{ "id": 2555126, "name": "CAROLYN M. SPROLES and husband, CHARLES B. SPROLES v. DAVID REED GREENE, TRAVELERS INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY and UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY COMPANY; JAMES A. PHILLIPS and wife, RITA L. PHILLIPS v. DAVID REED GREENE, TRAVELERS INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY and AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY; CAROLYN M. SPROLES and husband, CHARLES B. SPROLES v. TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY OF AMERICA, UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY COMPANY and THE AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY; CAROLYN M. SPROLES and husband, CHARLES B. SPROLES v. INTEGON GENERAL INSURANCE CORPORATION", "name_abbreviation": "Sproles v. Greene", "decision_date": "1991-08-14", "docket_number": "No. 482PA90", "first_page": "603", "last_page": "615", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "329 N.C. 603" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "394 S.E.2d 691", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "100 N.C. App. 96", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526349 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/100/0096-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 ALR2d 983", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 2d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "196 Ga. App. 271", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga. App.", "case_ids": [ 669097 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "273" }, { "page": "835" }, { "page": "274" }, { "page": "836" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga-app/196/0271-01" ] }, { "cite": "812 F.2d 412", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1694938 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" }, { "page": "413" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/812/0412-01" ] }, { "cite": "238 S.E.2d 597", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "604", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "293 N.C. 431", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565135 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/293/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "19 A.L.R.4th 107", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 S.E.2d 648", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "651" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis in the original" }, { "page": "651" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 460", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4718547 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "461-63" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0460-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 N.W.2d 920", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10690026 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "924" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/268/0920-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 S.E.2d 132", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "251 N.C. 624", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626746 ], "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/251/0624-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 127", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "129" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 N.C. App. 551", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521993 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "554" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/79/0551-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 44", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "47", "parenthetical": "quoting Crowder v. N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 79 N.C. App. 551, 554, 340 S.E.2d 127, 129 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 139", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2542714 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "143", "parenthetical": "quoting Crowder v. N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 79 N.C. App. 551, 554, 340 S.E.2d 127, 129 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0139-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 S.E.2d 691", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "691" }, { "page": "691" }, { "page": "691" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 N.C. App. 96", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8526349 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "103" }, { "page": "104" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/100/0096-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 834, "char_count": 28991, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.38053468017075e-07, "percentile": 0.9690636403898452 }, "sha256": "308f5089d9ac03960885646c4680b05490be87bae84db980dad695c544e3d8ff", "simhash": "1:542f6232a517b1c6", "word_count": 4724 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:30:52.475304+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Justice MARTIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case." ], "parties": [ "CAROLYN M. SPROLES and husband, CHARLES B. SPROLES v. DAVID REED GREENE, TRAVELERS INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY and UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY COMPANY JAMES A. PHILLIPS and wife, RITA L. PHILLIPS v. DAVID REED GREENE, TRAVELERS INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY and AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY CAROLYN M. SPROLES and husband, CHARLES B. SPROLES v. TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY OF AMERICA, UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY COMPANY and THE AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY CAROLYN M. SPROLES and husband, CHARLES B. SPROLES v. INTEGON GENERAL INSURANCE CORPORATION" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "FRYE, Justice.\nIn this appeal plaintiffs contend that the Court of Appeals erred in determining that they were not covered by underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage provided by defendant Aetna Casualty and Surety Company (Aetna) to plaintiffs\u2019 employer Lakeview Nursery and Garden Center, Inc. (Lakeview). Defendant Integon General Insurance Corporation (Integon) contends that the Court of Appeals erred in determining that Integon was obligated to pay prejudgment and postjudgment interest on $750,000, the entire amount of damages awarded to plaintiff Carolyn Sproles as a result of the negligence of defendant David Reed Greene, who is insured by defendant Integon. We conclude that the Court of Appeals was correct in its determination that plaintiffs were not covered by Lakeview\u2019s UIM coverage. We further conclude that the Court of Appeals did err in determining that Integon is liable for additional prejudgment and postjudgment interest.\nOn 27 January 1984, while returning from a business trip, plaintiffs Carolyn Sproles, Rita Phillips, and James A. Phillips, who were all employed by Lakeview, were injured in a collision with defendant David Reed Greene. Greene\u2019s automobile, a 1971 Chevrolet, ran into the rear of the 1983 GMC van in which plaintiffs were riding and caused plaintiffs\u2019 van to run off the highway and turn over several times. Sproles suffered extensive injuries from the collision which led to her permanent, total disability.\nAt the time of the accident, Greene was insured under a liability policy issued by defendant Integon. This policy had a liability limit of $25,000 per person and $50,000 per accident. The van in which plaintiffs were riding was owned by Avery County Recapping Company, Inc., rather than by their employer Lakeview. However, Lakeview had a liability insurance policy with Aetna which provided UIM coverage of $100,000.\nOn 3 June 1986, plaintiff Sproles and her husband Charles Sproles filed suit against Greene, among others, alleging that he was responsible for the accident and claiming damages for Ms. Sproles\u2019 injuries and damages for loss of consortium on behalf of Mr. Sproles. Judgment was entered on behalf of the Sproles against Greene in the amount of $750,000 for Ms. Sproles and $200,000 for Mr. Sproles. On 20 January, both Rita and James Phillips filed suit against Greene and others claiming damages for the injuries they had sustained in the accident. At the time of this appeal no judgment had been entered against defendant Greene on behalf of the Phillips.\nOn 26 January 1987, the Sproles filed a declaratory judgment action against, among others, defendant Aetna requesting adjudication of whether Ms. Sproles was covered by the UIM policy Aetna had issued to Ms. Sproles\u2019 employer Lakeview. All parties moved for summary judgment.\nOn 30 July 1987, Integon paid into the Clerk of Court the $25,000 it was liable for under the terms of Greene\u2019s policy and also paid $2,312.36 in interest. On 26 October 1987, the Sproles filed an action against Integon, Greene\u2019s insurer, claiming interest on the full amount of the judgment against Greene from the date the suit was filed until payment was tendered. Integon denied liability for interest on the entire amount, and the Sproles moved for summary judgment.\nThe actions filed by the Sproles and the Phillips were consolidated for a hearing. On 16 February 1988, Judge Lamm entered a judgment which, among other things, dismissed the Sproles\u2019 and the Phillips\u2019 claims against Aetna for UIM coverage under Lakeview\u2019s policy. The trial judge further determined that Integon was not obligated to pay prejudgment and postjudgment interest on the full amount of the Sproles\u2019 judgment against Greene or the full amount of any judgment that the Phillips might obtain against Greene. He therefore dismissed the Sproles\u2019 claims against Integon for prejudgment and postjudgment interest on the entire $750,000 judgment finding that Integon owed the Sproles nothing more.\nThe Sproles appealed the dismissal of their claims against Aetna and Integon to the Court of Appeals. The Phillips appealed the dismissal as to Aetna. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court\u2019s order dismissing the claims against Aetna but concluded that the trial court erred in its determination that Integon was not liable for prejudgment and postjudgment interest on the entire $750,000 judgment entered against Greene, Integon\u2019s insured. Sproles v. Greene, 100 N.C. App. 96, 394 S.E.2d 691 (1990). Integon and the Sproles and the Phillips filed petitions for discretionary review with this Court, and these petitions were granted on 10 January 1991.\nWe will address plaintiffs\u2019 appeal first and then address defendant Integon\u2019s appeal. Plaintiffs\u2019 appeal raises the threshold issue of whether employees of a corporation are included as named insureds when only the corporation is listed as the named insured on the automobile liability insurance policy. Plaintiffs contend that Lakeview\u2019s UIM coverage under a policy issued by defendant Aetna should cover Ms. Sproles and the Phillips as if they were named insureds because they were employees of Lakeview and were on a business trip when injured. According to plaintiffs, when the corporation is the named insured, the employees of the corporation should be treated as named insureds or as \u201cfamily\u201d of the named insured for the purposes of UIM coverage in part because a corporation cannot sustain bodily injury. Plaintiffs point out that the purpose of UIM coverage is to protect people who sustain bodily injuries from underinsured drivers and since the corporate entity is the named insured, if its employees are not also provided UIM coverage afforded to named insureds under the terms of the policy, the policy would essentially not provide any UIM coverage since the corporation cannot sustain bodily injury. To answer this issue, we must turn first to the language of the policy itself and then to the statutory language of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(3).\nAs noted earlier, Lakeview had a liability policy of automobile insurance with Aetna. The policy is labeled as a \u201cBusiness Auto Policy,\u201d and the named insured is \u201cLakeview Nursery & Garden Center, Inc.\u201d Under \u201cPart I \u2014 Words and Phrases with Special Meaning,\u201d the terms \u201cyou\u201d and \u201cyour\u201d are defined to be \u201cthe person or organization shown as the named insured in ITEM ONE of the declarations.\u201d Thus, where the word \u201cyou\u201d is found in the policy, it refers to Lakeview, and Lakeview, a corporation, is the only named insured in the policy.\nFor the purposes of UIM coverage, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(3) provides the following definition of \u201cpersons insured\u201d:\nthe named insured and, while resident of the same household, the spouse of any such named insured and relatives of either, while in a motor vehicle or otherwise, and any person who uses with the consent, expressed or implied, of the named insured, the motor vehicle to which the policy applies and a guest in such motor vehicle to which the policy applies or the personal representative of any of the above or any other person or persons in lawful possession of such motor vehicle.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(3) (1989). This section of the statute essentially\nestablishes two \u201cclasses\u201d of \u201cpersons insured\u201d: (1) the named insured and, while resident of the same household, the spouse of the named insured and relatives of either and (2) any person who uses with the consent, express or implied, of the named insured, the insured vehicle, and a guest in such vehicle.\nSmith v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 328 N.C. 139, 143, 400 S.E.2d 44, 47 (1991) (quoting Crowder v. N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 79 N.C. App. 551, 554, 340 S.E.2d 127, 129 (1986)). Thus, according to the statute, the named insured, in this case Lakeview, and the spouse and relatives of the named insured while living in the same household with the named insured are class one insureds and are covered for purposes of UIM coverage \u201cwhile in a motor vehicle or otherwise.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(3) (1989). Class one insureds have UIM coverage even if they are not in a \u201ccovered vehicle\u201d when injured. All other persons are class two insureds and are only covered while using \u201cthe motor vehicle to which the policy applies.\u201d Id.\nWe find no case law in North Carolina which addresses whether the employees of a corporation should also be treated as named insureds and thus class one insureds for the purposes of UIM coverage when only the corporation is listed as the named insured; however, this Court has previously concluded that a corporation is a legal entity which is distinct from its shareholders. Troy Lumber Co. v. Hunt, 251 N.C. 624, 112 S.E.2d 132 (1960). Likewise, a corporation is an entity which is separate from its employees. Since a corporation is a legal entity distinct from its employees and thus cannot have a \u201cspouse or other relatives,\u201d and since Lakeview the corporation is the named insured in the Aetna policy, we conclude that the plaintiffs as employees of the corporation Lakeview are not named insureds by the terms of the Aetna policy and therefore are not class one insureds under the statute for the purposes of UIM coverage.\nWhen the Minnesota Supreme Court was presented with the same argument plaintiffs present in the present case, that court concluded that the fact that the corporate entity could not sustain bodily injury does not mean that the entire UIM portion of the policy was a nullity because the UIM coverage did protect persons who were occupying an insured highway vehicle. Kaysen v. Federal Ins. Co., 268 N.W.2d 920, 924 (Minn. 1978). The court further concluded that the policy terms listing the corporation as the named insured were not ambiguous and did not include corporate officers and their spouses. Id. Since the terms of the policy were not ambiguous, the court refused to rewrite them to include the corporate officer and his wife as named insureds so that they would be covered while pedestrians and not in a vehicle covered by the policy. Id. Likewise, in the present case, the terms of the policy as to who are named insureds are not ambiguous. Although under the terms of the policy the corporation is the only named insured and thus the only class one insured and therefore the class one insured under the policy cannot sustain bodily injury, the UIM coverage of the policy does have effect because it provides protection to employees of the corporation who would receive coverage as class two insureds when they are using a vehicle which is covered under the terms of the policy. Therefore, the fact that the corporation is the named insured and the only class one insured under the terms of the UIM portion of the policy does not mean that the terms of the policy should be judicially interpreted to mandate that employees of the corporation should be treated as class one insureds. We note that if we were to hold that employees of the corporation are named insureds, then the spouses and relatives of such employees, if living in the same household, would also become class one insureds and therefore covered for UIM purposes even where the insured vehicle is not involved in the insured\u2019s injuries.\nSince plaintiffs in the present case are not class one insureds and since they were using the van with the consent of the named insured, Lakeview, plaintiffs are classified as class two insureds under the statute. Thus, in order to have UIM coverage under Lakeview\u2019s policy with Aetna, plaintiffs would have to be injured while \u201cin a motor vehicle to which the policy applies.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-179.21(b)(3) (1989). Under Item Two, which is entitled \u201cSchedule of Coverage and Covered Autos,\u201d the Aetna policy provides UIM coverage. However, under the category of \u201cCovered Autos,\u201d we find the number \u201c2\u201d and are referred to Item Three for a description of the types of automobiles covered under the UIM coverage of Lakeview\u2019s policy. Number \u201c2\u201d provides that the covered automobile is \u201cOwned Autos Only\u201d with the following explanation: \u201cOnly those autos you own .... This includes those autos whose ownership you acquire after the policy begins.\u201d Thus, the only automobiles covered under the UIM coverage in Lakeview\u2019s policy with Aetna are those automobiles owned by the named insured which in this case is the corporation Lakeview. When plaintiffs were injured, they were riding in a van which was owned by Avery County Recapping Company, Inc., and not by their employer Lakeview. Since plaintiffs are class two insureds and since class two insureds are only afforded UIM coverage under the terms of the policy when they are injured while occupying a \u201cvehicle to which the policy applies,\u201d we conclude that the Court of Appeals was correct in affirming the trial court\u2019s determination that plaintiffs are not covered by Lakeview\u2019s UIM coverage under its Aetna policy.\nWe now address defendant Integon\u2019s appeal concerning its liability for the payment of prejudgment and postjudgment interest on the full amount of the judgment against its insured, Greene. We first consider the issue of pre judgment interest. The Court of Appeals rejected the trial court\u2019s conclusion that Integon was not obligated to pay prejudgment interest on that portion of the $750,000 judgment against Greene which exceeded Integon\u2019s limit of liability under the policy. Under the policy, Greene had $25,000 in liability coverage, and Integon further agreed in the policy that, in addition to the $25,000 limit of liability, it would pay \u201call defense costs we incur.\u201d Integon contends that the Court of Appeals erred in its conclusion that prejudgment interest is a \u201cdefense cost within the meaning of the Integon policy.\u201d We agree.\nCiting to Lowe v. Tarble, 313 N.C. 460, 329 S.E.2d 648 (1985), the Court of Appeals concluded that \u201c[p]rejudgment interest, provided for by G.S. 24-5, is a \u2018cost\u2019 within the meaning of an insurance contract.\u201d Sproles v. Greene, 100 N.C. App. at 103, 394 S.E.2d at 691. However, this holding in Lowe is not applicable to the present case. In Lowe, after determining that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 24-5 does not violate due process as provided under the fourteenth amendment, this Court examined the relevant language of the policy in question in that case. Lowe v. Tarble, 313 N.C. at 461-63, 329 S.E.2d at 651. The policy at issue in Lowe provided that the insurance company would\n[p]ay all expenses incurred by the company, all costs taxed against the insured in any such suit and all interest accruing after entry of judgment until the company has paid, tendered or deposited in court such part of such judgment as does not exceed the limit of the company\u2019s liability thereon;\nId. (emphasis in the original). This Court concluded that \u201call costs\u201d included prejudgment interest. Id. at 464, 329 S.E.2d at 651.\nIn the present case, the language of the Integon policy is different from the language of the policy in Lowe. Integon\u2019s policy provides that, in addition to the policy limits, \u201cwe will pay all defense costs we incur.\u201d (Emphasis added.) The promise to pay \u201call defense costs\u201d in the Integon policy is quite different from the promise to pay \u201call costs taxed against the insured\u201d as found in the policy under consideration in Lowe. Lowe clearly decided that \u201call costs taxed against the insured\u201d as used in the policy included prejudgment interest because that is a cost taxed against the insured. However, the phrase \u201call defense costs we incur\u201d is not as broad. \u201cDefense costs\u201d refer to costs associated with the process of defending a claim such as attorney fees, deposition expenses, and court costs including such items as subpoena and witness fees. See Annot. \u201cAllocation of Defense Costs Between Primary and Excess Insurance Carriers,\u201d 19 A.L.R.4th 107 (1983). Thus, under the language of the policy in the present case, Integon has agreed to pay, in excess of its liability limits, only the costs of defense and not all costs taxed against the insured, and Lowe is not controlling. Furthermore, we find no other provision in the Integon policy in which it agrees to pay prejudgment interest in addition to its limit of liability; nor do we find any statutory provision requiring a liability insurance carrier to pay prejudgment interest in addition to its limit of liability under the policy. Therefore, we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in its conclusion that Integon was required to pay Ms. Sproles prejudgment interest on the entire amount of the judgment.\nIntegon next contends that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Integon owed postjudgment interest on Ms. Sproles\u2019 $750,000 judgment and in concluding that Integon\u2019s oral offer to pay its policy limit did not toll Integon\u2019s liability for postjudgment interest. On the day the jury verdict was returned, Integon orally offered in open court to pay its policy limit and costs to the plaintiff; however, Integon did not pay this amount into the court until thirteen days later. Integon claims that under the language of its policy, it must only pay postjudgment interest on $25,000, its limit of liability under the policy, from the time of judgment until Integon offered to pay the $25,000 on the day the verdict was returned. Thus, in this case, Integon would owe no postjudgment interest since it offered to pay the full amount of its .liability on the day the verdict was returned.\nThe supplementary payments provision of the Integon policy in question provides:\nIn addition to our limit of liability, we will pay on behalf of a covered person:\n(3) Interest accruing after a judgment is entered in any suit we defend. Our duty to pay interest ends when we offer to pay that part of the judgment which does not exceed our limit of liability for this coverage.\nThe relevant statute governing the accrual of prejudgment and postjudgment interest provides in part: .\nIn an action other than contract, the portion of money judgment designated by the fact finder as compensatory damages bears interest from the date the action is instituted until the judgment is satisfied.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 24-5 (Cum. Supp. 1990).\nThe Court of Appeals concluded that the provision in the Integon policy governing the payment of postjudgment interest \u201cconflicts with G.S. \u00a7 24-5 and is therefore without effect.\u201d Sproles v. Greene, 100 N.C. App. at 104, 394 S.E.2d at 691. The Court of Appeals further concluded that this action must be remanded and that \u201cthe costs against Greene must be retaxed to include interest on Mrs. Sproles\u2019 judgment until the date its policy limits were paid into court.\u201d Id. at 105, 394 S.E.2d at 691.\nIntegon contends that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the limitations as to the conditions under which Integon would pay interest are not enforceable because the limitations. conflict with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 24-5. We agree. As authority for its conclusion, the Court of Appeals cited Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Chantos, 293 N.C. 431, 238 S.E.2d 597 (1977). In Chantos this Court concluded, \u201c[t]he provisions of the Financial Responsibility Act are \u2018written\u2019 into every automobile liability policy as a matter of law, and, when the terms of the policy conflict with the statute, the provisions of the statute will prevail.\u201d Id. at 441, 238 S.E.2d at 604 (citations omitted). However, as Integon points out, \u00a7 24-5 is not a part of the Financial Responsibility Act. Therefore, Chantos does not provide authority for the proposition that \u00a7 24-5 must be written into every automobile liability insurance policy, and we find no authority for this proposition. Furthermore, we find no provision in the Financial Responsibility Act requiring a liability insurer to pay postjudgment interest on amounts in excess of its policy limits even though such interest may properly be taxed against the insured. When coverage provided in the policy is in addition to the mandatory statutory requirements, the additional coverage is not subject to the statutory provisions in the Financial Responsibility Act. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(g) (1989). Thus, the additional coverage is governed by the terms of the policy, and.we must look to the language of the policy to see whether Integon is obligated to pay postjudgment interest taxed against its insured.\nAs indicated above, the language of the policy provides for payment of postjudgment interest from the time judgment is entered until the time the insurance company \u201coffers to pay\u201d the part of the judgment which does not exceed its limit of liability. Thus, we must determine what is meant by the term \u201coffer to pay\u201d as it is used in context in this supplementary payments provision of a liability insurance policy. We find no cases in North Carolina which have addressed this specific issue. However, in Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bethel, 812 F.2d 412 (8th Cir. 1987) (per curiam), the court considered a provision in a policy of liability insurance which is identical to the provision in the present case. In Bethel, the insurer had made several offers to pay its policy limits before judgment and did not make a postjudgment offer to pay until five weeks after the judgment. Id. at 413. The court stated, \u201cWell before it was involuntarily required to defend its insured . . . appellee made a standing offer to pay the full policy limits. Its offers were refused through no fault of the insurer.\u201d Id. The court held that the insurer\u2019s \u201cmany good faith offers to pay the full policy limits satisfied the supplementary payments provision and precluded any obligation for postjudgment interest.\u201d Id.\nIn Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania v. Giles, 196 Ga. App. 271, 395 S.E.2d 833 (1990), the Georgia Court of Appeals was faced with the application of an identical provision. Agreeing \u201cwith the reasoning and the result reached by the court\u201d in Bethel, the Giles court concluded that the insurer\u2019s offer to pay the entire limits before judgment was effective to toll its liability for postjudgment interest. The Georgia court noted that the purpose of this \u201csupplementary payments\u201d provision in the policy \u201cis to assure that [the injured party] will quickly receive the primary amount the insurer is obligated to pay'under the policy after judgment. It does this by making it expensive for the insurer to delay.\u201d Id. at 273, 395 S.E.2d at 835. In Giles, as in Bethel, the insurer offered to pay the limit of its liability prior to the judgment, and the court concluded therefore that the \u201cdelay-preventing benefit provided for in the policy\u2019s supplementary payments section is inapplicable.\u201d Id. at 274, 395 S.E.2d at 836.\nIn the present case, the record shows that Integon, prior to judgment, made an offer to pay its policy limits conditioned on plaintiffs\u2019 release of Greene, and Integon\u2019s attorney, who was representing defendant Greene, made an unconditional offer at the end of the trial to pay the full amount of Integon\u2019s liability under its policy with Greene. We conclude that Integon\u2019s \u201coffer to pay\u201d made on the same day that the verdict was returned was sufficient, under the terms of Integon\u2019s policy with Greene, to toll Integon\u2019s responsibility for postjudgment interest even though the actual payment was not made until thirteen days later. Thus, the Court of Appeals erred in determining that Integon must pay postjudgment interest on the $750,000 judgment.\nFor the reasons stated above, we affirm the Court of Appeals as to the action involving Aetna and reverse the Court of Appeals as to the action involving Integon. We remand that portion of the action relating to the award of prejudgment and postjudgment interest to the Court of Appeals for remand to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion on the issue of prejudgment and postjudgment interest.\nAffirmed in part; reversed in part; and remanded in part.\nJustice MARTIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.\n. We note that the question before the Court is not what costs must be taxed against the defendant Greene but what costs must be paid by the insurer Integon in addition to the policy limits.", "type": "majority", "author": "FRYE, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Van Winkle, Buck, Wall, Starnes and Davis, P.A., by Roy W. Davis, Jr., and Michelle Rippon, for plaintiff appellants-appellees Sproles.", "Patla, Straus, Robinson & Moore, by Harold K. Bennett, for plaintiff-appellants Phillips.", "Roberts, Stevens & Cogburn, P.A., by Steven D. Cogburn and W. O. Brazil, III, for defendant-appellant Integon General Insurance Corporation.", "Weinstein & Sturges, P.A., by Cynthia Stakias, for defendantappellee The Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, Inc.", "Manning, Fulton & Skinner, by John B. McMillian, for National Association of Independent Insurers and North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company; Moore & Van Allen, by George M. Teague, for Insurance Guaranty Association and Alliance of American Insurers, amici curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CAROLYN M. SPROLES and husband, CHARLES B. SPROLES v. DAVID REED GREENE, TRAVELERS INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY and UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY COMPANY JAMES A. PHILLIPS and wife, RITA L. PHILLIPS v. DAVID REED GREENE, TRAVELERS INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY and AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY CAROLYN M. SPROLES and husband, CHARLES B. SPROLES v. TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY OF AMERICA, UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY COMPANY and THE AETNA CASUALTY & SURETY COMPANY CAROLYN M. SPROLES and husband, CHARLES B. SPROLES v. INTEGON GENERAL INSURANCE CORPORATION\nNo. 482PA90\n(Filed 14 August 1991)\n1. Insurance \u00a7 87.1 (NCI3d)\u2014 automobile liability insurance \u2014 employees of corporation not named insureds\nEmployees of a corporation are not included as named insureds for purposes of underinsured motorist coverage when only the corporation is listed as the named insured on an automobile liability insurance policy, since a corporation is a legal entity which is separate from its employees.\nAm Jur 2d, Automobile Insurance \u00a7\u00a7 246, 316.\n2. Insurance \u00a7 69 (NCI3d)\u2014 underinsured motorist coverage \u2014 employees injured on business trip \u2014vehicle not owned by employer \u2014no coverage\nThe Court of Appeals was correct in affirming the trial court\u2019s determination that plaintiffs were not covered by their employer\u2019s underinsured motorist coverage under its Aetna policy, since plaintiffs were class two insureds; class two insureds were afforded UIM coverage under the terms of the policy only when they were injured while occupying a \u201cvehicle to which the policy applie[d],\u201d that is, a vehicle owned by the employer; and plaintiffs in this case were injured while on company business but while in a vehicle belonging to one other than their employer.\nAm Jur 2d, Automobile Insurance \u00a7\u00a7 311, 314.\n3. Insurance \u00a7 110.1 (NCI3d) \u2014 automobile liability insurance \u2014 prejudgment interest \u2014 insurer not required to pay\nThe Court of Appeals erred in concluding that defendant liability insurer was required to pay prejudgment interest in addition to its limit of liability under the policy, since the insurer, pursuant to the language of the policy, agreed to pay only the costs of the defense, which would include attorney fees, deposition expenses, and subpoena and witness fees, but defendant did not agree to pay \u201call costs taxed against the insured\u201d which would include prejudgment interest.\nAm Jur 2d, Automobile Insurance \u00a7 428.\n4. Insurance \u00a7 110.1 (NCI3d)\u2014 automobile liability insurance \u2014 postjudgment interest on amounts in excess of policy limits \u2014 insurer not required to pay\nThe Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the provision in defendant liability insurer\u2019s policy governing the payment of postjudgment interest conflicted with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 24-5 and was therefore without effect, since that statute was not part of the Financial Responsibility Act and therefore was not \u201cwritten\u201d into the liability policy as a matter of law, and there was no provision in the Financial Responsibility Act requiring a liability insurer to pay postjudgment interest on amounts in excess of its policy limits even though such interest might properly be taxed against the insured.\nAm Jur 2d, Automobile Insurance \u00a7 428.\nLiability insurer\u2019s liability for interest and costs on excess of judgment over policy limit. 76 ALR2d 983.\n5. Insurance \u00a7 110.1 (NCI3d)\u2014 insurer\u2019s responsibility for post-judgment interest \u2014offer to pay on day verdict returned \u2014 responsibility for interest tolled\nDefendant liability insurer\u2019s \u201coffer to pay\u201d its policy limits made on the same day that the verdict was returned was sufficient under the terms of the policy to toll the insurer\u2019s responsibility for postjudgment interest even though the actual payment was not made until thirteen days later.\nAm Jur 2d, Automobile Insurance \u00a7 428.\nJustice MARTIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.\nOn discretionary review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, 100 N.C. App. 96, 394 S.E.2d 691 (1990), affirming in part and reversing in part an order entered by Lamm, J., in the Superior Court, MITCHELL County, on 5 February 1988. Heard in the Supreme Court 10 April 1991.\nVan Winkle, Buck, Wall, Starnes and Davis, P.A., by Roy W. Davis, Jr., and Michelle Rippon, for plaintiff appellants-appellees Sproles.\nPatla, Straus, Robinson & Moore, by Harold K. Bennett, for plaintiff-appellants Phillips.\nRoberts, Stevens & Cogburn, P.A., by Steven D. Cogburn and W. O. Brazil, III, for defendant-appellant Integon General Insurance Corporation.\nWeinstein & Sturges, P.A., by Cynthia Stakias, for defendantappellee The Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, Inc.\nManning, Fulton & Skinner, by John B. McMillian, for National Association of Independent Insurers and North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company; Moore & Van Allen, by George M. Teague, for Insurance Guaranty Association and Alliance of American Insurers, amici curiae." }, "file_name": "0603-01", "first_page_order": 641, "last_page_order": 653 }