{ "id": 2511365, "name": "NORTH CAROLINA FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. LOUISE HOOKS STOX and GORDON OWENS", "name_abbreviation": "North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance v. Stox", "decision_date": "1992-01-27", "docket_number": "No. 124A91", "first_page": "697", "last_page": "711", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "330 N.C. 697" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "401 S.E.2d 82", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "101 N.C. App. 671", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8528032 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/101/0671-01" ] }, { "cite": "48 ALR3d 1096", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "72 ALR3d 1090", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "31 ALR4th 957", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "637 S.W.2d 655", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 9950134 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "657" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/637/0655-01" ] }, { "cite": "280 F. Supp. 60", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 2782190 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/280/0060-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 So. 2d 1030", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9732727 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/361/1030-01" ] }, { "cite": "510 F. Supp. 1198", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. 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App. 3d 617", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5539340 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/89/0617-01" ] }, { "cite": "298 Minn. 93", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Minn.", "case_ids": [ 314284 ], "weight": 10, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "95" }, { "page": "328" }, { "page": "98" }, { "page": "330" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/minn/298/0093-01" ] }, { "cite": "569 N.E.2d 906", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "907" }, { "page": "907" }, { "page": "911" }, { "page": "910-11" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "58 Ohio St. 3d 189", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ohio St. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1428730 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ohio-st-3d/58/0189-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 So. 2d 478", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9550468 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "480" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/407/0478-01" ] }, { "cite": "31 A.L.R.4th 957", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 S.E.2d 214", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "217" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 N.C. App. 461", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523150 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "464" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/62/0461-01" ] }, { "cite": "281 S.E.2d 652", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 315", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573123, 8573162, 8573104, 8573175, 8573144 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0315-02", "/nc/303/0315-04", "/nc/303/0315-01", "/nc/303/0315-05", "/nc/303/0315-03" ] }, { "cite": "277 S.E.2d 473", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "475" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 N.C. App. 654", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 2643753 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "657" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/51/0654-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 S.E.2d 368", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 338", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568288 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0338-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 S.E.2d 518", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561396 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "350 S.E.2d 66", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "68" }, { "page": "68" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 534", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4732740 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "538" }, { "page": "538" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0534-01" ] }, { "cite": "401 S.E.2d 82", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "85" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 N.C. App. 671", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8528032 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "675" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/101/0671-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1101, "char_count": 31900, "ocr_confidence": 0.776, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.610657022026404e-07, "percentile": 0.9618371573014488 }, "sha256": "e517fc4312bfbb59962ea7b93332c3b724e72dc73a9ec13a9a0bc7bf5db202f4", "simhash": "1:a3e4440a754fcffa", "word_count": 5215 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:55:04.423674+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "NORTH CAROLINA FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. LOUISE HOOKS STOX and GORDON OWENS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MITCHELL, Justice.\nThe plaintiff, North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company (Farm Bureau), brought this declaratory judgment action seeking a determination as to the proper construction of a homeowners insurance policy. The primary issue to be resolved in this appeal is whether liability for personal injuries suffered by the defendant Louise Hooks Stox, which occurred when she fell as the result of a push by the defendant Gordon Owens, is covered by a policy of homeowners liability insurance issued to Owens by Farm Bureau. We conclude that under the language of the policy in question, coverage is provided. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals, which held to the contrary, is reversed.\nAll parties to the present case waived trial by jury. Evidence was introduced before the trial court tending to show, inter alia, that on 20 May 1989, the defendant Stox, age seventy, received a severely fractured right arm as a result of a fall which occurred while she was working at a Roscoe-Griffin shoe store in Greenville. While another employee, the defendant Owens, age sixty-eight, was assisting a customer, Stox began speaking with the customer\u2019s mother. Owens was sitting on a stool in front of the customer, a few feet away from Stox. Owens got up, stepped toward Stox, placed his hands on her left shoulder and pushed her, while saying \u201cget away from here.\u201d This unexpected push caused Stox to lose her balance and fall, severely fracturing her right arm.\nStox was wearing shoes with heels at the time of the fall. Stox testified that had she been expecting the push to her shoulder, she could have braced herself for it and not fallen. No evidence tended to show that Stox experienced any pain or injury in the area where Owens put his hands on her shoulder. Owens testified at deposition that he did not intend to knock Stox to the floor or cause her any injury. Prior to 20 May 1989, Owens had never pushed or laid a hand upon Stox or any other employee of the store.\nOn 20 May 1989, Owens was insured under, a homeowners insurance policy issued by the plaintiff Farm Bureau which provided him liability coverage. The relevant portions of that policy provide:\nCOVERAGE E \u2014Personal Liability\nIf a claim is made or a suit is brought against an insured for damages because of bodily injury or property damage caused by an occurrence to which this coverage applies, we will:\n1. pay up to our limit of liability for the damages for which the insured is legally liable; and\n2. provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our choice, even if the suit is groundless, false or fraudulent. . . .\nDefinitions\n5. \u201coccurrence\u201d means an accident, including exposure to conditions, which results, during the policy period, in:\na. bodily injury; or\nb. property damage.\nSection II \u2014 Exclusions\nCoverage E \u2014Personal Liability and Coverage F \u2014Medical Payments to Others do not apply to bodily injury or property damage:\na. which is expected or intended by the insured;\nb. arising out of business pursuits of an insured or the rental or holding for rental of any part of any premises by an insured.\nThis exclusion does not apply to:\n(1) activities which are usual to non-business pursuits; ....\nBusiness is defined in the policy as \u201ctrade, profession, or occupation.\u201d\nAt the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court entered its Judgment and Order in which it made the following findings of fact:\n2. On May 20, 1989, Gordon Owens intentionally pushed Louise Stox, causing her to fall and receive injury.\n3. The pushing of Louise Stox by Gordon Owens involved foreseeable consequences of significant bodily injury.\n4. At the time Gordon Owens pushed Louise Stox, he had no specific intent to cause bodily injury to Louise Stox, and the injuries sustained by Louise Stox were the unintended result of an intentional act by Gordon Owens.\n5. Although the pushing incident occurred in an employment setting, the pushing incident did not occur as a result of Gordon Owens engaging in a business pursuit.\n6. The \u201cbusiness pursuit\u201d exclusion in Plaintiff\u2019s insurance policy and the exception to the exclusion are ambiguous.\nBased on its findings, the trial court entered the following conclusions of law:\n1. The pushing incident constituted an \u201coccurrence\u201d under the terms of the homeowners insurance policy issued by Plaintiff to Gordon Owens.\n2. The \u201cexpected or intended injury\u201d exclusion contained in the policy is inapplicable.\n3. The \u201cbusiness pursuit\u201d exclusion contained in the policy is inapplicable.\n4. In the alternative, if the pushing incident occurred as a result of Gordon Owens engaging in a business pursuit, the act of pushing Ms. Stox constituted an activity which was usual to a non-business pursuit under the exception to the \u201cbusiness pursuit\u201d exclusion.\n5. The policy of insurance issued by Plaintiff to Gordon Owens affords liability coverage to Gordon Owens for damages for which he becomes legally responsible because of the pushing incident involving Louise Stox, and which forms the basis of Pitt County Case ....\nBased on its findings and conclusions, the trial court ordered the plaintiff to pay any amount for which Owens became legally liable to Stox, up to the limit of liability of the homeowners insurance policy. The plaintiff appealed. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals concluded that the policy did not cover Owens\u2019 liability for Stox\u2019s injuries, because those injuries were excluded from coverage by the exclusion for \u201cexpected or intended\u201d injuries. For that reason the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court.\nWe conclude that there was competent evidence to support the trial court\u2019s findings of fact which, in turn, supported its conclusions of law that Stox\u2019s injuries were covered under the Farm Bureau policy. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.\nAt the outset, it is important to note that the rules of construction which govern the interpretation of insurance policy provisions extending coverage to the insured differ from the rules of construction governing policy provisions which exclude coverage. State Capital Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 318 N.C. 534, 538, 350 S.E.2d 66, 68 (1986). Those provisions in an insurance policy which extend coverage to the insured must be construed liberally so as to afford coverage whenever possible by reasonable construction. Id. However, the converse is true when interpreting the exclusionary provisions of a policy; exclusionary provisions are not favored and, if ambiguous, will be construed against the insurer and in favor of the insured. Id.; Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 276 N.C. 348, 172 S.E.2d 518 (1970).\nIt must also be remembered that on appellate review of a declaratory judgment, a trial court\u2019s findings of fact in a trial without a jury will be upheld if supported by any competent evidence. Williams v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 288 N.C. 338, 218 S.E.2d 368 (1975). This is true even when evidence to the contrary is present. Id. The function of an appellate court in reviewing declaratory judgments in such cases \u201cis, then, to determine whether the record contains competent evidence to support the findings; and whether the findings support the conclusions.\u201d Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Allison, 51 N.C. App. 654, 657, 277 S.E.2d 473, 475, disc. rev. denied, 303 N.C. 315, 281 S.E.2d 652 (1981). If the trial court\u2019s findings are supported by competent evidence and, in turn, support its conclusions, the declaratory judgment must be affirmed on appeal.\nWe first consider whether the policy\u2019s exclusion of \u201cbodily injury . . . which is expected or intended by the insured\u201d places Owens\u2019 liability for injury to Stox in the present case outside the coverage of the policy. The trial court found from competent evidence before it that, although Gordon Owens intentionally pushed Louise Stox, he had no specific intent to cause her injury. Thus, the injuries she sustained were \u201cthe unintended result of an intentional act.\u201d These findings supported the trial court\u2019s conclusion that \u201cthe \u2018expected or intended injury\u2019 exclusion contained in the policy is inapplicable.\u201d\nThe Court of Appeals, however, reversed the trial court, concluding that the present case was controlled by Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Mauldin, 62 N.C. App. 461, 303 S.E.2d 214 (1983). We disagree with the Court of Appeals and conclude that Commercial Union is not controlling. In Commercial Union, one of the defendants, Tommy Joe Wilmoth, drove up beside a car occupied by his wife and Kay Mauldin Pugh. After arguing with his wife for a moment, Wilmoth pulled out a .38 caliber pistol and fired four or five shots into Pugh\u2019s car. The shots killed Pugh and injured Wilmoth\u2019s wife. Wilmoth pled guilty to the second-degree murder of Pugh, and stipulated that he had intended to shoot and injure his wife but not Pugh. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court\u2019s holding that Wilmoth\u2019s actions in shooting Pugh were excluded from coverage under his homeowners policy by the \u201cexpected or intended injury\u201d exclusion.\nIn the present case, the Court of Appeals put misplaced reliance on Commercial Union and focused on the intentional nature of the act rather than the resulting injury. The Court of Appeals stated that \u201c[w]hile there might well have been no specific intent to injure [Stox], the focus must be on the intentional act not the resulting consequence.\u201d N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Stox, 101 N.C. App. 671, 675, 401 S.E.2d 82, 85 (1991). Under the rules of construction which govern this exclusionary provision in the Farm Bureau homeowners policy, we disagree with the Court of Appeals and conclude that it is the resulting injury, not merely the volitional act, which must be intended for this exclusion to apply.\nCommercial Union involved a situation in which the insured fired four or five bullets into an occupied car at close range. The insured stipulated that he had the specific intent to shoot and injure his wife, and he pled guilty to the second-degree murder of Pugh. Thus, he obviously knew it was probable that he would injure Pugh when he fired four or five shots into her moving car. Commercial Union, 62 N.C. App. at 464, 303 S.E.2d at 217. Stated otherwise, through the insured\u2019s actions and admissions, the injury to Pugh was established to have been \u201cintended\u201d within the meaning of that term as used in the insurance policy.\nIn the present case, we encounter a different situation. Here, the insured intended the act, but competent evidence supported the trial court\u2019s finding that he did not intend to cause bodily injury. Owens testified he had no intent to injure Stox when he intentionally pushed her. Stox also testified that she did not believe Owens pushed her with the intent to injure her. The trial court was not required to find an intent to injure from evidence showing a mere push to the left shoulder which left no soreness or sign of injury \u2014 evidence entirely unlike the violent firing of bullets into an occupied car at close range.\nWe have focused on the language of the policy exclusion in dispute and have found no other North Carolina case interpreting this exact language. However, provisions contained in homeowner policies excluding expected or intended injuries have been the subject of extensive case law in other jurisdictions. See James L. Rigethaupt, Jr., Annotation, Construction and Application of Provision of Liability Insurance Policy Expressly Excluding Injuries Intended or Expected By Insured, 31 A.L.R.4th 957 (1984). Our interpretation of the provision in the policy before us is consistent with the majority rule that has emerged from the case law on this issue in other jurisdictions.\nIn Kling v. Collins, 407 So. 2d 478 (La. App. 1981), the Louisiana Court of Appeal, First Circuit, interpreted a similar exclusionary provision. In that case, Collins and Ms. Kling harbored ill feelings for each other. Id. at 480. While visiting Collins\u2019 home, Kling began shouting and making gestures towards Collins. Id. Collins then shoved Kling in an effort to make her leave his house. Id. As a result of the shove, Kling fell to the floor and sustained a wrist injury. Id. The Court affirmed the decision of the trial court that the exclusion was inapplicable because, though Collins intended to push Kling, the bodily injury was neither intended nor expected by the insured. Id. The Court explained that \u201c[t]he exclusionary clause sought to be enforced herein does not preclude liability for an expected or intended \u2018act\u2019 but rather for an expected or intended \u2018injury\u2019.\u201d Id. at. 481.\nMore recently, in Physicians Insurance Co. v. Swanson, 58 Ohio St. 3d 189, 569 N.E.2d 906 (1991), the insured, a teenage boy, shot a BB gun at a group of teenagers approximately seventy to one hundred feet away. Id. at 189, 569 N.E.2d at 907. According to the testimony of the insured, he was aiming at a sign ten to fifteen feet above the group to scare them. Id. Unfortunately, one of the BBs struck one of the teenagers in the right eye causing him to lose that eye. Id. at 190, 569 N.E.2d at 907. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the exclusion for bodily injury which is \u201cexpected or intended\u201d by the insured was inapplicable. Id. at 193, 569 N.E.2d at 911. The Court reasoned:\n[I]n order for an exclusion of this nature to apply, an insurer must demonstrate not only that the insured intended the act, but also that he intended to cause harm or injury. The rationale for this rule of law is twofold. First, the plain language of the policy is in terms of an intentional or expected injury, not an intentional or expected act. Were we to allow the argument that only an intentional act is required, we would in effect be rewriting the policy. Second, . . . many injuries result from intentional acts, although the injuries themselves are wholly unintentional.\nId. at 193, 569 N.E.2d at 910-11.\nFurther support for our conclusion in the present case is found in Caspersen v. Webber, 298 Minn. 93, 213 N.W.2d 327 (1973). There, the Supreme Court of Minnesota interpreted a similar exclusionary provision which excluded \u201cbodily injury . . . caused intentionally or at the direction of the insured.\u201d The insured went to the cloak checkroom in a restaurant but was unable to find his claim check. Id. at 95, 213 N.W.2d at 328. He asked the plaintiff, a hatcheck attendant, for permission to enter the checkroom. Id. The plaintiff objected but the insured proceeded to enter anyway. Id. The plaintiff attempted to block the insured\u2019s passage into the checkroom, and the insured proceeded to push her aside. Id. This caused the plaintiff to lose her balance and fall, striking her back against a metal message rack on the wall. Id. The Court concluded that the exclusion did not apply where the act itself was intended but the resulting injury was not. Id. at 98, 213 N.W.2d at 330.\nSimilarly, in the case at bar, the trial court found that while the insured intentionally pushed Louise Stox, the injuries sustained were the unintended result of the intentional act. We find competent evidence to support these findings in the record. The character of the insured\u2019s act did not rise to the level which would require that an intention to inflict an injury be inferred. Therefore we conclude that in order to avoid coverage on the basis of the exclusion for expected or intended injuries in the insurance policy at issue in this case, the insurer must prove that the injury itself was expected or intended by the insured. Merely showing the act was intentional will not suffice.\nThe plaintiff Farm Bureau argues that Stox will be limited in her tort action against Owens to the theory of recovery she alleged in her complaint, assault and battery. Therefore, the plaintiff reasons, Owens will be found liable in that action, if at all, only for intended injuries. The plaintiff primarily relies here on Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Freyer, 89 Ill. App. 3d 617, 411 N.E.2d 1157 (1980), where a tort action for assault and battery was filed against the defendant insured for beating a woman with his fists causing bruises, a black eye, and other injury. In Freyer, the injured woman alleged that the acts were \u201cwanton, willful and malicious on the part of the defendant.\u201d Id. at 619, 411 N.E.2d at 1158. The Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fourth Division found that \u201cmalice\u201d was specifically alleged in the action and was defined under Illinois law as an intent to do harmful injury. Id. at 622, 411 N.E.2d at 1161. The Court stated, \u201cThus it is clear that in alleging that malice was the gist of both causes of action, the tort plaintiff was alleging that the insured intended to injure the tort plaintiff.\u201d Id.\nStox merely alleged in her tort action that Owens \u201cwillfully committed an assault.\u201d No allegation of malice was put forth by Stox, and she testified in this declaratory judgment action that she did not believe Owens had any intent to injure her when he pushed her. Still, the plaintiff Farm Bureau urges that under North Carolina law, an intent to injure is inherent in every tort action involving an assault or battery. We disagree. This Court has stated, \u201cthe interest protected by the action for battery is freedom from intentional and unpermitted contact with one\u2019s person; the interest protected by the action for assault is freedom from apprehension of a harmful or offensive contact with one\u2019s person.\u201d Dickens v. Puryear, 302 N.C. 437, 445, 276 S.E.2d 325, 330 (1981) (emphasis added); see also Prosser, Law of Torts \u00a7\u00a7 9, 10 (5th ed. 1984) (hereinafter \u201cProsser\u201d). Further, Dean Prosser has stated that \u201c[t]he intent with which tort liability is concerned is not necessarily a hostile intent, or a desire to do any harm. Rather it is an intent to bring about a.result which will invade the interests of another in a way that the law forbids.\u201d Prosser, \u00a7 8, p. 34. We conclude that an allegation of an intent to injure was not inherent in Stox\u2019s assault and battery tort complaint.\nWe have allowed the plaintiff Farm Bureau\u2019s petition to bring forward additional issues for our review. Under its first issue, Farm Bureau contends that Owens\u2019 act was not a covered \u201coccurrence\u201d or \u201caccident\u201d under the terms of its homeowners policy in question. The policy provides coverage for \u201cbodily injury . . . caused by an occurrence.\u201d \u201cOccurrence\u201d is defined as \u201can accident, including exposure to conditions, which results, during the policy period, in . . . bodily injury.\u201d The term \u201caccident\u201d is not defined anywhere in the policy. The trial court found that at the time Gordon Owens pushed Louise Stox, he had no specific intent to cause bodily injury to Louise Stox, and the injuries sustained by Louise Stox were the unintended result of an intentional act by Gordon Owens. The trial court then concluded from those findings that \u201cthe pushing incident constituted an \u2018occurrence\u2019 under the terms of the homeowners insurance policy issued by Plaintiff to Gordon Owens.\u201d\nAgain, we are guided by established rules of construction for interpreting provisions of insurance policies. Provisions, such as the one in question, \u201cwhich extend coverage must be construed liberally so as to provide coverage, whenever possible by reasonable construction.\u201d State Capital Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 318 N.C. at 538, 350 S.E.2d at 68. It is also well settled that when an insurance policy contains no ambiguity, it shall be construed according to its terms, but when ambiguity exists the policy shall be construed in favor of coverage and against the insurer who selected its language. Jamestown Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 266 N.C. 430, 430, 146 S.E.2d 410, 410 (1966).\nIn Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. Fred M. Simmons, Inc., 258 N.C. 69, 128 S.E.2d 19 (1962), this Court was required to interpret the term \u201caccident\u201d where it was not defined in a liability insurance policy. We focused on various accepted definitions of the term \u201caccident\u201d and cited with approval Webster\u2019s definition of \u201c \u2018an event that takes place without one\u2019s foresight or expectation; and [sic] undesigned, sudden, and unexpected event; chance; contingency.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 74, 128 S.E.2d at 22 (quoting Lacey v. Washburn & Williams Co., 309 Pa. 574, 577, 164 A. 724, 725 (1932)). We also noted in Simmons, that an element of carelessness or negligence probably enters into most accidents. Id. at 75, 128 S.E.2d at 23 (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Little, 146 Ark. 70, 225 S.W. 298 (1920)).\nIn the present case, the plaintiff argues that the defendant Stox\u2019s injuries resulted from the intentional acts of the defendant Owens and therefore could not be covered as an \u201coccurrence\u201d or \u201caccident\u201d under the terms of the homeowners policy. We disagree. In choosing not to define the term \u201caccident\u201d in its policy, the plaintiff Farm Bureau left its interpretation open and subject to ambiguities. As our rules of construction dictate, all ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the insured. We have found no North Carolina case on point; however, other jurisdictions have found an unintended injury resulting from an intentional act to be a covered \u201coccurrence\u201d or \u201caccident\u201d under homeowners insurance policies.\nIn Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Blakeney, 340 So. 2d 754 (Ala. 1976), the Supreme Court of Alabama held that an insured\u2019s intentional pushing of a guest out of a doorway in his house, which resulted in serious brain damage when the guest hit his head on the ground, was a covered \u201coccurrence\u201d or \u201caccident\u201d under the policy. Id. at 754. The Court upheld the jury\u2019s finding that there was coverage under the policy. Id. In the process, the Court upheld the trial court\u2019s jury charge which stated: \u201cIt is an accidental injury where an unexpected result arises from an intended act.\u201d Id. at 755.\nIn Quincy Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Abernathy, 393 Mass. 81, 469 N.E.2d 797 (1984), the insured, a sixteen-year-old boy, admitted to intentionally throwing a large piece of blacktop at a passing car. Id. at 82, 469 N.E.2d at 798. The rock shattered the window on the driver\u2019s side of the car, causing the driver to sustain facial cuts. It then traveled to the rear seat where it struck a passenger in the forehead, fracturing her skull. Id. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed the trial court\u2019s granting of summary judgment for the insurer. Id. at 88, 469 N.E.2d at 802. The Court held that \u201cthe resulting injury which ensues from the volitional act of an insured is still an \u2018accident\u2019 within the meaning of an insurance policy if the insured does not specifically intend to cause the resulting harm or is not substantially certain that such harm will occur.\u201d Id. at 84, 469 N.E.2d at 799.\nWe conclude that where the term \u201caccident\u201d is not specifically defined in an insurance policy, that term does include injury resulting from an intentional act, if the injury is not intentional or substantially certain to be the result of the intentional act. Competent evidence supported the trial court\u2019s finding in the case sub judice that the injury to Stox was an unintended injury resulting from Owens\u2019 intentional act. Therefore, the trial court correctly concluded from that finding that Owens\u2019 liability, if any, for that injury was covered under the policy as an \u201coccurrence\u201d or \u201caccident.\u201d\nFinally, the plaintiff Farm Bureau contends that the defendant Stox\u2019s injury arose out of a \u201cbusiness pursuit\u201d of the defendant Owens and, for that reason, is excluded from coverage under the policy. The provision the plaintiff relies upon here excludes coverage for bodily injury \u201carising out of the business pursuits of an insured.\u201d The policy defines \u201cbusiness\u201d as \u201ctrade, profession or occupation.\u201d The policy also contains an exception to the \u201cbusiness pursuits\u201d exclusion, however, which causes the exclusion not to apply to \u201cactivities which are usual to non-business pursuits.\u201d The trial court determined that \u201c[t]he \u2018business pursuit\u2019 exclusion in Plaintiff\u2019s insurance policy and the exception to the exclusion are ambiguous.\u201d The trial court concluded:\nThe \u201cbusiness pursuit\u201d exclusion contained in the policy is inapplicable. 4. In the alternative, if the pushing incident occurred as a result of Gordon Owens engaging in a business pursuit, the act of pushing Ms. Stox constituted an activity which was usual to a non-business pursuit under the exception to the \u201cbusiness pursuit\u201d exclusion.\nWe agree with the trial court that the \u201cbusiness pursuits\u201d exclusion and the exception to that exclusion are ambiguous. Applying established rules of construction, these ambiguities must .be construed against the insurance company and in favor of coverage. Further, even assuming arguendo that the defendant Owens was engaged in a \u201cbusiness pursuit\u201d at the time he pushed Stox, a reasonable construction of the exception to that exclusion renders Owens\u2019 act of pushing Stox \u201can activity which is usual to non-business pursuits\u201d and affords coverage.\nThough no North Carolina decision has interpreted the exact exclusion and exception involved here, decisions from other jurisdictions have found such provisions ambiguous. In Myrtil v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 510 F. Supp. 1198 (E.D. Pa. 1981), an insured restaurant owner held a party for employees and business-related guests of the restaurant. Id. at 1200. The son-in-law of an employee dove into a canal adjacent to the property and was seriously and permanently injured. Id. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania concluded that while the injury was associated with the insured\u2019s business pursuit, her party, it arose from an activity which ordinarily would be incident to non-business pursuits and was covered under her insurance policy. Id. at 1202. The Court noted that the provisions had been the subject of extensive litigation, with many courts finding the language of the exclusion ambiguous. Id.; see Stanley v. American Fire and Casualty Co., 361 So. 2d 1030 (Ala. 1978); Gulf Ins. Co. v. Tilley, 280 F. Supp. 60 (N.D. Ind. 1967). The Court stated that \u201cintelligent people for years have differed in their interpretation of the business pursuits clause and divergent results have been reached as a consequence. If reasonably intelligent people differ as to the meaning of a policy provision, ambiguity exists.\u201d Id.\nAlso, in Foster v. Allstate Insurance Co., 637 S.W.2d 655 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981), the Court of Appeals of Kentucky interpreted a similar business pursuits exclusion as it related to an accident in the insured\u2019s home while she was babysitting. The Court found the business pursuits exclusion and the exception ambiguous, stating:\n[T]he exception provision contained in the exclusion leaves some doubt as to its meaning, and it is clearly susceptible to two reasonable interpretations, one of which would be favorable to the insured and one which would not. In such a case, the law in this Commonwealth is that the interpretation favorable to the insured will be adopted.\nId. at 657.\nThe pushing of Stox by Owens in the present case may reasonably be viewed as usual to \u201cnon-business\u201d pursuits within the meaning of the insurance policy in question. Under well established rules of construction governing insurance policies, this interpretation which affords coverage must be adopted, as all exclusionary provisions are strictly construed against the insurer.\nThe trial court\u2019s findings were supported by competent evidence and, in turn, supported its conclusions and its Judgment and Order. Therefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and this case is remanded to that court for further remand to the Superior Court, Pitt County, for reinstatement of the trial court\u2019s Judgment and Order affording coverage under the policy.\nReversed and remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "MITCHELL, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Speight, Watson and Brewer, by James M. Stanley, Jr., for the plaintiff-appellee.", "Ward and Smith, P.A., by A. Charles Ellis, for the defendant-appellant Stox." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "NORTH CAROLINA FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. LOUISE HOOKS STOX and GORDON OWENS\nNo. 124A91\n(Filed 27 January 1992)\n1. Insurance \u00a7 149 (NCI3d)\u2014 homeowners insurance \u2014 exclusion for expected or intended bodily injury\nIn order for the exclusion in a homeowners policy for bodily injury which is \u201cexpected or intended by the insured\u201d to apply, it is insufficient for the insurer to show only that the act was intentional; rather, the insurer must prove that the injury itself was expected or intended by the insured. Therefore, the exclusion did not apply where the insured intentionally pushed a co-worker on the shoulder, causing her to fall and sustain injuries, and competent evidence supported the trial court\u2019s finding that the insured did not intend to cause bodily injury to the co-worker.\nAm Jur 2d, Insurance \u00a7\u00a7 708, 709.\nConstruction and application of provision of liability insurance policy expressly excluding injuries intended or expected by insured. 31 ALR4th 957.\n2. Insurance \u00a7 149 (NCI3d)\u2014 homeowners insurance \u2014assault and battery action \u2014intent to injure not inherent \u2014 exclusion inapplicable\nAn allegation of intent to injure was not inherent in the injured party\u2019s assault and battery tort complaint against the insured so as to render applicable the \u201cexpected or intended\u201d bodily injury exclusion in the insured\u2019s homeowners policy.\nAm Jur 2d, Insurance \u00a7\u00a7 708, 709.\nConstruction and application of provision of liability insurance policy expressly excluding injuries intended or expected by insured. 31 ALR4th 957.\n3. Insurance \u00a7\u00a7 45, 149 (NCI3d) \u2014 homeowners insurance\u2014 accident \u2014 injury from intentional act\nWhere the term \u201caccident\u201d is not specifically defined in an insurance policy, that term includes injury resulting from an intentional act if the injury is not intentional or substantially certain to be the result of the intentional act. Therefore, the trial court correctly concluded that the insured\u2019s liability, if any, for an unintended injury to a co-worker resulting from the insured\u2019s intentional act of pushing the co-worker was covered under the insured\u2019s homeowners policy as an \u201coccurrence\u201d or \u201caccident.\u201d\nAm Jur 2d, Insurance \u00a7\u00a7 708, 709.\nLiability insurance: assault as an \u201caccident,\u201d or injuries therefrom as \u201caccidentally\u201d sustained, within coverage clause. 72 ALR3d 1090.\n4. Insurance \u00a7 149 (NCI3d|\u2014 homeowners insurance \u2014 business pursuits exclusion \u2014 exception \u2014 ambiguity \u2014 construction\nThe \u201cbusiness pursuits\u201d exclusion in a homeowners policy and the exception to that exclusion for \u201cactivities which are usual to non-business pursuits\u201d are ambiguous, and these ambiguities must be construed against the insurance company and in favor of coverage.\nAm Jur 2d, Insurance \u00a7 727.\nConstruction and application of \u201cbusiness pursuits\u201d exclusion provision in general liability policy. 48 ALR3d 1096.\n5. Insurance \u00a7 149 (NCI3d)\u2014 homeowners insurance \u2014 business pursuits exclusion \u2014 pushing of co-worker \u2014 exception for usual nonbusiness activities\nAssuming that the insured was engaged in a \u201cbusiness pursuit\u201d at the time he pushed a co-worker within the meaning of the \u201cbusiness pursuits\u201d exclusion of a homeowners policy, the insured\u2019s act of pushing the co-worker came within the exception to the \u201cbusiness pursuits\u201d exclusion for \u201cactivities which are usual to non-business pursuits.\u201d\nAm Jur 2d, Insurance \u00a7 727.\nConstruction and application of \u201cbusiness pursuits\u201d exclusion provision in general liability policy. 48 ALR3d 1096.\nAPPEAL by the defendant Stox pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-30(2) from a decision by a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 101 N.C. App. 671, 401 S.E.2d 82 (1991), reversing the judgment and order entered by Watts, J., on 9 April 1990 in Superior Court, PITT County. The plaintiff\u2019s petition for discretionary review of additional issues was allowed by the Supreme Court. Heard in the Supreme Court on 12 November 1991.\nSpeight, Watson and Brewer, by James M. Stanley, Jr., for the plaintiff-appellee.\nWard and Smith, P.A., by A. Charles Ellis, for the defendant-appellant Stox." }, "file_name": "0697-01", "first_page_order": 725, "last_page_order": 739 }