that she would require defendant to present evidence in his defense where, immediately following that response, the juror asked that the question be repeated and she ultimately agreed three times that if the State did not meet its burden of proof she could find defendant not guilty even though he presented no witnesses in his behalf.\nAm Jur 2d, Jury \u00a7 204.\nAppeal of right by defendant pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a) from a judgment imposing a sentence of life imprisonment entered by Ellis, J., at the 18 September 1989 Criminal Session of Superior Court, ROBESON County, upon a jury verdict finding defendant guilty of first-degree murder. Calendared for argument in the Supreme Court 9 April 1991; decided on the briefs without oral argument pursuant to N.C.R. App. P. 30(d).\nLacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by Debra C. Graves, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nMalcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender, by Constance H. Everhart, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant appellant." }, "file_name": "0668-01", "first_page_order": 702, "last_page_order": 712 }