{ "id": 2511838, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LEONARD BALDWIN", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Baldwin", "decision_date": "1992-01-10", "docket_number": "No. 574A90", "first_page": "446", "last_page": "465", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "330 N.C. 446" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "8 ALR3d 1236", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "89 ALR4th 456", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "257 S.E.2d 551", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 86", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568503 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0086-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 S.E.2d 144", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 196", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4708380 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0196-01" ] }, { "cite": "11 S.E. 525", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1890, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "526" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 N.C. 722", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8652082 ], "year": 1890, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "726" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/106/0722-01" ] }, { "cite": "290 S.E.2d 566", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "572" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 532", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571326 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "541" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0532-01" ] }, { "cite": "297 S.E.2d 563", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "568" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561161 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "158-59" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "378 S.E.2d 8", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "12" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 253", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2481966 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0253-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 S.E.2d 374", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "377" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 N.C. 75", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561038 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/295/0075-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 S.E.2d 70", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 N.C. 751", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8576519 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/281/0751-01" ] }, { "cite": "33 L. Ed. 2d 762", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "408 U.S. 939", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1782720, 1782785, 1782912, 1782723, 1782762, 1782831, 1782832, 1782961, 1782833, 1782865, 1782868, 1782933, 1782941, 1782835, 1782936, 1782777, 1782813 ], "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/408/0939-13", "/us/408/0939-10", "/us/408/0939-06", "/us/408/0939-16", "/us/408/0939-01", "/us/408/0939-05", "/us/408/0939-02", "/us/408/0939-08", "/us/408/0939-07", "/us/408/0939-17", "/us/408/0939-14", "/us/408/0939-15", "/us/408/0939-03", "/us/408/0939-12", "/us/408/0939-04", "/us/408/0939-11", "/us/408/0939-09" ] }, { "cite": "183 S.E.2d 671", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569338 ], "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 S.E.2d 882", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "888" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 31", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2568550 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0031-01" ] }, { "cite": "49 L. Ed. 2d 1208", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "428 U.S. 903", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6183298, 6181252, 6182756, 6183146, 6182571, 6181805, 6182223, 6181423, 6181585, 6182964, 6182388, 6181945, 6182076 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/428/0903-13", "/us/428/0903-01", "/us/428/0903-10", "/us/428/0903-12", "/us/428/0903-09", "/us/428/0903-04", "/us/428/0903-07", "/us/428/0903-02", "/us/428/0903-03", "/us/428/0903-11", "/us/428/0903-08", "/us/428/0903-05", "/us/428/0903-06" ] }, { "cite": "213 S.E.2d 238", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "244" }, { "page": "244" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 N.C. 597", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569931 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "606" }, { "page": "606" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/286/0597-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 S.E.2d 775", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "781" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 193", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4774343 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "203" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0193-01" ] }, { "cite": "257 S.E.2d 417", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "425", "parenthetical": "stating that a person \"who watches and waits in ambush for his victim is most certainly lying in wait\"" }, { "page": "425" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568643 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "147-48", "parenthetical": "stating that a person \"who watches and waits in ambush for his victim is most certainly lying in wait\"" }, { "page": "147" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0135-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 L. Ed. 2d 406", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "484 U.S. 970", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 600992, 599913, 599204, 599758 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/484/0970-03", "/us/484/0970-02", "/us/484/0970-01", "/us/484/0970-04" ] }, { "cite": "358 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4730916 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 L. Ed. 2d 155", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "390 S.E.2d 314", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "321" }, { "page": "375" }, { "page": "320" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 368", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5309751 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "377-78" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0368-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 S.E.2d 639", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 243", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2518702 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0243-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 S.E.2d 833", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4715827 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 309", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320", "parenthetical": "stating that \"an expert may not testify that a particular legal conclusion or standard has or has not been met, at least where the standard is a legal term of art which carries a specific legal meaning not readily apparent to the witness\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 599", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4715465 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "617", "parenthetical": "stating that \"an expert may not testify that a particular legal conclusion or standard has or has not been met, at least where the standard is a legal term of art which carries a specific legal meaning not readily apparent to the witness\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0599-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 S.E.2d 679", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "683" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 452", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4729285 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "459-60" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0452-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 55", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "59" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 749", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4718276 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "756" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0749-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 S.E.2d 783", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "789" }, { "page": "789" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 30", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4738200 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "41" }, { "page": "41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0030-01" ] }, { "cite": "494 U.S. 433", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 4898 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/494/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 S.E.2d 426", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 N.C. 31", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2497152 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "38" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/327/0031-01" ] }, { "cite": "342 S.E.2d 855", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "856" }, { "page": "856" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 523", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4697700 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "524" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0523-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1432, "char_count": 46158, "ocr_confidence": 0.759, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.240525087041859e-07, "percentile": 0.8682859502619651 }, "sha256": "101b2fc4f3ac1e42fdaf3e89ad82affacaf51aa8dcaefd7060ebd3d794febf4b", "simhash": "1:b76ac801367b98fa", "word_count": 7437 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:55:04.423674+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LEONARD BALDWIN" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MEYER, Justice.\nDefendant was indicted for the murder and conspiracy to commit the murder of Roosevelt Bates and was tried capitally at the 23 July 1990 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Mecklenburg County. The jury returned verdicts finding defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit murder and first-degree murder on the theories of premeditated and deliberated murder and murder perpetrated by lying in wait. Following a sentencing proceeding conducted pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000, the jury determined that the sixteen mitigating circumstances found were sufficient to outweigh the one aggravating circumstance found and accordingly recommended a sentence of life imprisonment. The trial court, following the recommendation of the jury, sentenced defendant to life imprisonment for the murder of Bates and imposed a consecutive sentence of ten years\u2019 imprisonment for the conspiracy conviction.\nOn appeal, defendant brings forward numerous assignments of error. After a thorough review of the transcript of the proceedings, record on appeal, briefs, and oral arguments, we conclude that defendant received a fair trial free of prejudicial error, and we therefore affirm his convictions and sentences.\nThe evidence presented by the State at trial tended to show that Roosevelt Bates was the victim of a contract killing \u2014 that he was killed by defendant for money at the behest of the victim\u2019s girlfriend, Doretha Weathers, and pursuant to a plan devised by defendant and Weathers. According to the State\u2019s evidence, defendant was approached by his friend, Darwin Mobley, on 3 August 1989. Mobley said that he knew a woman who wanted defendant \u201cto do something for her.\u201d Defendant agreed to go with Mobley to see the woman, and the two went to an apartment shared by Weathers and Bates. Weathers told defendant her name was Doretha and asked defendant if he would kill someone for $2,000. Defendant asked \u201cwho,\u201d and Weathers replied that she wanted her boyfriend killed. Defendant told Weathers that he would have to think about it and that he would \u201cget back up with her.\u201d Defendant and Mobley then left. Mobley asked defendant if he was going to do it, and defendant replied, \u201cI\u2019ll think about it.\u201d\nAt approximately 7:30 or 8:00 p.m. that evening, defendant was awakened at his home by Mobley. Mobley told defendant that a gun could be obtained from Jay Jones. Defendant and Mobley then walked toward Jones\u2019 house. Jones met them and said that he had only one bullet. Mobley asked Baldwin if he could do it with one bullet, and defendant said \u201cNo.\u201d Defendant, Mobley, and Jones then proceeded to Jones\u2019 house where Jones retrieved a .357 magnum, and the three then walked back to Mobley\u2019s home. They remained at Mobley\u2019s apartment until approximately 9:30 p.m. when they walked outside to watch a fight in the parking lot. Mobley left and returned a short time later with three bullets. Mobley took the gun, which already had one bullet in it, loaded three more bullets into the gun, and handed it to defendant.\nAt 9:55 p.m., defendant, carrying the loaded gun, walked with Mobley and Jones to Weathers\u2019 apartment. Defendant told Weathers that he had never shot anyone before. Weathers responded, \u201cDon\u2019t worry, this is my third person I\u2019ve done like this. . . . Third Boyfriend.\u201d Defendant and Weathers then walked into the apartment. Weathers escorted defendant to a bedroom, opened the closet door, and told defendant to get into the closet. Weathers told defendant that she would tell her boyfriend to get the sewing machine out of the closet and that when he came, defendant should shoot him. Defendant stepped into the closet and stood waiting, with his arms extended, pointing the gun at the closet door. About thirty seconds later, the bedroom light was turned on. The closet doors opened, and defendant saw Bates. Defendant aimed the gun and fired three shots, killing Bates. Weathers then rushed into the room and told defendant that he should leave and that she would pay him the next day.\nAfter the shooting, defendant hid the gun in the woods and walked to Mobley\u2019s apartment. He told Mobley that he had shot the man and that he was going to turn himself in. Mobley told defendant that it would be \u201cdumb\u201d to do that and suggested that defendant go home. After defendant returned home, Jones came to defendant\u2019s house looking for the gun. Defendant retrieved the gun from the woods and handed it to Jones. At Jones\u2019 request, defendant gave Jones some alcohol which Jones used to clean the gun.\nThe next day, defendant went with Jones to Mobley\u2019s apartment. Mobley left and returned with a bag containing approximately $1,500.00. Mobley reached into the bag, handed defendant $300.00, and told defendant that Weathers would pay him the rest of the money later.\nOn 23 August 1989, defendant was arrested and questioned about the shooting. Initially, defendant denied any knowledge of the shooting and claimed that he had been across town at the time of the shooting. In response to being told that he had been implicated in the shooting, defendant stated, \u201cOkay, I\u2019ll tell you about it.\u201d\nDefendant then gave a statement, which was reduced to written form and signed by defendant, detailing the events of 3 August 1989. This statement was admitted into evidence at defendant\u2019s trial and, together with an out-of-court identification made by Weathers, served as the State\u2019s primary evidence against defendant.\nOther evidence presented by the State included testimony concerning the investigation of the Bates\u2019 shooting. According to the testimony of two police officers, Bates\u2019 body was discovered lying face forward in the closet of a bedroom in his home. His \u201cleft arm was bent slightly near the upper portion of his body. His right arm was extended up and above his head into the closet area.\u201d A search of the victim\u2019s pockets revealed approximately $1,000.00 in cash, and in his right front pants pocket a small caliber pistol was found \u201cdown deep in the pocket\u201d with the money on top. An autopsy of Bates\u2019 body established that he died as a result of two gunshot wounds to the upper left chest. One additional bullet was removed from the ceiling of the bedroom in which Bates\u2019 body was found.\nA firearms examiner testified that he test-fired a .357 magnum that the police recovered from Jones. He stated that the trigger pull on the .357 magnum was normal \u2014 it was not a \u201chair trigger.\u201d He further testified that the two bullets recovered from Bates\u2019 body were of a different manufacture from the bullet recovered from the ceiling but all three had been fired by the .357 magnum obtained from Jones.\nThroughout the trial, defense counsel proceeded on the theory that defendant was mentally incapable of planning and executing a plan of murder. Dr. Daniel Biber, an expert in psychological evaluations and testing, testified that he had performed a psychological evaluation of defendant in July 1990. Dr. Biber testified that his evaluation of defendant revealed that defendant thinks very concretely; that due to his inability to think things out, defendant is intellectually unable to plan future courses of behavior or evaluate alternatives; that defendant tends to take direction from others and is easily led by and dependent upon others; and that defendant is \u201ceasily lead [sic] in an interview\u201d and may when making a statement or answer give an incomplete response.\nDefendant testified that Mobley , asked defendant if he would \u201ckill somebody for $40,000.00\u201d but that he never agreed to kill anyone. Defendant claimed that he went to the home of Bates and Weathers because he was scared that Weathers would have him killed. Defendant testified, \u201c[Jones] told me that if I didn\u2019t kill the guy that Ms. Weathers would have somebody to kill me.\u201d Defendant also stated that on the day of the shooting \u201cthis boy named Donald Young approached me and put a small revolver to my side and pulled the trigger twice. . . . That made me think that that Lady was serious about having me killed if I didn\u2019t kill Mr. Bates.\u201d\nIn order to corroborate defendant\u2019s testimony of the alleged threat by Young, defense counsel also presented testimony of Mobley. Mobley testified that he saw Young threaten defendant by pointing a gun at him. However, on cross-examination, Mobley further stated that at the time of the threat, Young \u201csaid something about [defendant] messing with [Young\u2019s] nephews and talking about [Young].\u201d This was the only evidence presented to explain Young\u2019s action and it in no way connected the threat made by Young to Weathers.\nDefendant further testified that Weathers led him into the closet and told him \u201cto stand in the closet until the bedroom light come [sic] on and that, would be him and for me to shoot him.\u201d Defendant testified that he was scared and that when the door opened he was surprised. Up until that moment, defendant stated, he had not known whom he was supposed to shoot. When he saw Bates, he recognized him and did not intend to shoot him. Defendant also claimed that he saw a gun handle sticking out of Bates\u2019 pocket and that he fired two shots as Bates reached for the gun in his pocket.\nBased on testimony elicited from defendant, Dr. Biber, and other witnesses, defense counsel argued to the jury that defendant was a \u201cpawn\u201d in a conspiracy to kill Bates; that he never agreed to and never intended to kill Bates; that he feared for his life; that he was scared to tell Weathers that he would not kill Bates; and that when the closet door opened defendant wanted out of the closet and did not know how to get out, that his act of shooting was a simple reaction \u201cto what he believed was an imminent threat of danger to himself.\u201d\nI.\nDefendant first contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to prohibit the State from seeking the death penalty. Defendant argues that North Carolina\u2019s capital sentencing pattern jury instructions, which authorize consideration of mitigating circumstances found by one or more jurors, deprive criminal defendants of the right to a unanimous jury verdict as required by Article I, Section 24 of the North Carolina Constitution. We disagree.\nArticle I, Section 24 provides that \u201c[n]o person shall be convicted of any crime but by the unanimous verdict of a jury in open court.\u201d (Emphasis added.) This section, as its plain language states, applies to the determination of a defendant\u2019s guilt of the crime charged. A defendant cannot be convicted except upon a unanimous jury verdict \u201cas to every essential element of the crime charged.\u201d State v. Denning, 316 N.C. 523, 524, 342 S.E.2d 855, 856 (1986).\nNever has this Court construed Article I, Section 24 or any other provision of the North Carolina Constitution as requiring that a defendant\u2019s sentence be based upon a unanimous recommendation of a jury. In fact, we expressly rejected this claim in State v. Denning, 316 N.C. 523, 342 S.E.2d 855. In Denning, the defendant, convicted of driving while impaired, contended that a trial judge\u2019s consideration of prior convictions as aggravating factors violated his constitutional right to a trial by jury. We disagreed, holding that aggravating factors are not elements of the offense charged and that \u201ctheir consideration for purposes of sentencing is . . . not susceptible to constitutional challenge based upon either the sixth amendment right to a jury trial or article I, section 24 of the North Carolina Constitution.\u201d Id. at 524, 342 S.E.2d at 856.\nOur opinion in State v. McKoy, 327 N.C. 31, 394 S.E.2d 426 (1990), also demonstrates that our Constitution does not require that mitigating circumstances be unanimously found by the jury. In McKoy, we were faced with the question of whether North Carolina\u2019s capital sentencing statute was invalidated by the United States Supreme Court\u2019s decision in McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 108 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1990). McKoy argued that the unanimity instructions held unconstitutional in McKoy v. North Carolina were required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000. After analyzing our prior opinions, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000, and Article I, Section 24 of our Constitution, we concluded that North Carolina\u2019s prior instructions, which required a unanimous finding of mitigating circumstances, were judicially approved based on \u201cthe interest of \u2018consistency and fairness\u2019 \u201d and were not constitutionally or statutorily required. State v. McKoy, 327 N.C. at 38, 394 S.E.2d at 430.\nMoreover, even assuming arguendo that Article I, Section 24 requires that a jury\u2019s sentencing recommendation be supported by unanimous findings of mitigating circumstances, we fail to see how defendant suffered any prejudice as a result of the denial of his motion to prohibit the State from seeking the death penalty. Defendant was tried and convicted of first-degree murder. Although tried capitally, defendant was not sentenced to death but received a sentence of life imprisonment upon the jury\u2019s recommendation. Had defendant been tried noncapitally and convicted of first-degree murder, he nevertheless would have received a sentence of life imprisonment. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-17 (Supp. 1991). Therefore, even assuming error arguendo and further that it was of constitutional magnitude under the North Carolina Constitution, any such error was harmless under the particular facts of this case.\nII.\nDefendant also assigns as error several rulings made by the trial court concerning testimony that defense counsel sought to elicit from defendant\u2019s expert psychologist, Dr. Daniel Biber. After Dr. Biber was tendered and accepted as an expert in psychological evaluations and testing, defense counsel sought to question Dr. Biber as to his opinion of defendant\u2019s state of mind at the time of the killing. The court held a voir dire during which Dr. Biber testified that he had personally interviewed defendant on three occasions and that during the interviews, defendant recounted the sequence of events surrounding the shooting. Dr. Biber further indicated that it was his opinion that the confession given by defendant to the police was inaccurate and that defendant shot the victim out of fear and in an attempt to protect himself from the victim.\nBased upon Dr. Biber\u2019s voir dire testimony, the trial court found as facts that Dr. Biber was retained by defense counsel to make a psychological diagnosis of defendant \u201cin three areas, a) intellectual ability, b) problem solving ability, and c) Defendant\u2019s pattern of relating to people (i.e., was he a leader or a follower).\u201d The court ordered that Dr. Biber could testify as to his opinion concerning defendant\u2019s intellectual ability, problem-solving ability, and pattern of relating to other people and could state that his opinions, conclusions, and diagnoses were based on interviews with defendant. The court further ordered, however, that Dr. Biber could not testify concerning the substance of \u201cany self-serving, exculpatory statements made to him by the Defendant during [the] interviews\u201d \u201cunless or until the Defendant has testified in this matter with regards to matters related to those statements made to the Doctor.\u201d\nDefendant first argues that the trial court erred in prohibiting defendant\u2019s psychologist from testifying concerning the statements made by defendant during his interviews with the psychologist. Defendant apparently asserts that defendant\u2019s hearsay statements were the facts or data underlying the expert\u2019s opinion testimony and were therefore admissible under N.C. R. Evid. 705. We find no merit in defendant\u2019s argument.\nRule 705 does not, as defendant contends, make the bases for an expert\u2019s opinion automatically admissible. This rule, entitled \u201cDisclosure of facts or data underlying expert opinion,\u201d merely provides:\nThe expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give his reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless an adverse party requests otherwise, in which event the expert will be required to disclose such underlying facts or data on direct examination or voir dire before stating the opinion. The expert may in any event he required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination. There shall be no requirement that expert testimony be in response to a hypothetical question.\nN.C. R. Evid. 705 (emphasis added). As noted in the official commentary, the primary purpose of this rule was to enable an \u201cexpert to give his opinion without prior disclosure of the underlying facts unless an adverse party requests otherwise.\u201d N.C. R. Evid. 705 official commentary. Only if an adverse party requests disclosure must the trial court require the expert to disclose the underlying facts of his opinion. Rule 611 vests the trial court with authority to \u201cexercise reasonable control over the mode and order\u201d of interrogation and presentation of the evidence. N.C. R. Evid. 611. Whether or not to exclude relevant but prejudicial evidence is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Penley, 318 N.C. 30, 41, 347 S.E.2d 783, 789 (1986); see N.C. R. Evid. 403. Such a decision \u201c \u2018may be reversed for abuse of discretion only upon a showing that [the trial court\u2019s] ruling was manifestly unsupported by reason and could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u2019 \u201d Penley, 318 N.C. at 41, 347 S.E.2d at 789 (quoting State v. Riddick, 315 N.C. 749, 756, 340 S.E.2d 55, 59 (1986)).\nWe find that the trial court\u2019s decision to exclude the evidence of defendant\u2019s hearsay statements was amply supported by reason and constituted a proper exercise of the trial court\u2019s discretion. As noted by the trial court, the statements made by defendant to his psychologist were self-serving, exculpatory statements raising matters relating to several defenses, including self-defense, coercion, intimidation, and duress. At the time that defendant sought to elicit this information from his psychologist, there had been no evidence presented to establish any of these defenses. The court determined that the hearsay statements would be probative for the purpose of \u201cshowing how the Psychologist formed his opinion\u201d and properly weighed the probative value against the prejudicial effect of defendant\u2019s statements. The court determined that \u201cthe probative value of [defendant\u2019s statements] is substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect of such statements in that they raise issues likely to confuse the Jury and are not reasonably necessary for an explanation by the Physician of the basis for his conclusions relating to the three areas of his investigation.\u201d After considering the alternative of giving a limiting instruction, the court concluded that \u201cany limiting instruction by the Court to the Jury concerning such matters cannot reasonably be expected to exclude such matters from the Jury\u2019s deliberation of the issues in this case.\u201d Given that defendant had not yet produced any substantive evidence concerning the matters raised in his statement, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the evidence due to possible juror confusion. See N.C. R. Evid. 403 (vesting the trial court with discretion to exclude evidence \u201cif its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury\u201d).\nWe further reject defendant\u2019s argument that this ruling \u201cforced the defense to put the defendant on the stand to justify the expert conclusions of the psychologist.\u201d The trial court\u2019s ruling expressly permitted defendant\u2019s psychologist to testify concerning his evaluation of defendant and the opinions and conclusions reached as a result of the evaluation. With the exception of the substance of defendant\u2019s hearsay statements, the psychologist was further permitted to testify concerning the facts and data upon which he relied in making his determinations. The substance of defendant\u2019s statements was not necessary to explain the psychologist\u2019s testimony, and therefore the exclusion of this hearsay evidence could not have forced defendant to take the stand to support the expert\u2019s conclusions.\nDefendant further argues that the exclusion of defendant\u2019s statements to his psychologist \u201cprecluded the defense from using an expert witness in psychological testing and evaluation to show that the defendant\u2019s confession was grossly incomplete by virtue of his limited and impaired intellectual functioning.\u201d We disagree. The record in this case quite clearly shows that the trial court permitted defense counsel to question the psychologist concerning' his determinations of defendant\u2019s intellectual ability, problem-solving abilities, and pattern of relationships. The trial court\u2019s ruling merely prohibited the expert from disclosing the substance of defendant\u2019s hearsay statements and from giving an opinion as to the validity or completeness of defendant\u2019s confession.\nAs noted above, the trial court properly exercised the discretion afforded it under Rule 403 when it refused to permit the psychologist to testify to the substance of defendant\u2019s hearsay statements.\nWith regard to the trial court\u2019s exclusion of the proffered expert opinion that defendant\u2019s confession was \u201cgrossly incomplete,\u201d we find no error. \u201cAlthough an expert\u2019s opinion testimony is not objectionable merely because it embraces an ultimate issue, it must be of assistance to the trier of fact in order to be admissible.\u201d State v. Jackson, 320 N.C. 452, 459-60, 358 S.E.2d 679, 683 (1987); see also 1 Henry Brandis, Jr., Brandis on North Carolina Evidence \u00a7 126 (3d ed. 1988). Where an expert\u2019s opinion testimony concerns matters with which the expert has no special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, the opinion would not be of assistance to the trier of fact, and the evidence is properly excluded. See State v. Jackson, 320 N.C. 452, 358 S.E.2d 679. The jurors in this case heard the evidence concerning defendant\u2019s alleged inability to give complete statements or answers, and they were in as good a position as Dr. Biber to determine whether defendant\u2019s confession to the police was \u201cgrossly incomplete.\u201d\nIn the case sub judice, the record reveals that the trial court properly limited the psychologist\u2019s testimony to the subjects of his psychological evaluation of defendant. The trial court did not preclude defendant from presenting evidence that defendant\u2019s statement to the police was inaccurate or incomplete. The record shows that the trial court ruled that the psychologist would not be permitted \u201cto testify to his opinion as to the validity of any confession or whether that confession contains all the things that he thinks ought to be.in it or not.\u201d From this portion of the transcript, it becomes apparent that the trial court\u2019s ruling merely prohibited the psychologist from giving an opinion as to the legal validity of defendant\u2019s confession. This ruling was a correct application of our well-established rule prohibiting expert opinion testimony concerning matters that require legal interpretations. See State v. Ledford, 315 N.C. 599, 617, 340 S.E.2d 309, 320 (1986) (stating that \u201can expert may not testify that a particular legal conclusion or standard has or has not been met, at least where the standard is a legal term of art which carries a specific legal meaning not readily apparent to the witness\u201d); State v. Smith, 315 N.C. 76, 337 S.E.2d 833 (1985).\nMoreover, although limited to the subject matter of his evaluation, the psychologist was permitted to relate extensive findings from which the jury could have inferred that defendant\u2019s confession was incomplete, inaccurate, or invalid. Following the trial court\u2019s ruling, the psychologist testified that he had administered tests to determine defendant\u2019s IQ; that on the verbal IQ test, which measures a person\u2019s ability to respond orally to questions, defendant obtained a rating of 84, within the sixteenth percentile; that the testing revealed that defendant\u2019s \u201coverall IQ was an 80,\u201d or within the ninth percentile; and that defendant\u2019s IQ level was characterized as \u201cdull normal intelligence\u201d or \u201cborderline retardation.\u201d The psychologist further testified that his evaluation of defendant revealed that defendant\u2019s limited intellectual abilities inhibited his ability to respond to questioning:\nPefendant] can in a situation like giving information fail to mention stuff that might be germane either because he hasn\u2019t thought of it at the moment or it hasn\u2019t been triggered. He is easily lead [sic] in an interview. . . .\n... It is very possible that a statement he would give or answers he would give would be incomplete.\nAlthough this evidence was elicited following defendant\u2019s testimony, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the trial court conditioned the admissibility of this testimony on defendant\u2019s testifying. We conclude that the trial court did not err in excluding Dr. Biber\u2019s proposed testimony as to the completeness or validity of defendant\u2019s confession.\nDefendant further argues that the trial court erred in refusing to permit the psychologist to give an opinion as to defendant\u2019s state of mind at the time of the shooting. We agree with defendant that expert opinion testimony concerning a defendant\u2019s state of mind is admissible to negate the first-degree murder elements of premeditation and deliberation. See State v. Shank, 322 N.C. 243, 367 S.E.2d 639 (1988). However, we conclude that defendant has failed to establish that the trial court\u2019s ruling constituted prejudicial error.\nThe record in this case reveals three instances where defendant sought to elicit from the psychologist testimony concerning defendant\u2019s state of mind at the time of the shooting. On the first occasion, the psychologist responded that defendant told him \u201c[h]e was fearful, scared for his life at that moment.\u201d The trial court sustained the State\u2019s objection to this question and instructed the jury to disregard the psychologist\u2019s response. On the two other occasions that defense counsel attempted to offer evidence of defendant\u2019s state of mind, the trial court sustained the State\u2019s objections prior to the psychologist\u2019s response. At no point did defense counsel seek to make an offer of proof to preserve the substance of the excluded testimony.\nAfter examining the record as a whole, we conclude that defendant has failed to show that the trial court\u2019s ruling precluded him from presenting evidence of his state of mind. In support of defendant\u2019s theory that he \u201cdid not have the ability to plan\u201d the murder, the psychologist testified on direct examination that defendant is unable to \u201cinitiate significant action on his own. He is likely to be very . . . group dependent .... In other words, it is very easy for him to be swept along in group behavior.\u201d In addition, Dr. Biber testified that it was his opinion \u201cthat [defendant] was incapable of functioning independently in planning\u201d or carrying out a plan of murder.\nFurthermore, the record reveals that the psychologist testified concerning defendant\u2019s state of mind prior to and at the time of the shooting. Dr. Biber testified that defendant stated that prior to going into the victim\u2019s apartment, someone put a gun in his side; that defendant perceived this as a warning and feared \u201cthat if he did not go through with [the killing] that he himself would become [the] victim.\u201d Based on statements made, by defendant, the psychologist was also allowed to testify that immediately before the shooting, defendant saw the victim, who was a \u201cbig black man\u201d weighing approximately three hundred pounds; that defendant and the victim stared at each other for a moment; that defendant thought the victim was reaching for a weapon; and that defendant shot in order \u201cto get away, not to kill.\u201d In light of the state of mind evidence presented and due to defendant\u2019s failure to make an offer of proof showing that he was precluded from presenting additional evidence of his state of mind, we are unable to conclude that the trial court\u2019s ruling constituted prejudicial error. We therefore overrule this assignment of error.\nIII.\nIn his next assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the defense of voluntary intoxication. Because defendant was convicted of first-degree murder by premeditation and deliberation and first-degree murder perpetrated by lying in wait, we address the applicability of this defense as to each crime.\nA.\nDefendant argues that the defense of intoxication is relevant to a charge of first-degree murder perpetrated by lying in wait because it negates any intent to kill and intent to lie in wait. However, we have previously held \u201cthat a specific intent to kill is not an element of the crime of first-degree murder by lying in wait\u201d and that evidence of intoxication is not relevant in this regard. State v. Leroux, 326 N.C. 368, 377-78, 390 S.E.2d 314, 321, cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 L. Ed. 2d 155 (1990); see also State v. Brown, 320 N.C. 179, 358 S.E.2d 1, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 970, 98 L. Ed. 2d 406 (1987). We further reject defendant\u2019s argument that murder by lying in wait requires an intent to lie in wait that may be negated by a showing of voluntary intoxication. As demonstrated by our prior opinions, lying in wait is a physical act. State v. Allison, 298 N.C. 135, 147-48, 257 S.E.2d 417, 425 (1979) (stating that a person \u201cwho watches and waits in ambush for his victim is most certainly lying in wait\u201d); see, e.g., State v. Leroux, 326 N.C. 368, 390 S.E.2d 314 (sneaking around a dark golf course constitutes lying in wait); State v. Brown, 320 N.C. 179, 358 S.E.2d 1 (waiting outside window for victim to bend down constitutes lying in wait). Like poison, imprisonment, starving, and torture \u2014 the other physical acts specified in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-17 \u2014 lying in wait is a method employed to kill. State v. Johnson, 317 N.C. 193, 203, 344 S.E.2d 775, 781 (1986). It does not require a finding of any specific intent. Because voluntary intoxication may only be considered as a defense to specific intent crimes, State v. McLaughlin, 286 N.C. 597, 606, 213 S.E.2d 238, 244 (1975), sentence vacated, 428 U.S. 903, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1208 (1976), it is therefore irrelevant to a charge of first-degree murder by lying in wait, a crime that does not require a finding of specific intent.\nB.\nIt is well established that \u201cspecific intent to kill is a necessary constituent of the elements of premeditation and deliberation in first degree murder, and a showing of legal intoxication to the jury\u2019s satisfaction will mitigate the offense to murder in the second degree.\u201d McLaughlin, 286 N.C. at 606, 213 S.E.2d at 244. However, it is equally well established that an instruction on voluntary intoxication is not required in every case in which a defendant claims that he killed a person after consuming intoxicating beverages or controlled substances. See, e.g., State v. Strickland, 321 N.C. 31, 361 S.E.2d 882 (1987); State v. McLaughlin, 286 N.C. 597, 213 S.E.2d 238; State v. Doss, 279 N.C. 413, 183 S.E.2d 671 (1971), sentence vacated, 408 U.S. 939, 33 L. Ed. 2d 762, on remand, 281 N.C. 751, 191 S.E.2d 70 (1972). In order to support a defense of voluntary intoxication, substantial evidence must be presented to show that at the time of the killing the defendant was so intoxicated that he was \u201c \u2018utterly incapable of forming a deliberate and premeditated purpose to kill.\u2019 \u201d Strickland, 321 N.C. at 41, 361 S.E.2d at 888 (quoting State v. Medley, 295 N.C. 75, 79, 243 S.E.2d 374, 377 (1978)). In the absence of evidence of intoxication to this degree, the court is not required to charge the jury on the defense of voluntary intoxication. Id.\nThe State asserts that defendant did not produce sufficient evidence to support an instruction on voluntary intoxication. We agree. At no point during the trial did defense counsel introduce or seek to introduce any evidence to establish that defendant was so intoxicated that he was unable to form the intent necessary to commit first-degree premeditated and deliberated murder. The only evidence concerning defendant\u2019s alcohol and drug consumption was elicited from defendant on cross-examination by the State. This evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to defendant, shows only that at some time during the afternoon on 3 August 1989, defendant went to a neighbor\u2019s house, drank \u201cabout five or six\u201d beers, and smoked marijuana and cocaine with three of his friends. When further questioned by the prosecutor, defendant stated that he had no idea how much marijuana or cocaine he had smoked that day. It was apparently after this that defendant and Mobley walked to Jones\u2019 house, obtained a .357 magnum and one bullet from Jones, and walked back to Mobley\u2019s house. Defendant testified that he (and apparently Jones) \u201csat in [Mobley\u2019s] house for a long period of time and [Mobley] went to get some more bullets.\u201d It was not until 10:00 p.m. that evening that the shooting occurred. When questioned concerning his state of intoxication at the time he entered the victim\u2019s home, defendant replied, \u201cI wasn\u2019t high. I was coming down off of it.\u201d\nWe conclude that the evidence presented in this case \u2014 that defendant drank \u201cabout five or six\u201d beers and consumed an indeterminate amount of marijuana and cocaine at some time earlier in the day \u2014 was insufficient to show that defendant was so intoxicated that he was incapable of forming the intent necessary to commit first-degree premeditated and deliberated murder. We therefore overrule this assignment of error.\nIV.\nNext, defendant contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on first-degree murder perpetrated by lying in wait. Defendant argues that murder by lying in wait \u201cpresupposes premeditation and deliberation\u201d and a \u201cspecific intent to kill or commit some grave bodily injury,\u201d neither of which were supported by the evidence presented at defendant\u2019s trial.\nIn State v. Leroux, 326 N.C. 368, 390 S.E.2d 314, we expressly rejected this argument and concluded that \u201c[premeditation and deliberation are not elements of the crime of first-degree murder perpetrated by means of lying in wait, nor is a specific intent to kill.\u201d Id. at 375, 390 S.E.2d at 320. \u201cMurder perpetrated by lying in wait \u2018refers to a killing where the assassin has stationed himself or is lying in ambush for a private attack upon his victim.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting State v. Allison, 298 N.C. 135, 147, 257 S.E.2d 417, 425).\nThe circumstances of this case fall within the definition of murder perpetrated by lying in wait. The evidence presented at trial showed that defendant armed himself with a .357 magnum, went to the victim\u2019s home, and hid in a closet within the victim\u2019s bedroom. When the victim opened the closet door, defendant fired three shots and killed the victim. This evidence was sufficient to convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of murder perpetrated by lying in wait. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on this charge.\nV.\nFinally, defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on imperfect self-defense. In support of his contention, defendant asserts that the evidence shows that he went to the victim\u2019s home out of fear that the victim\u2019s girlfriend would have him killed if he did not kill the victim and that he shot the victim, not to kill him but because he feared the victim.\nAs noted in State v. Norman, 324 N.C. 253, 378 S.E.2d 8 (1989):\nOur law . . . recognizes an imperfect right of self-defense in certain circumstances, including, for example, when the defendant is the initial aggressor, but without intent to kill or to seriously injure the decedent, and the decedent escalates the confrontation to a point where it reasonably appears to the defendant to be necessary to kill the decedent to save [himself] from imminent death or great bodily harm.\nId. at 259, 378 S.E.2d at 12. A defendant is entitled to an instruction on imperfect self-defense if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to him, shows that (1) he instigated the confrontation without murderous intent; (2) he believed it was necessary to kill his adversary in order to save himself from death or great bodily harm; and (3) \u201cdefendant\u2019s belief was reasonable in that the circumstances as they appeared to him at the time were sufficient to create such a belief in the mind of a person of ordinary firmness.\u201d State v. Bush, 307 N.C. 152, 158-59, 297 S.E.2d 563, 568 (1982).\nApplying the foregoing principles of law to the present case, we find that the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to defendant, does not entitle defendant to an instruction on imperfect self-defense. The uncontradicted evidence shows that the events leading to the shooting were initiated by defendant with murderous intent. By his own testimony, defendant admitted that he armed himself, went to the victim\u2019s house, and hid in the closet for the purpose of killing the victim. Upon cross-examination, defendant testified that he received $300.00 for the killing and that he was supposed to have received $40,000. Defendant\u2019s argument that he decided to kill the victim because he feared he would be killed by the victim\u2019s girlfriend is of no avail. At best, this evidence supports a finding of duress or coercion, neither of which justify or excuse the intentional killing of another. See State v. Brock, 305 N.C. 532, 541, 290 S.E.2d 566, 572 (1982) (\u201c \u2018[T]hough a man may be violently assaulted, and hath no other possible means of escaping death but by killing an innocent person, this fear and force shall not acquit him of murder, for he ought rather to die himself than escape by the murder of an innocent.\u2019 \u201d (quoting State v. Dowell, 106 N.C. 722, 726, 11 S.E. 525, 526 (1890))).\nWe conclude that defendant received a fair trial, free of prejudicial error.\nNo error.\n. In State v. Kirkley, 308 N.C. 196, 302 S.E.2d 144 (1983), we stated that \u201ca verdict of death in a capital case must be by unanimous vote of the twelve jurors.\u201d Id. at 218, 302 S.E.2d at 156 (citing State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. 86, 257 S.E.2d 551 (1979)). We note, however, that our holding in Cherry and our subsequent statement in Kirkley concerned the sentencing procedure established by the legislature in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000. Neither of these cases in any way intimated that the unanimity required in a jury\u2019s sentencing recommendation is constitutionally mandated.\n. Because we conclude that defendant has failed to show that he was precluded from presenting any state of mind evidence in defense of the charge of first-degree premeditated and deliberated murder, we do not address the question of whether the trial court\u2019s ruling should be deemed harmless as a result of defendant\u2019s conviction of first-degree murder perpetrated by lying in wait.", "type": "majority", "author": "MEYER, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by Tiare B. Smiley, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.", "Jean B. Lawson for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LEONARD BALDWIN\nNo. 574A90\n(Filed 10 January 1992)\n1. Criminal Law \u00a7 1352 (NCI4th)\u2014 capital sentencing \u2014 mitigating circumstances \u2014 state constitution \u2014 right to unanimous verdict\nA murder defendant did not suffer any prejudice as a result of the denial of his motion-to prohibit the State from seeking the death penalty where defendant was tried capitally but received a sentence of life imprisonment upon the jury\u2019s recommendation. Although defendant contended that North Carolina\u2019s capital sentencing pattern jury instructions, which authorize consideration of mitigating circumstances found by one or more jurors, deprive criminal defendants of the right to a unanimous jury verdict, neither article I, section 24 nor any other provision of the North Carolina Constitution requires that a defendant\u2019s sentence be based upon a unanimous recommendation of a jury.\nAm Jur 2d, Criminal Law \u00a7\u00a7 598-600; Homicide \u00a7 548; Trial \u00a7\u00a7 1754, 1760.\n2. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 90 (NCI4th)\u2014 defendant\u2019s statements to psychologist \u2014 basis of opinion \u2014prejudicial effect \u2014excluded\nThe trial court did not err in a murder prosecution by prohibiting defendant\u2019s psychologist from testifying concerning the statements made by defendant during his interviews with the psychologist. Although defendant contended that defendant\u2019s hearsay statements were admissible as the facts or data underlying the expert\u2019s opinion testimony, the trial court determined that the probative value of defendant\u2019s statements was substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect of such statements. Given that defendant had .-not yet produced any substantive evidence concerning the matters raised in his statement, it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the evidence due to possible juror confusion.\nAm Jur 2d, Expert and Opinion Evidence \u00a7\u00a7 228-230, 240.\nAdmissibility of testimony of expert, as to basis of his opinion, to matters otherwise excludable as hearsay \u2014 state cases. 89 ALR4th 456.\n3. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 2174 (NCI4th) \u2014 defendant\u2019s statements to psychologist \u2014 excluded basis of opinion \u2014 defendant not forced to testify\nA defendant in a murder prosecution was not forced to testify by the exclusion of statements made by defendant to the psychologist because the psychologist was permitted to testify concerning his evaluation of defendant, the opinions and conclusions reached as a result of the evaluation, and the facts and data upon which he relied in making his determinations. The substance of defendant\u2019s statements was not necessary to explain the testimony.\nAm Jur 2d, Criminal Law \u00a7 936; Expert and Opinion Evidence \u00a7\u00a7 228-230, 240.\n4. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 90 (NCI4th)\u2014 murder \u2014 defendant\u2019s statements to psychologist excluded \u2014 psychologist\u2019s opinion of confession\nThe exclusion of a murder defendant\u2019s statements to his psychologist did not deprive defendant of an expert witness in psychological testing and evaluation where the court permitted defense counsel to question the psychologist concerning his determinations of defendant\u2019s intellectual ability, problem solving abilities, and pattern of relationships. The court\u2019s ruling merely prohibited the expert from disclosing the substance of defendant\u2019s hearsay statements and from giving an opinion as to the validity or completeness of defendant\u2019s confession.\nAm Jur 2d, Expert and Opinion Evidence \u00a7\u00a7 41, 228-230, 240.\nAdmissibility of testimony of expert, as to basis of his opinion, to matters otherwise excludable as hearsay \u2014 state cases. 89 ALR4th 456.\n5. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 2152 (NCI4th)\u2014 murder \u2014 psychologist\u2019s opinion that confession incomplete \u2014 excluded\nThe trial court did not err by excluding a psychologist\u2019s proposed testimony regarding the completeness or validity of a murder defendant\u2019s confession. The psychologist was permitted to relate extensive findings from which the jury could have inferred that defendant\u2019s confession was incomplete, inaccurate, or invalid.\nAm Jur 2d, Expert and Opinion Evidence \u00a7 240.\n6. Evidence and Witnesses \u00a7 2302 (NCI4th)\u2014 murder \u2014 state of mind \u2014psychologist\u2019s opinion \u2014not admitted \u2014no prejudice\nThere was no prejudice in a murder prosecution where the court refused to permit a psychologist to give an opinion as to defendant\u2019s state of mind at the time of the shooting. State of mind evidence was presented and defendant failed to make an offer of proof.\nAm Jur 2d, Expert and Opinion Evidence \u00a7 359; Homicide \u00a7\u00a7 395, 406.\n7. Homicide \u00a7 28.6 (NCI3d|\u2014 murder by lying in wait \u2014 voluntary intoxication \u2014 refusal to instruct \u2014 no error\nVoluntary intoxication is irrelevant to a charge of first degree murder by lying in wait, a crime that does not require a finding of specific intent, because voluntary intoxication may only be considered as a defense in specific intent crimes.\nAm Jur 2d, Homicide \u00a7\u00a7 49, 127-129, 498, 517.\nModern status of rules as to voluntary intoxication as defense to criminal charge. 8 ALR3d 1236.\n8. Homicide \u00a7 28.6 (NCI3d)\u2014 murder \u2014voluntary intoxication\u2014 refusal to instruct \u2014no error\nThe evidence was insufficient to support an instruction on voluntary intoxication where the only evidence concerning defendant\u2019s alcohol and drug consumption was elicited from defendant on cross-examination by the State and the evidence presented in the case was insufficient to show that defendant was so intoxicated that he was incapable of forming the intent necessary to commit first degree premeditated and deliberated murder.\nAm Jur 2d, Homicide \u00a7\u00a7 498, 517.\nModern status of rules as to voluntary intoxication as defense to criminal charge. 8 ALR3d 1236.\n9. Homicide \u00a7 25 (NCI4th)\u2014 murder \u2014instruction on lying in wait \u2014 no error\nThe trial court did not err in a homicide prosecution by instructing the jury on murder by lying in wait'where the evidence showed that defendant armed himself with a .357 magnum, went to the victim\u2019s home and hid in a closet within the victim\u2019s bedroom, and fired three shots and killed the victim when he opened the closet door.\nAm Jur 2d, Homicide \u00a7\u00a7 49, 534.\n10. Homicide \u00a7 28.1 (NCI4th)\u2014 murder \u2014 imperfect self-defense\u2014 instruction not given \u2014 no error\nThe trial court did not err by refusing to instruct the jury on imperfect self-defense in a homicide prosecution where the uncontradicted evidence shows that the events leading to the shooting were initiated by defendant with murderous intent; defendant, by his own testimony, armed himself, went to the victim\u2019s house, and hid in the closet for the purpose of killing the victim; and defendant testified that he received $300 for the killing and was supposed to have received $40,000.\nAm Jur 2d, Homicide \u00a7 519.\nAPPEAL as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a) from a judgment imposing a sentence of life imprisonment entered by Gaines, J., at the 23 July 1990 Criminal Session of Superior Court, MECKLENBURG County, upon a jury verdict finding defendant guilty of first-degree murder. Defendant\u2019s motion to bypass the Court of Appeals as to his conviction of conspiracy to commit murder was allowed by this Court on 4 January 1991. Heard in the Supreme Court 15 November 1991.\nLacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General, by Tiare B. Smiley, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.\nJean B. Lawson for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0446-01", "first_page_order": 474, "last_page_order": 493 }